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ABSTRACT
Perceived connections between security concerns and migration are a central preoccupation of our
time. This dissertation explores how the preoccupation has played out in the Canadian context and
asserts that a basic and common infirmity of administrative decision-making in this domain is a
lack of justification. The dissertation commences by exploring foundational debates within
immigration theory about borders, exclusion, the rule of law and the role of justification in decisionmaking in liberal democracies, particularly in times of perceived emergency. From there, the
dissertation moves on to an exploration of immigration inadmissibility determinations in Canada,
with particular attention to the emergence of security concerns as a primary ground of
inadmissibility.
Central to this exploration is a quantitative analysis of inadmissibility
determinations rendered by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, pursuant to s34 of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA].
The results of the quantitative analysis challenge the perception that migrants within Canada pose
an exceptional security threat to the state, as the provisions related directly to Canadian national
security and public safety have essentially never been invoked in s34 cases. Rather, the majority of
those found inadmissible to Canada on security grounds tend to be asylum-seekers or Convention
refugees from countries of the Global South that have undergone periods of domestic political
turmoil. This fact raises important questions about the obligations of the Canadian state with
respect to the principle of non-refoulement, obligations that can only be met, it is argued, through
appropriately deliberative processes.
To help explain the results of the quantitative data and to identify ways of enhancing securityrelated decision making, the dissertation proceeds to a body of scholarship on international law
that places the concerns of individuals from the Global South at the centre of its analysis. This
approach – referred to as the Third World Approaches to International Law movement (TWAIL) –
emphasizes the importance of history, context and individual experience when confronting legal
domains, such as the security-inadmissibility context, that affect people from the Global South.
The dissertation then concludes by pairing the TWAIL analysis with an approach to administrative
law that posits that legitimacy and justification in administrative decisions are contingent upon
good faith exercises of dialogue between decision-makers and those who are affected by their
decisions. In combining this approach to administrative law with TWAIL, the dissertation closes by
putting forward a number of proposals for reform that would enhance the quality, justification and
legitimacy of decisions in the security-inadmissibility context.
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INTRODUCTION
On a snowy day in February, 2010, Habtom Kibreab a young and well-liked
refugee claimant living in Halifax, Nova Scotia walked to the woods in Clayton Park
and took his life. He was scheduled for an interview the next day with the Canada
Border Services Agency to discuss arrangements for his removal to Eritrea, where
he firmly believed he would immediately be placed before a firing squad. In the
days before his suicide, Canadian authorities had found Habtom to be inadmissible
to Canada for his participation in an organization that sought Eritrea’s liberation
from what was universally recognized as a shockingly oppressive Ethiopian regime.
Almost three years later in December, 2012, Hossein Blujani, another young and
by all accounts equally liked man walked to the railroad tracks near Vancouver’s
downtown eastside and also committed suicide. Despite what was described as
Hossein’s “compelling” and “credible” testimony about his coerced childhood
recruitment into an Iranian opposition group and despite a finding by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that he was a Convention refugee, the
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board found that he was a member of a terrorist
organization and ordered him to be deported.
Hossein and Habtom were from different continents and they settled in opposite
ends of their adopted country.

In between these differences, however, their

narratives followed remarkably similar, and similarly tragic, arcs. Both men came
from fractured societies. Both experienced the dislocation of conflict and a palpable
fear of persecution in their homelands. Both became associated with armed groups
that sought to displace undemocratic and repressive regimes. Both men were
survivors, having traversed thousands of kilometres, many countries and
considerable danger to arrive in a place where they thought they would find peace
and safety. But they were both mistaken. Upon arrival in Canada, Hossein and
Habtom were flagged as potential security threats. They were interrogated and
1

cross-examined. Their past actions were scrutinized and while no allegations were
ever made that either of them personally took part in activities giving rise to
security concerns, both were ultimately deemed inadmissible to Canada because of
their affiliations with their respective groups. Confronted with this reality, both
Hossein and Habtom chose to take control of their demise, rather than ceding it to
either their country of supposed refuge, or the despotic regimes to which they
feared they would be returned.
Hossein and Habtom’s stories are at the very heart of this dissertation, in which I
examine perceived connections between migration and security, with particular
reference to the Canadian legal landscape. In the pages that follow, I first examine
the role of migration in Western states and trace the ways in which it has always
occupied an exceptional legal category in liberal legal regimes. In doing so, I briefly
descend into one of the central debates that has dominated discussions amongst
migration scholars for the past thirty years – that is, whether acts of outsider
exclusion are constitutive of or in conflict with liberal first principles.

More

specifically, I examine the work of Joseph Carens who has long argued that, from a
moral perspective, most restrictions on the movement of peoples sit in tension with
universalist liberal ideals of equality. I contrast Carens’ position with the work of
others, namely John Rawls and Michael Walzer, whose well-known ideas are
premised on the notion of closed communities.

Along the way, I also devote

considerable attention to other scholars, most notably Seyla Benhabib and
Catherine Dauvergne, both of whom have forged their own responses to the
question of how liberal states respond to the rule of law challenges posed by noncitizens.
Moving on to the question of security, I next consider the scholarship of those
who query whether, and how, rule of law principles can be upheld, particularly by
administrative law bodies, in times of perceived emergency. Drawing on Catherine
Dauvergne’s observations about the securitization of migration, I then examine the
2

contributions of David Dyzenhaus, who recognizes that exceptional approaches to
administrative law – that is, approaches that are inconsistent with important rule of
law principles – exist, but rejects the notion that they are either necessary or
ordained. The challenge, for Dyzenhaus, is in fact to banish such “grey holes”, as he
calls them, from the legal order. Others, including Adrian Vermuele, insist that
Dyzenhaus’ challenge is in fact a Sisyphean one, doomed to failure because
administrative law, in its proximity and subordination to the executive, is always
susceptible to raw expressions of executive power, particularly during periods of
perceived exception.
I do not pretend to emerge from these debates having resolved them. While
attracted to Caren’s application of liberal egalitarian principles to the realm of
migration, there can be little debate that exclusionary impulses have defined liberal
democracies, as they have virtually every other political tradition.

While

understanding the nature of the equality-exclusion debate is central to
understanding immigration law, I extricate myself from the impasse of these
competing views by noting that essentially all approaches view as permissible, and
perhaps inevitable, the exclusion of those who threaten the security of the very
community that they seek to join. And as the principal focus of this dissertation is
not on migration itself, but rather on the intersections between migration and
security, I note in this first chapter that any problems in the security domain are not
necessarily with the concept of security itself, but with the decision-making
processes carried out in its name.
With this in mind, in the second chapter I look to the example of Canadian
migration law, its history of exclusion on various grounds and its growing concern
with matters related to security. I refer to the current migration-security regime as
a telling example of Dyzenhaus’ legal grey holes, given the extraordinary breadth of
the security-inadmissibility apparatus. I also suggest that this grey hole is one of
increasing concern given a surge in security cases over recent years. Moving from
3

the general to the particular, I then examine data that I have collected over the past
four years on security related inadmissibility decisions rendered by the Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada. More specifically, I look at the decisions rendered by
the Board pursuant to s34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,1 which
renders inadmissible those found to have engaged in espionage, subversion or
terrorism, those found to be members of organizations that engage in such activities
and those found to constitute a threat to Canadian security. While the numbers of
security cases may not, at first blush, appear high, they are nevertheless significant
when considering the stakes involved and the individual impacts that these
proceedings have, as most troublingly illustrated by the experiences of Habtom and
Hossein.
In analyzing the data, four important facts became apparent: 1) there has been a
sharp increase in security-related inadmissibility cases over recent years; 2) the
cases predominantly involve those who have asserted a fear of persecution in their
countries of origin or have already been found to be Convention refugees; 3) the
cases almost exclusively relate to individuals, like Habtom and Hossein, whose
impugned activities involved membership in locally oriented struggles in the Third
World, typically against oppressive regimes; and 4) no cases involved allegations of
actual security threats against Canada. The analysis of the data in this chapter
provides an empirical sketch of the problem that I seek to address in this
dissertation. The problem, as I see it, relates to an overly expansive security regime
that produces at best arbitrary, but at worst prejudicial outcomes against
individuals from the developing world, most of whom assert a fear of persecution in
their countries of origin. Given that Canada is a signatory to the Refugee Convention
and further considering that the Canadian security scheme can result in the removal
of Convention refugees, the importance of this topic comes into sharp focus, for it
directly implicates one of Canada’s core international human rights obligations. In

1

SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
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the remainder of the dissertation, I explore two distinct areas of legal inquiry –
emanating from international law and administrative law – that I argue could help
to reconcile concerns over security with respect for the core rights of non-citizens.
Having empirically outlined how the security-inadmissibility process appears
skewed against those who have taken part in discrete conflicts in the Global South,
in the third chapter, I move on to examine the relevance of international law to
inadmissibility determinations. In doing so, I assert that a reoriented conception of
this area of law – more specifically, a Third World conception of international law –
could assist decision-makers in separating legitimate security threats from those
whose life circumstances merely situated them closely to armed conflicts. The
burgeoning Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement
emphasises several themes that I argue would facilitate improved decision-making
in the security sphere – these include a focus on historical processes, a related
emphasis on context and an orientation towards examining the ways that law
affects individual lives, particularly those from the Global South.
In the fourth, and final, substantive chapter of the dissertation I take a step away
from international law and focus instead on domestic administrative law principles,
with a view to understanding how the process of administrative discretion could
help to implement some of the substance behind my earlier TWAIL critique of the
inadmissibility regime.

I do this by first examining applicable principles of

administrative law, exploring the emergence of, and controversies surrounding,
discretion as a key tool in the modern state. In short, these controversies revolve
around the key question of whether discretion amounts to a lawless space in need of
constant corralling by the judiciary, or whether it is an important regulatory feature
of the administrative state, one that can bring nuance to the sometimes blunt force
of the law.

5

Once again, I do not necessarily view it as my task to resolve this question.
Referring back to the first chapter, I note that discretion will likely always factor
into migration law, particularly on matters of security, which governments view as
requiring wide latitude in confronting. If discretion is here to stay, the question
becomes how it should be wielded and it is on this question that I devote
considerable attention.

I do this by exploring and applying the work of scholars

who have articulated a conception of administrative discretion as a communicative
process based on principles of dialogue.

These scholars do not dispute that

discretionary power emanates from the executive or question that there is
frequently a considerable power imbalance in discretionary relationships. They
suggest, however, that for discretionary decisions to be legitimate, they must be
democratically legitimate. And democratic legitimacy, in turn, requires that those
individuals who are affected by state decisions be afforded meaningful forms of
engagement in the decision-making process. Bringing this back around to the
security context, I first expose, in part through the narratives of individuals subject
to the inadmissibility regime, how the current regime is one largely devoid of
genuinely dialogical principles. The process in its current state is a classic example
of a top-down projection of power over individual lives.
I then argue that a reformulated and dialogical approach to discretion in the
security context would, by almost necessary implication, incorporate many of the
TWAIL principles that I outlined in the previous chapter. In the process, I conclude,
security-related decisions would shed much of their prejudice, replacing it instead
with a nuance and legitimacy that they currently lack.
I view this dissertation as being situated in, and contributing to three distinct
areas of legal inquiry. The first relates to the burgeoning literature on security and
migration, specifically in the Canadian context.

In the years since 2001, the

6

increased preoccupation with terrorism has been accompanied by a corresponding
increase in commentary on the intersections between migration law and security.2
In Canada, this commentary has tended to focus on either the security certificate
regime created under the IRPA3 or on the application of the exclusion clauses of the
1951 Refugee Convention to domestic refugee determination.4

The security

certificate regime engages extraordinary powers of detention and the use of secret
evidence. It is a matter of serious concern for both academics and practitioners,
particularly given the ways in which it defines the contours of state power at its
outer limits. This said, while the constitutionality of the security certificate regime
has been winding its way up and down the courts for over a decade, it has been
applied to a mere five individuals since 2001 and has not been invoked since a

For an important recent contribution to this commentary, see the special issue of the Queen’s Law
Journal entitled “Crimmigration, Surveillance and Security Threats” edited by Sharryn J. Aiken, David
Lyon and Malcolm Bruce Thorburn: (2014) 40 Queen’s Law Journal 1. See also Idil Atak and François
Crépeau, “National Security, Terrorism and the Securitisation of Migration” in Chetail, Vincent and
Céline Bauloz, Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (London: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2014); Sharryn J. Aiken, “Of Gods and Monsters: National Security and Canadian Refugee
Policy” (2001) 14 Revue Québécoise de droit international 1. See also François Crépeau & Delphine
Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada - Reconciling Security Concerns with Human Rights
Protection, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1516626 and Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration
(New York: Routledge, 2011). For an important contribution rooted primarily in the realm of
international political sociology, see Elspeth Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century
(Cambridge: Polity, 2009).
3 IRPA, ss 76-87.2.
The security certificate process is invoked in relation to allegations of
inadmissibility under ss34-37. It is not an entirely different inadmissibility regime, but rather
engages a separate decision-making process in respect of inadmissibility cases deemed to be of
particular concern from a national security perspective. For examples of the literature see: James
Stribopoulos, “Charkaoui: Beyond Anti-Terrorism, Procedural Fairness, and Section 7 of the Charter”
(2007) 16 Const Forum 15; Colleen Bell, “Subject to Exception: Security Certificates, National
Security and Canada’s Role in the War on Terror” (2006) 21 Can J Law Soc 63; Kent Roach,
“Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and Dialogue between Courts
and Legislatures” (2008) 42 Supreme Court Law Review 281; Hamish Stewart, “Is Indefinite
Detention of Terrorist Suspects Really Constitutional?” (2005) 54 Univ New Brunswick LJ 235; Rob
Aitken, “Notes on the Canadian exception: security certificates in critical context” (2008) 12:4
Citizenship Studies 381.
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, UNTS 189 [Refugee Convention]. See
Asha Kaushal & Catherine Dauvergne, “The Growing Culture of Exclusion: Trends in Canadian
Refugee Exclusions” (2011) 23:1 Int J Refug Law 54; James Simeon, “Complicity and Culpability and
the Exclusion of Terrorists From Convention Refugee Status Post-9/11” (2010) 29 Refugee Survey
Quarterly 104; Joseph Rikhof, “Complicity in International Criminal Law and Canadian Refugee Law”
(2006) J of Int’l Criminal Justice 702; Pia Zambelli, “Problematic Trends in the Analysis of State
Protection and Article 1F (a) Exclusion in Canadian Refugee Law” (2011) 23 Int’l J of Refugee Law
252.
2
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certificate was issued against Adil Charkaoui in 2003. By contrast, and as we shall
see in the second chapter, the security-related inadmissibility regime has been
invoked with much greater, and increasing, frequency over the past decade. Yet
despite this fact, it has remained almost entirely unscrutinised in the Canadian
immigration law literature.
As I also demonstrate in chapter two, the lack of commentary on the application
of the security-related inadmissibility scheme is of particular concern given the fact
that the majority of individuals on whom it is brought to bear are those who have
asserted a risk of persecution if removed from Canada. This is also the case for
those who are subject to the Refugee Convention’s exclusion clauses and it is for this
reason that the existing commentary on these clauses is vitally important. But it is
an essential feature of Canada’s inadmissibility regime that those found to be
inadmissible for, amongst other things, security reasons are deprived of the right to
even assert a claim to refugee status.5 Such being the case, the lack of any sustained
legal analysis on the application of s34 of the IRPA represents a significant gap in
the refugee law literature, one that this dissertation aims to fill.
The second contribution relates to international law and, specifically, to the call
of TWAIL scholars to transpose TWAIL analyses into all areas in which the interests
of Third World peoples and matters of international law intersect.6 While there
already exists an elucidating body of TWAIL scholarship on security, terrorism and
international law7 and on the international refugee law regime8 there has been, to

Through the combined operation of ss 101(1)(f) and 104(1)(b) of the IRPA.
See in particular, Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 31 at 38, who
argues that the reconstructive nature of TWAIL means that all processes (even ones seemingly
related to domestic law) “that create, foster, legitimize, and maintain harmful hierarchies and
oppressions must be revisited and changed.” See also Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL
Histories” (2008) 10 Int Community Law Rev 355 at 357-358.
7 Upendra Baxi, “The War on Terror and the War of Terror: Nomadic Multitudes, Aggressive
Incumbents, and the New International Law - Prefactory Remarks on Two Wars” (2005) 43 Osgoode
Hall Law J 7; Ikechi Mgbeoji, “The Bearded Bandit, the Outlaw Cop, and the Naked Emperor: Towards
5
6
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my knowledge, no study that brings these areas together in the context of a
particular immigration scheme. As I shall set out in the third chapter, an important
aspect of the TWAIL agenda is to identify and expose structures that “marginalize
and dominate” third world peoples.9

Given my observation that the security-

migration apparatus is one such structure, I view this dissertation as making a
helpful contribution to this aspect of TWAIL’s normative agenda.
The final way in which I suggest that this dissertation contributes to ongoing
legal debates relates to the unique vantage point provided by security-related
decision-making on administrative law and, more specifically, on the rich body of
literature on deliberative and dialogical approaches to administrative law. While
this area of inquiry has a well-established pedigree, I argue in the fourth part of this
dissertation that the security-migration nexus provides a particularly illuminating
perspective on administrative law because of the strong executive impulse in this
domain to engage in top-down exertions of state power. In proposing that dialogical
decision-making approaches be adopted even in matters related to national security
concerns, I seek to expand the scope of commentary on dialogue and legitimacy in
discretionary decision-making.
In short, I view this examination of migration and security to be a worthy topic
in itself, but also one that helps to illuminate other domains: the scope of refugee
rights; the intersections between domestic and international law; the limits of
executive authority and the content of decision-making in liberal democracies.

a North-South (De)Construction of the Texts and Contexts of International Law’s (Dis)Engagement
with Terrorism” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law J 105.
8 B.S. Chimni, “Reforming the International Refugee Regime: A Dialogic Model” (2001) 14:2 Journal of
Refugee Studies 151.
9 See the TWAIL vision statement, as reproduced in Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL
Histories,” supra note 6 at 357-8.

9

There are, of course, numerous other dimensions to this topic that are not
addressed in this dissertation, perhaps most notably the roles played by both
gender and race in conceptualizing security concerns and implementing border
control.10 As I discuss in Chapter Four, discretionary decision-making processes
tend to reflect the social norms and values of the society from which they emanate
and, consequently, they can also act as a conduit for the expression of
discriminatory impulses. The security realm is certainly not immune to this reality,
as is perhaps most articulately illustrated by the recent decision of the Canadian
government to prioritize women, families and children over single men in the
processing of Syrian overseas refugee resettlement applications.11 There is, to be
sure, much about both gender and race to unpack from this decision. However, in
an effort to remain focused on the issues that I do explore in this project, I leave
much of that unpacking for another day.
Before commencing, it is important to both situate myself in this research and
comment on my methodological approach. Prior to my graduate work, I was (and
remain) a lawyer with a practice dedicated to immigration and refugee law. Indeed,
it was over the course of my practice that I and several colleagues began to notice an
uptick in refugee cases that were suspended, and ultimately terminated, on grounds
of security-related inadmissibility.
As advocates, we were troubled by these cases. We were prepared to address
questions as to our clients’ backgrounds in the context of their refugee cases and to
confront allegations that they may be subject to one of the Refugee Convention’s

For illuminating explorations of these domains, see for example Sherene Razack, ed., Race, Space,
and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002) and Alison
Gerard and Sharon Pickering, “Gender, Securitization and Transit: Refugee Women and the Journey
to the EU” (2014) 27 J of Refugee Studies 338.
11 The Guardian, “Canada to turn away single men as part of Syrian refugee resettlement plan”, The
Guardian (23 November, 2015) online: Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com>.
10
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exclusion clauses.12 But this was something new, something that appeared to be an
attempt by state authorities to circumvent the refugee claim process entirely.
Refugee law is an intimate and delicate area of practice, one that probes deeply
into the lives of those who seek its protection. I came to know my clients and their
families well and was, frankly, as mystified as they were when we received
allegations that they were inadmissible on security grounds. I had represented
other clients with profiles that were essentially identical to those who were now
being streamed into the inadmissibility process, with no explanation as to why they
were suddenly of concern. My mystification was soon replaced by a sense of
foreboding, a feeling that a blunt instrument of state power was descending on my
clients and that, given the breadth of the security provisions, there was very little
that I could do, legally, for them. At the same time, I was contemplating a return to
graduate work, and it seemed that unpacking the many layers of what I was
observing in the security realm would make for a fascinating research project. In
retrospect, I can identify four key objectives that have animated my research. My
first objective was really a curiosity: that is, I wanted to find out whether my
personal and anecdotal sense of an increase in security cases was borne out
empirically. And if such was the case, a second and related objective was to examine
on whom these cases were being brought and why. My third objective was, more
generally, to explore the place of security concerns in immigration matters and to
query whether what I perceived as the impersonal and heavy-handed nature of the
inadmissibility regime is a necessary and justifiable reflection of post-9/11 security
concerns. Finally, given the gaps in the literature to which I referred above, my
fourth objective was to shed light on the inadmissibility regime and to illustrate
how, despite its relative subtlety, it is an area as worthy of critical examination as

The Refugee Convention, supra note 4, has several exclusion clauses which were intended to serve
as a closed list of grounds for which refugee claimants could be disqualified from protection,
notwithstanding the fact that they may otherwise meet the refugee definition.
12
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either the security certificate regime or the exclusion of refugees under the Refugee
Convention.
I do not view this dissertation as an act of advocacy, though I certainly cannot
pretend to have commenced it having shed my view that there is something
troubling about how, and on whom, the security apparatus is applied. Rather, I
consider my starting place as one informed by several years of a different sort of
field research, research that took place in the day to day grind of a legal practice that
was, for lack of a better phrase, ground zero of the security migration regime. By
this I do not mean to suggest that my legal practice bore any direct connection to
this research project, but rather, it provided me with a baseline of knowledge and an
orientation toward the security regime that I have drawn upon throughout this
project.
Methodology
This base of experience and knowledge also informed the methodology that I
chose to adopt in embarking on my research. While I sought to take a step back and
look at some of the more theoretical debates that surround immigration and refugee
law, the theory I explore is for a very particular purpose, one that is rooted in
conversations about how law actually operates and how it may be reformed to
operate differently.
As a result, while substantial components of this dissertation involve traditional
doctrinal and theoretical approaches, I also look to both quantitative and qualitative
research methods – the former in Chapter Two, the latter in Chapter Four – to assist
in examining the anachronistic state of decision-making in immigration-security
matters. It is my hope that this mixed methodological approach provides both a
thorough and multi-faceted perspective on the Canadian security-inadmissibility
regime.
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The Quantitative Data
As noted above, the quantitative aspect to this dissertation is based on
numerous Access to Information Requests that I have submitted over the past four
years. These range from several requests seeking data on numbers and various
other data points related to security cases, to data on Ministerial waivers of
inadmissibility, to training manuals and internal memoranda on the operation of
s34 of the IRPA. As I set out in detail in the second chapter, the disclosure that I
received came to several thousands of pages of information and it has been
illuminating in several different ways. There is, however, one gap in the data that is
important to consider. Inadmissibility determinations under s34 arise, for the most
part, in one of two ways: they can be made by Citizenship and Immigration Canada
officers to refuse status to foreign nationals, either in Canada or abroad, or they can
be invoked to revoke any status that may already have been obtained. As I set out in
greater detail in Chapter 2, these latter determinations are typically made by the
Immigration and Refugee Board following a referral from the Canada Border
Services Agency.

For reasons related largely, in my view, to government

obfuscation, this study is limited to the latter set of decisions on inadmissibility –
those rendered by the Immigration and Refugee Board. The IRB responded to ATIP
requests promptly and typically provided complete (if redacted) records related to
the requested data. The response of Citizenship and Immigration Canada was
profoundly different. My requests were first met with what I viewed as improper
demands for what would amount to thousands of dollars of research time and
database access fees. Upon challenging the imposition of these fees, I was informed
that the request would be re-examined, which was followed by many months of
delays. At one point I was informed that the data I requested could not be captured
by CIC’s databases and would, instead, require a manual review of every relevant
file. Finally, I was instructed that my requests were being refused because the
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information sought would be held on individual client files and was thus exempted
from disclosure pursuant to s19(1) of the Access to Information Act.13
I have not stopped in my attempts to obtain this data, but for the purposes of
this dissertation, I made the decision to confine my results to those provided by the
Immigration and Refugee Board. While I would have preferred to incorporate CIC
data into my research, I do not think that its absence affects the validity of the
disclosure that has been provided. Beyond this, as I note in my conclusion, the lack
of CIC data on security cases leaves open a further project in my research agenda.
The Qualitative Interviews
Originally, my intention was to interview individuals from all sides of the
security regime: CBSA officers, lawyers and individuals caught in the process.
Through my connections in the field, I was able to conduct interviews with the latter
two groups of individuals, but unfortunately I was unable to gain formal access to
interview CBSA staff. While I have spoken informally with former CBSA officers, I
was asked that comments made in those conversations not be incorporated into this
research project. I have respected that request.14
My objectives in relation to the interviews that I did conduct were modest. It
was not my intent with this dissertation to prepare a comprehensive qualitative
research project. My goals, rather, were twofold: first, as noted in the literature on
mixed methods research, combining personal narratives with quantitative data
analysis can help to explain and interpret the findings of the latter in frequently

RSC, 1985, c A-1.
I discuss at subsequent points in the dissertation the importance of examining institutions in
context to understand the decisions they make. The literature on New Institutionalism is particularly
interesting in this respect, see for instance, Mary Brinton and Victor Nee, The New Institutionalism in
Sociology (New York: Russell Sage, 1990) and K O Hawkins, Law as last resort: prosecution decisionmaking in a regulatory agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002).
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articulate ways.15 My second goal was related to my above observation that the
migration-security apparatus in Canada has been under-reported in the literature.
Part of the fallout of this under-reporting is that the voices of those individuals who
must navigate the security-inadmissibility process have not been heard. I wanted to
remedy this in some small way by carving out space for at least some of these
individuals to both share their experience of the security regime and to articulate
their observations of it. As I set out in Chapter Four, security decisions generally
take the form of top-down expressions of state power that leave little to no room for
the participation of those who become enmeshed in it. In conveying the experiences
of these individuals, I also suggest that we might capture a glimpse of a more
participatory approach, one that I contend would yield more legitimate results.
Seeking narrative voice as a supplementary way of understanding social forces
has a long pedigree in qualitative research and, more specifically, in the
multidisciplinary fields of forced migration research. As Eastmond notes,
In the field of forced migration, narratives have also
been important to researchers, not seldom relied upon
as the only means we have of knowing something about
life in times and places to which we have little other
access. With the more interpretive approach, narratives
have become interesting also for what they can tell us
about how people themselves, as ‘experiencing
subjects’, make sense of violence and turbulent
change.16
The interviews were open-ended and took the form of informal conversations. I
had known a few of the participants as prior clients, or as colleagues, while others
were unknown to me prior to this research. Some of the refugees who I interviewed
were actively advocating their cases in the public sphere, while others were

Nataliya V Ivankova, John W Creswell & Sheldon L Stick, “Using Mixed-Methods Sequential
Explanatory Design: From Theory to Practice” (2006) 18:1 Field Methods 3 at 10.
16 Marita Eastmond, “Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research” (2007)
20 J Refug Stud 248 at 249.
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resigned to observing (and waiting) as their various applications and legal cases
played out. That said, and as I describe in Chapter four, what all of the individuals
had in common was a sense of surprise that their cases had taken this path, a
corresponding notion that they were inaccurately described as posing a security
threat and , as a consequence, a firm conviction that the system was acting unjustly
on them.
While I view this mixed methodological approach as providing a well-rounded
vantage point on the security regime, it is not without its limitations and my
research should not be taken as either an exhaustive quantitative analysis or a
devoted legal ethnography. It is, at root, a legal and theoretical exploration of the
issues, but I contend that both the data I analyze and the stories I convey assist in
interrogating the intersections between security and migration in this era.
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CHAPTER ONE: IMMIGRATION, SECURITY AND
INADMISSIBILITY IN LIBERAL STATES
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1.1 Introduction
The connection, or lack thereof, between security and migration is a central
preoccupation of our time.

In the pages that follow, I explore how this

preoccupation has played out, with particular reference to the Canadian context,
and more broadly, to examine what it reveals about administrative decision-making
in liberal democracies and its interaction with international law.
I have already sketched out that my objective in this project is to explore the
arbitrariness – or worse, the prejudice – that I suspect pervades decision-making in
the migration-security realm. I further hypothesized in my brief introduction that
alternative approaches to administrative decision-making, combined with a more
nuanced understanding of international law might, taken together, provide both a
procedural and normative basis for improving decision making in this area. For the
present moment, however, I will for the most part leave aside these responses to the
problem of migration and security and instead focus on the nature of the problem
itself. What is migration and why is it viewed in exceptional terms by liberal
democracies? Why is it that both law and decision-making in the migration realm
appear to depart so palpably from basic rule of law principles? Correspondingly,
what is the nature of a security threat and why are such threats similarly treated as
representing an exception to the normal legal order?
In examining these questions, I argue that responding to concerns over
migration and security in exceptional ways is not necessarily ordained and nor is it
principled.

While acknowledging that the very idea of the liberal state is

intertwined with notions of insider and outsider, I argue that this fact does not, in
itself, lead inexorably to the kinds of exceptional approaches to which migrants and
perceived security threats are generally subjected. This is at least in part because of
another set of principles that are equally woven into the fabric of liberal
democracies – the cosmopolitan conception of the equal moral worth of all
18

individuals. Flowing from this principle, I will suggest that exclusion requires
justification and justification, in turn, requires communicative processes of
participation for immigrants and refugees. In the fourth chapter, I will explore one
form that such communicative processes may take – that being an interpretation of
administrative discretion as a mechanism for two-way dialogue between the state
and those who are affected by its decisions.
In the coming chapters, I will also trace the increased use of security
inadmissibility measures in Canada and elsewhere, to further explore the position of
migrants who are perceived, or at least are labeled, as posing threats to security. In
addition to exploring how administrative law could be reframed along dialogic lines,
I also intend to explore whether different understandings of international law,
particularly that which has emanated from the Third World Approaches to
International Law school would similarly enhance the legitimacy of inadmissibility
decisions. For now, however, I turn to an examination of the literature on the
preliminary issues.
Before doing so, however, a brief disclaimer. Virtually all of the thinkers to
whom I refer below are worthy of exploration in much greater detail than is
possible here. The works of many of them could be (and have been) the subject of
entire dissertations. My intent here is not to exhaustively detail the complex and
multiple contours of their work, but rather, to tease out the ideas from each of them
that I have found helpful in furthering my understanding of migration, security and
the perceived intersections that tie them together.
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1.2 Migration in Liberal States
The refugee should be considered for what he is, that is,
nothing less than a border concept that radically calls
into question the principles of the nation-state and, at
the same time, helps clear the field for a no-longerdelayable renewal of categories.1
Giorgio Agamben places the refugee at the very centre of conversations about
sovereignty, the nation state and legal order. Sovereignty, that is, the demarcation
of sovereign territory and the corresponding demarcation of citizens and noncitizens is, after all, frequently viewed as the very concept that creates and
perpetuates the notion of the refugee. And to the extent that the concept of the
refugee, or to use broader language, the migrant, provides an illustration of an
exception to the normal legal order, it also provides a window into the legal order
itself. As we shall see in the coming pages, Agamben is not alone in identifying the
migrant as both a subject of exceptional politics and a conceptual device with which
to examine modern states. Almost thirty years ago, Peter Shuck observed the
unique position of immigration within the larger (in this case, American) legal
regime:
Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in
our public law. Probably no other area of American law
has been so radically insulated and divergent from
those fundamental norms of constitutional right,
administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate
the rest of our legal system. In a legal firmament
transformed by revolutions in due process and equal
protection doctrine and by a new conception of judicial
role, immigration law remains the realm in which

Giorgio Agamben, "We Refugees" Symposium. 1995, No. 49(2), Summer, Pages: 114-119, English,
Translation by Michael Rocke. http://www.egs.edu/faculty/giorgio-agamben/articles/we-refugees/
accessed 03 April 2012.
1
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government authority is at the zenith, and individual
entitlement is at the nadir.2
The string that ties together the bulk of the literature to which I will refer is the
already apparent dichotomy between insider and outsider and the essential
question posed by Schuk’s observation of the maverick status of migration law;
namely is this an innate and natural state of affairs in liberal democracies or, rather,
a chosen course based on particular policy choices that could, with some degree of
effort and will, be altered?

1.2.1 Between a Locke and a Rawls Place –The Traditional view of Liberalism
and Migration3
People must recognize that they cannot make up for
failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land
by conquest in war, or by migrating into another
people’s territory without their consent.4
It is, of course, trite to suggest that liberalism and its corresponding ideals of
freedom and equality for all, is the dominant ideology of our time. Liberalism is a
term with which one can play fast and loose, but for the time being I use it to denote
an ideology that at least formally espouses universal notions of freedom, equality,
basic human rights to life, liberty and property and the view that the rule of law
should prevail over absolutism in government.

Peter H Schuck, “Transformation of Immigration Law, The” (1984) 84 Columbia Law Rev 1 at 85–
86.
3 I choose here to examine migration through the lens of liberal theory for three principal reasons:
first, because at present it represents the mainstream and dominant strand of legal and political
philosophy; second because as we shall see, it aspires to universalist notions of moral equality which
make questions about inclusion and exclusion particularly interesting; and lastly because it is liberal
democracies that, for the most part, drive the global migration law regime.
4 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) [Rawls, “The Law of
Peoples”] at 8.
2
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Liberal theory has always confronted something of a paradox. On the one hand,
liberal values are frequently described in universalist language, as above. The basic
rights and liberties associated with liberalism are said to inhere in all people by
mere virtue of their existence. Indeed, underpinning liberalism is a core assertion of
the moral equality of all persons. Since the end of the Second World War, this
notion of equality has also been promulgated on the international level, particularly
in the language of universalist human rights instruments, which explicitly recognize
that people, in addition to states, are the proper subjects of international law.
On the other hand, classical approaches to liberal theory have, from the outset,
been based on a profound distinction between peoples; on a presupposition, that is,
of a closed community within which principles of liberal justice may be elaborated.
This is apparent in the writing of one of the earliest proponents of the liberal ethos,
John Locke, who stated in his Two Treatises of Government that one of the principal
concerns of government was to “secure the community from inroads and invasion.”
Indeed, to Locke, those within the bounded liberal community were perfectly
justified in viewing those on the outside as if they were still in a state of nature. This
is not to say that Locke was against the naturalization of foreigners; indeed he
viewed the addition of resourceful individuals to the community as providing
almost unlimited benefit. The point is that he viewed questions of admission as
being aside from notions of equality and entirely within the prerogative of the predefined community. 5

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited, with an introduction, By C.B. McPherson
(Indianapolis
and
Cambridge:
Hackett
Pub.,
1980)
at
60,
accessed
at
http://epublish.biz/pdf/Two_Treatises_of_Government.pdf, on May 4, 2012. See also, Mark Goldie
(ed). “For a General Naturalization,” in John Locke, Political Essays. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1997) at 324.
5
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As we shall see, the tension – between a theory that notionally aspires to treat all
similarly, but implicitly draws distinctions between those on the inside and those on
the outside – has been addressed in various ways.
As mentioned, one of the central notions of classical liberal theory is that the
formation or definition of community is conceptually prior to conversations about
the content of liberal ideas; the boundary of the community is already in place and
questions of justice relate solely to those on the inside. Justice, in other words, is a
relational concept – justice as between whom – and theories about justice can only
take place once the “whom” is clearly defined. The rise of liberalism is closely tied
with the rise of the modern nation state and classical liberal theorists often take the
two as being inseparable: liberal conceptions of justice involve a social contract
between individual and state. As such, the very notion of liberalism presupposes the
existence of a defined, and to some closed, state. Dworkin’s frequently cited passage
from Law’s Empire puts it most clearly:
We treat community as prior to justice and fairness in
the sense that questions of justice and fairness are
regarded as questions of what would be fair or just
within a particular political group.6
But even more than Ronald Dworkin, it is John Rawls who is most commonly
associated with confining theories of liberal justice to a closed system. Described as
“arguably the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth century and the most
important academic exponent of liberalism since John Stuart Mill,” Rawls was
particularly vociferous in his insistence that one could not discuss liberal theory
without starting from the position of a defined and relatively set group.7 Rawls’
great insight, set out in detail in his seminal work, A Theory of Justice, is in
developing the idea that the principles of justice are those everyone would accept

Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001) at 208.
Stephen Macedo, “What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another: Universalism, Diversity, and
the Law of Peoples” (2003) 72 Fordham Law Rev 1721 at 1722.
6
7
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and agree to from a fair position.

8

He does this primarily through the use of a

conceptual device in which all members of a given community are put in the same
position, the original position, and are then left to determine the principles of justice
on which to base membership in the group. The trick, however, is that these
decisions on what is just must be made with incomplete information as to the
position that any particular individual will come to occupy in the community; this is
what Rawls terms the “veil of ignorance.”9
Behind the veil of ignorance, no one knows their social position, their wealth,
their intelligence, their attraction or aversion to risk or even which generation they
come from.10

Indeed, essentially the only thing that those behind the veil of

ignorance do know, according to Rawls, is that “their society is subject to the
circumstances of justice and whatever this implies.”11 For our purposes, the most
important part of this passage is of course Rawls’ use of the words “their society,”
for implicit in Rawls’ conception of the veil of ignorance is the assumption that those
behind it also know that they are part of the same, closed collectivity.

What

emerges, Rawls theorizes, is something of a lowest common denominator approach
to justice – not knowing what social position any one person will occupy, the group
will arrive at a mode of social organization in which all members are treated as
fairly as possible. More specifically, Rawls suggests that those placed behind the veil
of ignorance, at least as he configures it, would arrive at two distinct yet related
conclusions: first, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others; and second, social and economic
inequalities are permissible only to the extent they are of benefit to the least well off

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971) at 12.
Ibid, at 136.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. at 137, emphasis added.
8
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members of the community; and tied to this, that offices and positions must be open
to everyone under fair conditions of equal opportunity.12
But significant debate and critiques have arisen over the years as to precisely
what information is placed behind the veil of ignorance because, in many respects, it
is this consideration that determines the principles of justice that arise from it. And
again, for our purposes, Rawls’ most significant decision was to provide that those
cast behind the veil would be aware that they are all members of the same
community; Rawls opted, in other words, to remove the question of nationality from
behind the veil of ignorance. This was no oversight on Rawls’ part, it was integral to
the project; it was in many senses the project – to explore how a closed group of
individuals would come up with an idealized version of liberal justice. Rawls states,
I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a
reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure
of society conceived for the time being as a closed
system isolated from other societies.13
Beyond this, Rawls has little more to say in A Theory of Justice about the
movement of people away from or into the bounded community of persons about
which he theorizes. Later, in The Law of Peoples, which was essentially Rawls’ effort
to transpose his ideas about social justice onto the international plane, he expounds
in some, albeit still limited detail on the place of migrants in his conception of
justice.14 In it, Rawls argues that boundaries, while often arbitrary in their origins,
are nevertheless essential ingredients of a people’s government and one of the key

These are famously referred to by Rawls as the two principles of justice, see Ibid at 60. The two
principles have faced considerable criticism over the years, most notably and most recently by
Amartya Sen whose pluralist approach rejects the “transcendental” nature of the principles. See
Amartya Sen, The Idea Of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009).
13Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 8, at 8.
14 Rawls, The Law of Peoples supra note 4.
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functions of government, as agent of a people, is to be the guardian of its territory. 15
Reiterating the idea that opens this chapter, Rawls goes on to suggest that peoples
need to recognize that they cannot make up for their irresponsibility in caring for
their territory “by conquest in war or by migrating into other people’s territory
without their consent.”16 Rawls also notes that peoples (those in migrant receiving
states) have at least a “qualified right to limit immigration”.17 These passages, which
appear somewhat indifferent to the role that some peoples – some nations – have
played in the degradation and suffering of others, flows directly from one of Rawls’
central and, to my mind, startlingly oversimplified, observations: that a country’s
own political culture is the “crucial element” in determining how it will fair.18
Bad governments, that is, governments that persecute their people or that do
not adequately provide for them, generate emigration. To Rawls, the response to
this (rather narrowly construed) fact is not for good governments to open
themselves up to immigration, but to recognize an obligation to provide institutional
support for “burdened societies.”19 To Rawls, migration is merely a symptom of
larger institutional problems in burdened societies – fix the problems and the
phenomenon of the movement of peoples will largely disappear: “The problem of
immigration is not, then, simply left aside, but is eliminated as a serious problem in
a realistic utopia.”20
This statement gets to the crux of Rawls’ view of migration – it is quite simply
not a topic of concern to the discourse on liberal justice; on the contrary, it is a

Ibid, at 38-39. As shall be seen, while Rawls very purposefully uses the term “peoples” instead of
“states,” his views on the governments formed by peoples aligns very closely with traditional notions
of sovereignty under international law and particularly in the elevation of sovereign territories,
rather than individuals as the basic building blocks of international relations.
16 Ibid, at 39.
17 Ibid, at 39, note 48.
18 Ibid, at 117.
19 Ibid, beginning at 105.
20 Ibid, at 9.
15

26

distraction that disappears when the larger puzzle of achieving justice is solved.
And this, in my view, reveals at least in part why the rights of migrants within liberal
democracies are frequently viewed in exceptional terms.21 That the migrant is not a
participant in conversations about justice is deeply embedded in the ethos of the
modern liberal state. The question is whether migrants are similarly extraneous to
the very logic of the liberal state. The work of Rawls would seem to support this
view. Others, however, have not been so quick to dismiss migration as a subject of
concern for theories of liberal justice. I turn now to explore the insights of some of
the theorists who have examined the question of migration in more detail.
1.2.2 Responding to Rawls – Joseph Carens and Open Borders
If people want to sign the social contract, they should be
permitted to do so.22
Rawls has of course been immensely influential in developing liberal theories of
justice and in the immigration sphere, scholars have responded to him in a number
of different ways. One approach, most notably developed by Joseph Carens, is not to
flatly reject the reductionism of Rawlsian thinking, but on the contrary, to expand
the parameters of Rawls’ original position to include all of humankind.23 At the
outset of his enormously provocative and influential article, “Aliens and Citizens:
The Case for Open Borders,” Carens articulates the traditional view of the
relationship between migration and sovereignty. He states:
The power to admit or exclude aliens is inherent in
sovereignty and essential for any political community.

This is not, of course, to suggest that migrants are not also subjected to exceptional approaches in
“non-liberal” states, but I confine my comments here to liberal states that define themselves, at least
formally, with universalist notions of justice and equality.
22 Joseph H Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987) 49:2 Rev Polit 251 at
251 [Carens, "Aliens and Citizens"].
23 Carens certainly wasn’t the first to put forth a global view of the original position. As Carens
acknowledges, the most notable early proponent of such an alteration to Rawls’ approach was
Charles Beitz in Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1979). Carens can be credited, however, with applying such an approach specifically to the
question of global migration.
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Every state has the legal and moral right to exercise that
power in pursuit of its own national interest, even if
that means denying entry to peaceful, needy foreigners.
States may choose to be generous in admitting
immigrants, but they are under no obligation to do so.24
In the next sentence, Carens boldly asserts that his aim is to “challenge that
view.” While his focus is predominantly on Rawls, Carens develops his position by
also referring to other streams of liberal theory, most notably utilitarianism and the
theoretical approach proposed by Robert Nozick.25 Carens’ claim is that each of
these streams when applied to the topic of migration and followed through to their
logical conclusions produces the same result: open borders and relatively free
movement of peoples. Given the sharp distinctions between these theories in other
areas, Carens concludes that their convergence on the topic of migration lends
support to his argument.
At the outset, Carens rejects the proposition that the logic of liberalism is
inherently and indivisibly connected to the concept of the bounded state. While
liberalism may have emerged with the modern state, Carens disputes the assertion
that liberal conceptions of justice can only take place within the framework of a
closed society. He states:
Some may feel that I have wrenched these theories out
of context. Each is rooted in the liberal tradition.
Liberalism, it might be said, emerged with the modern
state and presupposes it. Liberal theories were not
designed to deal with questions about aliens. They
assumed the context of the sovereign state. As a
historical observation this has some truth, but it is not
clear why it should have normative force. The same
wrenching out of context complaint could as reasonably
have been leveled at those who first constructed liberal

Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 22 at 251.
As was most clearly articulated in Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books,
1974).
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arguments for the extension of full citizenship to
women and members of the working class. Liberal
theories also assumed the right to exclude them.26
If a closed society is not the foundation on which liberalism rests, what then
does it stand upon? To Carens, the answer to this question lies in the principles to
which I earlier referred, specifically the foundational (and cosmopolitan) ideal of the
equal moral worth of all persons. Closed communities are not prior to liberalism,
Carens asserts, but what is prior, and what all liberal theories have in common, is
the assumption of the equal moral worth of all individuals:
Each of these theories begins with some kind of
assumption about the equal moral worth of individuals.
In one way or another, each treats the individual as
prior to the community.27
With this as a given, Carens sets out to consider how migration fits into the
puzzle of liberal justice, and to do this, he incorporates a globalized version of
Rawls’ original position. He does this, in my view, for precisely the same reasons
that Rawls himself first conceived of the original position as a strategy for moral
reasoning. As noted by Carens, part of the appeal of the veil of ignorance to Rawls
was that it stripped away “the effects of specific [and often arbitrary] contingencies
which put men at odds,” contingencies such as wealth or social status, and enabled
one to think about how people would order themselves from a purely moral point of
view.28 In this sense, the veil of ignorance enables one to think about a topic
without being biased by “self-interested or partisan considerations” and without
allowing historical injustices (if any) to “warp our reflections.”29 And to Carens,
citizenship status is the very definition of one of the arbitrary contingencies referred
to by Rawls. Indeed, as Carens puts it,

Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 22 at 265.
Ibid, at 252.
28 Ibid, at 255, citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 8 at pp. 136, 72.
29 Ibid.
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Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the
modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited
status that greatly enhances one's life chances. Like
feudal birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is
hard to justify when one thinks about it closely.30
With this in mind, Carens proceeds to his analysis assuming a global view of
the original position. Those in the original position would not know their place of
birth or their membership (i.e. citizenship) in one society or another. And it is from
this position that Carens questions the liberal legitimacy of virtually all border
restrictions. He does not suggest, however, that relatively autonomous states would
be prohibited, but state sovereignty would be constrained by the principles of
justice.31 And because one approaches the veil of ignorance from the perspective of
those who would be most disadvantaged by restrictions on liberty, i.e. the potential
immigrant, Carens concludes that the right to migrate would be included as a basic
liberty.

To Carens, this liberty is really no different than the uncontroversial

freedom that people possess to move to a different territory within their given
state.32
In arriving at this conclusion, Carens addresses (and rejects) what he considers
to be one of the few principled theoretical objections to open borders: the
communitarian approach articulated by Michael Walzer. Walzer argues that people
who, through a shared common history, have developed a distinctive culture and a
common understanding about justice may justifiably restrict entry into their
territory.33

As with Rawls, Walzer presupposes that principles underlying

distributive justice must be formulated within the context of particular (and closed)
communities. Justice is an internal matter and as such questions of entry into the

Ibid at 252.
Ibid at 258.
32 Ibid.
33 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books,
1983).
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political community are not particularly constrained by larger principles that
transcend the community itself. Community is itself a good, a necessary ingredient
in the aspiration for equality and as such, the exclusion of outsiders is justified by
the right to self-determination.34
In rejecting this argument, Carens again refers to the open borders which
surround cities, states and provinces. These smaller political units often contain a
shared common history and frequently have profoundly distinctive cultures. And
yet, these entities have no capacity to limit immigration, and indeed, are frequently
sites of considerable influxes of people. Carens does not assert that such influxes
have no impact on the character of the communities in which they take place, but
suggests that, in the domestic context, mobility rights are viewed as taking priority.
But this understates the point – Carens rightly asserts that restricting mobility
rights within a political community is generally viewed as being anathema to the
very concept of a free state.35 This being the case, Carens questions the basis on
which restrictions on freedom of movement across states can be justified. Adopting
Walzer’s own logic, Carens suggests that finding such justification would require a
stronger case for the “moral distinctiveness” of the nation-state as a form of
community than that of the smaller political units that Walzer discusses. It is
implicit in this suggestion, of course, that no such case can be made out.
Numerous other authors, both before and after Carens, have arrived at similar
conclusions, questioning the legitimacy of liberal justifications for restrictive
migration

policies.

In

her

work,

Linda

Bosniak

directly

confronts

This claim draws an interesting parallel to my larger dissertation in which I will explore the rights
of states to render inadmissible those who themselves have participated in self-determination
struggles. The issue then becomes whether states can legitimately exclude, on self-determination
principles, those who have asserted their own right to self-determination and, as a result, have been
forced to flee their respective states.
35 Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 22 at p. 267. This fact is clearly illustrated in constitutional
mobility rights provisions, such as s6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) [Charter], c 11.
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Rawlsian/Walzerian notions of bounded national identities and their claims to
universalism that extend only so far as the border of the community. Describing
such approaches to membership as being “hard on the outside, soft on the inside,”
Bosniak sets out to establish that in a world of porous borders, the concept of
citizenship is more complicated than the traditional approach would imply.36
Much earlier, Bruce Ackerman, provocatively asserted that “I cannot justify my
power to exclude you without destroying my own claim to membership in an ideal
liberal state.”37 Philip Cole, meanwhile, has suggested that "liberal theory cannot
provide a justification for membership control and remain a coherent political
philosophy.”38 And in another passage worth citing at length, Peter Schuck sums up
what, in his estimation, a truly liberal approach to immigration would look like:
Liberalism has never satisfactorily answered these
questions and probably never will. It regards any fixed
or exclusive definition of community with profound
suspicion. Indeed, in a truly liberal polity, it would be
difficult to justify a restrictive immigration law or
perhaps any immigration law at all. National barriers to
movement would be anomalous. Criteria of inclusion
and exclusion based upon accidents of birth, criteria
that label some individuals as insiders and others as
outsiders, would be odious. Wealth, security and
freedom would not be allocated on such grounds,
especially in a world in which the initial distribution of
those goods is so unequal. Instead, individuals would
remain free to come and go, to form attachments, and to
make choices according to their own aspirations,

Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton UP, 2006) at 4. Bosniak goes on to refer to the migrant as illustrating the problem with the
traditional liberal conception of the community; in some ways non-citizens living spatially within a
community remain in many respects excluded outsiders: “the border effectively follows them inside.”
In other respects, however, non-citizens in most liberal democracies are treated as “citizenship’s
subjects.” The essential point is that the taken for granted notions of insider-outsider that lie at the
core of classical liberal theory are, and probably always have been, problematic.
37 Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale UP, 1980) at 93.
38 Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh UP, 2000) at 202.
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consistent with the equal right of others to do likewise.
No self-defining, self-limiting group could deny to nonmembers the individual freedom of action that
liberalism distinctively celebrates.39
All of this being said, Carens does acknowledge one principal restriction to his
open border proposition: a limitation that flows directly from Rawlsian theory, and
which has direct bearing on the intersection between migration and security.
According to Rawls, all liberties depend on public order and security, and as a
consequence, any actions which may threaten public order and security may be
prohibited.40 Liberty, in other words, may be restricted for the sake of liberty.
Carens applies this logic to the immigration context:
Suppose that unrestricted immigration would lead to
chaos and the breakdown of order. Then all would be
worse off in terms of their basic liberties. Even adopting
the perspective of the worst-off and recognizing the
priority of liberty, those in the original position would
endorse restrictions on immigration in such
circumstances. This would be a case of restricting
liberty for the sake of liberty and every individual
would agree to such restrictions even though, once the
"veil of ignorance" was lifted, one might find that it was
one's own freedom to immigrate which had been
curtailed.41
Carens was explicit that, as national security is one form of public order,
states are entirely justified in refusing entry to people whose goal is “the overthrow
of just institutions.”42 Of relevance to our later discussion, it is interesting to note
that Carens does not specify whether this national security exception would be

Schuck, supra note 15 at 85–86.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 8 at 212-213. It should be noted, however, that the tradeoff
between public order and liberty is as old as liberalism itself. Much of Locke’s Second Treatise, in
fact, explores his view of the state of nature as being one of inherent insecurity; thus the role of civil
government is explicitly to provide public order so that individual freedoms may be realized. I
discuss this “classic tradeoff” in more detail in my discussion of Catherine Dauvergne, below.
41 Carens, Aliens and Citizens supra note 22 at 259.
42 Ibid, at 260.
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limited to those who seek only to overthrow institutions in the receiving state or,
more generally, to those who may participate in such activities abroad but pose no
threat to the country in which they seek entry. Given that the rationale of the
restriction is the security of the receiving state, however, it can safely be assumed
that Carens was only referring to the former scenario.
Both Carens and Rawls were clear, however, about the potential for abuse of the
“public order exception” and emphasized the need for it to be narrowly construed;
any such restriction, according to Carens, has to be minimally intrusive and based
on “evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all.”43 But what precisely does
this mean? While the assertion that liberal states can limit immigration where there
is evidence that a person may pose a threat to national security certainly appears
both coherent and justified, upon closer analysis, it succumbs to some of the very
criticisms that Carens levels at other border restrictions. That is, according to
Carens, states are justified in excluding foreigners where there is evidence to
suggest they may pose a threat to security.44 But clearly citizens of those states, who
may pose a similar threat, are not subject to any restrictions until they have actually
committed, conspired to commit or attempted to commit a criminal act. There is of
course a sharp distinction, a lack of equality if you will, between suspicion that
someone may commit an act and prosecution for actual acts committed.
This fact is not lost on Carens, who refers to it as an asymmetry in the treatment
between citizens and foreigners. It is curious, however, that even liberal egalitarian
concepts of open borders are not immune to the tensions that arise in balancing
sovereignty and individual liberty interests. This fact has also led some to question
the coherence of the liberal egalitarian approach to immigration and, more broadly,

Ibid, citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 8 at pp. 212.
Ibid at 260. Carens further elaborates on the public order and national security restrictions to
open borders in “Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective”, in B. Barry and R.
Goodwin (eds.), Free Movement: Ethical Issues in Transnational Migration of People and Money
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) at p. 28.
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to question whether liberalism in any of its streams can rationally accommodate
what I refer to here as the “membership/equality conundrum.”45
In much of his later work, Carens has attempted to address this conundrum and,
more specifically, the question as to whether his open borders argument reveals “a
deep moral problem with the exclusionary practices of liberal states or the
limitations of abstract liberal theory.”46 In the end, he concludes that the answer to
this question is a little bit of both. This has led him into something of a “halfway
house,” to use his words, somewhere in between the open borders approach and the
more orthodox understandings of bounded liberal communities, albeit he remains
much closer to the former than the latter. What he proposes, then, is:
a version of liberalism that takes rights seriously
without making them absolute and that retains the
fundamental liberal commitment to human freedom
and equality, but is more pluralistic and open-ended in
its understanding of the human good, and more
sensitive to context and history.47
In the subtle softening of Carens’ position on open borders, one gets a sense
of the state of paralysis that such an argument can lead us into. As he acknowledges,
either the argument remains coherent and reveals in our current political
arrangements a deep moral problem that will not, indeed cannot, foreseeably end or

45 See for example Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration,
supra note 37. On the latter point, see Catherine Dauvergne, “Beyond Justice: The Consequences of
Liberalism for Immigration Law” (1997) 10 Can J Law Jurisprud 323. Others have opined, in direct
contrast to Carens, that Rawlsian liberalism can rest comfortably on a closed borders formulation,
see for example Donald Galloway, “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration” (1993)18 Queen's LJ
266. To Galloway, justifying state control over immigration is not simply a convenient defence of the
status quo, such control is in fact immanent to liberal theory. While it is impossible here to do justice
to Galloway’s nuanced critique of Carens’ position, for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that
even on his conception of a principled liberal rejection of open borders, there is a recognition that in
certain circumstances, states will be compelled to allow entry to foreigners, see Galloway, above, at
298.
46 Joseph H Carens, “A Reply to Meilaender: Reconsidering Open Borders” (1999) 33:4 Int Migr Rev
1082 at 1082.
47 Ibid at 1083 and see Joseph Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000).
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it reveals the incapacity of liberal theory to contemplate questions of membership.48
The challenge for many immigration law scholars is how to both acknowledge and
move beyond this puzzling conundrum. Taking a minimal approach, I suggest that
Carens’ argument establishes that important liberty interests are invoked in matters
involving migration. Even less radical interpretations of liberalism than that first
put forward by Carens have to take seriously the moral (and, as a result, legal)
claims of people who wish to join or remain in a political community. Exclusion may
in many situations be appropriate, but it has to be justified. Others have formulated
this proposition in the form of presumptions and burdens – because there is always
a presumption against restricting the freedom of individuals, the burden is on those
who would restrict movement to demonstrate that such limitations are justified.49
For the purposes of this dissertation, I intend to extricate myself from the
theoretical quagmire outlined above by, for the most part, sidestepping it. I suggest
that I can do this for two reasons, ones which would, I think, be acceptable to both
Rawls and Carens and, consequently, to advocates of both closed and open borders.
The first relates to my primary focus on issues of national security. As we have seen,
while the open borders debate remains very much alive, it has become relatively
uncontroversial that states may restrict access to those deemed to pose security
threats.50 As we wind our way through my analysis of inadmissibility, international
and administrative law, I accept this premise, though devote considerable attention
to interrogating how and on whom security-related decisions are made. The point
for present purposes is that, at least as a lowest common denominator, states may
legitimately restrict admission in order to preserve internal security.

Ibid at 1082.
See for example Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (London: Routledge, 2001) at pp.
46-57 and Bas Schotel, On the Right of Exclusion: Law, Ethics and Immigration Policy (Oxon:
GlassHouse, 2012).
50 I say relatively here because, as described above, even Carens’ modified open borders approach
has been critiqued for its asymmetrical treatment of citizens and foreigners who pose threats to
security.
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At the same time, and as I shall set out in detail in the following chapter, the vast
majority of security-related cases that I assess in this study involve asylum seekers
or Convention refugees. Even on Rawls narrow conception of the place of migration
in and across states, it is clear that legal obligations do arise in respect of individuals
seeking refugee status. Some have argued that Rawls himself makes this admission
when he acknowledges that the right of peoples to limit immigration is “qualified”.51
But whether this is what Rawls meant or not, the fact of the matter is that states
have willingly and voluntarily assumed obligations under the rubric of international
refugee law. And if such is the case, if we can all agree in other words that states
may limit migration on security grounds, but simultaneously bear some obligations
toward the persecuted, then the analysis shifts to the question of decision-making
and, ultimately, to the question of whether individual decisions on entry and
removal are justified. Justification in liberal states, as I shall later argue, requires
not only the participation of those affected by state decision-making, but also good
faith dialogue. Dialogue and engaged deliberation also inform the writing of Seyla
Benhabib and I turn now to explore her ideas on migration and democracy.
1.2.3 Seyla Benhabib – Refugees, Community and Deliberative Democracy
In her writing on migration, Seyla Benhabib frequently begins with the assertion
that the movements of people have been ubiquitous throughout human history, and
it can fairly be said that her critique of Rawls and other closed borders approaches
flows directly from this point. Hers is a decidedly cosmopolitan conception of the
relationship between the movement of peoples and state sovereignty which has, at

Rawls, The Law of Peoples supra note 4 at 39, note 48. See, for example, Caleb Yong, “Migration
and Rawls's Law of Peoples: Problems of Non-Ideal Theory” (15 August 2011), online: Academia.edu
http://academia.edu. See also Donald Galloway, “Liberalism, Globalism, and Immigration”, supra
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its roots, a deep connection to democratic theory and the Kantian principle of
universal hospitality.52
At the outset, Benhabib identifies the membership/equality conundrum, carving
out what is essentially a middling position. On the one hand she recognizes that
political inclusion is the key to individual equality, but she also acknowledges the
unsatisfactory alternative of completely open borders, or at least what is to her its
necessary corollary, a global polity. In the end, however, Benhabib arrives at the
conclusion that liberal democratic legitimacy demands that participatory
mechanisms be instituted for non-citizens.
Benhabib takes as her starting point the Kantian (and deeply cosmopolitan)
view that “if the actions of one can affect the actions of another, then we have an
obligation to regulate our actions under a common law of freedom which respects
our equality as moral agents.”53 This said, Kant’s cosmopolitanism was deeply
imbued with the existence of a global political order made up of states and he was
both conscious and suspicious of the potentially homogenizing effects of a world
polity. With respect to the movement of people, the tension between claims to
universal moral equality and the existence of demarcated boundaries was resolved
by the law of hospitality. As Benhabib notes, hospitality was not a question of
philanthropy, but of right, flowing directly from principles of equality:
In other words, hospitality is not to be understood as a
virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one
may show to strangers who come to one's land or who
become dependent upon one's act of kindness through

This principle is one of the “Definitive Articles” which Kant asserted would provide both a
cessation of hostilities and a foundation for perpetual peace: "The law of world citizenship shall be
limited to conditions of universal hospitality.” See Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch (Ted Humphrey trans.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003) 1795.
53 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (West Nyack NY: Cambridge UP,
2000 at 104) [Benhabib "Rights of Others"]. See also “The Law of Peoples, Distributive Justice, and
Migrations” (2003) 72 Fordham L Rev 1761 at 1780. [Benhabib, “Law of Peoples”]
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circumstances of nature or history; hospitality is a right
which belongs to all human beings insofar as we view
them as potential participants in a world republic.54
This said, the duty of hospitality was not an argument for open borders and Kant
certainly did not contemplate it conveying the right of anyone to live anywhere for
any length of time. What the duty granted, however, was the right of non-citizens to
enter into a political community, the right not to be turned away if it would signify
their destruction, the right to “associate” and, to extrapolate only somewhat, the
right to be considered as a potential entrant into the polity. To Benhabib, then, the
right of hospitality “occupies that space between human rights and civil rights” or
put differently, between the rights enjoyed by all as individual moral agents and the
rights that accrue specifically to citizens as members of republics.55
As noted above, Kant clearly qualified the right of sovereign states to turn
foreigners away, particularly where to do so would cause that person’s destruction.
Benhabib rightly points to this principle as being a precursor to the contemporary
regime of international refugee protection and she sees the constraints that it places
on sovereign states vis-à-vis the individual rights of non-citizens as a part of the
“watershed” moment that Kant’s Perpetual Peace reflected. This moment marked
the transition between two conceptions of sovereignty, between what she terms the
old "Westphalian sovereignty" and the new "liberal international sovereignty”. In
the classical Westphalian regime of sovereignty, Benhabib notes, states “enjoy
ultimate authority over all objects and subjects” within their territory and they
regarded "cross-border processes as a 'private matter' concerning only those
immediately affected."56 By contrast, Benhabib continues,

Benhabib, Rights of Others at 26.
Ibid, at 27.
56 Ibid at 40, citing David Held, Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty, 8 Legal
Theory 1, 5 (2002). See also, Benhabib, The Law of Peoples, supra note 53 at 1786.
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[I]n conceptions of liberal international sovereignty, the
formal equality of states is increasingly dependent upon
their subscribing to common values and principles such
as the observance of human rights and the rule of law
and respect for democratic self-determination.
Sovereignty no longer means ultimate and arbitrary
authority; states who treat their citizens in violation of
certain norms, who close borders, prevent freedoms of
market, speech and association and the like are thought
not to belong within a specific society of states or
alliances; the anchoring of domestic principles and
institutions in principles shared with others like oneself
becomes crucial.57
In this observation we can see a cosmopolitan conception of migrant rights
begin to percolate through the western legal paradigm. Over 200 years after Kant’s
death, Benhabib certainly goes much further than Kant did in characterizing states’
ethical and legal obligations toward non-citizens, but the Kantian balance between
democratic processes rooted in the state and obligations toward foreigners can still
be discerned. While Kant recognized an early form of asylum and temporary rights
of sojourn, he nevertheless kept one foot planted in Westphalian sovereignty,
recognizing the legal prerogative of the state not to extend such temporary sojourn
to full membership.
By contrast, Benhabib argues that the “right to membership of the temporary
resident must be viewed as a human right, which can be justified along the
principles of a universalistic morality.”58 The terms and conditions under which long
term membership can be granted remain the prerogative of the state, but even this
prerogative is subject to human rights constraints such as non-discrimination and
the right of the immigrant to due process.59 In the chapters that follow, I will
attempt to illustrate how, over the past decade, security procedures have been

Ibid at 41.
Ibid at 42.
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applied to non-citizens in a manner that defies these constraints and has replaced
them with virtually untrammeled expressions of sovereign power.
But what is the source of these rights to which Benhabib refers? As I alluded to
above, Benhabib (unlike Carens and similar to Walzer) views the existence of some
form of boundaries as constitutive of democratic communities. “We the people”
refers to a particular community and not to all people in all places. And moments
will arise when the will of the people, on questions of entry for example, may be
legitimate, in a democratic sense, but unjust.

At the same time, modern

democracies act in the name of universal principles which must constantly be
“reactualized and renegotiated” within actual polities as “democratic intentions.”
This tension, between the prerogative of the democratic state and universal human
rights, Benhabib terms “the paradox of democratic legitimacy.”60
In this context, conversations about membership in the demos are always
“flanked” by human rights concerns on the one side and commitments to
sovereignty on the other.61 While this paradox is integral to democracies, Benhabib
argues that questions of membership can be renegotiated and reiterated. This is
because the principle of popular sovereignty – “that those who are subject to the law
are also its authors” – is not necessarily anchored to territorial sovereignty.
Benhabib observes in this regard:
While the demos, as the popular sovereign, must assert
control over a specific territorial domain, it can also
engage in reflexive acts of self-constitution, whereby the
boundaries of the demos can be readjusted. The politics
of membership in the age of the disaggregation of
citizenship rights is about negotiating the complexities
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of full membership rights, democratic voice, and
territorial residence.62
The disaggregation to which Benhabib refers has arisen from globalization
processes which have both frayed and complicated traditional notions of political
membership. Notwithstanding this fraying, or perhaps because of it, Benhabib
argues that democracies need to engage in acts of reinvention with the recognition
that in today’s world, more than ever, actions taken within the state have effects that
reverberate around the world. Unlike Rawls, and indeed unlike other cosmopolitan
theorists, Benhabib further argues that a theory of international justice cannot be
confined to notions of just distribution on a global scale, but must also incorporate
notions of just membership. This does not necessarily call for a world with no
borders, but rather, for a world of “porous” borders.63 The concept of porous
borders again represents Benhabib’s attempt at a conceptual midway point between
open borders and absolute state prerogative in respect of migration. It calls for an
openness to varied forms of political membership, such as municipal voting rights
for non-citizens, and for a recognition of peoples’ fluid and multiple allegiances in a
globalized world.
In addition to porous borders, just membership requires recognizing the moral
claim of refugees to first admittance; and, in a nod to Hannah Arendt, “the
vindication of the right of every human being ‘to have rights,’ that is, to be a legal
person, entitled to certain inalienable rights, regardless of the status of their

Ibid at 48. Other democratic theorists take a different view of the constitution of the demos.
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political membership.”64 Inclusion, furthermore, must be accommodated by
practices that are “non-discriminatory in scope, transparent in formulation and
execution, and justiciable when violated by states and other state-like organs.”65
Building on these neo-Kantian, cosmopolitan ideals, Benhabib turns to discourse
ethics to further elaborate her position on questions of inclusion. The foundational
principle upon which discourse ethics is structured (and against which other
principles must be tested) is described by Habermas as follows: “only those norms
and normative institutional arrangements are valid which can be agreed to by all
concerned under special argumentation situations named discourses.”66
This “metanorm,” as Benhabib calls it, is in turn built on the presupposition of
principles of “universal moral respect” and “egalitarian reciprocity.” She explains:
Universal respect means that we recognize the rights of
all beings capable of speech and action to be
participants in the moral conversation; the principle of
egalitarian reciprocity, interpreted within the confines
of discourse ethics, stipulates that in discourses each
should have the same rights to various speech acts, to
initiate new topics, and to ask for justification of the
presuppositions of the conversations.67
Since discourse theory begins from a universalist moral standpoint, Benhabib
continues, it cannot limit the scope of the moral conversation only to those who
reside within bounded political communities.

The moral conversation, or in

Habermasian terms, the opportunity for communicative action, must extend to
every person who has interests and who may be affected by the actions of others. In
another passage worth reproducing, Benhabib elaborates on this ethical position:

Ibid, at 3.
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66 Ibid, citing Jürgen Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. by Christian
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge Ma.: MIT Press, 1983, trans. ed. 1990).
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I have a moral obligation to justify my actions with
reasons to this individual or to the representatives of
this being. I respect the moral worth of the other by
recognizing that I must provide them with a justification
for my actions. We are all potential participants in such
conversations of justification.68
In other words, moral beings capable of engaging in a dialogue have a
fundamental right to justification where their freedoms are being restricted. And
such restrictions may only be imposed through “reciprocally and generally
justifiable norms which apply equally to all.”69 And it is at this point that we can see
a parallel to the conclusions that Carens has also arrived at in his more recent
writing. First, there is something of a convergence between Carens’ later position
on (mostly open) borders and Benhabib’s argument for porous borders. Both
conclude that borders should be permeable, but that certain forms of exclusions are
permitted.

This said, all exclusions must be justified through respect for

fundamental rights and through processes of communicative action, dialogue and
engagement.
As I explore in detail in Chapter Three, one basis for exclusion that cannot be
easily justified, but which appears common in the migration-security realm is a
disproportionate preoccupation in designating as security threats those who seek
admission from conflict zones in the Global South.
And as I shall further explore in Chapter Four, theoretical approaches
emphasizing justification and communication have helped to inspire another body
of literature emanating from law scholars and social scientists on the role of
discretion in administrative law. Recognizing the fundamental nature of the rights
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frequently at stake in administrative proceedings, this literature calls for an
approach to decision-making that has communicative processes at its core. In the
end, I assert that in combining a view of immigration in which acts of exclusion
require justification with an approach to administrative law in which justification is
derived from dialogue, a model for decision-making in the immigration-security
setting can be created that would enhance both the legitimacy and fairness of the
process.
For the time being, however, I move on to a discussion of how the conundrum of
liberal democracies – the membership/equality conundrum – is closely tied to
exceptional approaches to the regulation of migration, particularly where elements
of security are added to the mix.

1.3 The Exception and the Rule of Law in Immigration and Security
In the preceding section, I attempted to briefly sketch out the difficulty that
liberal democracies have in conceptualizing the place of migration. Continuing on
with this theme, in this section I will explore how these difficulties have crystallized
in particular ways. First, I will turn to Catherine Dauvergne and her ideas on the
“making of illegality.” More specifically, I will look at how Dauvergne’s views on
globalization and liberalism suggest that exceptional approaches to decision-making
in immigration-security matters are an entrenched feature of liberal states. I will
also explore her prescription for this diagnosis, which calls for extricating the rule of
law from its domestic home, and placing it into the realm of the global.
Following this, I will conclude by examining (through the work of David
Dyzenhaus and his foil on this issue - Adrian Vermuele) the intersections between
the rule of law and exceptional approaches to legality in times of perceived
emergency. Again, the discussion will explore the issue of whether exceptional
approaches and unchecked executive action are indeed endemic to liberal states
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and, more specifically, to administrative decision-making, with specific reference to
the immigration realm.
1.3.1 Catherine Dauvergne and the Making of Illegality
In the twenty years since Joseph Carens wrote that birth
in a prosperous state is the modern equivalent of feudal
privilege, his statement has become truer than ever as it
travels through time to the cusp of a postmodern world.
This truth comes from the shifting nature of sovereignty
under the pressures of globalization, and from the
resulting transformation in migration laws that
undercuts the individual equality of liberal legalism
with a rigid hierarchy of entitlement.70
Catherine Dauvergne has written extensively on the question of migration and
liberal democracies, but it is not this body of work that I intend to focus on at the
moment.71 Rather, I turn to her more recent work on globalization, migration and
illegality, though it must be acknowledged that, for reasons I will touch upon below,
this work flows directly from Dauvergne’s earlier conclusions on migration and the
liberal state.72
Before delving into Dauvergne’s observations on the security-migration nexus, it
is important to explain in some detail the larger context in which these observations
take place. Like Benhabib and Carens, Dauvergne’s viewpoint is a cosmopolitan one
and she also begins with the reminder that migration has long been a ubiquitous
social force. But whereas Benhabib explores the ways in which studies in migration
yield interesting insights into contemporary liberal democracies, Dauvergne’s
project in Making People Illegal is to explore the connections, and the interstices,
between migration, globalization and the rule of law.

Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law
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Dauvergne’s central argument is that, as states have ceded more and more
control over domestic policy to globalization processes, they have increasingly
turned to migration laws as a “last bastion” of sovereign control.73 To Dauvergne,
this effort on the part of states to exert control, in one of the few remaining areas
where they can still do so, is revealed in several different sites of contact between
insiders and outsiders. Much of her work in Making People Illegal is in examining
these sites of contact (or “core samples” as she calls them), which include labor
migration, refugee law, human trafficking and smuggling, national security, and the
nature of citizenship. These core samples, Dauvergne suggests, provide interesting
raw material with which to explore the contours of globalization and law.

To

Dauvergne, globalization and the resulting “push-back” of states in the area of
migration are largely responsible for the recasting of migration as an act of illegality,
criminality and deviance.
Another central theme in Making People Illegal is precisely what is implied in its
title – the manufacturing of illegality through law. “However it is defined,”
Dauvergne rightly suggests, “illegality is a creation of the law.”74 It is not, of course,
a novel proposition to suggest that the act of defining that which is legal also (and
simultaneously) defines that which is illegal.

Notwithstanding the fact that

migration laws have always created insider/outsider distinctions, Dauvergne
suggests that legislative changes and political machinations over the past two
decades have created a sharp edge of illegality to these distinctions. For a legal
scholar such as Dauvergne, then, the question that emerges is whether law itself can
be mobilized to help alleviate this illegality.75
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Her response to this question is a qualified and tentative “yes” but only under
certain conditions. At the outset, she strongly asserts that neither domestic nor
formal international legal mechanisms are up to the task. Drawing on the work of
De Sousa Santos (though substantially diverging from it), Dauvergne sets out two
main conditions for the realization of law’s “emancipatory potential.” First, the rule
of law needs to be “unhinged” from its domestic sources and replaced by a sort of
transnational version of the rule of law that is rooted in the global. And by global,
Dauvergne does not mean international legal treaties or anything of the kind, but
rather, a rule of law that emerges from “an existent ethics of a community of law.”76
And this leads to the second condition, which is that gains will only be made upon a
“thick” conception of the rule of law; a conception, in other words, of a rule of law
based on principles of equality, freedom and impartiality that is “imbued with
process rights so strong they form a platform of human dignity at the core of the law
itself…”77 Dauvergne states:
Here the question is raised of the potential of a thick
version of the rule of law overlapping the boundaries of
national legal systems. In recent transformations of
migration laws, this emerges in my view as the sole
location for the emancipatory potential. As I illustrate…
an assessment of any progressive potential of migration
law is discouraging from the perspectives of
international law (especially international human rights
law) and domestic law. But almost in the spaces
between these texts, there is the hint of something else.
This is what is so intriguing about exploring the
globalization of law in this context. If what can be
glimpsed here is a thick and unhinged…rule of law, we
are indeed on the cusp of a paradigmatic shift in
thinking about the law. If what is making this possible is
a “regardful community of law,” a new faith may
emerge.
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According to Dauvergne, it is really only through basic principles of law,
unhinged from the distorting pressures of domestic legal contexts, that a substantial
rethinking of the illegalization of migration can occur. A globally situated rule of law
would proceed, for example, on the presumption that the law and the protections
contained within it apply to all persons. In the exceptional realm of migration law,
this would already indicate a paradigmatic shift.

It would also imply that all

persons, regardless of their immigration status, would be entitled to certain basic
rights, such as the right to be heard, a meaningful system of review and, presumably,
the right to receive reasons for decisions that may have a fundamental impact on
one’s rights. Foreshadowing what will become a central theme of this dissertation,
what would be required, in other words, is a process of justification in which the
persons affected by a given decision would be communicatively engaged in the
process.
But more fundamentally, what is this version of the rule of law of which
Dauvergne speaks? This is a matter of some opacity in Making People Illegal and
Dauvergne has been critiqued for failing to specify with precision what she means
by the term. 78 It is clear that Dauvergne is referring to something more substantive
than the narrow set of procedural rights afforded the undocumented in many
receiving states, but is she simply calling for more procedure, for more “law
measured by volume,” as she puts it or is there something more radical in her
approach?79
Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, Dauvergne’s globalization/migration thesis
is an intriguing one, in part because it flows naturally from our earlier discussion on
the place of migration in liberal states. Unlike Carens, Dauvergne is largely on board
with Rawls and Walzer in her diagnosis of the relationship between migration and
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liberal states – in essence, there is no necessary relationship.80 To Dauvergne, the
liberal state may very well be built on the foundational presupposition that “the
borders to the community are, or at least can morally be, closed.”81 And if, as Walzer
suggests, the question of membership is a prior ideal to those of justice or equality
then it is membership itself that becomes the “primary good that a community
bestows.”82 Closure therefore is the presumed starting point and any openings
remain the prerogative of the community, a prerogative that is mediated in today’s
world through migration law, though crucially, the rule of law is also implicated:
In order for the community to operate against an
assumption of closed borders, there must be a way of
closing them, of identifying who has a right to cross
them, and of providing for enforcement of their closure.
Although ultimately the coercive power of the state
provides these things, it is the rule of law that
legitimates them and makes them part of the liberal
state.83
The result is that, by necessary implication, people are ‘made’ illegal. This said,
while Dauvergne may share the views of classical liberal theorists on these points,
she likely differs with them greatly on the prescription that follows the diagnosis.
This is because, unlike the majority of classical liberal theorists, Dauvergne appears
normatively uncomfortable with her observations and so she traverses global legal
and political developments in search of a new source of law that, to her mind, would
produce better, more just results. As a mere extension of domestic priorities,
Dauvergne rejects international law (with the possible exception of refugee law) as
a site of progressive potential. And this is why, in the end, we arrive back at
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Dauvergne’s call for an unhinging of the rule of law from its domestic base and a
grafting of it onto an ethical (and ethereal) community of law.
With all of this in mind, I turn (at last) to Dauvergne’s examination of the
connections between security and migration, though to do so I remain within the
realm of liberal theory for another couple of moments. While Dauvergne suggests
that community is prior to individual rights, it is security, or at least a desire for it,
that both precedes and inspires the creation of community in the first place. This is,
after all, at the very core of the liberal bargain:
The classic bargain of the liberal state is that between
the perils of individuated life without the protection of a
collectivity on the one hand and loss of individual
liberty to the state on the other. Whether this balance
involves an abject state of nature and a Leviathan, a
social contract, or an original position, its basic
structure is the same. The fulcrum of this balance is
security – staying safe is the reason for the trade,
constituting a community is the result. As a central
construct of the liberal state, this balancing act is
replicated in diverse settings. Contemporary
contestation of security and migration is a key
illustration.84
Given her premise that security and (bounded) communities form two of the
pillars of the modern liberal state, it is not surprising that Dauvergne begins her
analysis of migration and security with the uncontroversial observation that the two
have essentially always been paired together. Others have made, and provided a
critique of, the same observation.

Elspeth Guild, for example, suggests that

undocumented migrants are deemed security threats not because they pose an
individualized threat to citizens of the host country, but because “the remit of the
state is reconfigured,” that is, migrants are deemed a threat because they call into
question the sanctity of the state as the central superstructure organizing human
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relations.85 It is also because migration and security are viewed as threats to the
liberal way of being that state responses to them have tended towards the
exceptional. Dauvergne continues:
In the migration realm, security is more easily
understood in the terms of newer constructivist and
critical scholarship that tell us that when something is a
security issue, both threat and exceptional politics are
to be expected. These newer understandings of security
focus on how states, nations, peoples, or others come to
understand something as an important threat to their
existence or way of being. In response to this threat,
they are then prepared to take actions that are in some
way extraordinary, suspending, or circumventing what
counts as “normal” decision making. “Normal” involves
the rule of law; when one is jettisoned, the other often
goes with it. This way of understanding security issues
helps us make sense of reactions that would seem
nonsensical without the elements of both threat and
exception.86
It can fairly be said that one of Dauvergne’s central objectives in her writing on
migration and security is to unsettle the relationship between the two. That she
views the relationship between security and migration as tenuous is immediately
apparent; the chapter on security begins with a description of the calls for
immigration reform that followed the 2005 London terrorist bombings,
notwithstanding the fact that it was British citizens, born and raised, who planned
and executed the attacks. Dauvergne is certainly not alone in this endeavour. As
noted above, Elspeth Guild devotes considerable attention to debunking the
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security-migration nexus in her work.87 It is also central to the scholarship of
Canadian scholar Sharryn Aiken, who notes that:
Numerous studies confirm that the overall impact of
refugee flows on the crime rate and internal security of
receiving countries tends to be misjudged and
overestimated. In Canada refugees and immigrants are
actually less likely to commit major crimes than the
native-born, and are under-represented in the national
prison population. Nevertheless, in both Canada and the
United States, refugees and immigrants have been
criminalized and "securitized" in efforts to assuage
conditions of turmoil and anxiety.88
Notwithstanding the long, if dubious, pedigree of the security-migration nexus,
Dauvergne points to an increasing tendency to cast migration as a security issue
throughout the 1990’s, followed by a profoundly sharpened focus on such tactics
following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September, 2001. Dauvergne
identifies three of the ways in which the immigration landscape has changed since
9/11. First, and most important for our purposes, Dauvergne rightly notes that the
past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of discretionary measures
that the executive has at its disposal to regulate migration.89 Such measures provide
the executive (often, but not always through decision-makers) a margin of
manoeuvre within which to operate and are relatively manipulable because of the
broad statutory language in which they are frequently couched.90
The consequence is that security measures can be quickly ratcheted up to
respond to perceived threats, even in the absence of legislative change.91 The
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concentration of power within the executive is a common, if not natural, tendency in
times of danger – it represents a shift in the balance of the classic bargain referred
to above – more security in the form of unchecked executive power, but less
freedom.

There has been an explosion of commentary on these exceptional

approaches to decision-making in matters that touch on security and I will explore
at least one stream of it in greater detail below, in the writing of David Dyzenhaus.
The second change that Dauvergne identifies is the creation of new specialized
government agencies that have, as their very raison d’etre, the security-migration
nexus. As examples of this phenomenon, she points to the fact that the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service was “swallowed whole” by the Department
of Homeland Security and the creation in Canada of the Canada Border Services
Agency (CBSA), under the auspices of the Minister for Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness.92
In a very tangible way, these organizational changes serve to embed the
connection between security, public safety and immigration. But the changes have
much more than just a symbolic importance. As Dauvergne notes, they also have the
effect of moving government decision-making on many immigration matters into an
organizational structure with a “differing governing ethos” – an ethos, that is, of
enforcement and security.93 Agencies such as the CBSA do not foster inclusion; on
the contrary, one might view inclusion as the very antithesis of their raison d’ètre.
Where they are involved in decision-making, therefore, they operate within an
organizational ethos in which removal is the end-game of immigration. They are, I
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think Dauvergne would agree, the embodiment of what she views as the liberal
presumption against open borders.94
The final change that Dauvergne identifies is the increasing cooperation and
information sharing amongst Western states in matters of both immigration control
and security. In making this observation, Dauvergne relies heavily on the nascent
security studies discipline, and particularly on the so-called “Copenhagen School,”
which is commonly credited for coining the term “securitization.” The Copenhagen
School espouses the idea that security is not an objective fact, but rather a “speech
act” aimed at moving a topic away from the political (and the legal) and into the
domain of the exceptional: “Traditionally, by saying ‘security,’ a state representative
declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are
necessary to block a threatening development.”95

Dauvergne describes the

approach as follows:
This [call for greater government intelligence gathering
and information sharing] corresponds well with the
Copenhagen School’s analysis of the “grammar” of a
security speech act: a plot with an external threat, a
point of no return, a possible way out. It is the notion of
a way out that makes the speech act a call for
securitization. This way out means that there is
something that can address the threat provided the
actors involved are willing to move beyond the limits of
normal politics. Without the possibility of a way out,
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there is no securitization because there is no call to
action.96
In further adopting and adapting the Copenhagen approach, Dauvergne next
moves onto a phenomenon she terms “fact-resistance.”97 She uses the term to
indicate a state of being whereby once something (or someone) has been identified
as a security threat and transported into the realm of the exceptional, facts take on
an ever-diminishing importance. In the language of the Copenhagen School, this is
an example of the “intersubjectivity” of the securitization process. As mentioned
above, securitization in this approach is not a question of an objective threat, but
nor is it merely a subjective perception of risk.

It is, rather, a public act of

acquiescence to the language of security.98 Once something, such as migration, has
successfully been cast as a security issue, fact-resistance kicks in, analysis stops,
scrutiny turns off like a light, and exceptional expressions of executive power come
in through the dark.
Closely connected to fact-resistance is the racialization and “othering” of the
security setting. Dauvergne suggests that an image of “foreign-ness” is central to the
security narrative; it provides a clear, if inaccurate, reason for attacks and provides
the (at least illusory) comfort in knowing who the threats are.99 One of the central
findings of the empirical investigations that I have undertaken (outlined in detail in
Chapter Two) is that while security-migration legislation is broad enough to capture
enormous swaths of people from many (including Western) countries, the actual
cohort of those subjected to inadmissibility determinations represents a far
narrower set of countries. This fact would appear to bear out the “othering” process
of which Dauvergne speaks.
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After reviewing the ways in which the migration-security nexus has played out
in the jurisprudence of several states, Dauvergne moves on to several concluding
observations, two of which are worth mentioning here. The first flows from another
observation of the Copenhagen School, that the securitization of migration has
become, in large measure, normalized, which in turn causes the exceptional
approaches of the security setting to become normal. Channelling Giorgio Agamben,
Dauvergne suggests that this state of exception means that it is “more and more
normal to treat migration, particularly of asylum seekers, as a policing matter rather
than

a

question

of

economic

redistribution,

social

composition,

or

humanitarianism.”100 And indeed, since Making People Illegal was published, we
have seen, at least within the Canadian context, a striking increase in exceptional
and enforcement-minded approaches to migration.
When the exceptional becomes normal and the normal exceptional, Agamben
has (now famously) observed that examples of “bare life” can be expected to
emerge.101 While Agamben’s prototypical example of bare life is that which existed
inside the concentration camps and his contemporary example is Guantánamo Bay,
other less extreme examples of bare life can emerge from the exceptional practices
of the executive, one of which, I assert, is the indefinite and potentially unwarranted
state of limbo experienced by those labelled as security threats.102
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The second of Dauvergne’s concluding observations relates to the rule of law,
and the marginalization of law, in the exceptional politics of security. Security
politics, Dauvergne suggests, “thrive on exception, the defined antithesis of the rule
of law.”103 Clearly Dauvergne is of the view that the pendulum has swung too far in
the direction of security and that the classic tradeoff between rights and security
needs to be recalibrated. The question is how to reel back the “jettisoned” rule of
law and the answer, to Dauvergne, is to find its source in a location other than that
which shed it in the first place – the state.
While I find much of value in Dauvergne’s engaging analysis, I hesitate to accept
entirely the determinism of her claims regarding the nature of the liberal state vis-àvis outsiders. The empirical validity of her observations on the securitization of
migration and the resort to exceptional policies is unassailable; and whether or not
exclusion is inherent to liberal communities, they have certainly acted as if this were
the case throughout much of recent history.

This said, where I differ with

Dauvergne is in the degree to which the exception is ordained. In this respect, I
agree with Jeremy Webber who, in a critique of Agamben, provides:
Agamben's is not my argument. His theory carries with
it a structural determinism that I do not accept, creating
the reciprocal relation of exception and insider as
universal, engrained within the logic of the state. In
doing so it lets our governments off the hook. States do
define themselves in significant measure through their
policies on membership, including their immigration
and refugee policies. But Agamben's presumption that
the definition necessarily involves stark differentiation
between those within the sphere of the state's concern
and those without is excessively Manichean. Nor is it
borne out in practice, where even those states that seek
to establish hermetic boundaries find themselves drawn
into broader spheres of interaction, many states
interact more positively with their would-be entrants,
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and within the Australian context in particular many
individuals advocated a very different role for law.
States sometimes do pursue policies that seek to
establish their identity against a demonized and
rigorously excluded other. If that is the aim, asylum
seekers are easy targets, unable to fight back. States
sometimes embrace executive action and dismantle
legal constraints in their rush to confront that other.
They embrace, in other words, both a Schmittian
tendency to create clear enemies and a Schmittian
constitutional ethos. But neither is necessary. Neither
should be able to rely on our acquiescence.104
What resonates most to me about the above passage is Webber’s refusal to
accept the membership/equality conundrum as a stark either-or proposition, but
rather as a site of tension and negotiation within the liberal state. President Barack
Obama’s recent decision to halt deportations of young, long term illegal residents is
one, albeit minor, example of the nuance and complexity of executive action.105
Dauvergne would likely suggest that this measure represents itself a legally
exceptional measure intended to counteract the most troubling aspects of a legally
exceptional immigration regime. While this may be true on some level, it is at the
same time an expression of the view that at least some non-citizens have certain
moral (if not legal) claims that are difficult to ignore.106
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There may always be a temptation for the executive to descend into the realm of
the exceptional, but the descent can be averted and restraint is possible. David
Dyzenhaus has wrestled precisely with these issues and I turn now to something of
a debate between him and Harvard professor Adrian Vermeule on the role of law,
administration and the judiciary in responding to exceptional executive action.
1.3.2 Black and White and Read All Over – David Dyzenhaus and Legal Grey
Holes
What we have is the growth of governmental power, so
that law becomes the vehicle by which the government
delegates back to itself the power to make policy for
which it will be accountable only at the next election.
Rather than legislative supremacy, we have executive
supremacy.107

Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not
increase granted power or remove or diminish the
restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved.
The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave
emergency. Its grants of power to the federal
government and its limitations of the power of the
States were determined in the light of emergency, and
they are not altered by emergency. What power was
thus granted and what limitations were thus imposed
are questions which have always been, and always will
be, the subject of close examination under our
constitutional system.108
I believe I am on firm ground in stating that both David Dyzenhaus and
Catherine Dauvergne call for a legal regime based on a thicker version of the rule of
law, and that judges have an important role to play in this project. This being said,
they differ significantly on the avenues by which this version of the rule of law may
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come about. They have the same destination in mind, if you will, but they disagree
fundamentally on the questions of where we are and how to get there.
As noted above, Dauvergne is of the view that matters of migration are beyond
the borders of what the liberal state can contemplate. This being the case, any
domestic conception of the rule of law cannot, at least in any sustained way, be
counted upon to benefit non-citizens, particularly where matters of security are
involved. As a result, Dauvergne argues that the rule of law must be extricated from
its domestic source, and placed into the realm of a global community of law.
While Dyzenhaus does not focus on migration, he has written extensively
about the rule of law, executive authority and administrative law and his views on
these subjects can quite easily be grafted onto the migration context. In short,
Dyzenhaus is not of the view that exceptional approaches are inherent to liberal
states, but rather, where they arise, they represent “embedded mistakes” in the legal
order.109 The goal for Dyzenhaus then, is not to situate the rule of law elsewhere,
but to use the law in an attempt to correct the mistake. In Dyzenhaus’ words, the
aim is to “banish the exception from the legal order.”110
The last decade has witnessed a remarkable, if somewhat off-putting
renaissance. Since the events of September 11, 2001, and more particularly since
states responded to the terrorist attacks of that date, there has been a renewed
interest in the writing of the Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt. The interest arises
from Schmitt’s commentary on how states respond to perceived emergency
situations and his views continue to be a polarizing phenomenon. In both “Schmitt
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v. Dicey”, an article published in the Cardozo Law Review, and his later work, “The
Constitution of Law: Legality In a Time of Emergency,” Dyzenhaus takes up the
challenge of addressing and unseating the Schmittian perspective on legality in
times of emergency.

Schmitt’s perspective is neatly conveyed in what is

undoubtedly the most cited line from his body of work: "Sovereign is he who
decides on the exception."111 Shortly after this remark, Schmitt further elaborates
on its meaning:
There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a
legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist,
and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this
normal situation actually exists…All law is "situational
law." The sovereign produces and guarantees the
situation in its totality. He has the monopoly over this
last decision. Therein resides the essence of the state's
sovereignty, which must be juristically defined
correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but
as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most
clearly the essence of the state's authority. The decision
parts here from the legal norm, and (to formulate it
paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it
need not be based on law.112
Perhaps the central idea in Schmitt’s writing is the inherent contradiction
that he saw in the notion, common in constitutional democracies, that states of
emergency – the suspension of law – can be brought about by law. To Schmitt, this
view is not only something of a logical fallacy, but it also represents a fundamental
misapprehension of the fact that political authority is not ultimately constituted by
law; it is prior to law. The source of sovereign authority, in other words, comes
from outside of the legal order.113 Moreover, the legal order itself, or at least the
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application of it, is based on a sovereign decision and not on a legal norm. In this
structure, argued Schmitt, the state retains the power necessary to act decisively in
times of existential crisis, in part because it gets to decide when such crises arise
and recede. Legal norms are well and good in normal times, but in emergencies, the
sovereign must have the capacity to act in an unfettered manner and need not find
authority to do so from the law. All law is situational law. More to the point, the
existence of law is contingent on the will of the sovereign, for in times of emergency,
the polity becomes a lawless space, a legal black hole, of which Guantanamo Bay is
the most prominent current example.114
While Dyzenhaus takes issue with the term “black hole” – he prefers “a space
beyond law” – he nevertheless coins a similar term to describe a parallel
phenomenon, “legal grey holes.” Unlike legal black holes, which explicitly operate in
a realm in which the rule of law is eviscerated, legal grey holes are much more
common and they arise in subtler circumstances. A legal grey hole involves the use
of a veneer of legality to cover over what is, in reality, a draconian act of executive
power. Veneer is an apt analogy here, for the rule of law principles that are used to
justify such grey holes are remarkably thin. In this scenario, it is not in fact rule of
law that governs, but rather, rule by law. The difference, to Dyzenhaus, is crucial:
“rule of law” is a substantive framework of norms that serve to constrain executive
action. Rule by law, by contrast, implies a thin conception of the rule of law, one
which permits grey holes to arise. Dyzenhaus describes grey holes in this way:
While it is relatively rare to find a position that
articulates so stark a view, it is quite common to find
positions that are comfortable with grey holes, as long
as these are properly created. A grey hole is a legal

definitional feature of the sovereign, it can take on many different forms: dictator, president and
executive being the first to come to mind.
114 In describing American responses to 9/11, Johan Steyn is generally thought to have coined the
term “legal black hole,” see Johan Steyn, “Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole” (2004) 53 Int’l &
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space in which there are some legal constraints on
executive action-it is not a lawless void-but the
constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well
permit government to do as it pleases. And since such
grey holes permit government to have its cake and eat it
too, to seem to be governing not only by law but in
accordance with the rule of law, they and their
endorsement by judges and academics might be even
more dangerous from the perspective of the substantive
conception of the rule of law than true black holes.115
Dyzenhaus’ description of the difference between black and grey holes is
reminiscent of the way that many people describe the difference between Jim Crow
era racial segregation and the lingering, though hidden from view racism that
persists: less overt, but more insidious and probably harder to eliminate. In another
passage worth citing directly, Dyzenhaus notes
Another way of making my point is to say that grey
holes are more harmful to the rule of law than black
holes. As I have indicated, a grey hole is a space in which
the detainee has some procedural rights but not rights
sufficient for him effectively to contest the executive's
case for his detention. It is in substance a legal black
hole, but it is worse because the procedural rights
available to the detainee cloak the lack of substance. It is
of course a delicate matter to decide when the
blackness shades through grey into something that
provides a detainee with adequate rule of law
protection-when, that is, on the continuum of legality,
the void ceases to be such. But for the moment I want
simply to establish that minimalism is too close to the
black hole end of the continuum for comfort. A little bit
of legality can be more lethal to the rule of law than
none.116
It is my suspicion that much of migration law in Western states, and particularly
that which relates to security concerns, takes place within legal grey holes. Few

115
116

Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 109 at 2018.
Ibid at 2026.

64

would argue that migrants within Western states have no legal rights. This said, the
legal rights that are granted to non-citizens tilt to the thin end of the spectrum, often
being confined to the most basic of procedural rights. And even these rights tend to
be minimal: participatory rights are circumscribed, appellate rights are limited and
access to legal representation is, at best, scattershot.
As with Jeremy Webber, Dyzenhaus does not deny that both black and grey
legal holes can arise, but he does reject the notion, Schmitt’s notion, that they are
structurally determined. In doing so, he looks to the work of three of the most
influential legal scholars of the past 100 years: A.V. Dicey’s treatises on the rule of
law, Lon Fuller’s writing on the inner morality of law and Hans Kelsen’s Identity
Thesis: the thesis that the state is totally constituted by law.
According to Dyzenhaus, a (slightly modified) Diceyan conception of the rule of
law responds directly to the two-pronged challenge posed by Schmitt – first, the
courts must retain the authority to decide whether the government has a justified
claim that there is an emergency; and second, the courts must also assess whether
the actual responses to the emergency are legal.117 In other words, Dyzenhaus
argues that law must retain a role during exceptional times, and that the rule of law
should be understood as “a rule of fundamental constitutional principles which
protect individuals from arbitrary action by the state.”118
What about constitutionally authorized emergency clauses? Dyzenhaus suggests
that the existence of such clauses is an unnecessary concession to Schmitt, even if
one maintains that derogations from the rule of law under emergency situations
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must be justified under a parallel legal order.119 Indeed, at the very centre of
Dyzenhaus’ understanding of the rule of law is the notion that legal order is unitary,
admitting of no parallel or exceptional circumstances. And this is where Dyzenhaus
refers to Hans Kelsen’s identity thesis:
According to that thesis, when a political entity acts
outside of the law, its acts can no longer be attributed to
the state and so they have no authority. Dicey, on my
understanding, subscribes to the same thesis, and
differs from Kelsen only in that he clearly takes the
claim that the state is constituted by law to mean that
the law that constitutes the state and its authority
includes the principles of the rule of law. This has the
result that a political entity acts as a state when and
only when its acts comply with the rule of law. There
will of course be thicker and thinner versions of the
Identity Thesis, and Dicey's is much thicker, or more
substantive, than Kelsen's.120
If Dicey and Kelsen help to establish that all executive actions, even those
taken in the most dire of circumstances, must be subjected to the rule of law, it is
Lon Fuller who assists Dyzenhaus in providing thick substantive content to those
rule of law principles. To Fuller (and Dyzenhaus) the rule of law is more than mere
compliance with whatever duly enacted positive laws there happen to be; in
Dyzenhaus’ words, this would be “rule by law.” By contrast, the rule of law under
Fullerian principles imposes substantive requirements on laws to be recognized as
such; laws, in other words, must comport with a broader set of principles of legality,
which Fuller set out in his seminal The Morality of Law.121
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While beyond the scope of what I intend to undertake in this study, Fuller’s
principles of legality provide that laws must be: (1) sufficiently general; (2) publicly
promulgated; (3) sufficiently prospective; (4) clear and intelligible; (5) free of
contradiction; (6) sufficiently constant through time so that individuals can order
their behavior accordingly; (7) not impossible to comply with; and (8) administered
in a way sufficiently congruent with their wording so that individuals can abide by
them. In the chapters that follow, I will seek to demonstrate that the securitymigration scheme has failed to comply with these basic principles of legality, but for
now I simply flag them as an integral part of Dyzenhaus’ approach to banning
exceptional practices from the legal order.
Another important principle that arises in Dyzenhaus’ work is one that has
woven itself throughout this brief review of the literature – that of justification.
According to Dyzenhaus, a Diceyan interpretation of the rule of law, as applied to
emergency situations, is sufficiently flexible to permit officials to respond to
emergencies, but also requires them to “justify to an independent tribunal their
decisions as both necessary and made in good faith.”122 The tribunal proceedings
must be independent and must take place on a full evidentiary record, and in
proceedings involving a perceived security threat, the onus of establishing that an
individual does pose such a threat must lie with the state.

These measures,

undertaken within the context of a robust conception of the rule of law, achieve a
dual goal – they provide a statutory basis for official decisions and, perhaps more
importantly, they ensure that decisions are made in a “spirit of legality.”123
The effect of this requirement for justification is that it provides decisionmakers with a basis on which to evaluate the legitimacy of government action and
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carries with it the potential to limit the harmful effects of legal grey holes. At the
very least, it enables the judiciary to bring legal grey holes into the light of day:
And to the extent that holes created by statute are grey
rather than black, judges, as long as they are not
minimalists, can use the legal protections provided as a
basis for trying to reduce official arbitrariness to the
greatest extent possible. In doing so, they challenge the
government either to make clearer its intention that
detainees should be placed outside the protection of the
law or to come up with some better way of fulfilling its
claim to be committed to the rule of law.124
Elsewhere, Dyzenhaus has elaborated more fully on the role of justification in his
conception of the rule of law, most notably in commenting on the work (both
judicial and academic) of the late South African jurist Etienne Mureinik. Dyzenhaus,
also a South African, was deeply influenced by Mureinik and, presumably, by the
experience of growing up in a place defined by the most notorious of executive
abuses. In adopting much of what Mureinik called for during Apartheid, Dyzenhaus
argues that the “the constraints of legality are the constraints of adequate
justification.”125 The rule of law requires that public officials provide reasons for
their actions, even during emergencies, and these reasons must be consistent with
the fundamental principles of legal order.126 Mureinik himself put it this way:
If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture
of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It
must lead to a culture of justification - a culture in
which every exercise of power is expected to be
justified; in which the leadership given by government
rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its
decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its
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command. The new order must be a community built on
persuasion, not coercion.127
A culture of justification is a discursive culture, one based on the exchange of
ideas, arguments and persuasions. In Chapter Four, I will elaborate on what this
means in the migration-security context, but in brief, I suggest that a culture of
justification requires that dialogue take place between government officials and
those who are affected by their decisions. To borrow from Lorne Sossin, this in turn
means that that such dialogue must take place in a manner in which all parties are
“equally empowered to be persuasive,” so that decision-makers are motivated “by
the force of a better argument,” rather than the whims of the executive.128
With this in mind, I now turn very briefly to criticism of Dyzenhaus’
approach, as articulated by Adrian Vermeule.

1.3.3 Adrian Vermuele and Administrative Law – Inherently Schmittian?
I look to the approach of Adrian Vermuele, not because I adopt it as my own, but
because Vermuele responds to Dyzenhaus’ effort to “banish the exception from the
legal order” in the specific context of administrative law, which is of course highly
relevant to immigration matters. According to Vermuele, administrative law is
structurally riddled with processes, practices and decisions that either explicitly or
implicitly exempt the executive from legal constraints; that create, in other words,
legal black and grey holes. These exceptional approaches cannot, realistically at
least, be banished from administrative law as “they are necessarily built into its
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fabric.”129 This being the case, efforts to extend legality to eliminate these black and
grey holes – what Dyzenhaus refers to as the rule of law project – are both
impracticable and “hopelessly utopian.”130
Ironically, one person who may have agreed with Vermuele was the very person
who Dyzenhaus enlists in support of his argument for the banning of the exception –
A.V. Dicey. Dicey was notoriously suspicious of administrative law as a true form of
law given its proximity to the executive, and while he certainly did not use the
language of black and grey holes, his concern was clearly that such phenomena
would arise under an administrative regime.131
Vermuele’s view of administrative law as inherently Schmittian is, in many
respects, an empirical one. His conclusions rest on numerous examples in which
legally exceptional approaches have been taken in the administrative realm, and
takes these examples as proof-positive that such exceptions are inevitable. His
proposition is essentially that because black and grey holes have existed, they must
inevitably exist. The examples he provides of “law-free zones” and “sham review”
are “themselves the facts to be established” and their mere existence is sufficient to
establish that administrative law is “substantially Schmittian.”132
One of the main reasons why such exceptions have existed and always will exist
is, according to Vermuele, because of the inherently unpredictable nature of
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emergency situations and the unwillingness of legislatures to bind the hands of the
executive in responding to the unexpected. Vermeule states in this regard:
Emergencies cannot realistically be governed by ex
ante, highly specified rules, but at most by vague ex post
standards; it is beyond the institutional capacity of
lawmakers to specify and allocate emergency powers in
all future contingencies; practically speaking, legislators
in particular will feel enormous pressure to create
vague standards and escape hatches - for emergencies
and otherwise - in the code of legal procedure that
governs the mine run of ordinary cases in the
administrative state, because legislators know they
cannot subject the massively diverse body of
administrative entities to tightly specified rules, and
because they fear the consequences of lashing the
executive too tightly to the mast in future emergencies.
As we will see, all of these institutional features are
central to our administrative law, and they create the
preconditions for the emergence of the legal black holes
and legal grey holes that are integral to its structure.133
As Scheureman intimates, however, the fact that law cannot necessarily predict
the nature of undefined future emergencies does not mean it cannot govern them –
indeed, this is the very point of the kind of common law constitutionalism proposed
by Dyzenhaus.134
In addition to the fact that states seek to marginalize the courts in times of
emergency by adding layers of exception to the laws they create, Vermuele also
argues that the courts themselves want no part of emergency situations. They “dial
down” the intensity of judicial review in times of emergency and in matters of
national security and dial it back up again when the emergency has dissipated or on
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matters not touching on the security of the nation.135 To Vermuele, the general
parameters for judicial review, such as review for arbitrariness or capriciousness
are adjustable in a manner that creates grey holes in exceptional times. These
“adjustable parameters,” he continues are inherent to administrative law and they
inevitably lead to judges applying different standards at different times.

In

developing this argument, Vermeule again points to examples (in this case
jurisprudential ones) of exceptional practices as proof of his assertion. He sums up
this prong of his argument as follows:
Nor do judges of any party or ideological bent want to
extend legality so far, partly because they fear the
responsibility of doing so, partly because they
understand the limits of their own competence and fear
that uninformed judicial meddling with the executive
will have harmful consequences where national security
is at stake, and partly because it has simply never been
done before.136
There is no doubt some validity to Vermeule’s observations. Administrative law,
and more acutely the realm of administrative discretion, both contemplate and
permit exceptional approaches. And as Dauvergne has observed, the ratcheting up
of both discretionary action and deference in the post-9/11 world have palpably
contributed to the security climate in which we live. But again, the question is not
whether this is the case, but whether this should be the case. Dyzenhaus, of course,
would readily agree that exceptional practices exist and even that they have become
endemic in matters of national security. But in this sense, I suggest that Vermuele
overly focuses on the symptoms of our present system, without properly
considering either Dyzenhaus’ diagnosis or his prescription for addressing a
perceived excess of executive power.

In the process, Vermuele confuses the

aspirational with the utopian. Furthermore, while much of Vermuele’s argument
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has the appearance of neutrality – he says that he takes no position on the question
of whether legal black and grey holes are desirable – at other times, he clearly
descends into normative arguments about their necessity.137
To his credit, Vermuele confines his arguments to the United States, given his
quasi-empirical approach and his acknowledgment that all of the examples of legal
exceptionalism to which he refers take place in the context of U.S. administrative
law. This said, he strongly suggests that his observations are generalizable, and he
does so for good reason. For if there are examples of administrative regimes that
have not followed a Schmittian agenda, it undercuts, indeed refutes, his assertion
that such an agenda is a patent inevitability. And if other jurisdictions are not
Schmittian, there is no reason (aside perhaps from American exceptionalism) that
the United States must be. This, in part, is where Vermeule’s argument comes short.
In failing to refer to examples where a robust and thick conception of the rule of law
has been utilized, some of which were discussed by both Dauvergne and Dyzenhaus,
Vermuele comes across as wishing them away. But to the extent that they do exist,
they undermine his assertion, not that grey holes exist, but that they must exist.

See for example the following passage at p.1133, where Vermuele appears to stake out both his
neutrality and his normative position in the same paragraph:
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However, the main point I want to suggest is not that black and
grey holes are desirable; it is that they are inevitable. Black holes
arise because legislators and executive officials will never agree to
subject all executive action to thick legal standards, because the
inevitability of changing circumstances and unforeseen
circumstances means they could not do so even if they tried - one
of Schmitt's points – and because the judges would not want them
to do so in any event. There are too many domains affecting
national security in which official opinion holds unanimously,
across institutions and partisan lines and throughout the modern
era, that executive action must proceed untrammeled by even the
threat of legal regulation and judicial review, no matter how
deferential that review might be on the merits.
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Conclusion
In this somewhat brief theoretical exploration of themes related to borders,
security, legality and the rule of law, I have attempted to outline some of the key
debates that lie at the very root of immigration matters, particularly the subset of
immigration decision-making that relates to questions of national security. One
thread that has emerged over these pages and that will continue to be woven into
this study is that of the importance of justification, discourse and dialogue between
states and those affected by their decisions, including migrants. Justification is
important to Carens, at least in his later work, and is central to that of Benhabib,
Dauvergne and Dyzenhaus.
I turn now to a detailed exploration of security-migration decision-making in the
context of Canadian law and to an empirical analysis of some of the problematic
trends that I contend have emerged in recent years. As I do, however, it is important
to keep in mind the contributions of the scholars that I have referred to in this
chapter, as they provide an important theoretical context for the increasingly
exclusionary nature of Canadian immigration law. The themes that I have described
above also help to inform the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, in which I set
out an argument that a Third World perspective on international law, paired with a
dialogical approach to administrative law could foster decision-making in the
migration-security context that complies with core rule of law principles, that takes
seriously the lived experiences of those subject to security decisions and that is, in
the end, both intelligible and justifiable.
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CHAPTER TWO: SECURITY INADMISSIBILITY IN
CANADA – A CASE STUDY
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I set out how the security-migration nexus plays out, in practical
terms, within the framework of immigration law. More particularly, using the
example of the Canadian security-inadmissibility apparatus, I intend to explore how
both legislative over-breadth and the discretionary decisions that undergird the
security inadmissibility process give rise to situations reminiscent of Dyzenhaus’
legal grey holes.
At the outset, I will provide a background to the current legislative framework,
and then proceed to an analysis of the current law on security-inadmissibility,
noting along the way its bearing on refugee protection and Canada’s obligations
under international law. I will also explore in some detail the jurisprudence as it
has unfolded under the current inadmissibility regime and finally, I will turn to an
empirical exploration of data that has been collected on inadmissibility decisions
made over the past decade.
The vast breadth of the security-inadmissibility legislation will be immediately
apparent in this analysis. The breadth of discretion afforded immigration officials
should be equally apparent. More subtly, I contend that decisions on immigration
security are suffused with a North-South chauvinism that, in combination with the
breadth of both legislation and discretion, has yielded unfortunate results. More
specifically, I intend to illustrate how the security-inadmissibility regime has come
to be preoccupied with a very particular kind of individual, namely those with any
perceptible association with armed conflict in the Global South. Such individuals, I
further contend, seem to pose little actual concern to Canadian national security.
Ironically, however, for reasons which I elaborate upon below, I observe that
this skewing of inadmissibility findings to those who have taken part in conflicts
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emanating from the Global South has probably also played a role in preserving the
law by concealing its plainly untenable reach.
The other irony to which I make reference is that, for those who flee conflict
situations in the South, the law on inadmissibility effectively limits refugee
protection to the archetypal victim – to those whose personal narrative discloses
passivity in situations of repression, rather than to those who, often at greatest risk
of persecution, have resorted to active resistance.
Liberal democracies (and indeed all states) reserve to themselves the authority
to exclude from their midst those perceived to pose a threat to national security. As
I described in the previous chapter, most commentators, even those advocating an
open-borders approach, refrain from arguing that this authority should not exist.
The issue becomes, therefore, how decisions about security and inadmissibility are
made. In this chapter, I examine this question from the perspective of Canadian law,
demonstrating how security matters are tilted toward those from the global south.
In the chapter that follows, I will look at the same issues from the perspective of an
academic movement that aims to place the interests of Third World peoples at the
centre of processes that affect them. And finally, in the last chapter I will examine
one aspect of the Canadian security regime – its reliance on administrative
discretion – and argue that it, together with an infusion of Third World perspectives,
could help to bring a sense of justification to a process currently defined by its
absence. For now, however, I move on to an exploration of the Canadian securityinadmissibility regime.

77

Many Shades of Black: A brief background to the security-migration
nexus1
2.2.1 Introduction
In our previous discussion about Catherine Dauvergne and the making of
illegality, recall that the links between migration and (in)security have a long
pedigree. To borrow Dauvergne’s words again, if security is the fulcrum of the
balance between individual and community, it is perhaps inherent to any
conversation about immigration, even if any actual connection between security
threats and migration is of dubious empirical validity. 2 Indeed, it is almost trite to
note that national security has always played a large role in immigration and
refugee policy, but it is only relatively recently that scholars, practitioners and
others have come to scrutinize the rationale underlying the connection.3
While the events of 9/11 exponentially intensified the attention paid to the
security-migration nexus, as Audrey Macklin points out, terrorism provisions within
immigration law were already commonplace. This was in contrast to the criminal
law which, to that point, did not tend to identify terrorism as a distinct category of
criminal act. To Macklin, the import of this approach to dealing with terrorism
solely within the confines of immigration law was evident:
Locating terrorism exclusively in immigration
legislation institutionalized in law the figure of the

The Raconteurs, “Many Shades of Black” from the album Consolers of the Lonely, released August 25,
2008.
2 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008) [Dauvergne, “Making People Illegal”] at p. 103.
3 Such commentators have observed that notions of security, particularly in relation to migration, are
not so much about safety, per se, as they are about identity, group identity, and shared narratives
about what constitutes the state – see for example Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde,
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Boulder, 1998) at 120-121 [Buzan, “Security”].
1
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immigrant as archetypal menace to the cultural, social,
and political vitality of the nation. The myriad tropes of
the foreign Other - as vector of disease, agent of
subversion, corrupter of the moral order and debaser of
the national identity - all trade on the exteriorization of
threat and the foreigner as the embodiment of its
infiltration. Canadian immigration history is replete
with examples, ranging from the exclusion of racialized
groups on grounds of inferiority and degeneracy, to the
deportation of foreign-born labour and social activists
in the inter-war years, to the persistent stereotype of
immigrants as distinctively crime-prone.
In this
symbolic order, the border of the state is akin to the
pores of the national corpus, and expelling the foreign
body serves to restore the health of the nation.4
Some may balk at the imagery invoked by Macklin, but even the most cursory
examination of the history of Canada’s immigration-security provisions confirms its
accuracy. It should also come as no surprise that immigration law has long provided
the legal bulwark against perceived security threats, given the latent suspicion of
foreigners as being the source of such threats and the stripped down set of
procedural rights that accrue to non-citizens.

This combination of factors –

suspicion of foreigners and the ease with which they may be controlled in legal grey
holes – has made immigration law the dominant site at which to address national
security concerns. With this in mind, I turn now to a brief historical sketch of the
intersections between national security and immigration in Canadian law.
2.2.2 National Security in Canadian Immigration Law
To the extent that immigration law demarcates the line between inclusion
and exclusion, it also provides an interesting lens with which to examine societal
views on migrants, migration and the threats they are often perceived to pose. It
should come as no surprise that immigration laws have frequently engaged in the
broad characterization of entire classes of people as being “undesirable” or

4 Audrey Macklin, “Borderline Security” in Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach, eds. The
Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: UofT Press, 2001) at 392.
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“unsuitable”. Immigration law has, for over a century, included “prohibited classes”
of persons who were excluded because they were considered a danger to public
health or safety.5
In 1919, the federal government amended the Immigration Act, for the first
time adding provisions specifically related to national security concerns.

The

provisions prohibited from entrance into Canada those involved in subversive
activities and espionage. The law provided in part:
3. No immigrant, passenger, or other person, unless he
is a Canadian citizen, or has Canadian domicile, shall be
permitted to enter or land in Canada, or in case of
having landed in or entered Canada shall be permitted
to remain therein, who belongs to any of the following
classes, hereinafter called “prohibited classes”:
…
(n) Persons who believe in or advocate the
overthrow by force or violence of the Government
of Canada or of constituted law and authority, or
who disbelieve in or are opposed to organized
government, or who advocate the assassination of
public officials, or who advocate or teach the
unlawful destruction of property;
(o) Persons who are members of or affiliated with
any organization entertaining or teaching disbelief
in or opposition to organized government, or
advocating or teaching the duty, necessity, or
propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any
officer or officers either of specific individuals or of
officers generally, of the Government of Canada or
of any other organized government, because of his
or their official character, or advocating or teaching
the unlawful destruction of property;

In 1910, the government introduced certain “prohibited classes” of immigrants, which included
“idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons, and persons who have been
insane at any time previously” Immigration Act, SC 1910, c 27, s 3.
5
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…
(q) Persons guilty of espionage with respect to His
Majesty or any of His Majesty's allies;6
As Trebilcock and Kelley document, the 1919 Act also contained a provision
authorizing the Cabinet to “prohibit any race, nationality, or class of immigrant by
reason of 'economic, industrial, or other condition temporarily existing in Canada';
or because such immigrants were unsuitable, given the social, economic, and labour
requirements of the country; or simply because of their 'peculiar habits, modes of
life and methods of holding property' and their 'probable inability to become readily
assimilated or assume the responsibilities and duties of Canadian citizenship within
a reasonable time.”7 Treblicock and Kelley further note that the Cabinet shortly
thereafter invoked these new powers to prohibit the immigration of enemy aliens as
well as several ethno-religious groups including Mennonites, Hutterites, and
Doukhobors.8
The exclusionary provisions contained in the 1919 Immigration Act remained
relatively static until 1952 when, amongst other things, the concept of subversion
was introduced into the list of prohibited classes, as was, for the first time, provision
for a discretionary Ministerial exemption of inadmissibility:
5. No person…shall be admitted to Canada if he is a
member of any of the following classes of persons:
…

An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, SC 1919, c 25, ss 3, 3(n), 3(o), 3(q).
Ninette Kelley and M. J Trebilcock. The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration
Policy. 2nd ed. (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 187.
8 Ibid. Ironically, given the discussion that will ensue below, Trebilcock and Kelley go on to observe
that these groups were in all likelihood singled out for inadmissibility because of their refusal to take
up arms in their respective countries during the First World War.
6
7
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(l) persons who are or have been, at any time before
or after the commencement of this Act, members of
or associated with any 'organization, group or body
of any kind concerning which there are reasonable
grounds for believing that it promotes or advocates
or at the time of such membership or association
promoted or advocated subversion by force or
other means of democratic government, institutions
or processes, as they are understood in Canada,
except persons who satisfy the Minister that they
have ceased to be members of or associated with
such organizations, groups or bodies and whose
admission would not be detrimental to the security
of Canada.9
Over the next 25 years, there were considerable policy debates over the
“modernization” of the immigration program, debates that included deliberation
over national security and, for the first time, responding to terrorism.10 While the
Immigration Act, 1976 made no explicit reference to terrorism, the inadmissibility
provisions on espionage and subversion were supplemented to include a new
ground of inadmissibility related to potential acts of violence. It is interesting to
note, however, that the new provision only related to anticipated future acts of
violence against persons in Canada. Paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Immigration Act,
1976 provided:
19. (1) No person shall be granted admission who is a
member of any of the following classes:
…
(g) persons who there are reasonable grounds to
believe will engage in acts of violence that would or
might endanger the lives or safety of persons in
Canada or are members of or are likely to

Immigration Act, SC 1952, c 42, ss 5, 5(l), consolidation in Immigration Act, RSC 1952, c 325.
See Canada, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, White Paper on Immigration, (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1967) [White Paper] and Canada, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, A report
of the Canadian immigration and population study: The Immigration Program, (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1974) at 37-49.
9

10
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participate in the unlawful activities of an
organization that is likely to engage in such acts of
violence;11
Further changes to immigration legislation in 1992 led to the first explicit
reference to admissibility by reason of terrorist activity. In the 1992 legislation, s 19
of the Immigration Act was amended to create a category of inadmissibility for those
who will or had, on a reasonable grounds to believe standard, engaged in
terrorism.12 The changes also rendered inadmissible those found to be members of
organizations that will engage, or have engaged, in terrorism.13
In 2002, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act14 came into force. In the
IRPA, the various grounds of inadmissibility were segregated into their own
respective sections, as follows:
x

Section 34 –Security

x

Section 35 – Human or international human rights violations

x

Section 36 –Criminality

x

Section 37 – Organized criminality

x

Section 38 – Health Grounds

x

Section 39 – Financial reasons

x

Section 40 – Misrepresentation

Immigration Act, 1976, SC 1976-77, c 52.
Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2, ss 19(1)(e)(iii), 19(1)(f)(ii), as amended by An Act to Amend the
Immigration Act and other Acts as a Consequence Thereof, SC 1992, c 49, s 11. The reasonable
grounds to believe standard, which remains applicable to inadmissibility decisions, appears to have
first been introduced in the 1952 Immigration Act, supra note 7 at s 5(1)(m).
13 Ibid at ss 19(1)(e)(iv)(C) and 19(1)(f)(iii)(B).
14 SC 2001, c. 27 [“IRPA”]. The IRPA came into force roughly nine months after the events of
September 11, 2001. While much of the Act had been drafted before the attacks and already
reflected a recalibration of immigration law towards a greater emphasis on security, the events of
9/11 resulted in several amendments which further entrenched security interests in the final text of
the legislation.
11
12
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Sections 34, 35 and 37 were also accompanied by their own Ministerial relief
provisions, granting the Minister the (non-delegable) discretionary authority to
essentially waive inadmissibility on the basis that the person’s presence in Canada
would not be detrimental to the national interest. Section 34 provided:
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is
inadmissible on security grounds for
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of
subversion against a democratic government,
institution or process as they are understood in
Canada;
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by
force of any government;
(c) engaging in terrorism;
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might
endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or
(f) being a member of an organization that there are
reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged
or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a),
(b) or (c).
(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not
constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent
resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister
that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental
to the national interest.
Also of note, the IRPA implemented a subtle but important change in the
treatment of refugee claimants found to be inadmissible for, amongst other things,
security reasons. Under the previous iterations of the Immigration Act refugee
claimants thought to pose a threat to security would be deemed ineligible to pursue
their claims if two conditions were met: first they had to be found by an adjudicator
to be a person described in the security-admissibility provision; and second, the
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Minister would have to prepare a report indicating that she or he was of the opinion
that it would be contrary to public interest to have the claim determined.15 Under
the IRPA, the second condition was eliminated, such that a finding of inadmissibility
for security grounds now results in automatic ineligibility to make a refugee claim. 16
Claims that have already been initiated will be suspended pending an
inadmissibility hearing and, if the person is found to be inadmissible, the claim will
be terminated.17
In many ways, the IRPA came to reflect and emphasize growing concerns over
public safety, border integrity and security. In an early decision considering the
shift in orientation contained within the new legislation, the Supreme Court of
Canada noted:
The objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an
intent to prioritize security. . . . Viewed collectively, the
objectives of the IRPA and its provisions concerning
permanent residents, communicate a strong desire to
treat criminals and security threats less leniently than
under the former Act.18
In perhaps the clearest indication of the increased emphasis on security, in the
years immediately following 9/11, the government created an entirely new federal
department – the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness –
whose sole mandate was to coordinate the activities of the various security-related
agencies that were placed under its control, including the newly formed Canada
Border Services Agency (CBSA).19 Under the auspices of the CBSA, the government

Immigration Act, 1985, supra note 12 at s 46.01(1)(e)(ii).
IRPA, supra note 14, s 101(1)(f)
17 Ibid, s 103(1)(a) and s 104(2)(a). It should be noted that, the termination of an individual’s refugee
claim does not result in their immediate or automatic removal. Such individuals may still access a
circumscribed “Pre-Removal Risk Assessment” pursuant to s112 of the IRPA [PRRA]. If such
individuals are found to be at risk, they may obtain a temporary stay of removal.
18 Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51, at para 10.
19 See the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, SC 2005, c 10 and the Canada
Border Services Agency Act, SC 2005, c 38.
15
16
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created an “Immigration Intelligence Branch” to enhance security screening for
persons suspected of terrorism, organized crime and war crimes or crimes against
humanity. The government also intensified the screening of visa applicants abroad
and began a front-end security screening process for all inland refugee claimants
immediately after a claim is made. These and other changes were discussed in a
comprehensive 2004 statement of the Federal Government’s national security
policy. The report, which articulated the country’s core national security interests
and proposed a “framework for addressing threats to Canadians”, focused on three
particular concerns: protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring
Canada was not a base for threats to its allies, and contributing to international
security.20 The report further revealed a new weapon in the immigration-security
arsenal – the deploying of “migration integrity officers” around the world to prevent
illegal migration and block security threats before they arrive in Canada. The report
claimed that, over the previous six years, these officers had stopped more than
40,000 people with improper documents from boarding planes bound for North
America.21
As I noted earlier, the symbolic and substantive importance of bringing
significant aspects of immigration decision-making into an organizational matrix
dominated by national security concerns cannot be overstated. Symbolically, the
move helped to embed the connection between security, public safety and
immigration.

Substantively, the move handed discretionary decision-making

authority over many immigration-related matters to an organizational structure
with a “governing ethos” of enforcement and security. 22 This is not a particularly
controversial view - as former Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Peter
Harder recently noted, there is now a "total preoccupation” with border security,

Canada, Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, (2004),
online: Privy Council Office www.pco-bcp.gc.ca at vii, 5-6.
21 Ibid, at 42.
22 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, supra note 2 at pp 96-97.
20
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and while there used to be a balance between the imperatives of compassion and
enforcement, that balance has been jettisoned in the organizational culture that has
been cultivated at CBSA.23
Among the many changes brought about with the creation of the Department of
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was a transfer of authority to the public
safety Minister of several aspects of the security-inadmissibility process. Subsection
4(2) of the IRPA now provides:
(2) The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness is responsible for the administration of
this Act as it relates to
(a) examinations at ports of entry;
(b) the enforcement of this Act, including arrest,
detention and removal;
(c) the establishment of policies respecting the
enforcement of this Act and inadmissibility on
grounds of security, organized criminality or
violating human or international rights; or
(d) determinations under any of subsections 34(2),
35(2) and 37(2).24
The scheme of the IRPA is such that, if an officer suspects that an individual is
inadmissible, he or she may write a report outlining the perceived inadmissibility,
pursuant to s 44(1) of the Act. That report is then referred to a Minister’s Delegate
who, pursuant to s 44(2) of the IRPA may then refer the matter to the Immigration
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) for an admissibility hearing.
The result of section 4 of the IRPA, above, is that in cases involving security,
organized criminality or human or international rights violations, it is the CBSA that

See Debra Black, “Canada's immigration system lacks heart, critics say”, The Toronto Star (28 June
2013) online: The Toronto Star < http://www.thestar.com>.
24 IRPA, supra note 14.
23
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has responsibility for the discretionary s 44 tasks of identifying and referring cases
of suspected inadmissibility to the IRB.
Further changes to the security-inadmissibility scheme were brought about with
the recent promulgation of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act.25 This Act,
which received Royal Assent in June, 2013, implemented several changes to the
inadmissibility regime under the IRPA, three of which are directly related to the
security provisions under s 34. First, the FRFCA segregated s 34(1)(a) into two
different sections, the first changing the espionage provision such that it will now
only lead to an inadmissibility finding if the acts of espionage in question are
“contrary to Canada’s interests”, while the second preserved and moved the preexisting subversion prohibition into a new provision – s 34(1)(b.1).26
Second, the FRFCA repealed the Ministerial exemption of inadmissibility located
at s 34(2) of the IRPA (as well as identical Ministerial exemptions under sections 35
and 37), and relocated a blanket exemption clause for all three sections under a
newly created, and narrowly defined, s 42.1.27
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the FRFCA amended s 25 of the IRPA,
which provides for general discretionary exemptions from the requirements of the
Act on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, eliminating access to this
provision for those found inadmissible under sections 34, 35 and 37.28

SC 2013, c 16 [FRFCA].
FRFCA, s 13.
27 Ibid at s 18. While the wording of the relief provision is similar to the former s 34(2), the
amendment also contains a virtually incomprehensible interpretive clause which seemingly limits
the scope of the term “national interest” to matters related to national security, see the new s 42.1(3),
discussed in greater detail below.
28 Ibid at ss 9, 10.
25
26
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The evolution of Canadian immigration-security legislation culminates (at least
for now) with the recent passage of changes to Canadian citizenship law. 29 The
changes now permit the government to commence citizenship revocation processes
against dual national Canadian citizens who have, inter alia, been convicted of
terrorism-related offences, either in Canada or abroad.30
This has been a relatively cursory exploration of the history of the legislative
intersections in Canada between immigration and security. It is sufficient, however,
to make some broad observations. While provisions related to national security
have always been broadly framed, earlier legislation tended to be oriented to other
forms of inadmissibility. The 1910 Immigration Act, for example, contained a list of
21 different “prohibited classes,” the majority of which related to mental health
bars;31 physical health bars32 or socio-economic bars33. While many of the above
categories continue to exist, albeit in more benignly worded language, the scope of
security related inadmissibility has clearly expanded.34
This having been said, it would appear that the far more profound changes that
have taken place in the migration-security sphere are not those related to the
legislation itself, but to the bureaucratic infrastructure that surrounds it.
Immigration law has always broadly defined entire categories of persons as being
either undesirable or dangerous.

The difference is that, by transferring

Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, SC 2014, c 22.
Ibid, at s 10(2)(b). The Act was widely criticized and is already subject to constitutional challenge,
see Debra Black “Court challenge slams new Citizenship Act as ‘anti-Canadian’”, Toronto Star (20
August 2015) online: http://thestar.com.
31 “Idiots, imbeciles, feeble minded persons,” those with “constitutional psychopathic inferiority” and
alcoholics, see Immigration Act, 1910, supra note 5 at ss 3(a), (k), (l).
32 Those with tuberculosis or any other “loathsome disease” and those who were “dumb, blind, or
otherwise physically defective,” Ibid, at s 3(b), (c).
33 Prostitutes and pimps, “professional” beggars or vagrants, the indebted, those likely to become a
public charge and “illiterates,” Ibid, at s 3(e), (f), (g), (h), (j), (m).
34 One can point to several examples of the expanded scope of more recent security provisions.
These include: 1) the inclusion of terrorism grounds; 2) the addition of a subversion provision that
applies to any government, as opposed to a democratic government; 3) the shift away from
provisions that refer to the security of Canada and toward security concerns more generally.
29
30
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responsibility for administering the inadmissibility provisions to an institution with
a narrow enforcement mandate, increasing the capacity of the authorities to identify
and remove inadmissible persons has become a clear priority.
This is demonstrated perhaps most articulately by reference to recent staffing
trends within the federal government. According to the Parliamentary Budget
Office, staffing at the Canada Border Services Agency increased, in absolute terms,
more than any other government agency or department between 2005 and 2012. In
total, the Agency grew by 5200 employees, or 54.6 percent in those years.
Additionally, the Canadian Security Establishment, which handles various
intelligence services grew by 42 percent, while FINTRAC — the Financial
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada which, amongst other things,
tracks suspected terrorist financing, increased staffing levels by 88 percent. At the
same time, however, staff levels at Citizenship and Immigration, decreased by 8.3
percent.35
The creation of the Canada Border Services Agency and its rapid expansion is
very much in keeping with the commentary, referred to above, on the securitization
of immigration regulation. It is also in keeping with the expanded use of security
inadmissibility provisions to exclude non-citizens, particularly refugee claimants,
from obtaining status in Canada, a topic to which I will turn further on in this
chapter.

First, however, I provide a detailed exploration of the security-

inadmissibility provisions in Canadian law, together with an analysis of the
jurisprudence that has interpreted it.

Parliamentary Budget Officer, Federal Employee Classification Dataset (2013) online:
Parliamentary Budget Officer < http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/en/>, reported in “Budget watchdog data
shows bureaucracy grew under Harper”, Canadian Press (29 June 2013) online: CBC News <
http://www.cbc.ca/news/>.
35
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2.3 Casting the Dragnet – Canadian Law and Jurisprudence on
Security Inadmissibility
2.3.1 Introduction
As I set out above, the main security related inadmissibility provision in
Canadian law renders inadmissible not just those thought to pose a security threat
to Canada, but a significantly broader ambit of individuals.36 In the pages that
follow, I will explore some of the principal themes that have emerged in the
jurisprudence on s 34 of the IRPA over the past decade.
2.3.2 The Evidentiary standard
Section 33 of the IRPA sets out an overarching interpretive clause in respect of
sections 34-37:
33. The facts that constitute inadmissibility under
sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from omissions
and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which
there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have
occurred, are occurring or may occur.
As such, inadmissibility under s 34 of the IRPA is made out where the Minister
establishes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the individual

36

For ease of reference, s 34 of the IRPA provides:
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
(a) engaging in an act of espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to
Canada’s interests;
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
(b.1) engaging in an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as
they are understood in Canada;
(c) engaging in terrorism;
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in
Canada; or
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has
engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (b.1) or (c).
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concerned has engaged or will engage in the kinds of activities enumerated in the
provision. In Mugesera, the Supreme Court affirmed that the reasonable grounds
standard applies solely to facts and requires more than suspicion, but less than the
civil standard of balance of probabilities.

In essence, the court concluded,

reasonable grounds will exist where there is an objective basis for the belief which
is based on compelling and credible information.37
This interpretation was consistent with the oft-cited earlier decision of the
Federal Court of Appeal in Chiau, wherein the court stated:
As for whether there were “reasonable grounds” for the
officer’s belief, I agree with the Trial Judge’s definition
of “reasonable grounds” as a standard of proof that,
while falling short of a balance of probabilities,
nonetheless connotes “a bona fide belief in a serious
possibility based on credible evidence.”38

2.3.3 Sections 34(1)(a) and (b) Espionage and Subversion of Governments
While, as noted above, the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act has bifurcated
s 34(1)(a) of the IRPA into two sections, separating the concepts of “espionage” and
“subversion”, jurisprudential interpretation of the terms has arisen more or less in
tandem, and so I consider them together here, notwithstanding the recent legislative
changes. I also include in this analysis paragraph 34(1)(b), as it too relates to the
meaning of “subversion”.

Mugesera v Canada (MCI), 2005 SCC 40, para 114
Chiau v Canada (MCI) [2001] 2 FC 297, para 30. In my review of all Immigration Division decisions
on s 34, elaborated upon below, I observed that it was this passage, more than any other, that was
relied upon by the board in setting out the applicable evidentiary standard. This is perhaps because
the applicable immigration manual used by CBSA officers in evaluating inadmissibility incorporates
the “bona fide belief in a serious possibility” language utilized by the Federal Court of Appeal in Chiau
– see Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “ENF 2 Evaluating Inadmissibility” (2009) online:
Citizenship and Immigration Canada http://www.cic.gc.ca.
37
38
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The term “subversion” in the immigration context has been considered
somewhat sparingly and never with appellate finality. In an early analysis, the
Federal Court in Shandi provided the following analysis of the term, interpreting it
in strikingly broad terms:
Espionage and subversion are not limited to the actual
act but to be engaged in these activities the words
envisage participation by one who assists or facilitates
the objective as one who commits the actus reus. Any
act that is intended to contribute to the process of
overthrowing a government is a subversive act. It
perplexes me that so much has been written about
subversion, or that the word should not be used
because it runs contrary to a person's rights under the
Charter to be a dissident. Certainly CSIS investigators
must be aware of the difference (which may not always
have been the case), but subversive acts are not difficult
to distinguish from acts of protest that should not be
subject to investigations. For example, if funds are
raised or guns sent to the I.R.A. from Canada, is that not
clearly subversion? However, vocal comment or written
treaties on the "Struggle” are clearly protected under
the Charter. Examples of subversive acts are difficult to
find.39
The courts soon pulled back from this rather simplistic view of subversion,
noting in Al Yamani that the terminology used by Justice Cullen in Shandi was
“remarkably broad” and would encompass virtually any form of non-violent, lawful
political opposition.40
In Al Yamani I, the applicant challenged the constitutionality of the use of the
term subversion as it appeared in the former Immigration Act, arguing that his
removal under the applicable security certificate scheme would constitute a
deprivation of his liberty in a manner that was not in accordance with the principles

39
40

Shandi (Re) (1992), 51 F.T.R. 252, at para 17
Al Yamani v Canada (MCI), [2000] 3 FC 433, para 49 [Al Yamani I]
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of fundamental justice and was therefore a violation of s 7 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.41 Specifically, he argued that the use of the term “subversion”
had little definable meaning, was overly broad and unconstitutionally vague. In
taking into account the variable meanings ascribed to the term, including the earlier
analysis of Justice Cullen in Shandi, the court agreed that previous interpretation of
subversion provided no means by which to distinguish it from lawful dissent and
that the use of the term “subversion” in the Act was unconstitutionally vague in that
it was "...incapable of framing the legal debate in any meaningful manner or
structuring discretion in any way."42

Having so concluded, however, the court took the rare measure of concluding
that the otherwise unconstitutionally broad use of the term subversion was saved
under section 1 of the Charter as its use could be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society. It should be noted that earlier jurisprudence (not cited by
the court in Al Yamani I) had found that infringements of section 7 will typically only
be saved by the constitutional override of section 1 in situations “arising out of
exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics,
and the like…”43 By finding that the infringing use of the term “subversion” in the
Immigration Act was saved by section 1, the court thus firmly, if perhaps
unwittingly, equated the objective of identifying those who have engaged in
subversion with the seemingly more “exceptional” conditions listed above.
The analysis undertaken by the court under s 1 of the Charter is interesting from
an immigration perspective because it required, in a legal setting, precisely the kind
of insider/outsider balancing that moral philosophers (Carens), immigration
scholars (Dauvergne) and liberal theorists (Rawls) all discuss from the confines of

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
42 Al Yamani I, supra note 40, at para 62, citing R v Morales [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711.
43 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 518.
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the academy. The s 1 analysis involves a very practical contemplation of the
membership/equality conundrum; that is, a balancing of state (and collective)
interests in security (and exclusion) with the individual liberty interests of noncitizens. The court in Al Yamani I clearly indicated that for individuals suspected of
having participated in the subversion of foreign governments, the rights of the latter
should give way to the interests of the former.
Shortly after the decision in Al Yamani I, the Federal Court of Appeal in Qu
explored the meaning of subversion and espionage against a "democratic
government, institution or process," as it appeared at section 19(1)(f) of the
Immigration Act, the predecessor to section 34(1)(a).44 The case involved a Chinese
Master’s student at Concordia University in Montreal who participated in the
activities of a student group that, amongst other things, engaged in human rights
and pro-democracy work. The student passed along information about the activities
of the group to the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, which came to the attention of a visa
officer after the student had applied for Canadian permanent residence. As a result,
the visa officer refused the student’s application on the basis that he had engaged in
acts of espionage and/or subversion against a democratic government, institution
or process. On judicial review of that decision, the Federal Court found that while
there was no doubt that the appellant had engaged in espionage or subversion, it
could not conclude that the student group he was trying to subvert was a
democratic government, institution or process.
The applications judge reviewed the jurisprudence and legislation on the
meaning of the terms espionage and subversion and concluded as follows:
“Espionage" is simply a method of information
gathering--by spying, by acting in a covert way. Its use
in the analogous term "industrial espionage" conveys
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the essence of the matter -- information gathering
surreptitiously.
"Subversion" connotes accomplishing change by illicit
means or for improper purposes related to an
organisation.45
The applications judge further defined "democratic government" in terms of
political governance, as a system by which citizens govern themselves and in which
elected representatives make laws; the executive branch administers those laws and
is responsible for the way it does so.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal did not question the Trial Division's
understanding of the terms espionage or subversion, but concluded that the
applications judge had adopted an overly narrow definition of the "fabric" of
democratic governments, institutions or processes. In overturning the decision of
the Trial Division, the court found that the applications judge had erred in
interpreting the expression "democratic government, institutions or processes" to
be restricted to institutions and processes involving political, state-based
governance.46 The expression also encompasses, the court continued, institutions
and processes which although non-governmental, are integral to the democratic
fabric of Canada.

Later, the court provided its own broader definition of the

provision, finding that it merely invokes a “structured group of individuals
established in accordance with democratic principles with preset goals and
objectives who are engaged in lawful activities of a political, religious, social or
economic nature.47
While few would deny that non-governmental organizations can play an
essential role in the “fabric” of democracy, the open-ended and extremely broad

Qu v Canada (MCI), [2000] 4 FC 71 (T.D.) at paras 48-49.
Qu v Canada (MCI), 2001 FCA 399 at para 35.
47 Ibid at para 50.
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interpretation of democratic institutions in the security-inadmissibility context
means that “subversion” of virtually any organization with a democratic operating
structure – from chess clubs to Chinese dissident groups – could, notionally at least,
lead to a finding of inadmissibility. What this means, of course, is that immense
discretionary power is placed in the hands of first-level decision makers to
distinguish between the disgruntled member of a local cultural organization and the
sleeper agent who foments subversion of a foreign government.

The expansive

scope of judicial interpretation of s 34, together with the correspondingly vast
discretionary powers conferred on decision-makers, is, as we shall see, a theme to
which we will repeatedly return.
Recall that under the security inadmissibility regime, there are two separate
grounds of inadmissibility in relation to subversion, which are, in a sense, mirror
images of each other. The first, discussed above, renders inadmissible those who
have engaged in any form of subversion against a democratic government, while the
second establishes inadmissibility only for those who have engaged in subversion
by force, but as against any form of government.
In the case of Oremade,48 the court considered whether a 'bloodless coup'
amounts to subversion by force. The applicant, a former Nigerian army officer, was
found to have engaged in the subversion by force of the Nigerian government
because of his participation in the planning of a coup which never took place and
which was planned to be brought about without the use of military force.
A central issue on judicial review of the finding of inadmissibility was whether,
for the purposes of s 34(1)(b) of the IRPA, the individual concerned need have
formed the intention of actually using force in subverting a government. The court
concluded that while the intention of an individual alleged to have taken part in the

48

Oremade v Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 1077 (Oremade I).

97

subversion by force of a government is a relevant consideration, so too is the
perception of others as to whether the subversion may be supported by the threat
of force. To the extent that the tribunal had found that the issue of intention was
irrelevant, the court found that it had erred and ordered a new hearing. However, in
further finding that s 34(1)(b) is not confined to the actual use of force, the court
noted:
However, this intent to subvert by force is not to be
measured solely from the subjective perspective of the
Applicant. It may well be that there was a hope or
expectation that the coup would be bloodless but it is
also reasonable for persons on the street to assume
upon seeing armed soldiers occupying lands and
buildings that force could or would be used if thought
necessary.
I agree with the IAD's conclusion that the term "by
force" is not simply the equivalent of "by violence". "By
force" includes coercion or compulsion by violent
means, coercion or compulsion by threats to use violent
means, and, I would add, reasonably perceived potential
for the use of coercion by violent means.49
It is important to take a step back for a moment to consider some of the
implications of the above passage. In it, we can observe a tendency, common in
immigration-security matters, to graft criminal law principles onto what Legomsky
refers to as the procedurally stripped-down “civil regulatory model of immigration
law.”50 While the Oremade case incorporates the criminal law concept of intent into

Ibid at para 27. Because the Federal Court concluded that the tribunal had erred in its finding that
the applicant’s non-violent intentions were irrelevant, the matter was sent back to a differently
constituted Immigration Appeal Division member, who confirmed the board’s earlier finding. This
finding was later upheld by the Federal Court: Oremade v Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 1189 (Oremade II).
In that decision, the court referred approvingly with the rationale of the earlier Oremade decision,
and further confirmed that s 34(1)(b) applies to subversion by force as against all governments, even
despotic ones: see para 12. Later, in Suleyman v Canada (MCI) , 2008 FC 780, the court again found
that the question as to whether the use of force may be justified as a last resort against tyranny is
essentially irrelevant to the analysis of subversion under s 34(1)(b).
50 Stephen H Legomsky, “The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal
Justice Norms” (2007) 28 Immigr Natly Law Rev 679 at 682. See also Pratt’s discussion of the
49
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the analysis of subversion, a measure that would generally be thought to increase
the legal protections afforded non-citizens, it does so in the context of a low
threshold of proof and in a manner that essentially hollows it of any meaning. By
expanding the meaning of subversion by force to include the “reasonably perceived
potential for the use of coercion by violent means”, the court casually broke the link,
essential in criminal law, between the accused’s actions and intentions and replaced
it with a subjective (“perceived”) and conditional (“potential”) standard, to be
assessed from the perspective of, well, that is left unsaid. Is it the reasonably
perceived potential for the use of force from the perspective of the despotic ruler?
Or is it the perspective of the general populace that is most relevant? Or is it simply
an assessment to be made from the perspective of the immigration officer? We are
left to wonder, but it is no surprise that on rehearing the matter based on the
guidance of the Federal Court, the tribunal again found Mr. Oremade to be
inadmissible, nor that this decision was subsequently upheld on judicial review.51
In another theme to which we will repeatedly return in this discussion, the court
in Oremade recognized (and sidestepped) the vast and potentially overreaching
scope of s 34:
There is no doubt that paragraph 34(1)(b), had it been
in force at the relevant times, could have had potentially
startling impact on historical, and even contemporary
figures. Arguably such revered and diverse figures as
George Washington, Eamon De Valera, Menachem Begin
and Nelson Mandela might be deemed inadmissible to

concept of ‘immigration penality,’ most notably in "Immigration Penality and the Crime-Security
Nexus: The Case of Tran Trong Nghi Nguyen" in Karim Ismaili, et al (eds), Canadian Criminal Justice
Policy: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) at 276 and “Wanted by the CBSA” in
Deborah Brock, et al (eds) Criminalization, Representation, Regulation: Thinking Differently About
Crime (Toronto: UofT Press, 2014) at 286-7.
51 Following Oremade, the Minister has attempted to expand the scope of subversion even further,
arguing (unsuccessfully) in Minister of Public Safety v X (2010), A3-00236 (Immigration and Refugee
Board) [“IRB”], for example, that subversion equals merely opposition.
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Canada. With respect, the sweep of paragraph 34(1)(b)
is not particularly relevant to this applicant.52
As in numerous other decisions, the court noted firstly that Parliament clearly
intended the provision to have the broad sweep it describes and then concluded
that it does not lead to “unreasonable” or “ludicrous” results because of the
availability of the Ministerial override found at s 34(2) of the IRPA.53 As we shall see
in the coming pages, however, while the intentional overbreadth of s 34(1) has
remained intact, the scope of the override provision designed to rectify this
overbreadth has been narrowed.
In considering the ambit of sections 34(1)(a) and (b), it should be noted that the
court has also on occasion emphasized that first-level decisions must set out with
some specificity the alleged acts of subversion or espionage and the individual's
involvement in them.

In Alemu,54 the court found that for decisions under s

34(1)(a), an officer must engage in a two-step analysis, first to determine whether
the government, institution or process spied against or subverted should be
considered a democratic one. Second, the act of espionage or subversion should be
specified to make the reasons intelligible. Under s 34(1)(b), the analysis is "less
demanding," since engaging in or instituting the subversion by force of any
government does not require an evaluation of the democratic quality of the
government subverted.55 This said, a decision-maker rendering a decision under
this provision must nevertheless specifically identify how the individual concerned
is alleged to have engaged in subversion.

Oremade I, supra, note 48 at para 17.
Now s 42.1 of the IRPA, ibid at para 18.
54 Alemu v Canada (MCI), 2004 FC 997.
55 Ibid, at para 31. See also the discussion below at section 3.2.4 on Najafi v Canada (MPSEP), 2013 FC
876 [Najafi], affm’d 2014 FCA 262.
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2.3.4 Section 34(1)(c): Terrorism
As with many other terms incorporated into the text of s 34, the IRPA provides
no definition of terrorism and for years it seemed the Federal Courts were hesitant
to provide any definitional form to the term, preferring to determine on a case by
case basis whether inadmissibility findings appeared reasonable on the facts. 56 The
hesitancy on the part of the courts to define terrorism stemmed from the inherently
variable and political meaning of the term, but it did come to be defined in
international law, most particularly in the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.57
This Convention provides both a "functional" and a "stipulative" definition of
terrorism. The functional definition includes an annexed list of treaties which relate
to acts considered to be terrorist in nature, while the stipulative definition provides
a more general description of the kinds of acts which may constitute terrorist
activity. Article 2(b) of the Convention sets out the stipulative definition:
Any ... act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.
In Suresh,58 the Supreme Court adopted the view that the term terrorism could
be legally defined, if not exhaustively, at least sufficiently to set the proper
boundaries for legal adjudication. In finding that the term is subject to intelligible
definition, its use in the former Immigration Act was found not to be
unconstitutionally vague and did not violate the Charter. The court stated:

See for example Re Baroud, (1995), 98 F.T.R. 99 (T.D.).
GA Res 54/109, Dec. 9, 1999.
58 Suresh v Canada (MCI), 2002 SCC 1 (Suresh I).
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In our view, it may safely be concluded, following the
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, that "terrorism" in s. 19 of the
Act includes any "act intended to cause death or serious
bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a government or an international organization
to do or to abstain from doing any act". This definition
catches the essence of what the world understands by
"terrorism". Particular cases on the fringes of terrorist
activity will inevitably provoke disagreement.
Parliament is not prevented from adopting more
detailed or different definitions of terrorism. The issue
here is whether the term as used in the Immigration Act
is sufficiently certain to be workable, fair and
constitutional. We believe that it is.59
In addition, s 83.01 of the Canadian Criminal Code now contains a definition of
terrorist activity and s 14 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations
dovetails with the Code by providing that the findings of fact set out in a criminal
proceeding regarding terrorism are to be considered conclusive findings of fact by
decision-makers in the context of s 34 inadmissibility proceedings. It is notable that
the definition of terrorism elaborated in the Code includes acts which cause
property damage, provided that the other essential elements of a terrorist act are
present.
Following on the heels of the Suresh I decision, the Federal Court in Fuentes,60
overturned the decision of an adjudicator, in part based on the fact that the
adjudicator's interpretation of the meaning of terrorism did not coincide with the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the targeting of civilians as a pre-condition to a
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terrorist act. Similarly, in Zarrin,61 the court overturned another decision, because it
did not coincide with the clear guidance provided by the Supreme Court as to the
meaning of terrorism. The court noted:
In my view, pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Suresh, as well as the recent decision of this
court, Fuentes, the respondent's department now has
judicial guidance, including particular criteria, that
should be used in determining whether an organization
is indeed one that engages or engaged in terrorism.
Such reasoning should have formed part of the officer's
decision. [citations omitted]
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Suresh I, cases considering the issue
of terrorism under s 34 tend to focus on whether decision makers: a) adequately set
out their understanding of the meaning of the term terrorism; and b) adequately
apply this understanding to specific events or incidents, in which the individual
concerned is alleged to be implicated. In Jalil,62 the court held that the assessment of
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that an organization has engaged
in acts of terrorism involves a two-step analysis. The first step involves a factual
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
organization in question committed the acts of violence attributed to it. At the
second step of the analysis, a determination is made as to whether those acts
constitute acts of terrorism. The officer must provide the definition of terrorism
relied upon and explain how the listed acts meet that definition.
In Naeem,63 the Federal Court emphasized the need to properly and explicitly
characterize the acts in question as terrorism, noting that "[a]cts such as
kidnapping, assault and murder are undoubtedly criminal, but are not necessarily
acts of terrorism. It was incumbent on the officer to explain why she viewed them to
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be terrorist acts.”64 On this note, it is interesting, if not surprising, that the definition
of terrorism provided by Citizenship and Immigration Canada in its manual for
decision-makers on inadmissibility is at the broader end of the spectrum established
internationally and in the jurisprudence, and, as with the Criminal Code of Canada, is
not confined to acts carried out against civilians. The Manual states:
“terrorism” relates to activities directed toward or in
support of the threat or use of acts of violence against
persons or property for the purposes of achieving a
political objective; an act intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person
not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to
compel a government or an international organization
to do or to abstain from doing any act.65
Following Suresh I, the jurisprudence on terrorism under s 34(1)(c) has focused
almost entirely on determining whether first-level decisions have complied with an
almost checklist-like approach to considering the “who”, “what”, “when”, “why” and
“where” of alleged terrorist acts. In other words, in the immigration context, the
courts have not substantively revisited the lawfulness of the terrorism provision,
but as we shall also see, the focus in the jurisprudence under 34(1)(c) has arisen
almost entirely within the context of allegations of membership in a terrorist
organization pursuant to s 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, rather than the actual commission
of terrorist acts. It is perhaps for this reason that the substantive jurisprudence on
terrorism under s 34(1)(c) has been sparse.

Ibid, at para 46.
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2.3.5 Sections 34(1)(d) and (e): Danger to the Security of Canada or Danger
to Persons in Canada
In Suresh I, the Supreme Court also considered whether the term 'danger to the
security of Canada' was unconstitutionally vague. In finding that the term was not
overly vague, the court found that the term must be given a broad interpretation.
Recognizing that the term is difficult to define, is largely context-specific and is
“political in a general sense,” the court found that a broad and flexible approach is
required, combined with a highly deferential standard of judicial review. Provided
the Minister is able to point to some evidence that reasonably supports a finding of
danger to the security of Canada, the courts should not interfere with the Minister's
decision.66
In noting the serious consequences attached to deportation, the court also
cautioned that, to survive constitutional scrutiny a threat to the security of Canada
must be a serious one and in providing guidance to first-level decision-makers, the
court provided the following broad definition of the term:
These considerations lead us to conclude that a person
constitutes a "danger to the security of Canada" if he or
she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada,
whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact
that the security of one country is often dependent on
the security of other nations. The threat must be
"serious", in the sense that it must be grounded on
objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and
in the sense that the threatened harm must be
substantial rather than negligible.67
Since Suresh, however, s 34(1)(d) has remained a rarely invoked provision and
consideration of the term “danger to the security of Canada” has been almost
entirely confined to a small number of individuals subject to Canada’s national
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security certificate regime and to the usage of the term under s 115 of the IRPA,
regarding the removal of Convention refugees.68 Section 34(1)(e) of the IRPA,
which creates a further ground of inadmissibility for those “engaging in acts of
violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada,” has
been invoked even less frequently and has received essentially no jurisprudential
analysis.
2.3.6 Section 34(1)(f): Membership
Section 34(1)(f) of the Act creates a further ground of inadmissibility for those
who have not personally committed proscribed acts, but who are, or have been
members in an organization that has engaged, or will engage in the acts referred to
in sections 34(1)(a)-(c). This membership category has proven to be the most
commonly invoked, hotly contested and controversial security provision.

An

analysis of inadmissibility under s 34(1)(f) involves two separate assessments.
First, the decision-maker must determine whether there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the organization in question engages, has engaged or will engage in acts
referred to in s 34(1)(a)-(c). Second, the decision-maker must consider whether the
individual in question is (or was) a member of such an organization, once again on
the reasonable grounds to believe standard set out at section 33 of the IRPA.
The courts have repeatedly adopted a broad interpretation of the meaning of
membership as it appears in s 34(1)(f).

The rationale for such a broad and

unrestricted definition relates, at least in part, to the importance of protecting the
Canadian public from perceived security threats and to the difficulties associated
with defining membership in what are often loosely-structured and informal
organizations. In an oft-cited passage, future Supreme Court Justice Rothstein (then
of the Federal Court) framed the issue of membership in the following terms:

See for example, Canada (MCI) v Harkat, 2014 SCC 37; Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 3; Zûndel, Re, 2005 FC
295; Mahjoub v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 171; Jaballah v Canada (MCI), 2006
FCA 179; Nagalingam v Canada (MCI), 2008 FCA 153.
68

106

The provisions deal with subversion and terrorism. The
context in immigration legislation is public safety and
national security, the most serious concerns of
government. It is trite to say that terrorist organizations
do not issue membership cards. There is no formal test
for membership and members are not therefore easily
identifiable…I think it is obvious that Parliament
intended the term "member" to be given an unrestricted
and broad interpretation.69
Similarly, in another Suresh decision, the Federal Court rejected the applicant's
argument that he was not a member of a terrorist organization because he had not
taken a membership oath. Essentially, the court found that, as the applicant had
participated in other activities that could be considered indicia of membership, he
was lawfully considered a member for the purposes of determining admissibility.
The court noted:
I am satisfied that one can reasonably conclude that an
individual is a "member" of an organization if one
devotes one's full time to the organization or almost
one's full time, if one is associated with members of the
organization and if one collects funds for the
organization. This is the case of Suresh. He is known to
the leadership of the LTTE and has continual contacts
with them. Whether he took an oath administered by
the LTTE or not or whether he carries with him a
cyanide tablet is immaterial. An oath may be required
today for a person who joins the LTTE for the purpose
of "fighting" for the LTTE with guns and ammunition
but one can still be considered a member without taking
an oath or carrying on his or her person a cyanide
tablet.
Membership cannot and should not be narrowly
interpreted when it involves the issue of Canada's
national security. Membership also does not only refer
to persons who have engaged or who might engage in
terrorist activities.70
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At roughly the same time, the court in Chiau found that neither actual or formal
membership nor active participation in unlawful acts is required to establish
membership for the purpose of s 34(1)(f).71
Following these decisions, the jurisprudence came to incorporate an
exceptionally broad approach to considering membership, detaching it entirely from
any temporal connection to proscribed activity and providing little by way of
detailed analysis as to what an “unrestricted and broad” interpretation of
membership should mean.72 As the Federal Court noted in Ugbazghi, “subsection
34(1) was intended to cast a wide net in order to capture a broad range of conduct
that is inimical to Canada’s interests.”73
As noted, beyond the fact that membership in proscribed organizations should
be given a broad interpretation, the courts also found that the term should not be
bound by any temporal limitations. Thus in Al Yamani, the court found that even if
an organization had not engaged in terrorist acts over the course of an individual's
membership, if the organization later turned to violence the individual may be
found to be inadmissible.74 Justice Snider of the Federal Court stated in this regard:
Quite simply, and contrary to the arguments made by
Mr. Al Yamani, there is no temporal component to the
analysis in s. 34(1)(f). If there are reasonable grounds to
believe that an organization engages today in acts of
terrorism, engaged in acts of terrorism in the past or
will engage in acts of terrorism in the future, the
organization meets the test set out in s. 34(1)(f). There
is no need for the Board to examine whether the
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organization has stopped its terrorist acts or whether
there was a period of time when it did not carry out any
terrorist acts.
Membership by the individual in the organization is
similarly without temporal restrictions. The question is
whether the person is or has been a member of that
organization. There need not be a matching of the
person's active membership to when the organization
carried out its terrorist acts.75
While this result may have appeared harsh, the Justice concluded that the
exemption clause under (the then) s 34(2) of the IRPA allowed the Minister to
excuse from inadmissibility those whose membership in a terrorist organization
may have been innocent. The assertion that there is no temporal dimension to the
security-inadmissibility analysis has been the prevailing wisdom in the
jurisprudence for several years76 and, at least for now, remains good, if not
unquestioned, law.77 The result, at times, borders on the bizarre. It means that past
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membership in an organization that has never engaged in proscribed activity, but
takes up such activity after the period of membership has ended results in
inadmissibility. It similarly means that membership in an organization that, at
virtually any period in history, engaged in subversion or that committed even a
single act of terrorism can result in an inadmissibility finding, even if that
organization disavowed the use of violence decades before the individual in
question became a member.
Also in contrast to other contexts, the courts in security-inadmissibility
proceedings have rejected arguments that minors should be exempt from
inadmissibility for membership in terrorist/subversive organizations. In Poshteh,
the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a finding of inadmissibility despite the fact that
the appellant was a minor at all relevant times of his (informal) membership in an
Iranian group known as the MEK. The court noted that the IRPA specifically bars
inadmissibility findings against minors who have committed criminal offences and
have been convicted under Canada’s Youth Criminal Justice Act. The lack of any
similar reference to minors in the security context suggested to the court that no
categorical distinction was to be made between adults and minors. Rather, the
court found that an individual's status as a minor is “simply a further consideration”

organization, by this interpretation of's. 34(1)(f), has a Sword of
Damocles suspended indefinitely over his or her head should the
organization they once had been a member [of] become engaged in
terrorist activities in the future.
In considering the wording of s.34(1)(f), which clearly contains a future component to it (will engage
in terrorism), the court found that the reasonable grounds to believe standard must be considered
from the time at which an individual was a member. This approach, Justice Mandamin concluded,
provides for a nexus between membership and future organizational activity associated with
terrorism. It provides for the requisite national security and public safety objectives. Importantly, it
does not include within s 34(1)(f) individuals who are themselves innocent of the conduct of the
organization in the future : para. 78.
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to be made in the individualized assessment of membership made under s
34(1)(f).78
Furthermore, flowing from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Suresh I,
the Minister has argued that even non-voluntary acts, i.e. those made under coercion
or duress, are sufficient to attract liability under s 34(1)(f) if the acts themselves
constitute membership under the broad and unrestricted definition of the term. In
such situations, the Minister has contended, the involuntariness of the individual’s
actions is only relevant to an application for relief of inadmissibility under s 34(2)
(now s 42.1) of the IRPA.79
Beyond the broad statutory language and expansive jurisprudence associated
with the definition of membership under s 34(1)(f), it is also of note that the mere
fact of employing membership as a form of proscribed activity is viewed in other
(even immigration) contexts as a legally and empirically dubious proposition.
Imposing sanctions against individuals for membership in an organization is
typically a form of third party liability. It is not the membership, per se, that is of
concern, but rather the criminal actions of other members of that collectivity that
give rise to liability. However, in international criminal law and the law of refugee
exclusion mere membership in an organization that has committed international
crimes is never sufficient in and of itself to attract legal liability. 80

Beyond

membership, there must be some evidence that the individual contributed, not just

Poshteh v Canada (MCI), 2005 FCA 85 [Poshteh] at para 45.
See Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness v. X, Immigration and Refugee Board,
Immigration Division, ID File No. B0-00824 (April 14, 2011) at para 29, citing Suresh I, supra note 55
at para 110 and Canada (MPSEP) v Agraira, 2011 FCA 103 at para 64, affm’d (on other grounds),
2013 SCC 36.
80 For a recent, comprehensive review of developments in the law of complicity vis-à-vis both
international criminal law and refugee law, see Ezokola v Canada (MCI), 2013 SCC 40; R (JS) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15 at 42-44 and 55; Xu Sheng Gao v. United
States Attorney General, 500 F.3d 93 (2007) and Attorney-General (Minister of Immigration) v. Tamil X
[2010] NZSC 107 at paras 58-70.
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to the organization itself, but to the criminal purpose of the organization to attract
some form of liability.81
Imposing consequences for membership alone amounts to a form of absolute
liability that requires, in some senses, neither actus reus, nor mens rea in any
unlawful activity. While this approach may appear unproblematic when considering
organizations with, in the language of Canadian refugee law, a “limited and brutal
purpose,” the reality is that the vast majority of organizations implicated in
allegations of terrorism and subversion are multifaceted organizations with a
myriad of distinct purposes, some social, some humanitarian, some political and
some violent. Membership alone in a death squad may well give rise to legitimate
concerns, but the moral implications of membership in large and varied
organizations are infinitely more complex. It is for this reason that the Supreme
Court of Canada recently affirmed in Ezokola that any analysis of complicity in
international crimes cannot result in the exclusion of refugee claimants for mere
membership or for a failure to dissociate from a multi-faceted organization which
has committed war crimes.82 Rather, the evidence must indicate that, beyond
membership, the individual has made a substantial contribution not simply to the
organization, but to the criminal element within the organization. The Supreme
Court stated in Ezokola:
In sum, the foregoing approaches to complicity all
require a nexus between the individual and the group’s
crime or criminal purpose. An individual can be
complicit without being present at the crime and
without physically contributing to the crime. However,
the UNHCR has explained, and other states parties have
recognized, that to be excluded from the definition of
refugee protection, there must be evidence that the

81
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Ezokola, ibid, at paras 8, 29, 36.
Ezokola, ibid, at para 74.
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individual knowingly made at least a significant
contribution to the group’s crime or criminal purpose.83
The recent findings of appellate courts around the world on the application of
the exclusion clauses to those accused of international crimes84 all flow more or less
directly from a surge of developments on the issue of complicity in international
criminal law. These developments, tied to the ad hoc war crimes tribunals for
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the promulgation of the Rome Statute85 and the creation of
the International Criminal Court, provide varying analyses as to when third parties
will be found responsible for international crimes, but they all coalesce around the
consensus that mere association is not sufficient to ground liability.

There is

agreement, in other words, that individuals are simply not responsible for the
crimes of others by sole virtue of their common membership in a given collective. It
is not a particularly controversial assertion to suggest, therefore, that the securityinadmissibility regime is a clear outlier in the manner in which it attributes both
responsibility and legal consequence to those deemed to belong to organizations
that have engaged in terrorism or subversion.
Following on the heels of the Ezokola decision, one Federal Court justice raised
the question as to whether the Supreme Court’s analysis of complicity in the context
of the Refugee Convention could find application to the question of membership
under s 34 of the IRPA. In Joseph, Justice O’Reilly stated:
In my view, while Ezokola dealt with the issue of
exclusion from refugee protection, the Court's concern
that individuals should not be found complicit in
wrongful conduct based merely on their association
with a group engaged in international crimes logically
extends to the issue of inadmissibility. At a minimum, to
exclude a person from refugee protection there must be

Ibid at para 77.
Supra note 80.
85 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, art 25.
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proof that the person knowingly or recklessly
contributed in a significant way to the group's crimes or
criminal purposes (at para 68). Similarly, it seems to me
that to find a person inadmissible to Canada based on
his or her association with a particular terrorist group,
there must be evidence that the person had more than
indirect contact with that group.86
These obiter comments opened the door to more fulsome arguments in
subsequent cases on the implications of the Ezokola decision on the membership
analysis conducted under s 34.87 The door was soon closed. Other justices on the
Federal Court disagreed with the stance of Justice O’Reilly in Joseph, concluding that
the Ezokola complicity analysis was essentially irrelevant to the assessment of
membership under s 34.

And in Kanagendren, the Federal Court of Appeal

unambiguously endorsed this view.88 More specifically, the court found that while
the Ezokola decision does have direct bearing on the interpretation of
inadmissibility under s 35(1) of the IRPA, the same cannot be said for the
interpretation of s 34(1)(f), which neither requires nor contemplates a complicity
analysis in the context of determining membership.89 In arriving at this conclusion,
the court acknowledged that the other provisions of s 34 related to the actual
commission of acts could engage a consideration of complicity, but as I shall
illustrate below, this is of little practical effect as the vast majority of s34 cases
involve allegations of inadmissibility based on membership.90
The use of membership alone as a basis for inadmissibility exponentially
increases the scope of the security regime. As indicated, it captures not only the
perpetrators of international crimes, and not only those who have furthered the

Joseph v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1101, para 14.
See Kanagendren v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 384, affm’d 2015 FCA 86; Nassereddine v Canada (MCI),
2014 FC 85; Haqi v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 1167.
88 Kanagendren v Canada (MCI), 2015 FCA 86.
89 Ibid at para 22.
90 Ibid at para 25.
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illicit goals of subversive or terrorist organizations, but also a broad swath of
individuals whose relationship to such organizations is both marginal and
innocuous. As noted above, when combined with the broad definitions of terrorism
and subversion, the reach of the security-inadmissibility regime metastasizes,
extending to an ambit of individuals who most would agree are of no concern from a
national-security perspective.
To again borrow the words of Peter Shuck, it also makes the realm of securityinadmissibility something of a maverick even within the larger maverick of
immigration law, “radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental
norms…that animate the rest of our legal system.”91 Or, to channel Dyzenhaus once
more, the striking breadth of the security inadmissibility regime, together with the
steadfast refusal of the courts to reign it in, has given rise to a gaping legal grey hole.
Recall for a moment what Dyzenhaus’ means by the term. Legal grey holes arise in
situations where “there are some legal constraints on executive action…but the
constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it
pleases.”92 In other words, legal grey holes exist within legal domains, but are
governed by a razor thin conception of the rule of law that confers virtually
unlimited authority on the executive.
The incontrovertible fact of the security-inadmissibility regime is that it doesn’t
just capture those who have taken part in unlawful coups d’etat and terrorism, and
it is not even limited to “George Washington, Eamon De Valera, Menachem Begin
and Nelson Mandela,” to refer back to the decision of the Federal Court in Oremade I.
Notionally at least, the scope of s34 extends to any present, former or future
member of the militaries of, for example, the United States, Great Britain, Italy,
Russia, France, Australia and Poland, all of which have engaged in the subversion by

Peter H Schuck, “The Transformation of Immigration Law” (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 1 at 1.
David Dyzenhaus, “Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency inside or outside the Legal Order”
(2005) 27 Cardozo Law Rev 2005 at 2018.
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force of governments; to anyone affiliated with the current ANC government in
South Africa; to every Russian former member of the Communist Party; and the list
goes on, almost ad infinitum. In other words, the security-inadmissibility regime
more or less permits the government to “do as it pleases” in the precise manner
described by Dyzenhaus. The reality of course is that s34 is not generally applied to
such individuals and this fact, combined with an examination of the kinds of persons
who are subjected to s34 proceedings, lies at the very core of this dissertation.
Of all the jurisprudence on the application of s34(1)(f), perhaps no case
highlights its anachronistic nature more than that which arose around a planned
visit to Canada of British Member of Parliament George Galloway. In 2010, the
controversial Galloway was invited to Canada to speak about his spearheading of aid
caravans to the Gaza Strip. As a citizen of a visa-exempt country, Galloway was not
required to obtain an entrance visa prior to entering Canada, but some two weeks
before his planned visit, Galloway was informed that a preliminary assessment had
been conducted in relation to his admissibility to Canada. The assessment suggested
that he might be inadmissible under s 34 of the IRPA because of his donations to the
Hamas-led government of the Gaza Strip.

At the same time, however, it was

abundantly clear from the record that the only reason why the admissibility
assessment was conducted in the first place was at the instigation of political
officials in the Minister of Citizenship's office.
As a result of the assessment, Galloway cancelled his planned trip and instead
addressed his audiences by way of a video link.

Galloway, together with the

organizations and individuals who had invited him then sought judicial review of
the “decision” that had been communicated to him.93 Leave was granted in respect
of the judicial review, but the application was ultimately dismissed on the basis that

93 Toronto Coalition to Stop the War, et al v Canada (MPSEP), 2010 FC 957 [“Toronto Coalition to Stop
the War”].
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the correspondence to Mr. Galloway was not a decision subject to judicial review.
Despite this finding, the court proceeded to conduct a review of the preliminary
admissibility assessment, in the event that it had erred in finding that it was not a
reviewable decision. In this respect, the court noted that it was "clear that the efforts
to keep Mr. Galloway out of the country had more to do with antipathy to his
political views than with any real concern that he had engaged in terrorism or was a
member of a terrorist organization."94 In addition, the individuals who had initiated
the effort to find Mr. Galloway inadmissible appeared to have given "no
consideration…to the interests of those Canadians who wished to hear Mr. Galloway
speak, or the values of freedom of expression and association enshrined in the
Charter..."95
In considering the inadmissibility assessment on its merits, the court further
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Galloway
was a de facto member of a terrorist organization or had engaged in acts of
terrorism. It was, therefore, unreasonable for the Minister to rely on those grounds
to deem him inadmissible to Canada. In particular, the court noted that the
donations made by Mr. Galloway were clearly for humanitarian purposes and, as
such, were not sufficient to bring him under the rubric of inadmissibility under s.34
of the IRPA. While donations to a government led by an organization such as Hamas
may be sufficient to ground an inadmissibility finding, the intention behind the
donations was found (at least in this case) to be a relevant factor that was not
considered in the assessment. In this regard, the court noted:
The Court is not so naïve as to believe that Hamas is
above taking advantage of the goodwill of others who
contribute funds to them for humanitarian reasons. To
suggest, however, that contributions to Hamas for such
purposes makes the donor a party to any terrorist
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crimes committed by the organization goes beyond the
parliamentary intent and the legislative language. The
purpose to which the funds are donated must be to
enhance the ability of the organization to facilitate or
carry out a terrorist activity. Absent such a purpose, the
mere assertion that material support was provided to
such an organization is not sufficient. To hold otherwise
could ensnare innocent Canadians who make donations
to organizations they believe, in good faith, to be
engaged in humanitarian works.96
The Toronto Coalition to Stop the War case is instructive on a number of levels.
First, as I shall illustrate below, it is one of the very few s34 security cases involving
an individual from a “Western” country and it is, of course, notable that the
inadmissible conduct in question relates to support for an organization (albeit one
designated as engaging in terrorism) from the Global South. Second, the somewhat
embarrassing facts that came to light in the course of the litigation in the case reveal
both: a) the vulnerability of the s 34 process to executive manipulation; and b) the
central role that discretion plays in the determination as to who will, and who will
not become subject to s34 proceedings.
2.3.7 Ministerial waivers of inadmissibility – Section 42.1 (Formerly Section
34(2))
As noted above, persons who would otherwise be inadmissible to Canada
pursuant to s 34(1) of the IRPA may nevertheless be permitted to enter (or remain
in) the country if the Minister concludes that their presence in Canada would not be
detrimental to the national interest.97 The existence of an exemption clause has

Ibid, at para 110
See s 42.1 of the IRPA. The relevant Minister is the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness and the decision-making authority is non-delegable: see s 6(3) of the IRPA . These
national interest decisions have repeatedly been found to be highly discretionary in nature, in part
owing to the national security concerns involved and the Minister’s relative expertise in this area: see
Miller v Canada (Solicitor General), 2006 FC 912, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1164, at para. 42; and Al Yamani v
Canada (MPSEP), 2007 FC 381 at paras. 38-39; Tameh v Canada (MPSEP), 2008 FC 884 at paras. 3436.
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both protected the security provisions from constitutional scrutiny and justified a
broad interpretation of inadmissibility under s 34(1).
In Suresh I, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld what was essentially the
predecessor to s 34(1) in the former Immigration Act, at least in part because of the
existence of a national interest exemption clause. The court stated:
We believe that it was not the intention of Parliament to
include in the s.19 class of suspect persons those who
innocently contribute to or become members of
terrorist organizations. This is supported by the
provision found at the end of s. 19, which exempts from
the s. 19 classes "persons who have satisfied the
Minister that their admission would not be detrimental
to the national interest". Section 19 must therefore be
read as permitting a refugee to establish that his or her
continued residence in Canada will not be detrimental
to Canada, notwithstanding proof that the person is
associated with or is a member of a terrorist
organization. This permits a refugee to establish that
the alleged association with the terrorist group was
innocent. In such case, the Minister, exercising her
discretion constitutionally, would find that the refugee
does not fall within the targeted s. 19 class of persons
eligible for deportation on national security grounds.98
This passage has been cited by the lower courts in rejecting arguments that s
34(1)(f) violates constitutionally protected equality rights, liberty interests and
rights to freedom of expression.99

The availability of an exemption has also

provided perhaps the single greatest justification for the expansive interpretation of
s 34(1) with the courts adopting the view that the security provisions are to be read
as an integrated whole with the national interest waiver always running in the
background to remedy any injustices that may arise as a result of an overly broad
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See Al Yamani II, supra note 74 at paras 41-57.
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approach to the s 34(1) process.100 In theory, this may be an understandable
assertion; the empirical reality, as I shall set out below, tells a starkly different story.
In any event, because the prevailing view was that the national interest waiver
constituted a safeguard against a (potentially) overbroad security provision, it too
was implemented broadly, taking into consideration a wide range of factors. The
Minister's role was not to reassess the s 34(1) decision, but was rather aimed at
determining, notwithstanding an applicant’s inadmissibility under s 34(1), whether
it would be detrimental to the national interest for that person to remain in Canada.
This being the case, the assumption for many years was that the national interest
determination needed to take into consideration several factors, including any
evidence that: a) contextualized the facts underlying the individual’s inadmissibility
finding; b) established that the individual no longer posed a threat to national
security or public safety; and c) demonstrated that the person has contributed
productively to Canadian society.101 The relevant Citizenship and Immigration
training manual, until recently, set out the following relevant considerations:
x

Will the applicant's entry into Canada be offensive to the Canadian
public?

x

Have all ties with the regime/organization been completely severed?

x

Is there any indication that the applicant might be benefiting from
assets obtained while a member of the organization?

Singh, supra note 69 at paras 49-52. In 1992, officials with what was then known as the
Department of Employment and Immigration testified before a parliamentary committee that the
intent in drafting the national interest exemption (then found at subparagraph 19(1)(f)(iii)(B) of the
Immigration Act, RSC 1985 c29 was to "define broadly with a discretion" to exclude from
inadmissibility those whose presence in Canada, in the Minister's opinion, would not be detrimental
to the national interest, see Singh, supra note 69 at para 50.
101 See for example Momenzadeh v Canada (MPSEP), 2008 FC 884 and (yet) another decision
concerning the Palestinian Issam Al Yamani: Al Yamani v Canada (MPSEP), 2007 FC 381 (Al Yamani
III).
100
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x

Is there any indication that the applicant may be benefiting from
previous membership in the regime/organization?

x

Has the person adopted the democratic values of Canadian society?102

This prevailing view about the scope of the national interest waiver was shared
by the courts, immigration counsel and the Minister until a somewhat bizarre
sequence of events commenced with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Agraira.103 Muhsen Agraira was a citizen of Libya who claimed to fear persecution
in that country because of his participation in the Libyan National Salvation Front
(LNSF), an anti-Gadaffi (and CIA backed) organization that, at some points, was also
alleged to be aligned with Libyan Islamic opposition groups, who in turn were
thought to have links to Al Qaeda. The Immigration and Refugee Board disbelieved
his story and rejected his claim to refugee status, largely on credibility grounds.
Later, Mr. Agraira married a Canadian citizen who attempted to sponsor him for
permanent residence. The application was refused under s 34(1)(f) of the IRPA,
somewhat ironically, on the basis of Mr. Agraira’s affiliation with the LNSF. Agraira
then submitted a request for Ministerial relief which was also eventually refused,
the refusal decision consisting entirely of the following:
After having reviewed and considered the material and
evidence submitted in its entirety as well as specifically
considering these issues:
x

The applicant offered contradictory and
inconsistent accounts of his involvement with
the Libyan National Salvation Front (LNSF).

Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, ENF 2 - Evaluating Inadmissibility, (2009)
online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada www.cic.gc.ca at para 13.6; also found at Canada,
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, IP 10 Refusal of National Security Cases\Processing of
National Interest Requests Guidelines (2009) online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada
www.cic.gc.ca at Appendix D. Note, however, that due to subsequent jurisprudential events
discussed below and legislative changes, these sections of the immigration manuals have been
expunged.
103 Canada (MPSEP) v Agraira, 2011 FCA 103.
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x

There is clear evidence that the LNSF is a
group that has engaged in terrorism and has
used terrorist violence in attempts to
overthrow a government.

x

There is evidence that LNSF has been aligned
at various times with Libyan Islamic
opposition groups that have links to AlQaeda.

x

It is difficult to believe that the applicant,
who in interviews with officials indicated at
one point that he belonged to a “cell” of the
LNSF which operated to recruit and raise
funds for LNSF, was unaware of the LNSF’s
previous activity.

It is not in the national interest to admit individuals
who have had sustained contact with known terrorist
and/or terrorist-connected organizations. Ministerial
relief is denied.104
On judicial review of this decision, the Federal Court found that the Minister's
decision "turned on the simplistic view that the presence in Canada of someone who
at some time in the past may have belonged to a terrorist organization abroad can
never be in the national interest of Canada.”105 The court criticized the circular
reasoning of the Minister, which amounted to a finding that an individual who
commits an act described in s 34(1) cannot secure Ministerial discretion because he
committed the very act that confers jurisdiction on the Minister to exercise
discretion under then s 34(2). This analysis, the court concluded, renders the
exercise of Ministerial discretion in these cases meaningless.

In granting the

application for judicial review, the court certified a question of general importance
for consideration by the Federal Court of Appeal,106 which had earlier been certified

Ibid at para 20.
Agraira v Canada (MPSEP), 2009 FC 1302, para. 27, citing Kanaan v Canada (MPSEP), 2008 FC 241,
para 8.
106 Immigration matters that come before the Federal Courts in Canada are subject to a unique set of
procedural measures, all aimed at circumscribing appeal rights. Interlocutory matters may not be
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in a different case, that of Abdella, 2009 FC 1199. The certified question sought to
clarify the specificity with which the Minister was required to refer to and consider
the broad factors for Ministerial relief set out in the relevant guidelines and referred
to above.107
On appeal by the Minister, the Federal Court of Appeal rendered a decision in the
Minister’s favour, but based on reasons that had not been raised by either of the
parties. At the outset of its decision, the court noted this was the first case to come
before it on the topic of Ministerial relief since the promulgation of the IRPA and,
more importantly, since the subsequent transfer of responsibility for rendering
relief decisions from the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to the Minister of
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The court found both the increased
emphasis on security under the IRPA and the transfer of decision making authority
to the Minister of Public Safety to be relevant in determining the function and nature
of the relief provision. The court emphasized that the burden in ministerial relief
cases is squarely on the applicant, and that the overriding consideration for the
Minister to consider is that of public safety. Other factors, such as those listed in the
immigration manual and factors related to the personal situation of the applicant
were found by the court to be not particularly relevant to relief applications and, the
court concluded, are more appropriately raised in an application to the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration for humanitarian and compassionate relief under s 25
of the IRPA. In response to the argument that the decision under appeal simply

appealed and for any final decision to be appealed, the applications judge who presides over the case
must state and certify a question of general importance: see s 74(d) of the IRPA. While clearly
outside the scope of this work, an appellate regime in which a first instance judge is tasked with
determining whether his/her own decision may be appealed is itself a startling example of the
exceptional or “maverick” status of immigration law in the larger legal order.
107 The specific question was this:
When determining a ss. 34(2) application, must the Minister of
Public Safety consider any specific factors in assessing whether a
foreign national's presence in Canada would be contrary to the
national interest? Specifically, must the Minister consider the five
factors listed in the Appendix D of IP10?
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reiterated the original inadmissibility determination, rendering the relief provision
redundant, the court found that such provisions still have a role, but ostensibly only
when membership in a proscribed organization was innocent or unknowing.108
This interpretation of the role of the Ministerial relief provision in the statutory
scheme of the IRPA appeared to come as a surprise to all parties. It explicitly
rejected the approach taken by the Minister himself (as articulated in the
immigration manuals) and provided a striking illustration of the securitization of
immigration decision-making. Above I spoke of the important symbolism attached
to the shift of certain immigration matters to an agency responsible for enforcement
and security. The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Agraira, however, went far
beyond symbolism, adding interpretive meaning to the shift in a manner that not
even the Minister of Public Safety had contemplated.
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Agraira raised another interesting question as
to whether the narrowed threshold for obtaining Ministerial relief would actually (if
unintentionally) become easier to meet, given that the only relevant factor in
considering whether to grant Ministerial relief now appeared to be that of public
safety. Put another way, if the sole criterion on Ministerial relief applications was
now public safety, would an individual necessarily qualify for relief if it were
established that he/she posed no threat to Canadian society? This was the implied
finding of the Federal Court in Khalil,109 a case that arose shortly after the Court of
Appeal’s decision in Agraira. As a result, the government quickly introduced the
amended version of the national interest exemption, now found at s 42.1 of the
IRPA, which appears to both codify the Federal Court of Appeal’s interpretation of
the national interest exemption and simultaneously to retreat from its unanticipated
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consequences. The result borders on the unintelligible; s42.1(3) of the IRPA now
states:
In determining whether to make a declaration, the
Minister may only take into account national security
and public safety considerations, but, in his or her
analysis, is not limited to considering the danger that
the foreign national presents to the public or the
security of Canada.110
The meaning of this provision is, on its face, difficult to discern, but read in
context, it appears to be aimed at prohibiting applicants from raising humanitarian
and compassionate considerations in a Ministerial relief application, while
preserving the ability of the Minister to deny applications of individuals who clearly
do not pose a threat to national security. As noted above, the Federal Court of
Appeal found that the personal circumstances of an applicant for Ministerial relief,
i.e. factors not directly related to public safety or security, were more appropriately
considered under the separate humanitarian and compassionate decision-making
process established under s 25 of the IRPA. Of interest, however, is that, as noted
above, another significant change brought about by the Faster Removal of Foreign
Criminals Act was the elimination of access to s 25 for those found to be inadmissible
pursuant to, amongst other provisions, s 34.111 That which the court giveth, the
government taketh away.
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FRFCA, supra note 22 at s 18
Ibid at s 9, 10. The newly amended s 25(1) of the IRPA states:
25. (1) Subject

to subsection (1.2), the Minister must, on
request of a foreign national in Canada who applies for
permanent resident status and who is inadmissible —
other than under section 34, 35 or 37 — or who does
not meet the requirements of this Act, and may, on
request of a foreign national outside Canada — other
than a foreign national who is inadmissible under
section 34, 35 or 37 — who applies for a permanent
resident visa, examine the circumstances concerning
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In yet a further wrinkle, the day after the FRFCA came into force, the Supreme
Court of Canada issued its decision in the appeal of the Agraira case, and while it
ultimately upheld the Minister’s refusal to grant relief, it also overturned the Federal
Court of Appeal’s holding on the narrow scope of the (now repealed) relief
provision.112 The court questioned the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal on
the significance of the transfer of responsibility for Ministerial relief applications
from the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to the Public Safety Minister. In
rejecting the view that the transfer essentially eliminated all concerns other than
those related to national security in determining national interest waivers, the court
found that incorporating a transfer of Ministerial responsibility into an analysis of
statutory meaning would represent a new and “perplexing” principle of
interpretation.113 The court also made reference to the key concern of the Federal
Court, namely that an interpretation of the waiver provision that focuses only on
security renders it entirely illusory for those already found inadmissible for security
concerns.

At the very least, such an approach would make it categorically

impossible for individuals found inadmissible under certain categories of s 34(1) to
obtain relief, leading the court to conclude that this was an “absurd interpretation
which must be avoided.”114 What remains to be seen, however, is how the new s
42.1 will be interpreted, given that it codifies into law the precise absurdity referred
to by the Supreme Court.

the foreign national and may grant the foreign national
permanent resident status or an exemption from any
applicable criteria or obligations of this Act if the
Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by
humanitarian and compassionate considerations
relating to the foreign national, taking into account the
best interests of a child directly affected.
Agraira v Canada (MPSEP) 2013 SCC 36 [Agraira SCC].
Ibid at para 74.
114 Ibid at para 83.
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In any event, the (curiously-timed) result of the Court’s decision is, at least on
this point, relatively moot, given the changed wording of the Ministerial relief
provision and the now explicitly narrow scope provided under s 42.1(3). What is
not moot, however, is the actual bulk of the court’s decision which, as with a surfeit
of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, transcended the substantive issues on
appeal and became something of a meditation on judicial deference and
administrative action.115
While the Supreme Court in Agraira acknowledged that it was not able to
“determine with finality” the actual reasoning of the Minister, it looked instead at
the reasons that could have been offered for the Minister's decision.116

In

embarking on this search for a possible rationale, the court found that, implicit in
the Minister's brief decision, was an interpretation of the national interest that
related “predominantly to national security and public safety, but does not exclude
the other important considerations outlined in the Guidelines or any analogous
considerations.”117 The court then noted that the Minister was entitled to deference
in regard to this attributed interpretation and concluded that the decision was
reasonable.
An analysis of the increased emphasis on deference emanating from the
Supreme Court of Canada is, at least for present purposes, outside the scope of this
discussion. This said, as we move on to an analysis of decisions made under both s
34(1) and the national interest exemption, it is important to recall that, increasingly,

See for example: Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2011
SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471 [Mowat]; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and
Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708 [Newfoundland Nurses]; Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 SCR
654 [Alberta Teachers]; Smith v. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC 7, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160 [Smith] and
Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 SCR
364 [Halifax].
116 Agraira SCC, supra note 98 at para 58, citing Alberta Teachers, Ibid.
117 Ibid at paras 63-64.
115
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these decisions will be the final word on whether a person is or is not deemed an
inadmissible security threat. In the exceptional realm of the security-migration
nexus, which combines high stakes rights interests and low-grade procedural
protections, the retreat of the court is of concern, calling to mind the now infamous
(and lamentable) words of the United States Supreme Court in the Chinese exclusion
case:
If, therefore, the government of the United States,
through its legislative department, considers the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country,
who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its
peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed
because at the time there are no actual hostilities with
the nation of which the foreigners are subjects…[and in
such cases] its determination is conclusive upon the
judiciary.”118
Before turning to the empirical data, however, I turn now to a brief exploration
of the human rights principles at stake in these proceedings to illustrate why these
decisions matter so profoundly to those subject to them.
2.3.8 Why Inadmissibility Matters: Section 34 and Refugee Status
As I have discussed above, immigration has historically, and persistently, been
viewed as a matter of the receiving state’s prerogative. Countries may, at least in
theory, legitimately choose who to admit and how narrowly or broadly to exclude
those who have taken part in foreign conflicts. The commonly accepted exception to
state discretion regarding admission is in the area of asylum where the majority of
states have agreed to limit their sovereignty to allow those at risk of persecution in
their respective countries of origin the right to assert a claim for asylum and to
receive protection from persecution.119

Per Justice Field in the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
See the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150, entered into
force April 22, 1954, [Refugee Convention], but even before the Refugee Convention came into
118
119
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The obligation not to return refugees to persecution, the principle of nonrefoulement, is firmly entrenched in international discourse and has become, at least
according to some commentators a jus cogens principle of international law, from
which no derogation is permitted.120 Recognizing the limits to state’s willingness to
accede to this regime, the drafters of the Refugee Convention incorporated into it
exceptions – known as the exclusion clauses – for those involved in: i) war crimes,
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity; ii) serious non-political crimes;
and iii) acts “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”121 The
Refugee Convention also contains provisions for national security during times of
exception, most notably the following:
Article 9
Provisional Measures
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting
State, in time of war or other grave and exceptional
circumstances, from taking provisionally measures
which it considers to be essential to the national
security in the case of a particular person, pending a
determination by the Contracting State that that person
is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such
measures is necessary in his case in the interests of
national security.
Article 32
Expulsion

existence, the inalienable right to be free of persecution was entrenched in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810, 1948,Article 14
of which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution…”
120 See for example J. Allain, “The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement”, 13 Int’l J Refugee Law
(2001) 533-558; A. Farmer, “Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures that
Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 Georgetown Imm LJ, (2008) 2-43. The assertion, however, is
controversial, with other commentators (and several courts) maintaining that non-refoulement
remains a norm of customary international law which has not attained jus cogens status.
121 Refugee Convention, supra note 119, respectively Articles 1F(a), (b) and (c).
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1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee
lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national
security or public order.
…
Article 33
Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”)
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”)
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not,
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that country.122
In Canada, the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention have been directly
incorporated into the IRPA.123 Sitting parallel to these clauses, however, is the
inadmissibility regime, which in certain circumstances, bars individuals from
consideration as to whether or not he/she is a Convention refugee, let alone from
the protections that are afforded same. Pursuant to s 100 of the IRPA, consideration
as to whether an individual meets the threshold criteria for eligibility to initiate a
refugee claim is suspended if an officer has exercised her/his discretion to refer the
individual for an admissibility hearing. Section 103 of the IRPA provides for the
suspension of an already existing refugee claim if an officer later refers the matter to
an inadmissibility hearing. Section 101 of the IRPA clarifies that, upon a finding of
inadmissibility for, amongst other things, national security, a refugee claim is

122
123

Refugee Convention, supra note 119.
IRPA, supra note 14 at s 98.
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ineligible for consideration, while section 104 sets out the notice process associated
with the termination of a claim. Finally, s 112 of the IRPA bars consideration as to
whether or not an individual who is inadmissible for, amongst other things, national
security grounds, will face persecution in the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment process,
which is intended to provide a final risk screening for those subject to removal.
However, largely to ensure compliance with the Convention Against Torture, such
individuals are entitled to a consideration as to whether their removal will subject
them personally to a risk of torture, a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment.124 For perceived security threats, even this
scaled-down risk assessment is subject to a balancing process, wherein an official of
the Public Safety department determines whether an individual’s application should
be refused, notwithstanding any risks, because of the “nature and severity of acts
committed by the applicant or because of the danger that the applicant constitutes
to the security of Canada.”125 Finally, to make matters completely clear, the IRPA
also explicitly states at s 115(2) that Canada’s commitment to the principle of nonrefoulement does not apply to those found inadmissible on grounds of, amongst
other categories, security if, in the opinion of the Public Safety Minister, the person
should not be allowed to remain in Canada “on the basis of the nature and severity
of acts committed or of danger to the security of Canada.”
All of this is a rather technical way of illustrating the high stakes process
associated with Canada’s security-inadmissibility regime. It charts a course of
removal for those deemed threats, circumventing entirely the refugee protection
process, while maintaining minimal protections only for those at risk of the most
severe forms of harm if removed. To be sure, not all persons who are subject to the
security-inadmissibility regime are Convention refugees or even assert a risk of
harm if removed from Canada. As we shall see below however, refugee claimants,

124
125

IRPA, supra note 14 at s 112(3) and s 113.
Ibid at s 113(d)(ii).
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Convention refugees and permanent residents who had previously been found to be
refugees make up the vast majority of s 34 cases, at least for those that have arisen
in Canada over the past decade.126

When this fact is combined with the vast

breadth of the security-inadmissibility regime what comes into focus is not only a
legal process defined by legal grey holes, but one that has the potential to expose
significant numbers of individuals to a palpable risk of harm.

2.4 Feeling Insecure: Data on Security and Inadmissibility in Canada
Democracy don't rule the world,
You'd better get that in your head;
This world is ruled by violence,
But I guess that's better left unsaid.127
2.4.1 Introduction
The extraordinary reach of the Canadian security-inadmissibility regime raises a
panoply of interesting questions.

Given the notional reality that the security

provisions capture broad swaths of the populations of many countries, decisions are
clearly made by immigration and public safety officials about what constitutes a
security threat; about categories of persons who may be of concern and, on the
flipside, about which cases warrant the discretionary turn of a blind eye.
Recall that security inadmissibility cases are generally initiated in Canada by
immigration or public safety officials through the process set out at s 44 of the IRPA.
This process involves two separate discretionary decisions.

First, if an officer

suspects that an individual is inadmissible, he or she may write a report outlining
the perceived inadmissibility, pursuant to s 44(1) of the Act. That report is then

In making this claim, I don’t mean to minimize the impact that the security-inadmissibility process
can bring to bear on those who make no claim to personal risk in their country of origin. The effect of
an inadmissibility finding, particularly one related to allegations of terrorism and/or security, can be
profound. The process can lead to stigma, isolation, bars on the ability to work and permanent
separation from immediate family.
127 Bob Dylan, “Union Sundown” from the album Infidels, released October, 1983.
126
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referred to a Minister’s Delegate who, pursuant to s 44(2) of the IRPA, may then
refer the matter to the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board
(IRB) for an admissibility hearing. The admissibility hearing is a quasi-judicial,
adversarial process involving a civil servant decision-maker, a counsel for the
Minister of Public Safety and counsel for the individual alleged to be inadmissible (if
they choose, and are able, to exercise their right to counsel).
In this chapter, I assess and analyze the outcomes of decisions from the
Immigration Division on security-inadmissibility cases arising under s 34 of the
IRPA.128 The Immigration Division decisions provide interesting information in
their own right, but because the cases that come before it are initiated through the
discretionary decision-making process of the Public Safety Minister, they also
provide insight into the concerns and priorities of the Federal government in the
security-migration regime. The initial questions I sought to address in analyzing
these cases were basic ones, including:
x

Who is being referred for admissibility hearings under s 34?

x

From what countries are individuals referred for inadmissibility
hearings?

x

Why, i.e. under which particular head of inadmissibility under s34,
are individuals referred for inadmissibility hearings?

x

Since the outset of the IRPA, are there any trends in the number of
referred cases?

Before I turn to a description of the methodology that I have used in analyzing
these cases, I should provide a brief note of disclosure. My interest in looking at

Note that s 34 decisions are not only rendered by the Immigration Division. Overseas immigration
applications and in-Canada applications for permanent residence (in certain situations) are
determined by immigration officers and, in the course of their determination, they may find
(generally in conjunction with a centralized national security intelligence unit) that a person is
inadmissible under s 34. Access to Information Requests have also been submitted in respect of
these decisions but, to date, they have not been fulfilled.
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these cases arose, at least in part, from my legal practice and my representation of
individuals who were referred for security-related inadmissibility hearings. My
anecdotal sense, from both my own experience, and from talking with other
lawyers, was that such hearings were increasing in frequency and that they were
becoming something of a preferred method for addressing individuals of particular
backgrounds, as opposed to addressing them through the exclusion clauses
associated with the refugee process. These views were based on more than mere
speculation, but at the same time, they were not based on any empirical data, a
problem that this study seeks to address. To my knowledge, no empirical studies on
the application of s 34 have been conducted. While the data collected in relation to
this aspect of this project cannot answer all of the questions that arise, it does
provide interesting insights into the security-migration regime under s 34 of the
IRPA.

2.4.2 Methodology
Immigration Division (ID) decisions are only sporadically published in online
legal databases, such as the open-access CanLII database and other fee-based
services such as LexisNexis and Westlaw. To obtain a full record of ID decisions on
national security, therefore, Access to Information Requests were submitted seeking
disclosure of all decisions issued by the ID related to admissibility hearings
conducted under the provisions of s 34(1) of the IRPA from the date of enactment of
the IRPA (June 28, 2002).

An initial request provided data on 158 cases, to

December, 2011.129 A follow-up Access to Information Request yielded 37 further

Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information (ATIP) Request #A-2011-00094 (10 April
2012). I am very grateful to Professor Sharryn Aiken of Queen’s University who was able to fund the
fulfilling of this access request and to lawyer Catherine Bruce, who joined in the submission of the
request to assist her in preparing a challenge to the provisions of s 34(1). The disclosed material is
all on file with the author.
129
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cases, updated to May, 2013.130 A total of 195 decisions, amounting to over 3700
pages of reasons have now been disclosed.131
As I set out above, the existence of a national interest exemption clause is
commonly referred to, by both the courts and the Public Safety Minister alike, as a
legal justification for the extraordinary reach of the security-inadmissibility
provisions.

In order to assess the empirical validity of this assertion, further

information was obtained on decisions rendered by the Public Safety Minister under
the national interest exemption found, until recently, at s 34(2) of the IRPA.132
Following disclosure of the 195 s 34 cases, the next stage in the analysis was to
manually review them, coding various categories of information in each decision,133
including the following:
x

Year of decision

x

Country of origin of the person concerned (PC)

x

Name of person134

x

IRB File Number and Location (Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal)

ATIP Request #A-2013-00352 (10 October 2013).
Though disclosure of the cases was provided in full, redactions were made to many of the
decisions, typically because the proceedings were held in camera. The redactions did not, however,
prevent the collection of the relevant data for this study.
132 This data was initially obtained by lawyer Chantal Desloges, pursuant to Access to Information
Request #A-2011-00189 (11 May 2011), in relation to a challenge to the constitutionality of another
national interest exemption clause, this one dealing with organized criminality under (then) s 37(2)
of the IRPA. This request was updated by way of a separate request by the author: A-2013-02797
(25 June 2013).
133 Not all of the categories coded will be directly used in this study. The coding process is a
relatively laborious one, and in the interests of efficiency it made sense to review the decisions once,
even if not all of the below categories are relevant for present purposes.
134 Immigration Division hearings are public proceedings, except, pursuant to s 166(c.1) of the IRPA,
which provides that proceedings before the Division must be held in the absence of the public if they
concern a person who is the subject of a proceeding before the Refugee Protection Division or the
Refugee Appeal Division that is pending or who has made an application for protection to the
Minister that is pending. As a high percentage of s 34 inadmissibility cases involve refugee claimants,
or persons already found to be Convention refugees, the names of many of the individuals were
withheld. Furthermore, to protect the privacy of all of the persons whose cases were disclosed, I will
refer to all cases by file number, rather than by name, even where it has been disclosed.
130
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x

Specific s 34 allegations (34(1)(a)-(f) – espionage, subversion,
terrorism, etc.)

x

PC’s alleged organizational affiliation

x

Organization type (as characterized in the decision, i.e. government
agency, political movement, separatist movement, etc.)

x

Outcome

x

Refugee Claimant (i.e. has the person initiated a refugee claim, been
found to be a Convention refugee or become a permanent resident
following a successful refugee claim)135

x

Identity of the Board Member

x

Counsel (and indicates where individual was unrepresented)

x

Information regarding judicial review136

2.4.3 A Steady Rise: Section 34 cases by year
While the overall number of inadmissibility cases may, at first glance, appear
small, two factors are important to consider.

First, as discussed above, the

consequences of a finding of security-inadmissibility are profound, most notably
because they include the possibility of removing individuals to known risks of
persecution.

And beyond the individual rights at stake, Canada’s record of

compliance with international human rights norms is also clearly implicated in the
security-inadmissibility process. Less than 200 prisoners remain imprisoned at

This coding category was determined in a couple of different ways. First, as mentioned above,
given that Immigration Division decisions are to be held in public, except in relation to matters
involving refugee claimants, the withholding of names in ATIA disclosure decisions was in itself a
strong indicator that the person concerned had made a refugee claim. The stronger indicator,
however, was typically provided in the content of the decisions themselves which virtually always
provide at least an outline of the individual’s circumstances, including whether they have made a
refugee claim.
136 As I shall set out in greater detail below, for individuals found to be inadmissible to Canada under
s 34, the only means of challenging the inadmissibility decision is by way of an application for judicial
review at the Federal Court. Furthermore, immigration matters at the Federal Court are subject to a
leave requirement in order to obtain judicial review, a process which has long been criticized, see
Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38:1
Queen’s LJ [Rehaag, the Luck of the Draw].
135

136

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, yet notwithstanding this relatively small number of
remaining prisoners, their ongoing detention remains a significant human rights
and public policy issue in the United States. Second, as illustrated below, while
modest, the number of cases determined by the Immigration Division under s 34 has
been steadily increasing in virtually every year since 2002, from only two cases in
that year to an average of over 30 cases per year from 2010-2012. This increase
was most notable between 2008 and 2009 when the number of cases more than
doubled from previous years.
What is also notable for these years is that, while the numbers of inadmissibility
cases steadily rose, the number of refugee claimants (who, as will be set out below,
make up a large proportion of the s 34 cases before the ID) sharply declined, from
almost 44,000 cases in 2001, to less than 20,000 per year in more recent years.137
The number of claims has continued to diminish following the major overhauls to
the refugee determination system that have occurred since 2011, to the point that
they are now at “historical lows.”138

As such, the increase in security-related

inadmissibility cases does not appear to be attributable to any increases generally in
the pool of individuals from whom inadmissibility concerns typically arise.

Canada, Parliament of Canada, Canada's Inland Refugee Protection System, (2008) online:
Parliament of Canada http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/bp185-e.htm#CPushpanathan at Appendix A and Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Claims Statistics, Trends and Projections, (2013) online Immigration and Refugee Board http://www.irbcisr.gc.ca/Eng/RefClaDem/Pages/RefClaDemStat.aspx.
138 Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, (2014) online:
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/annual-report-2014.pdf at 9.
137
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Table 1: Number of s 34 cases per year (2002-2011)
Year

No. of Cases

2002

2

2003

8

2004

10

2005

13

2006

8

2007

13

2008

12

2009

26

2010

32

2011

34

2012

27

2013*

10

TOTAL (2002-2012)

195

* Incomplete year
2.4.4 Inadmissibility by Country of Origin
The disclosed cases reveal an interesting, if not entirely surprising,
concentration on a relatively small number of countries. Of the 195 cases, slightly
more than half are represented by just four countries: Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India and
Iran. Furthermore, roughly 96% (187) of the cases involved individuals from
countries of the Global South, with the lone exceptions coming from the former
Soviet Bloc (alleged KGB and Stasi operatives), the former Yugoslavia (a single case
from Macedonia), Spain (alleged Basque separatists) and a single case from the
United States (alleged membership in the Earth Liberation Front).
138

It is also not surprising that the vast majority of cases involve nationals of
countries that have experienced protracted situations of violence and conflict, but it
is notable that the majority of these conflicts are entirely internal in nature, from the
civil wars of Sri Lanka and Colombia, to liberation movements in Eritrea, Namibia
and Sudan.
Finally, it is notable that, because of the atemporal nature of the s 34 analysis,
inadmissibility proceedings in respect of several countries arise, not because of the
current situation, but because of historic, and long since passed, conflicts.139
Table 2(a): Section 34 cases by country of origin (2002-2013) (sorted by
number of cases)

139

Countries

Number of cases

Sri Lanka

45

Pakistan

30

India*

16

Iran**

16

Nigeria

13

El Salvador

8

Ethiopia

7

Colombia

6

Lebanon

6

Sudan

6

Eritrea

5

El Salvador, Eritrea and some of the Iranian cases are three examples.
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Palestinian territories

4

Afghanistan

3

Democratic Republic of Congo

3

Russia

3

Iraq

2

Namibia

2

Spain

2

Turkey

2

Angola

1

Bangladesh

1

Cameroon

1

China

1

German Democratic Republic (East
Germany)

1

Jordan

1

Liberia

1

Libya

1

Macedonia

1

Mongolia

1

Niger

1

Not stated

1

Peru

1

Philippines

1

Tunisia

1

United States

1

Total

195

Total No. of Countries

34
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Table 2(b): Section 34 cases by country of origin (2002-2013) (sorted
alphabetically by country)
Countries

Number of cases

Afghanistan

3

Angola

1

Bangladesh

1

Cameroon

1

China

1

Colombia

6

Democratic Republic of Congo

3

El Salvador

8

Eritrea

5

Ethiopia

7

German Democratic Republic (East
Germany)

1

India*

16

Iran**

16

Iraq

2

Jordan

1

Lebanon

6

Liberia

1

Libya

1

Macedonia

1

Mongolia

1
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Namibia

2

Niger

1

Nigeria

13

Not stated

1

Pakistan

30

Palestinian territories

4

Peru

1

Philippines

1

Russia

3

Spain

2

Sri Lanka

45

Sudan

6

Tunisia

1

Turkey

2

United States

1

Total

195

Total No. of Countries

34

One case involved a national of India, but the allegations against him were in
respect of espionage in Pakistan.
** One case involved a dual national of the Netherlands and Iran, but the
allegations against the individual were in respect of membership in the Iranian MEK
organization.
*

2.4.5 Distribution of s 34(1) inadmissibility findings by paragraph
Given that persons can be found inadmissible under s 34(1) for a broad range of
activity, the Immigration Division decisions were also coded according to the
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specific ground(s) of inadmissibility that arose in each case.140 Two interesting and
distinct facts emerged from the data when approached from the perspective of the
alleged grounds of inadmissibility. First, there is a striking reliance on membership
as the primary or sole ground of inadmissibility. Of the 195 cases, only two cases
did not raise membership as at least one of the grounds of inadmissibility.141 A few
other cases, six in total, raised membership as a ground of inadmissibility, but also
alleged that the individual in question had been directly involved in espionage,
subversion or terrorism.142

This leaves a remainder of 186 cases that were

determined on the basis of membership. Because the membership allegations can
only be brought forward in conjunction with an allegation that the organization in
question has engaged in the acts set out at s 34(1)(a), (b) or (c), the membership
cases can take on several different forms.143 The essential point, however, is that
over 95% of security cases before the Immigration Division were decided on the
basis of membership in an organization, rather than on allegations of direct
involvement in subversion, espionage or terrorism. What is fascinating about those
few cases that involve allegations of direct involvement in the acts described at s
34(1)(a)-(c) is that the majority of them (five out of 9) involved individuals from the
Global North. Recall from above, that there were only a total of seven individuals in
the disclosed materials who originated from Northern countries.

The coding process in this respect was somewhat challenging, given that the provisions can be
overlapping and many cases involved multiple allegations. Allegations in relation to membership
under s 34(1)(f), furthermore, can only be made by way of further reference to the other ground of
inadmissibility that is alleged to have been carried out by the organization in question. Finally, there
are cases in the disclosure that do not clearly articulate the particular ground of inadmissibility on
which it relied.
141 See Minister of Public Safety v X (2009), A8-01297 (IRB) and Minister of Public Safety v X (2004),
A4-00251 (IRB), both on file with the author.
142 Minister of Public Safety v X (2008), A5-01959 (IRB); Minister of Public Safety v X (2005), A400550 (IRB); Minister of Public Safety v X (2006), A4-00778 (IRB), Minister of Public Safety v X
(2009), A9-00033 (IRB); and Minister of Public Safety v X (2008), A7-00636 (IRB).
143 For example, a clear majority of the membership cases (113) were based on allegations that the
organization in question had engaged in acts of terrorism alone. 13 cases alleged that the
organization in question had committed acts listed at s 34(1)(a), (b) and (c), while 35 cases involved
allegations that the organization had engaged in acts listed at s 34(1)(b) and (c).
140
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Second, and perhaps more striking, is that the two provisions that relate directly
to Canadian security – s 34(1)(d) and 34(1)(e) – have been essentially unused since
the IRPA came into effect over a decade ago. Specifically, s 34(1)(d) (being a danger
to the security of Canada) was raised in only one case, and in that matter the
Immigration Division rejected the Minister’s allegations.144 To date, s 34(1)(e)
(engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of
persons in Canada) does not appear to have ever been invoked in proceedings
before the Immigration Division.
2.4.6 Organizations that give rise to inadmissibility under s 34(1)(f)
Keeping in mind that virtually all security-inadmissibility cases relate to
membership in organizations, the organizational affiliation of the individual
concerned in each case was recorded. While it is beyond the scope of this study to
engage in a detailed analysis of the nature of these organizations, it can be said that
the vast majority of them are political in nature and that their objectives are
relatively narrowly construed to political change within the nation state in which
they act. Some are strictly political in nature, advocating (often with violence) a
sharp or radical political change in their country. Others seek to achieve political
change, but are more properly construed as either separatist or liberation
movements. Regardless of how these organizations are characterized, however,
virtually all of them tended to have local aims, centred around destabilizing the
(often repressive) regimes within their respective countries.
It is also notable, given prevailing views about the sources of insecurity in the
contemporary world, that only nine cases, or less than 5% of the total, were
organizations with a strong religious orientation.145

Minister of Public Safety v X (2009), A8-01297 (IRB).
Several of these organizations have multiple agendas, for example, Hamas in the Palestinian
territories, Amal in Lebanon and Al-Haramain, which has operated in several countries.
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Consistent with the fact that certain countries of origin were highly represented
in the data set, a few organizations from those countries also appeared very
frequently. 21 cases involved allegations of inadmissibility for membership in the
Pakistani Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM – formerly known as the Muhajir
Qaumi Movement). Nine cases related to membership in the Iranian Mojahedin-eKhalq (MEK) organization, while 42 cases involved the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
It is also notable, though again not surprising, that several of the groups were
ostensibly advocating for the protection of human rights and democratic values and
were supported in their objectives by the West.

The Iraqi Patriotic Union of

Kurdistan, for example, was founded and led by the current U.S. backed President of
Iraq, Jalal Talabani.

Similarly, the Angolan UNITA organization was actively

supported by the United States in the drawn out Angolan civil war and both the
Eritrean ELF and EPLF groups were commonly recognized as engaging in a justified
struggle for political independence from almost unspeakably repressive Ethiopian
regimes, as was most clearly illustrated in Eritrea’s admission into the United
Nations, an initiative that was sponsored by both Canada and the United States.146
Overall, what emerges from the data is that, while many of the groups under
scrutiny have engaged in various degrees of political violence, they have tended to
do so in the context of discrete civil conflicts, often involving repressive and violent
ruling regimes.

Angus Grant, Catherine Bruce & Catherine Reynolds, “Out of the Fire and into the Pot: The Eritrean
Liberation Movement, the Right to Self-Determination and the Over-Breadth of North American
Immigration Security Provisions” (2010) 25 Georgetown Imm Law J 859 at 870.
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Table 3: Section 34 cases by country of origin and organization (2002-2013)
Countries

Number
of cases

Organizations (No. of Cases)*

Afghanistan

3

Muslim World League (1), Mujahadeen (1), Taliban (1)

Angola

1

União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
(UNITA) (1)

Bangladesh

1

Bangladesh Freedom Party (1)

Cameroon

1

South Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) (1)

China

1

East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) (1)

Colombia

6

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (3),
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) (2), M19 (1)

Democratic Republic of Congo

3

Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
(AFDL) (1), Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)
(2)

El Salvador

8

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) (8)

Eritrea

5

Eritrean Liberation Fron (ELF) (4),
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) (1)

Ethiopia

7

Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) (4),
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
(EPRDF) (1),

Democratic

Front

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (1), Eritrean People’s
Patriotic Front/Coalition for Unity and Democracy
(EPPF/CUD) (1)
German Democratic
(East Germany)
India

Republic

1

Ministry for State Security (STASI) (1)

16

Bhindranwala Tigers Force of Khalistan (BTF) (2),
All India Sikh Students Federation/International Sikh Youth
Federation ( AISSF/ISYF) (9),

Babbar Khalsa (BKI) (2),
Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) (1)
Iran

16

Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) (9),
Fedayan-e Khalq (1),
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Basji Forces (2),
Mahdaviyat (1);
Komala (1) ,
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) (1), Kurdish
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) (1)
Iraq

2

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (2)

Jordan

1

Arab Liberation Front (1)

Lebanon

6

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (1),
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)(1),
Amal Movement (2),
Hezbollah (1),
Syrian Social Nationalist Party in Lebanon (SSNP) (1)

Liberia

1

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) (1)

Libya

1

Al-Haramain (1)

Macedonia

1

Albanian National Army (1)

Mongolia

1

Government Intelligence Agency (1)

Namibia

2

Caprivi Liberation Army (1),
Caprivi Liberation Movement (1)

Niger

1

Movement of Niger. For Justice (1)

Nigeria

13

Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) (1),
Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC)(1);
Niger Delta Force (1);
Niger Delta Vigilantes (1);
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB) (7)

Not stated

1

Redacted

Pakistan

30

Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) (21);
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) (4);
Imamia Students Organization (ISO) (2);
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (2);
The Pakistan Muslim League (PML)(1)

Palestinian territories

4

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (2);
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Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)(1);
Hamas (1)
Peru

1

Shining Path (1)

Philippines

1

New People’s Army (NPA) (1)

Russia

3

KGB (3)

Spain

2

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (2)

Sri Lanka

45

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (41);
Tamil National Alliance (TNA) (2);
World Tamil Movement (WTM) (1)**;
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) (1)

Sudan

6

Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) (2);
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (1);
Justice & Equality (2);
Beja Congress (1)

Tunisia

1

Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) (1)

Turkey

2

Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, (HADEP) (1);
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) (1)

United States

1

Earth Liberation Front (1)
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* Organizational information may be redacted from record, so when added together
may not total the sum in the previous column
** TNA and WTM both found to have links to LTTE

2.4.7 Status of those subject to admissibility hearings
In the pages above, I have indicated that the majority of persons subject to
inadmissibility proceedings under s 34 are either recognized Convention refugees,
or individuals who are in the process of making a refugee claim, having asserted a
risk of persecution if returned to their country of origin. While it was impossible to
determine the status of each person referred for an admissibility hearing with total
148

precision, the data certainly confirms that a vast majority of these individuals have
engaged in the refugee process. Twenty six of the cases involved persons who had
already been found to be Convention refugees. Eight cases involved persons who
had already been denied refugee status. It appears that there were only seven cases
involving individuals who had never made a refugee claim, compared with 131
cases in which the individuals had made a refugee claim and were still at some stage
in the refugee claim process. There were, finally, 23 cases in which it could not be
known whether the individual had made a refugee claim, although several of them
had had their inadmissibility determined in camera, which, as noted above, strongly
suggests that they had initiated a refugee claim.

Even using a conservative

approach, taking into consideration only those known cases in which the persons
concerned had either initiated a refugee claim or had been found to be a refugee,
157 cases, or 81% of the dataset involved persons who asserted that they would be
at risk of persecution if removed from Canada.
2.4.8 Inadmissibility Rates
The data was also coded with respect to outcome. In essence, there are really
only two options available to the Division in reaching a conclusion in each case. On
the reasonable grounds to believe standard, the Division must simply determine
whether the individual is admissible or inadmissible under s 34. If it finds the
person inadmissible, the Division must issue a deportation order.147 If it concludes
that the allegations against the person have not been made out, it must conclude as
such and the person maintains the status that he or she had prior to the
inadmissibility hearing. There is no discretion and there are no further remedies
available to the Division.

147 See sections 45(d) of the IRPA, supra note 14 and 229(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227.
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Overall, when the Minister refers a matter to the Immigration Division for an
admissibility hearing under s 34, the referral is found to be well-founded (on the
reasonable grounds to believe standard) and a deportation order is issued in
roughly 67% of cases. In 33% of cases, then, the referral is found to be without
merit and the person retains whatever status he/she had prior to the
commencement of the proceedings.
Table 4: Section 34 cases by outcome
Year

No. of Cases

Admissible (%)

Inadmissible (%)

2002

2

1 (50%)

1 (50%)

2003

8

4 (50%)

4 (50%)

2004

10

6 (60%)

4 (40%)

2005

13

6 (46%)

7 (54%)

2006

8

2 (25%)

6 (75%)

2007

13

3 (23%)

10 (77%)

2008

12

3 (25%)

9 (75%)

2009

26

6 (23%)

20 (77%)

2010

32

6 (19%)

26 (81%)

2011

34

18 (53%)

16(47%)

2012

27

6 (22%)

21 (78%)

2013

10

4 (40%)

6 (60%)

TOTAL (2002-2013)
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65 (33.3%)

130 (66.6%)

Two facts are of note in looking at the data from the perspective of outcomes.
First, after an initial few years in which the inadmissibility rate hovered around the
fifty percent mark (albeit over a small sample size) the rate jumped up to the midseventy percent range for the next several years. While it is perhaps impossible to
establish with certainty the cause of this increase in inadmissibility findings, it is
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notable that this timeframe coincides precisely with several oft-cited Federal Court
and Federal Court of Appeal decisions that asserted the breadth with which s 34 is
to be interpreted.148
Second, the inadmissibility rate for 2011 sharply dropped, from an average rate
of 78% for the preceding 5 years to 47% in 2011. This drop is almost certainly
attributable to the government’s response to the arrival of the MV Sun Sea vessel in
2010, which carried with it 492 Tamil asylum seekers. 149 18 of the 34 cases for
2011 were former Sun Sea passengers, only a third of whom (six) were found to be
inadmissible. When the 2011 figures are examined with these cases adjusted out of
the mix, the inadmissibility rate for the year closely resembles that of previous years
(75%). What is fascinating about the Sun Sea cases and what likely explains the low
success rate on the part of the CBSA in bringing these cases forward for
admissibility hearings is the aggressiveness with which officers were instructed to
approach them; what is interesting, in other words, is the narrowing of officers’
discretion as to whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Sun Sea
asylum seekers were inadmissible under s 34. Recall that in 2009 another migrant
vessel, the MV Ocean Lady arrived in Canada carrying 76 Tamil asylum seekers.150
In response to this arrival, and after intelligence reports indicated that the Sun Sea
was in transit to Canada, a senior CBSA official drafted a memorandum entitled
Marine Migrants: Program Strategy for the Next Arrival that was intended to outline
CBSA strategy for responding to the next mass arrival of asylum seekers by boat. In
addition to noting that CBSA would take “maximum advantage” of detention as an
“effective tool against those who circumvent immigration processes,” the report also
advised that CBSA would be “aggressive” in bringing admissibility hearings forward

See most notably Poshteh, supra note 78; Al Yamani II, supra note 74, but also Ugbazghi, supra note
73; and Kanendra, supra note 72.
149 “Documents: The Sun Sea Investigation”, The National Post (13 February 2011) online: National
Post www.nationalpost.com.
150 Petti Fong, “76 illegal migrants found on ship seized off B.C.”, The Toronto Star (18 October 2009).
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against many of the Sun Sea passengers.151 In keeping with this memorandum, the
CBSA have dealt with the Sun Sea passengers with unusual zealousness, resulting in
the referral of many admissibility cases to the Immigration Division that appear to
have had little merit.
2.4.9 Appeals and Judicial Review
Another example of the “maverick” status of immigration law is the asymmetry
in appeal rights granted to the Minister, as compared to those found to be
inadmissible for security purposes. Pursuant to s 63(5) of the IRPA, the Minister has
access to a full, fact-based administrative appeal of Immigration Division decisions
to the Immigration Appeal Division of the IRB. Judicial review may also be sought
from a decision of the IAD. Persons found to be inadmissible under s 34 (and those
described by section 35, a subset of s 36 and s 37) are, by contrast, precluded from
appealing to the IAD and must rely solely on the more circumscribed judicial review
process.152 In April, 2014, a further Access to Information Request provided data on
appeal and judicial review outcomes of the previously disclosed s 34 Immigration
Division decisions.153 The ATIP response provided data indicating that some sort of
review (either Ministerial appeal to the IAD and/or judicial review) was sought in
79 cases.

Obtained pursuant to Access to Information Request No. A-2013-03486(10 September 2013).
Disclosed material was obtained by the Canadian Council for Refugees and is on file with the author.
152 Which is itself set out at s 72 of the IRPA. The differences between an appeal to the IAD and
judicial review are myriad. To cite but two of them: i) IAD parties may adduce new evidence,
whereas judicial review proceedings are based solely on the record before the Immigration Division;
and ii) the IAD may substitute its own decision upon hearing the appeal and either granting it and
issuing the applicable removal order, or dismiss it and uphold the Immigration Division decision.
The Federal Court’s jurisdiction is generally confined to remitting successful applications back to the
Immigration Division for reconsideration.
153 Immigration and Refugee Board, ATIP request # A-2013-01798 (9 April, 2014). Because of
disclosure delays, this request related to the slightly more limited dataset initially disclosed under
ATIP request # 2011-00094 and thus relates to 158 decisions rather than the full dataset of 195
cases. The Access to Information response provided data on several different possible outcomes:
Minister’s Appeals to the IAD; judicial review leave applications (of both the Minister, from the IAD
and of inadmissible individuals); and judicial review decisions, upon leave being granted.
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The overall success rate for inadmissible persons seeking leave and judicial
review of Immigration Division decisions was low. While the vast majority of
Federal Court decisions (on both leave and judicial review) related to individual
(rather than Ministerial) applications, in only 3 of 56 applications were individuals
successful in having Immigration Division decisions quashed.154 By contrast, in 19
appeals determined on their merits by the Immigration Appeal Division, the
Minister’s appeal was granted in 12 cases. Appeals were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction in the remaining four cases.155 Of the cases decided on the merits, then,
the Minister was successful in over 63% of cases.
The low success rates of individuals seeking review of their inadmissible status
comes as no surprise; the Federal Court is generally deferential of IRB decisions156
and as I outlined above, the broad interpretation of the security provision has been
endorsed (and to a significant extent developed) by the courts themselves. Put
simply, if there is a problem with the overreach of s34, the problem does not lie in
the decision-making of the Immigration Division, but in the exceptionally broad
wording of s34 and, as I argue in the final part of this study, in a misuse of
administrative discretion.

In the absence of their own discretionary powers,

decisions of the Immigration Division involve a somewhat mechanical application of
law to fact, and given that many if not most individuals fleeing conflict zones may
come under the notional rubric of s34, it is of little surprise that the Division’s
decisions in these cases are by and large found to be reasonable. With this in mind, I
turn briefly to an area of decision-making that does involve a large measure of

In two other cases, IAD decisions granting Ministerial appeals were overturned by the court: see
PS v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 168 and B074 v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1146. There was one further
application in which an inadmissible individual prevailed: in Canada (MCI) v Qureshi, 2007 FC 1049,
the Minister unsuccessfully sought judicial review of an appeal that the IAD had earlier dismissed.
155 I presume these were situations in which individual applicants sought to appeal Immigration
Division decisions, rather than seeking relief from the Federal Court.
156 In the context of the Refugee Protection Division of the IRB, see Rehaag, The Luck of the Draw,
supra note136 at 9.
154
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discretion – that being the Ministerial waiver of inadmissibility located at s42.1 of
the IRPA.

2.4.10 Section 34(2) (now 42.1) exemptions
As I have mentioned above, the existence of a discretionary Ministerial
exemption from the application of s 34 has been at once a recognition of its broad
application and a constitutional salve to its potential overbreadth.

For years,

however, it has been viewed by refugee advocates as a largely illusory mechanism,
in part because it was seen as being virtually impossible to convince a political
figure (the Public Safety Minister) to sign off on a waiver of inadmissibility for
someone already found to be a security threat.
The process also came to be viewed as a hollow one because it has been mired in
delays, the length of which would likely be viewed as unconstitutional in virtually
any other context.157 Recent data from access to information requests tend to
confirm these views.158 In the almost eleven years between 2002 and the first half
of 2013, 293 applications for relief were submitted under s 34(2) and over that
period of time, only 95 decisions were made, many of which related to applications
submitted under the regime that preceded the IRPA.159 On average, then, the Public
Safety Minister issues roughly 8 decisions on s 34(2) applications per year. With a
current (though constantly increasing) backlog of 223 applications, this means that
the timeframe for determining the pending applications is just under 28 years and

Indeed, in the context of Canadian criminal trials (in which the rights at stake are similar to those
associated with immigration proceedings, particularly those involving refugees) accused individuals
have a constitutionally entrenched right to a trial within a reasonable time – see s 11(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While there is no rigid formula for determining whether a
delay has become unreasonable, as we shall see below, the timeframes for obtaining a decision under
s 34(2) are completely outside the range of periods considered to be unreasonable in the criminal
context, see for example R. v. Azkov, [1990] 2 SCR 119, 1990 CanLII 45 (SCC).
158 Access to Information Request #A-2011-00189 (11 May 2011); Access to information request A2013-02797 (25 June 2013), both on file with the author.
159 Access to Information Request #A-2011-00189 (11 May 2011).
157
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individual applications can take upwards of a decade to complete.160 Furthermore,
while the government previously held permanent residence applications in
abeyance pending the outcome of Ministerial relief applications, a change in policy
implemented in 2013 ended this practice. The impact of this change in policy has
had immediate effect, resulting in the refusal of permanent residence applications of
numerous Convention refugees and an ensuing risk of removal.161
Given the stigma associated with security-related inadmissibility, given the
omnipresent spectre of removal and family separation, and finally, given that those
found inadmissible are ineligible for healthcare coverage and frequently cannot
work, the situation is a virtual archetype of the “justice delayed is justice denied”
axiom.
2.4.11 Further Observations and Analysis
Numerous conclusions can be drawn from the above data, some of them
tentatively, given the relatively small cohort of cases, but others with confidence.
First, security-related inadmissibility is an increasingly utilized tool for Canadian
public safety officials. Second, and perhaps most strikingly, these security cases are
overwhelmingly based on membership in groups perceived as having taken part in
violence, rather than allegations of actual participation or complicity in violence.

160 Ibid.
The 28 year figure was derived by simply dividing the total number of outstanding
applications by the average number of decisions rendered per year. This assumes that the rate at
which the Minister renders decisions on Ministerial relief will remain constant. The assertion that
applications can take over a decade to be determined is borne out by the data released, but was also
related to me by various refugee lawyers. It confirms my own experience in representing clients who
have submitted these applications. The delays in decision-making have also been documented in
mandamus applications that have been brought before the Federal Court, see for example: Sencio
Hechavarria v Canada (PSEP), 2010 FC 767; John Doe v Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 535.
161 This information was shared with me by several lawyers, who unexpectedly received a spate of
refused permanent residence applications for their Convention refugee clients. See Canada,
Citizenship and Immigration “Operational Bulletin 524”, on file with the author. The question as to
whether those who had submitted permanent residence applications prior to the change in policy
had a legitimate expectation that such applications would be held in abeyance pending the outcome
of their Ministerial relief applications was considered (and rejected) in Omer v Canada (MCI), 2015
FC 494.
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This focus on membership cases, furthermore, would appear to have arisen as a
result of the “broad and unrestricted” interpretation of the term, as has been
developed in the jurisprudence. This interpretation is essentially sui generis to the
inadmissibility context and stands in direct contrast to other immigration contexts
where membership, in and of itself, is never seen as being sufficient on its own to
attract sanction.

In the wide-open realm of security-inadmissibility, the data

demonstrates that membership is the ultimate catch-all.
Indeed, over the course of the period under study, the cases on inadmissibility
directly reflect the ever-increasing, court-mandated scope of membership.
Consider, for example, the following statement from the Immigration Division prior
to the Federal Court decision in Al Yamani II which found the definition of
membership under s 34 to have unlimited temporal application:
The JKLF did engage in terrorist activities in Indian-held
Kashmir, but at a time that pre-dated Mr. Syed's
membership in the organization. There is no evidence
before me that the JKLF committed terrorist acts in
Indian-held Kashmir after April 1993 or before
December 1995, the time period during which Mr. Syed
was a member.
…
I consider the time period during which the activities of
the organization are relevant to be that time during
which Mr. Syed was learning about the organization and
was a member of the organization. I have concluded
that IRPA cannot intend that a person can be held
responsible for the conduct of an organization after the
person has severed their membership or association
with that organization. Similarly, if a person becomes a
member of an organization which has substantially
changed in nature and character, that person could not
reasonably be held responsible for activities
undertaken by the ·organization before the person's
membership. In other words, to be found inadmissible I
consider a person would have to have been a member
while the organization was engaged in terrorism. To
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find otherwise would not be in accordance with the
stated objectives provided in section 3 of IRPA. I do not
see how a person who was a member of an organization
at a time that organization was not engaged in terrorist
activity could be said, on the basis solely of membership
and nothing more, to threaten the security of Canadians,
or to generally be a security risk.162
Now, compare this statement to the following passage from an Immigration
Division decision that post-dated the Al Yamani decision:
The other factor that is important in looking at your
membership is that according to the case of Aliamani
[sic] there is no temporal component to my analysis. It's
irrelevant that the period of your membership in the
EPRP did not coincide with the terrorism and
subversion by force that the EPRP committed. When I
say it's irrelevant I mean it's irrelevant in my analysis.
Or course, in reality it's relevant but in terms of
paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act the case law says it's irrelevant. There is
no temporal component.
This passage reveals, not surprisingly, the trickle down influence of the Federal
Court’s broad interpretation of membership. But more interestingly, it also appears
to reveal a sense in the decision-maker that the law related to membership has been
ruptured from the reality of what, presumably, the member understands to be the
“everyday” meaning of the term. It seems, in other words, that the decision-maker
recognized a tension between the legal consequences he felt obliged to impose in
the circumstances and the absence of morally sanctionable conduct on the part of
the individual. Without making too much of this small passage, the rupture between
law and “reality” recognized by the member reveals something profound about the
place of legality in the immigration realm and represents a clear, if unintentional
articulation of Dyznehaus’ legal grey holes.

162

Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v X (2005), A4-00685 (IRB).
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Another related observation that can be made from the data is that, contrary to
the primary legal justification for the broad scope of s 34(1), the provision has
rarely been invoked in relation to any kind of actualized concern over Canadian
security. As noted above, in a passage routinely cited by the Immigration Division
the Federal Court in Suresh II articulated the justification for the breadth of s 34 by
reference to Canadian security: “[m]embership cannot and should not be narrowly
interpreted when it involves the issue of Canada's national security.”163 So far as it
goes, this justification is one on which there is a reasonably broad consensus. Recall
that even most open, or “porous” border advocates recognize the legitimacy of
inherent limitations on migration for those who present some kind of threat to the
liberal legal order of the host country.

It should also be acknowledged that

Canadian courts have (not unreasonably) suggested that domestic security
concerns, broadly construed, may also incorporate threats to international security.
As the Supreme Court noted in Suresh I:
These considerations lead us to conclude that a person
constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” if he or
she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada,
whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact
that the security of one country is often dependent on
the security of other nations. The threat must be
“serious”, in the sense that it must be grounded on
objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and
in the sense that the threatened harm must be
substantial rather than negligible.164
The data suggests, however, that s 34 cases rarely invoke, at least explicitly, the
security of Canada, even under this broad interpretation of the term. This is of
course most clearly articulated by the fact that the provisions built into s 34
(sections 34(1)(d) and (e)) that relate directly to Canadian security are essentially

163
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Suresh II, supra note 70 at para 22.
Suresh I, supra note 58 at para 90.
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never invoked. Those implicated on the other grounds, furthermore, were generally
individuals with (often tenuous) affiliations to inward-looking and parochial
organizations whose aims tend to be localized political change, often in the context
of repressive state regimes. This fact should not be taken as a defence of, or
justification for, the violent means adopted by some of these organizations, but it
should inspire reflection as to the classes of persons who are subjected to securityinadmissibility procedures and those for whom a blind eye seems to be turned.
Why is it, for example, that membership in the obscure Namibian Caprivi Liberation
Movement165 is of greater concern, from a Canadian security perspective, than
membership in the United States military? It is a firmly established fact that both
organizations have engaged in the subversion of governments, and yet nominal
membership in the “CLM” triggers inadmissibility procedures, while senior
command control in U.S. military units directly involved in government subversion
does not appear to raise any concern.
This asymmetry in the application of the law is concerning. It may very well
offend the guarantee against nationality-based discrimination found in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,166 but on a more basic level it also calls into
question the integrity of the legal regime. It is, after all, a basic principle of legality
that laws should be implemented as promulgated and that it must be capable of
guiding the behaviour of its subjects.167

Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v X (2009), A8-02764 (IRB).
Supra note 41, s15, which guarantees all persons equal treatment under the law without
discrimination on the basis of, amongst other things, national or ethnic origin.
167 See generally Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1979) and Lon Fuller, The
Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1969).
165
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Conclusion
If it is true, as Bob Dylan suggests, that “Democracy don't rule the world” but
that it is rather “ruled by violence” the question for our purposes is why some
violence is disregarded by immigration inadmissibility proceedings, while other
forms of resistance attract sanction. The answer, I argue in the coming chapters, lies
in a certain kind of chauvinism toward the Global South, in a disregard for the role of
Western democracies in the conflicts of the South and in a failure, I contend, to view
immigration law through the prism of those in the South who have been forced to
flee from upheaval. The solution, I later argue, lies in a reformulated view of
administrative discretion in inadmissibility matters, one that incorporates as
integral components both a dialogical approach to decision-making and a sensitive
understanding of Third World perspectives on conflict, the use of force and the
movement of peoples.
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CHAPTER THREE: RETHINKING SECURITY FROM
THE OUTSIDE IN: MIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD
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3.1

Introduction

Thus far, we have situated the place that immigration occupies in liberal theory and
examined how the immigration-security regime identifies and excludes those alleged to
have participated in subversion, espionage and terrorism. We have also witnessed how the
broad language of the security regime seems to be used to capture not all of those
described in the words of the legislation, but rather particular kinds of individuals from
particular parts of the world who have engaged in particular kinds of activities. With this
in mind, I now move to an examination as to why this might be the case; about why it is, in
other words, that so much of Canada’s immigration-security apparatus appears to be
directed toward those who have taken part in relatively obscure and decidedly localized
Southern conflicts. To understand why it is that people originating from the Global South
seem to be disproportionately targeted for exclusion under the immigration-security
regime, I turn to an approach to the study of law, specifically international law, which
places the Global South at the very centre of its analysis.
I begin this chapter by describing the somewhat uneasy relationship between domestic
migration control and international law, which I then follow with an explanation as to how
decision-making in the immigration-security regime directly, if sometimes unwittingly,
implicates several key areas of concern to international law. These include, but are not
necessarily limited to, the principles of self-determination and territorial contiguity, the use
of force, international human rights norms and the international refugee law principle of
non-refoulement. Immigration decision-making is, to be sure, a domestic, state-based
practice – indeed there are ways in which it is an exceedingly inward-looking process. This
said, decisions about who may enter a state and who may legitimately be excluded from it
are equally about the nexus between the domestic and the international, and it is these
points of contact and intersection that I highlight in this section. In addition, I demonstrate
how the lack of a nuanced and explicit engagement with international law has led to the
arbitrariness of immigration-security decisions explored in the previous chapter.
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With this in mind, however, in the next section I acknowledge that even a more
fulsome understanding of the place of international law in the migration-security regime
does not fully capture, or adequately explain, why decision-making in this area remains
fixated on individuals from the Global South.

In short, I argue, mere knowledge of

international law will not be sufficient to ensure that balance is brought to migrationsecurity decision making. In addition to a more ‘nuanced and explicit’ engagement with
international law, I contend that decisions in this realm must also be suffused with an
understanding of the history and context from which those typically found to be
inadmissible come.
To do this, I turn to the writing of several individuals who, to varying degrees, selfidentify as scholars of the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
movement. I commence, not surprisingly, by describing the TWAIL approach, tracing its
history and contributions to our understanding of international law. I then look to a
TWAIL perspective on those areas particularly relevant to the immigration-security
regime, such as subversion, terrorism and self-determination. From this vantage point, I
look to a number of specific examples of cases, within the Canadian context, that illustrate
both the problems that arise when immigration law is applied in a vacuum, devoid of the
context of subaltern realities, and the potential that a TWAILian perspective may bring to
the process.

3.2 Immigration and International Law
Laws defining and enforcing borders lie, by their very nature, at the intersection
between the domestic and international. At the same time, regulating inflows of people has
always been characterized as a matter of pure state prerogative and states remain
profoundly reticent to cede control over their immigration programs to anything
resembling an international legal regime. Immigration, to many, is one of the clearest
expressions of sovereignty and it therefore remains sacrosanct as a matter of internal state
discretion, except to the extent that international law may reinforce this notion. The
(misplaced) perception amongst many Northern states that they bear the brunt of
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immigrant, and particularly refugee, inflows, together with the fact that international legal
frameworks cannot take root without the acquiescence of such states means that an
international and binding regime for immigration, as opposed to border control, has never
gained traction.1
However, there are ways, albeit tentative ones, in which domestic immigration law
recognizes at least the relevance of international norms to its processes and the language of
international law can, not infrequently, be found in immigration decision-making. Below I
sketch out three distinct ways in which international legal norms interact with domestic
immigration law in Canada:

1) they inform the interpretation of domestic law; 2)

international law is, in certain circumscribed categories, directly incorporated into
domestic law; and 3) migration law has become a key cite for interpreting the content of
international human rights norms.
3.2.1 International law as interpretive guide
In Canada, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act makes reference to
international law, specifically international human rights instruments, requiring that the
Act be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with it.2 As a dualist country, however, the
hard edge of international law is not realized in Canada without direct and explicit
incorporation into Canadian law.3 This said, the degree to which domestic immigration and
refugee law implicates international law and international legal obligations has been the
subject of considerable judicial commentary, most notably perhaps in the seminal decision

1 Though several have proposed such an international regulatory regime, particularly liberal economists, see
for example Howard F Chang, “The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for Global
Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory” (2008) 41 Cornell Int Law J 14.
2 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), s 3(3):
This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that…

(f) complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory.
For an overview of the monist and dualist modes of incorporating international law domestically, see J.H.
Currie, Public International Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 199-201. See also Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J
Toope, “A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of International Law by Canadian Courts” (2002) 40 Canadian
Yearbook of Intl Law 3 at 21. Also found in David Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (Portland, Oregon:
Hart Publishing, 2004) at 357 [Brunnée and Toope, “Hesitant Embrace”].
3
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of the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker.4 In Baker, the court adopted the principle first
established elsewhere that international human rights law represents, at the very least, a
key body of content with which to identify, interpret and resolve ambiguity in domestic
legislation.5 The court in Baker also noted that international human rights norms have a
“critical influence” on the interpretation of the rights included in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, including the scope and applicability of such rights to non-citizens.6
Mavis Baker was a Jamaican woman who entered Canada on a visitor's visa in 1981
at the age of twenty-six. She worked as a live-in domestic worker for eleven years, during
which time she gave birth to four children who were, by virtue of their birth in Canada,
Canadian citizens.

She applied for permanent residency on humanitarian and

compassionate grounds, based on the hardship she would endure if forced to return to
Jamaica, given her current need for psychological care and on the impact that her
departure would have on her Canadian-born children. A senior immigration officer refused
the application, stating that there were insufficient humanitarian and compassionate
reasons to warrant an exemption to the general rule that applications for permanent
residency be processed outside Canada. On judicial review to the Federal Court, Baker
argued that, as a signatory to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can.
T.S. 1992 No. 3, Canada was obliged to make the consideration of the best interests of her
children a primary consideration and that the responsible officer had not fulfilled this
obligation. The court dismissed this argument, but did certify the following question of
general importance: “Given that the Immigration Act does not expressly incorporate the
language of Canada’s international obligations with respect to the International Convention
on the Rights of the Child, must federal immigration authorities treat the best interests of
the Canadian child as a primary consideration in assessing an applicant under s. 114(2) of

[1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker].
Ibid, at para 70, following Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA), at p 266; Vishaka v.
Rajasthan, [1997] 3 LRC 361 (SC India).
6 Ibid, citing Slaight Communications Inc. v Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R 1038; R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
4
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the Immigration Act?”7 The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court decision, finding that
the best interests of the children need not be given primacy in assessing such an
application. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the law, as
constructed, did not mean that the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the affected
children’s best interests were determinative8 of an application for permanent residence on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds, but Canada’s signing of the Convention was an
important interpretive factor in determining how such applications are to be determined:
[F]or the exercise of the discretion to fall within the standard
of reasonableness, the decision-maker should consider
children’s best interests as an important factor, give them
substantial weight, and be alert, alive and sensitive to
them. That is not to say that children’s best interests must
always outweigh other considerations, or that there will not be
other reasons for denying an H & C claim even when children’s
interests are given this consideration. However, where the
interests of children are minimized, in a manner inconsistent
with Canada’s humanitarian and compassionate tradition and
the Minister’s guidelines, the decision will be unreasonable.9
Of interest, while the minority judgment adopted the bulk of Justice Claire
L’Heureux Dube’s majority reasoning in Baker, it dissented on the question of the
application of international law to domestic decision-making, finding that the primacy
accorded to children’s considerations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child was
“irrelevant unless and until such provisions are the subject of legislation enacted by
Parliament.”10

The Canadian approach to judicial review and appeals of immigration matters provides an articulate
example of how such matters are dealt with in legally exceptional ways – applications for judicial review of
immigration decisions are subject to a leave requirement, while appeals are barred unless the judge who
determines the judicial review certifies a question of general importance: see IRPA s 74(d). Challenges to this
sui generis appellate structure have not been successful: see Huynh v Canada, [1996] 2 F.C. 976, leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, [1996] SCCA No. 311.
8 For further on this, see also Legault v Canada (MCI), 2002 FCA 125.
9 Baker, supra note 4 at para 75.
10 Ibid at para 81.
7

166

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which was passed into law in 2002, and
the corresponding requirement that the Act be interpreted in a manner that complies with
international human rights instruments, codified and arguably expanded the majority
ruling in Baker, making international human rights requirements the lynchpin in resolving
ambiguity in the IRPA. This said, judicial decision-making on the relationship between
domestic and international law has remained somewhat inconsistent, at times treating the
latter simply as one part of the interpretive matrix to be considered, while at other times
presuming it to be determinative, unless the international source is patently inconsistent
with the statutory text.11
The Federal Court of Appeal leaned towards this latter approach in the case of de
Guzman, which involved a challenge to a regulation that permanently bars the sponsorship
of any family member who has not been listed on a permanent resident’s own immigration
application. The appellant argued, inter alia, that this provision offended the guarantees to
non-interference with family life, as enumerated in both the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Noting the mandatory
language of s3(3)(f) of the IRPA, the court asserted that decision-makers are to attribute
more than mere persuasive or contextual significance to relevant international human
rights instruments in the interpretation of the Act.12 Indeed, the court concluded that the
jurisprudence, together with the plain words of s3(3)(f) signify that the IRPA is to be
interpreted and applied consistently with Canada’s international human rights obligations,
unless, on the modern approach to statutory interpretation, this is impossible.13 In other
words, because the international human rights instruments on which the appellant relied
in de Guzman create binding legal obligations, s3(3)(f) makes them “determinative of the
meaning of the IRPA, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary.”14 In a neat judicial sleight of hand, however, the court further reasoned that the

Brunnée and Toope, Hesitant Embrace, supra note 3 at 6-7.
de Guzman v Canada (MCI), 2005 FCA 436 at para 75.
13 Ibid at para 83.
14 Ibid at para 108.
11
12
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impugned regulation was not to be examined in isolation, but in the context of the entire
legislative regime. Considering that the regime provides the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration with the discretionary capacity to override on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds any decision that may offend Canada’s international legal
obligations, the court concluded that the regulation does not make the IRPA non-compliant
with Canada’s obligations under international law. More of course could be said about the
soundness of this reasoning, but for the sake of my argument, the court’s conclusions on
the merits are not as important as the emphasis it placed on integrating international legal
obligations with the domestic sphere of Canadian immigration decision-making.
The same can be said for the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Okoloubu, in
which the court held that immigration officers deciding cases on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds must bear in mind not only the values enshrined in Canada’s
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but also those found in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.15 The court then went on to enumerate various provisions of the
ICCPR – the principles of non-interference in family life (Article 17), the importance of a
family unit and protection thereof by society and the state (Article 23), as well as children’s
rights (Article 24) – as being amongst those interests that the officer must have in mind
when dealing with an application for permanent residence on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds.

Citing another decision – Thiara - the court nevertheless

concluded that s3(3)(f) of the IRPA does not require that an officer exercising discretion
under the Act “specifically refer to and analyze the international human rights instruments
to which Canada is signatory. It is sufficient if the officer addresses the substance of the
issues raised.”16 What this means remains somewhat unclear, but one would at least
presume that if officers are required to “bear in mind” international human rights law in
considering the applications that come before them, their decisions must also be consistent

15
16

Okoloubu v Canada (MCI), 2008 FCA 326 at paras 49-50.
Ibid at para 50, citing Thiara v Canada (MCI), 2008 FCA 151, at para 9.
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with this body of law or provide compelling reasons based on domestic law for departing
from it.17
More recently, in a number of cases primarily involving two migrant ships that
arrived in Canada in October, 2009 and August, 2010, the courts have examined the
intersections between the IRPA’s organized criminality inadmissibility provisions, its
criminal sanctions and international instruments on the smuggling of persons, specifically
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and a protocol to that
Convention, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.18 The
arrival of these migrant ships – the MV Ocean Lady and the MV Sun Sea – was clearly
viewed by the government as a profound threat to the integrity of Canada’s borders and the
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) responded to the arrivals forcefully through
detention, criminal prosecutions and inadmissibility proceedings.19 In an interesting and
ill-fated twist to the story, prior to the departure of the MV Sun Sea for Canada, the ship’s
Thai crew refused to go ahead with the voyage and left the boat. The organizers of the
smuggling operation, alleged to be members of the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) group, nevertheless commenced the journey and in so doing recruited some
of the asylum seeker passengers to help along the way. Following their arrival (and

This interpretation would also seem consistent with statements from the Supreme Court of Canada that the
Charter should be presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection as is found in the international
human rights documents that Canada has ratified: see Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, para 70.
18 Jointly passed by U.N. General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000 and ratified by
Canada in May, 2002, referred to hereafter, respectively, as UNCTOC and the Smuggling Protocol.
19 Both ships carried Tamil asylum seekers fleeing the ongoing, post-civil war violence in Sri Lanka. The
initial arrival of the MV Ocean Lady was a relatively modest smuggling operation, carrying aboard 76
passengers. The MV Sun Sea carried 492 passengers. In a memorandum drafted days before the arrival of the
MV Sun Sea, the Director General for Post-Border Programs for CBSA noted that “[d]etention is an effective
tool against those who circumvent immigration processes” and that the agency would be “aggressive in
building evidence and arguing for inadmissibility.” In contrast to the normally non-adversarial nature of
refugee proceedings, the memo further outlined that the agency would be active in trying to oppose the
refugee claims of all Sun Sea arrivals. The Director stated: “In terms of the approach for refugee
determination hearings, they will be dealt with aggressively as well. The CBSA will advise the IRB that it
intends to intervene in each case, however, the IRB's current 84% acceptance rate will be a challenge.”
Memorandum obtained through Access to Information Request A-2013-03486(10 September 2013),
provided to the Canadian Council for Refugees and on file with the author. See also above discussion at
Chapter 2, note 151 and accompanying text.
17
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detention) in Canada, several of the asylum seekers who had helped out with the voyage,
including some who had merely cooked aboard the ship, were referred to the Immigration
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board for an admissibility hearing, based on the
premise that in assisting the smuggling operation, they had engaged in the transnational
crime of people smuggling, as set out at s 37(1)(b) of the IRPA. The Immigration Division
consistently affirmed the allegations of the CBSA in these cases, finding the asylum seekers
inadmissible under s 37, which has the effect of terminating their claims to refugee status.20
Meanwhile, the suspected masterminds of the MV Ocean Lady operation were
criminally prosecuted under s 117 of the IRPA on charges attracting a fine of up to
$1,000,000 and, potentially, to life imprisonment.21
Prior to the commencement of the trial in the criminal prosecutions, the four coaccused applied for an order declaring that s 117 of the IRPA infringes s 7 of the Charter. At
the heart of the application, the accused argued that the provision was unconstitutionally
overbroad in that it criminalizes a broader range of activities, including humanitarian
refugee assistance and assistance of family members, than was intended to be caught by
the provision.
The trial judge accepted that s 117 was overly broad, based in part on the narrower
scope of the Smuggling Protocol and on the Refugee Convention, which specifically
prohibits prosecution for illegal entry. The court noted that the Smuggling Protocol, unlike
the IRPA provision, specifically limits the ambit of what is considered to be smuggling
activity to those actions undertaken for some form of profit or personal gain. The means

Pursuant to sections 101(1)(f) and 104(2)(a) of the IRPA. See for example: Canada (PSEP) v. X, 2011 CanLII
93842 (CA IRB); X (Re), 2011 CanLII 86097 (CA IRB); X (Re), 2012 CanLII 95162 (CA IRB); Canada (PSEP) v X,
2012 CanLII 93972 (CA IRB).
21 Since (and in response to) the arrival of these migrant ships, s117 of the IRPA was amended to include
mandatory minimum sentences, in addition to the already existing possibility of life imprisonment. The
minimum sentences are three, five and ten years, depending on the number of persons smuggled, on whether
the accused smuggler endangered any lives or harmed anyone, and on whether the offence was for profit, or
was for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization or terrorist group.
20
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chosen to achieve the legitimate state objective of combating human smuggling therefore
captured a broader range of conduct, and persons, than is necessary and, as such, s.117 was
found to violate the Charter and was therefore of no force or effect.22 On appeal to the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, the Crown was permitted to substantially recast its
argument regarding the objectives of the anti-smuggling provision. Rather than merely
fulfilling its international obligation to combat human smuggling, the Crown argued that
the true objective of s 117 was to “prevent individuals from arranging the unlawful entry of
others into Canada, thereby securing the secondary goals of enforcing Canadian
sovereignty; maintaining the integrity of Canada’s immigration and refugee regime;
protecting the health, safety, and security of Canadians; and promoting international justice
and security.”23 The Court of Appeal accepted this expanded articulation of the provision’s
objective, which led to the unsurprising conclusion that s 117 is not overly broad. The
court accepted, in other words, that the aim of Canada’s anti-smuggling provision is equally
to prevent parents from bringing their children into Canada as it is to prevent profiteering
people smuggling who organize large scale boat arrivals.24 Nevertheless, in arriving at this
conclusion, the court paid considerable attention to both the Refugee Convention and the
Smuggling Protocol.25
Both before and after the British Columbia trial court’s decision in Appulonappa, the
Federal Courts were considering judicial reviews and appeals of the Immigration Division
decisions on the application of s 37 to the asylum seekers who participated in the MV Sun
Sea operation.26 In two consolidated appellate decisions, the Federal Court of Appeal
upheld the findings of the Immigration Division, distinguishing the Appulonappa trial
decision and concluding that Canada had legitimately decided to incorporate a definition of
people smuggling that was broader than that which was required under its international

R v Appulonappa, 2013 BCSC 31
R v Appulonappa, 2014 BCCA 163 at para 5.
24 Ibid at paras 114, 120-146.
25 Ibid at paras 121-140.
26 B306 v Canada (PSEP), 2012 FC 1282; B010 v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 569; S. C. v Canada (PSEP), 2013 FC
491; J.P. v Canada (PSEP), 2012 FC 1466; Sivagnanasingam v Canada (PSEP), 2013 FC 604; B006 v Canada
(MCI), 2013 FC 1033; B072 v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 899.
22
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obligations.27 Leave to appeal both these decisions and the Appulonappa decision was
granted by the Supreme Court of Canada and the matters were heard together in early
2015.28
Once again, however, the ultimate conclusions reached by Canadian courts in these
decisions is ancillary to my larger point, which is that domestic law is presumed to conform
with international law and the latter has become an important interpretive mechanism by
which Canadian decision-makers determine the substantive content of domestic
immigration and refugee law.29
3.2.2 International law as directly incorporated into Canadian immigration law
The second and most obvious way in which international law is embedded in
Canadian immigration decision-making is by direct incorporation of key elements of two
particular international treaties – the Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and the
Convention Against Torture – into Canadian law.30 Little need be said of the relevance of
international law to these aspects of Canadian domestic immigration law – in short,
Canada’s international legal obligations to, amongst other things, recognize Convention
refugees and prohibit the expulsion of anyone to torture have been fully integrated into
Canadian law. That Canada has elevated the status of these international norms to the level

B010 v Canada (MCI), 2013 FCA 87; Canada (PPSEP) v JP, 2013 FCA 262.
JP et al v Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, SCC Court File Nos.35688, 35685, 35677,
35958, 35388.
29 See R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (4th ed.) (Markham: Butterworths,
2002), at 422; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003) on the incorporation of customary international where it is not expressly contradicted by domestic
legislation. For further jurisprudence on the role of international law in interpreting domestic legislation, see
Slaight Communications Inc. v Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations
Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; Suresh v Canada (MCI), 2002 SCC
1 [Suresh]; United States v Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76.
30 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150, entered into force
for Canada on June 4, 1969: [1969] Can TS. No. 6 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85, entered into force for Canada on July 24, 1987: [1987]
Can TS No 36. These instruments are referred to hereinafter as the “Refugee Convention” and the “CAT”,
respectively. Key provisions of both the Refugee Convention and the CAT are incorporated into sections 9698 of the IRPA and are reproduced in a Schedule to the Act.
27
28
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of binding domestic law is not surprising, given that the prohibition on refoulement to
persecution has taken on quasi-jus cogens status31 and the prohibition on the return to
torture is fully recognized as a jus cogens, or peremptory norm, from which no derogation
is permitted.32

As a result, international legal interpretations of these human rights

doctrines are frequently relied upon; the views of international monitoring bodies are often
treated as persuasive, if not determinative, and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees periodically intervenes directly in Canadian cases implicating key parts of the
Refugee Convention.33 This latter point illustrates, perhaps more articulately than anything
else, the uniquely interwoven nature of immigration regulation and international law in
this area.

Indeed, there is essentially no other context in which a United Nations

organization intervenes in litigation in individual domestic cases, albeit those with a larger
precedent-setting possibility, to ensure compliance with an international treaty. Of course
the fact that Canada has incorporated its commitment to these international agreements
into domestic law does not mean that its interpretation of its obligations is always
consistent with international law doctrine or with the positions of United Nations agencies.
There are, for example, numerous instances in which Canadian policy and jurisprudence
have run directly contrary to the position of the UNHCR on the proper interpretation of the
Refugee Convention.34

Jean Allain, “The jus cogens nature of non-refoulement” (2001) 13:4 Int J Refug Law 533.
See for example Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 Dec 1998 at
paras 153-157. This said, in the context of previous legislation which had not incorporated the CAT, the
Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh, supra note 29 considered at length the nature of Canada’s obligations
when considering the deportation of an individual to the likelihood of torture. And while the court accepted
the non-derogable nature of the prohibition on torture, it also found (possibly in the still-proximate
aftershock of 9/11) that the “jurisprudence does not suggest that Canada may never deport a person to face
treatment elsewhere that would be unconstitutional if imposed by Canada directly, on Canadian soil: para 58.
33 Most recently in two cases involving the exclusion clauses of the Convention: see Ezokola v Canada (MCI),
2013 SCC 40, UNHCR amicus factum available online: http://www.refworld.org/docid/50ebcf272.html and
Hernandez Febles v Canada (MCI), 2014 SCC 68, heard before the Supreme Court March 25, 2013, UNHCR
amicus factum available online: http://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNHCR,AMICUS,,532019774,0.html.
34 See, most recently, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hernandez Febles, ibid. For a fascinating
account of international law and domestic interpretation and compliance, see Jutta Brunnée, and Stephen
Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 114-121.
31
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3.2.3 Migration law as key cite for interpreting international human rights norms
Finally, there is another, almost inverse way in which migration law implicates
international norms and that is by directly influencing, through litigation, the
interpretation and therefore the content of international law. Indeed, in recent years
migration law has proven to be a key cite for the interpretation of countries’ international
human rights obligations. Given the nascent and still relatively non-enforceable nature of
international human rights law, there remains a relatively small body of international
authority on the interpretation of various instruments.

This being the case, the

interpretive process in relation to these instruments has fallen, in some significant
measure, to domestic courts. One example of this phenomenon arises from the exclusion
clause found at Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention, which excludes from refugee
protection those believed to have “committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make
provision in respect of such crimes.” Domestic courts, in interpreting this provision, must
therefore determine the meaning of the clause within the scheme of the Refugee
Convention, but in giving it definitional form, must also look to other international
instruments that refer to the prescribed crimes.
In recent years, appellate courts in several countries have considered the
application of Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention, and in so doing, they have also been
compelled to consider and shed light on recent developments in international criminal law,
most particularly, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court35 and the
jurisprudence of both the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.36 Moreover, the influence that the decisions may have is not confined to domestic

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF. 183/9, 17 July 1998 (as amended) [Rome
Statute]. The International Criminal may hereafter be referred to as the “ICC”.
36 See for example, the decisions of appellate and Supreme Courts in the United Kingdom: R (JS) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15; New Zealand: Attorney-General (Minister of Immigration) v
Tamil X [2010] NZSC 107; Canada: Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40; France: CE,
14 juin 2010, No 320630 (Conseil d’État); and Australia: SHCB V. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 308.
35
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refugee law, but also may have an impact on international refugee law, international
criminal law and international humanitarian law. Indeed, the Rome Statute specifically
contemplates that the ICC may take into consideration domestic law on relevant issues.37
In its own interventions before state courts, furthermore, the UNHCR frequently relies
upon national decisions that it views as being consistent with the Refugee Convention.38
Additionally, domestic courts and tribunals are frequently influential in the
development of jurisprudence in other states. This “transnational judicial conversation” is
particularly influential in the domain of refugee law, where it has led to a “rich comparative
jurisprudence” concerning the key principles of international law relative to refugees.39 In
these ways, domestic immigration law can be viewed as playing a role in the dialogical
nature of developments in international law, both taking instruction from international
norms, but also transmitting its own interpretation of such norms back out into the
international sphere.
Once again, for our purposes, what is important is to recognize that, despite the
dogged provincialism of immigration law in certain respects, it also remains intimately
connected with international law. To further, and more specifically, elaborate on the point,
I now turn to the ways in which immigration decision-making in the security context also
engages international law.

Albeit, as a matter of secondary preference to international authority: see Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome
Statute.
38 See, for example, its amicus factum in intervening in the Ezokola case, supra note 33.
39 James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 2d ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014) [Hathaway and Foster, “Law of Refugee Status”] at 5, which proposes, in part, a greater
penetration of transnational dialogue and cooperation in domestic refugee law jurisprudence. For a
contrasting view from within the European context, see Guy Goodwin Gill and Helene Lambert, eds, The
Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the European Union
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010).
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3.2.4 Immigration, Security and International Law
As with the other aspects of immigration and refugee law referred to above,
decision-makers in the immigration-security arena also regularly engage, albeit sometimes
unwittingly, in both the discourse and content of international law.

Given the

extraordinary breadth of the security provision, decision-making in the field touches on a
number of different themes, many of which have a corresponding plane internationally. In
the previous chapter, I discussed the various grounds on which security cases are brought:
subversion, terrorism, membership, etc. Below I revisit some of these grounds, and the
legal issues that arise from them, to cast further light on their international dimensions;
more specifically I look at the intersections between allegations of subversion and
terrorism and a response to these allegations, based on the right of self-determination at
international law.
Subversion
Recall that an individual who has engaged in the subversion by force of any
government is inadmissible to Canada pursuant to s34(1)(b) of the IRPA. Recall further
that a significant percentage of Canadian security cases arise under s34(1)(b) and that the
majority of these cases relate to individuals found to be members of secessionist, anticolonial or liberation movements.
Subversion as a specific term of art in Canadian security law does not appear to have
a parallel existence under international legal doctrine. That said, the acts to which it refers
– the undermining, often by illicit means and with force, of a government – are at the very
core of international law as it has developed over the past 60 years. Given that states
comprise the basic building blocks of international law, it is not surprising that numerous
international instruments place enormous emphasis on national stability (frequently
referred to as ‘territorial integrity’), and contain corresponding prohibitions on the use of
force. The cornerstone of this emphasis on peace and stability is the United Nations Charter
itself, which provides at Article 2(4):
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All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.40
Not surprisingly, however, international law admits of certain exceptions to this
general prohibition on armed aggression, specifically contemplating rules of engagement
and situations in which the use of force may be justified. Indeed the exceptions to the norm
of territorial integrity have coalesced into an entire field of international law known, some
say perversely, as the law of armed conflict, which includes as a subset international
humanitarian law. The most notable expressions of this area of international law are the
four Geneva Conventions of 194941 and their two additional protocols of 1977: Additional
Protocol I42 and Additional Protocol II.43
On the surface these provisions would appear to apply solely to states vis–à–vis their
relations with other states and to have, as a consequence, little to do with the kinds of
intra-state conflicts in which liberation movements have typically engaged. And for a time,
this was arguably true, however, Additional Protocol I to the Conventions broadens the
application of the various provisions to certain classes of individuals associated with purely
domestic conflicts. More specifically, Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I provides:
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph [which
tie the Protocol into the larger Geneva Conventions] include
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial

Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (U.N. Charter), Art 2(4).
1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field (Geneva Convention No. I), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; 1949 Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva
Convention No. II), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No. III), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention No. IV), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287.
42 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3.
43 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. The Conventions and
Additional Protocols were both incorporated into Canadian law by the Geneva Conventions Act, RSC 1985, c
G-3.
40
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domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in
the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations.
The implications of this provision have been much debated, but in broad terms an
individual may obtain the right under international law to participate in a purely internal
conflict where two conditions are met: first, the armed conflict must be one in which
“peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination;” and second, the individual
must be a member of an "armed force" of a party to the armed conflict.

These

requirements are rich in both meaning and controversy, but it is clear that, at a minimum,
Article 1(4) brings internal conflicts of a particular character into the purview of
international law.
Determining which internal armed conflicts may be justified under international law
– in other words, determining which conflicts are composed of “peoples” fighting against
“colonial domination,” “alien occupation” and against “racist regimes” in the exercise of
“self-determination” – is an immensely complex and fraught task, but the same of course
could be said of purely international conflicts. Both involve entrenched interests, highly
politicized contexts and competing interpretations of history. The point to recall for our
purposes is that individuals who have participated in, and fled from, situations involving
the subversion of a government may often stake the claim that their actions are entirely
within the bounds of what is permitted at international law.44

And as I shall further set out below, many organizations that have been implicated in security
inadmissibility matters have made this precise argument: the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI);
the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Angolan União National para a Independencia Total de Angola
(UNITA), to name a few.
44
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In response, one might ask whether the possible justification of an armed act of
subversion under international law is at all relevant to domestic questions of admission
and admissibility. The answer to this (as I have mentioned and will mention again), is that
in a legislative landscape as amorphous as the security context, something has to inform
decision-making if it is to maintain any semblance of consistency and coherence; if it is to
maintain, in other words, adherence to the rule of law.45 Immigration decision-makers are
called upon, in a very tangible way, to assess the character of situations of armed conflict
and to preside over their lawfulness. Given that liberation struggles for self-determination
are, in other contexts, clearly in the dominion of international law, it seems only logical to
assess them from the international perspective.
Terrorism
As with subversion, the data on Immigration and Refugee Board decisions illustrates
that a high percentage of cases in the security area relate to allegations of membership in
terrorist organizations. Decision-makers therefore frequently have to grapple with what
has long been, both domestically and internationally, a vexing legal issue – that being the
definition of a terrorist act. As I have noted earlier, while terrorism as a concept is relevant
to several provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, it provides no
definition of the term. This being the case, the Immigration Division tends to rely on the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh46 as a starting point for working through
the meaning of the term and how it plays out in particular situations. Manickavasagam
Suresh, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil descent entered Canada in 1990 and was found to be a
Convention refugee.

He later applied for permanent residence in Canada,

but the

application was not finalized because, under processes associated with the former
Immigration Act, the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister of Citizenship and

By ‘rule of law’, I refer again here to the term in the substantive, Fullerian sense, as a set of principles that
impose substantive requirements on laws to be recognized as such. This would include the requirement that
laws, and the application of them, be clear and intelligible, be prospective in nature and be consistently
applied.
46 Suresh, supra note 29.
45
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Immigration commenced proceedings to deport him on security grounds.

More

specifically, Canada alleged that Mr. Suresh was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), an organization alleged to have funding networks in Canada and to have
committed terrorist activity in Sri Lanka. While the courts noted that the LTTE was
engaged in a protracted rebellion against the democratically elected government of Sri
Lanka, it also acknowledged that atrocities were commonplace on both sides of the
struggle.47 It was also firmly established in the evidence that the use of torture by the
security forces was widespread, particularly against persons suspected of membership in
the LTTE.
As a result of Suresh’s perceived leadership role in the LTTE and the World Tamil
Movement, an alleged front organization for the LTTE, the government commenced the
somewhat Byzantine process for removing Suresh, given his status as a Convention
refugee. This culminated in the issuance of a Ministerial “opinion” (the term used in the
legislation), that Suresh constituted a danger to the security of Canada and should be
deported. Suresh challenged the decision, arguing, inter alia, that the terms “danger to the
security of Canada” and “terrorism” were unconstitutionally vague. The decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in the matter represented a somewhat tepid victory for refugee
advocates. The court determined that, informed by the non-derogable nature of the
Convention Against Torture, the Canadian Charter “generally” prohibits the deportation of
an individual to torture.48 The court also found that while the legislative framework for the
removal of Convention refugees was constitutional, the procedures followed to carry out
the deportation of Mr. Suresh did not comply with the Charter in so far as they failed to
provide him with adequate disclosure of the case that needed to be met.

Ibid, at para 10.
Ibid, at paras 76, 78. Of interest here, of course, is the use of the word “generally” which clearly leaves open
the possibility that the courts would uphold the removal of an individual to a known risk of torture in certain
extraordinary, if unspecified, circumstances. On this point, the timing of the Suresh appeal is also perhaps
noteworthy; the appeal hearing was heard in May, 2001 just before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington, but the decision was not released some until four months after the attacks, in January 2002.
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The court further found that, despite difficulties providing definitional form to the
term “terrorism” it was not unconstitutionally vague. In a passage worth citing at some
length, the court first noted:
One searches in vain for an authoritative definition of
“terrorism”. The Immigration Act does not define the
term. Further, there is no single definition that is accepted
internationally. The absence of an authoritative definition
means that, at least at the margins, “the term is open to
politicized
manipulation,
conjecture,
and
polemical
interpretation”…
Even amongst those who agree on the definition of the term,
there is considerable disagreement as to whom the term
should be attached…Perhaps the most striking example of the
politicized nature of the term is that Nelson Mandela’s African
National Congress was, during the apartheid era, routinely
labelled a terrorist organization, not only by the South African
government but by much of the international community.49
Yet, having said this and more regarding the elusive nature of the meaning of
“terrorism”, the court found itself unpersuaded that the term was so unsettled that it could
not “set the proper boundaries of legal adjudication.”50 This finding was premised on an
emerging consensus in international law as to an acceptable definition of the term, based
largely on a two-pronged approach to the definition found in the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.51 The first, or “functional”, approach is to
simply incorporate certain activities already proscribed in other international instruments,
described in an Annex to the Convention.52 The second, or “stipulative”, approach is to
provide an actual definition of terrorist activity, as follows:

Ibid, at paras 94-95, citing the factum of the intervener, Canadian Arab Federation.
Ibid at para 96.
51 9 December 1999, GA Res. 54/109 [ICSFT].
52 These are: 1) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December, 1970, 860 UNTS
105, entered into force Oct. 14, 1971; 2) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, 974 UNTS 178, entered into force January 26, 1973; 3) Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March, 1988,1678 UNTS 221, entered into force
March 1, 1992; 4) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA-INFCIRC/274, Entered into
force 8 February, 1987; 5) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
49
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Any . . . act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a government or an international organization to
do or to abstain from doing any act.53
While the court in Suresh acknowledged that “particular cases on the fringes of
terrorist activity will inevitably provoke disagreement,” it directly adopted the above
definition of “terrorism,” and found that the use of the term in immigration legislation was
“sufficiently certain to be workable, fair and constitutional.”54
As mentioned above, in my review of security-related decisions, I have found that
the Immigration Division tends to provide a relatively shorthand analysis of its
understanding of terrorism, relying on the Suresh decision and its incorporation of the
various international instruments that help to delineate the meaning of terrorist activity.
There is, in other words, a relatively unbroken line connecting international legal
principles on terrorism and decision-making on immigration security matters in the
domestic sphere. Once again, for our purposes, the essential point is that, like subversion,
there is a clear nexus between the domestic task of determining whether an individual has
engaged in terrorism and international law.

Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December, 1973, GA Res 3166, UN Doc A/Res/3166
(XXXVIII) (1974), entered into force 20 February 1977; 6) International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, G.A. Res. 146 (XXXIV), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979),
entered into force June 3, 1983; 7) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15
December, 1997, GA Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 389, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (1998), entered
into force May 23, 2001; 8) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
located on the Continental Shelf, 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304; and 9) Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 February 1988, UNTS 1990, entered
into force 6 August 1989.
53 Supra note 38, at Article 2(1)(b).
54 Suresh, supra note 29 at para 98.
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Self-Determination
Above I have discussed the two primary grounds for inadmissibility and their
connections to international law. The grounds are also connected with each other in that a
large number of inadmissibility cases are brought forward on allegations of membership in
organizations that have engaged in both subversion and terrorism. As with most situations
of political conflict, however, subversive acts and acts of alleged terror do not tend to be the
ends themselves, but are rather the means by which to attain a different end. For national
liberation movements, this end is virtually always related to the concept of selfdetermination.55 Because self-determination lies at the core of so many inadmissibility
cases, because it is so misunderstood, and because many lawyers argue that a greater
understanding of it will lead to better decision-making, I devote considerable attention
here to the concept, its historical roots, its recent history and its place in the security
inadmissibility process.
As a principle of international law, self-determination occupies an ambivalent
position that is at once widely recognized and hotly contested, and yet it remains rather
poorly understood.56 Its roots can be traced to Enlightenment thinkers, not necessarily in
its international dimension, but in connoting personal autonomy and, collectively, the right
to participate in the idea of democratic self-government.

Self-determination flows

naturally from the Kantian notion of the capacity of individuals to “translate their arbitrary
impulses and desires into action through rational thought that defines their juridical

Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) [Buchanan, “Justice, Legitimacy and Self-determination”].
56 Edward M Morgan, “The Imagery and Meaning of Self-Determination” (1987) 20 N Y Univ J Int Law Polit
355 [Morgan, "Imagery"] at 355. Indeed, of the inadmissibility decisions canvassed in the previous chapter, a
sizeable majority related, in some form or another, to organizations that have asserted as their core objective
principles of self-determination. These organizations include narrowly-focused liberation and separatist
movements such as those of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, Sikh nationalist movements in
India and independence movements in countries such as Eritrea and Sudan, but also movements that
espoused a more politically-oriented set of objectives, such as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
(FMLN) in El Salvador.
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existence as holders of legal right.”57 Autonomy and the capacity to reason – individual
self-determination – give rise, by virtue of their universality, to notions of essential equality
and a shared ability to refrain from “egotistical” impositions on others.58 The seismic
changes of the following 200 years resulted in the transposition of this classic
Enlightenment notion of individual autonomy onto the national and international planes,
frequently fixing discussions about rights to the state-based contexts through which they
were to be realized.
By the First World War, the notion of national self-determination, or a selfdetermination of peoples, had embedded itself into official discourse and (in a sign of what
would become its highly contentious nature) was equally endorsed by Woodrow Wilson
and Vladimir Lenin’s Bolsheviks, albeit for very different reasons.59 Self-determination was
characterized by Wilson as the mechanism by which to deal with the fallout of the
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and his infamous “Fourteen
Points” statement was suffused with self-determination principles.

Even at the time,

however, there was concern over the ways in which self-determination could become more
disruptive than ameliorative in the process of dealing with the West’s unsettled
boundaries. One of the concerns was that the concept could “get into the wrong hands”, as
articulated by Wilson’s Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who wrote:
The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the
right of ‘self-determination,’ the more convinced I am of the
danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It
is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace
Congress and create trouble in many lands…Will it not breed
discontent, disorder and rebellion?...The phrase is simply
loaded with dynamite.60

Ibid, at 357.
Ibid.
59 See generally, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1961) and, specifically, Hurst Hannum,
Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) [Hannum, Autonomy] at 27-28.
60 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921) at 97-98,
cited also in Morton Halperin and David Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington:
57
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For his part, Lenin viewed self-determination through the lens of class struggle and
while there is no particular philosophical affinity between communism and selfdetermination, he recognized the right of peoples to secede from “oppressor nations”:
The right of nations to self-determination implies exclusively
the right to independence in the political sense, the right to
free political separation from the oppressor nation.
Specifically, this demand for political democracy implies
complete freedom to agitate for secession and for a
referendum on secession by the seceding nation. This demand,
therefore, is not the equivalent of a demand for separation,
fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies only
a consistent expression of struggle against all national
oppression.61
Without endorsing the rather odious statement of Secretary of State Lansing, he was
prescient in forecasting the complexities associated with Wilson’s conception of selfdetermination. Nevertheless, with the next wave of geopolitical turmoil following the
Second World War, the principles first elaborated 25 years earlier became enshrined in the
founding instrument of the United Nations and acquired, at least notionally, the status of a
binding rule of international law. Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter provides:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
…
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen
universal peace…62

Carnegie Foundation, 1992) at 17 and wrongfully attributed to Secretary of State Stanton in Buchanan,
Justice, Legitimacy and Self-determination, supra note 55 at 332.
61 V.I. Lenin, Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1950) at 138-9.
62 U.N. Charter, supra note 40, Art. 1(2).
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The same guarantee of the right to self-determination of peoples was later included
in the first articles of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.63
While these documents clearly underscored the centrality of self-determination in
contemporary international legal discourse, they did little to shed light on the actual
meaning of the term. Most importantly, the U.N. Charter was silent on the very nub of the
problem, which relates not to the meaning of self-determination, per se, but to the question
of who are the “peoples” that are entitled to it. As mentioned earlier, the right of a nonstate entity to engage in activities – in the name of self-determination – that threaten
national borders has always sat uneasily with the concomitant principle of territorial
integrity but in the post-war period, self-determination was repeatedly endorsed by U.N.
bodies, primarily in association with the decolonization movement.64

The 1960

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 65 strongly
affirmed the right of self-determination for all those subject to “alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation” and further prohibited “all armed action or repressive
measures” directed against dependent peoples in order to enable them to exercise
peacefully and freely their right to “complete independence.”66 It must be noted, however,
that even within this widely supported Declaration (it was passed by a vote of 89-0, with 9
notable, i.e. colonial-power, abstentions) the spectre of territorial integrity was everpresent. Article 6 of the Declaration affirmed:
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is

G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976 (ICCPR); GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316
(1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 (ICESCR).
64 C. Quaye, Liberation Struggles in International Law (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1991) [Quaye, Liberation
Struggles] at 214-215 and Hannum, Autonomy, supra note 51 at 33.
65 GA Res. 1514 (XV) U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684, at 67 (Dec.14, 1960) [1960
Declaration].
66 Ibid, at articles 1, 2 and 4.
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incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations.
Beyond the inherent limitations (if not contradictions) posed by the selfdetermination/territorial integrity dynamic, there were also those who argued that selfdetermination, at least in the sense that it was adopted by the United Nations, was limited
to the decolonization context.67 This view was undermined, however, in another UN
declaration, the inelegantly worded Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, which is the most recent and perhaps influential statement from the
U.N. on self-determination.68 The Friendly Relations Declaration, while again affirming the
principle of territorial integrity, asserted that the right to self-determination applies to any
people subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation and prohibited states from
engaging in any forcible action which deprives peoples of their right to self-determination
and freedom and independence. In a subtle, but important gesture, the Convention also
affords to peoples who meet with resistance to their assertion of self-determination the
right to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter.69
The Friendly Relations doctrine further provided that the principles elucidated in it
constituted “basic principles of international law” and its affirmation of a right to selfdetermination led commentators to conclude that, even in its disputed and ambiguous
form, it has clearly become a jus cogens principle of international law.70 And while there
were still claims that the concept had limited application – that the terms “alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation” were still merely shorthand for colonization – an

See for example, R. Emerson, “Self-Determination” 65 Proc American Soc Int’l Law 459 at 464-466.
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc A/8028, at 123-24 (Oct. 24, 1970)
[Friendly Relations Declaration].
69 Friendly Relations Declaration, ibid, at Preamble.
70 Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of peoples : a legal reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995)
[Cassese, Self-determination of peoples] at 171-172.
67
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increasingly critical mass of commentators expressed the view that this language did not
limit the right of self-determination so narrowly.71
Liberation movements were by no means oblivious to these developments in
international law. In fact, many of the movements that have given rise to inadmissibility
findings for its members have actively made the argument that their actions fall within the
ambit of international humanitarian law.72 And for what it is worth, the international
community has frequently agreed.

In one UN resolution, for example, the General

Assembly of the United Nations stated in respect of Namibia:
Reaffirming its full support for the armed struggle of the
Namibian people under the leadership of the South West Africa
People's Organization…
4. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to
self-determination, freedom, and national independence in a
united Namibia…and the legitimacy of their struggle by any

Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990) at 153-174; Martti
Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice” (1994) 43 Int
Comp Law Q 241[Koskenniemi, Self-Determination Today) at 247-248 and Quaye, Liberation Struggles at
212-223. Support for this view came in part from the broader wording of the Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions, supra note 35, which provided (at Art.1(4)) that it applied to situations in which
“peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination.” Koskenniemi notes in this regard: “The definition…is not limited
to a Third World context but seems to cover all situations where a foreign minority imposes its rule on the
majority. It is not difficult to extend this sense to any situation where an ethnic group becomes the object of
human rights abuses or at least a denial of equal rights.”
72 In December, 1975, for instance, the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
issued a statement that it would respect international humanitarian law. A similar declaration was made by
the Angolan União National para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in 1980. In the early 1980’s, with
the adoption of the Additional Protocols, several movements made more formal declarations. In a 1981
declaration, for example, the Namibian South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) stated:
71

It is the conviction of SWAPO that fundamental rules protecting the dignity
of all human beings must be upheld at all times. Therefore, and purely for
humanitarian reasons, SWAPO declares hereby that in the conduct of the
struggle for self-determination, it intends to respect and be guided by the
rules of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection
of the victims of armed conflicts and the 1977 additional Protocol relating
to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I).
See Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, “Respect for international humanitarian law by armed non-state actors in
Africa” (2006) 88 Int’l Review of the Red Cross 864 at 906-907.
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means at their disposal, including armed struggle against the
illegal occupation of their territory by South Africa…73
There have also been situations in which the use of force in the pursuit of selfdetermination has been retrospectively found to be justified by the international
community following a negotiated secessionist process, such as happened in Eritrea.74
What to make then of the clearly ambivalent place of self-determination at
international law? One view is that while the use of force by liberation movements may not
be explicitly permitted, it is also not prohibited. In the words of Cassese, while liberation
movements do not have a legal “right” to resort to the use of force, they may have a “legal
licence” to do so.75 The Cassese argument underscores that liberation movements cannot
be held responsible for international wrongdoings in relation to their legitimate use of
force when their actions are in compliance with the laws of armed conflict and are in
response to the “forcibl[e] deni[al]” of self-determination.76
Some commentators have gone further, suggesting that the right to selfdetermination has evolved to incorporate secession rights in a process that has literally
transformed international law. Tappe notes in this regard:
The evidence, which includes recent successful secession
movements, international declarations, and a reading of
current scholarly literature, suggests that international law is
in a process of metamorphosis, characterized by a slow
acceptance of some right of self-determination in the form of
secession, both in textual and customary forms.77

Question of Namibia, 12 December, 1979, GA Res A/34/92/G.
Inge V. Porter, “Two Case Studies in Self-Determination: The Rock and the Bailiwick” (2003) 4 San Diego
Int’l Law Journal 339 at 355, n.119.
75 Cassese, Self-determination of peoples, supra note 70 at 154-155. This passage is based on previously
coauthored work, see A. Grant, C. Bruce and C. Reynolds, “Out of the Fire and into the Pot: The Eritrean
Liberation Movement, the Right to Self-Determination and the Over-Breadth of North American Immigration
Security Provisions” (2010) 25 Georgetown Imm LJ 859. [Grant, Bruce and Reynolds, “Out of the Fire”] at 875.
76 Ibid.
77 Trent N. Tappe, “Chechnya and the State of Self-Determination in a Breakaway Region of the Former Soviet
Union: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims” (1995) 34 Colum. J. Transnat’l L, 255, 258-59.
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Perhaps the clearest example of the view that self-determination may permit a
limited right to engage in secessionist armed struggle, however, also involves the Namibian
movement to free itself from South African rule. In its last opinion on the Namibian
situation, the International Court of Justice acknowledged that the exercise of the
substantive right to self-determination may legitimately involve the use of violence. In a
particularly strong concurring opinion, Justice Ammoun openly questioned whether the
legitimate right to self-determination could ever have been obtained “if it had not been for
the heroic fight of peoples aspiring with all their hearts after freedom and
independence?”78 In further citing Ammoun, Klabbers goes on to note that “[t]he right to
self-determination, having been written ‘with the blood of the peoples,’ was thus conceived
as an enforceable, tangible right.”79
But as is so often the case, Klabbers too steps back from unqualified assertions as to
the right to use force in pursuit of the right to self-determination, preferring instead to
characterize the right as a seemingly much more innocuous one, that being the right for
peoples “to be taken seriously.”80 He does so for much the same reason that every U.N.
pronouncement on self-determination is also accompanied by a corresponding affirmation
of the principle of territorial integrity – which gets back to its potentially explosive
character. As Koskeniemmi puts it, self-determination has always been something of a
two-headed monster, simultaneously affirming the nation state as the basic recognizing
principle on which international law is built, while also creating the context and, some say,
the legal right for peoples (however defined) to undermine, challenge and secede from
existing states.81 This “revolutionary” sense of self-determination has the potential to turn
international law on its head, with the result that secessionism can be explained as

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (21 June) [Namibia
Opinion] at 74, as cited in Jan Klabbers, “The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International
Law” (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 186 [Klabbers, “The Right to be Taken Seriously”] at 192.
79 Namibia Opinion at 74, as cited in Klabbers, The Right to be Taken Seriously at 192.
80 Klabbers, The Right to be Taken Seriously at 202.
81 Koskenniemi, Self-Determination Today, supra note 71 at 245-246.
78
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“compliance-and opposing it as an international crime or possibly a breach of a peremptory
norm of international law.”82
Any in-depth examination of self-determination reveals the accuracy of
Koskeniemmi’s observation – claims to self-determination have taken on a number of
different guises, but they generally seek to harness (or create) feelings of communal
authenticity with objectives that are decidedly statist in nature. Decolonization efforts did
not recreate pre-colonial political units, but ‘modern’ nation states, recognized
internationally as equal players on the world stage.83 Modern liberation efforts have thus
always been about international law and it is for this reason that they frequently sought to
justify their actions within the nascent language of the post-war normative universe.84 At
the same time, it is self-apparent that many, if not most self-determination claims have
been disputed on the basis that they violate the rights of a differently defined, but
overlapping group of people, or as Koskiniemmi states: another authentic “selfdetermination unit”. The result of this dichotomous nature of self-determination is all but
intractable; one group’s national aspirations are generally characterized as inherently
repressive of the other’s.85
In the end, the indeterminacy of self-determination and its inherent connection to
often competing political struggles leads Koskiniemmi to the conclusion that it provides

Ibid at 241.
Which is not to say, of course, that states did not exist in colonized areas before colonization, only that the
liberation struggles tended to respond to the “erasure” of pre-existing statehoods by mapping themselves
onto the normative order of the new international law, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “After Martyrdom:
International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa” (2000) 41 Harv
Int Law J 503 [Okafor, "After Martyrdom"] at 504, 513.
84 Koskenniemi elaborates on this point in Self-Determination Today, supra note 71 at 256:
Decolonisation was not accompanied by a challenge to statehood. The self-determination it strived
for was of the gesellschaftlich and not of the gemeinschaftlich type. The call for authentic communal
attachment was an ingredient in it but did not determine its essence or its consequences. The
attempt to create a "modern" developed State after the European model was always a stronger
legitimating force.
85 The Balkan example immediately comes to mind here, particularly given the sizeable minority populations
(Serbs in Croatia and Croatians in Serbia, for example] of minority groups in each of the states of the former
Yugoslavia.
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little by way of substantive legal guarantees. Similar to Klabbers’ ‘right to be taken
seriously’, however, Koskeniemmi suggests that self-determination rights may offer
something in the nature of procedures for what he terms “acceptable ad hoc adjustments,”
in responding to international conflicts over competing self-determination claims.86
Much more could be said about the paradox of self-determination in international
law, but suffice to say that in spite of it, or perhaps because of it, immigration lawyers in
both the United States and Canada have recently grasped onto it as one possible means by
which to challenge the perceived overreach of the security and inadmissibility regime.87 In
one recent Canadian case,

for example, a former member of the Kurdish Democratic

Party of Iran (KDPI) – Behzad Najafi – argued that he should not have been found
inadmissible for engaging in the subversion by force of the Iranian regime because the acts
of aggression committed by the KDPI were authorized by international law as a justifiable
use of force by a repressed people in furtherance of its right to self-determination.88 Given
the express requirement referred to above that the IRPA be interpreted in accordance with
international law, Najafi argued that inadmissibility determinations should not be based on
a use of force that is recognized internationally as legitimate.89 In support of his position,
Najafi adduced affidavits from two international law experts, one of whom suggested that
the actions of the KDPI were at least notionally justified under international law, while the
other more provocatively asserted that Canada would be in violation of its international
obligations if it were to “give support to the unlawful denial [of the right to selfdetermination] by [another] state.”90 Without explicitly rejecting the opinions posited by

Koskenniemi, Self-Determination Today, supra note 71 at 265-266.
Grant, Bruce and Reynolds Out of the Fire, supra note 75.
88 Najafi v Canada (MPSEP), 2013 FC 876 [Najafi], affm’d 2014 FCA 262.
89 Ibid at para 4, citing s3(3)(f) of the IRPA, supra note 2. Similar arguments have been made in a number of
other cases, see for example: Hagos v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1214 [Hagos]; Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. X, 2008 CanLII 76254 (CA IRB), Joseph v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2013 FC 1101; Yamani v Canada (MPSEP), 2006 FC 1457 [Yamani]; Khalil v Canada
(MPSEP), 2011 FC 1332; Suresh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (1999) 173 FTR 1; FH-T, v. Holder,
723 F.3d 833 (7th Cir, 2013).
90 Najafi, supra note 88 at para 76. The experts who provided the affidavits were Professors Craig Forcese
and René Provost.
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the experts, the Federal Court in Najafi summarily rejected their applicability to the
security context:
Professor Provost constructs an additional argument based on
the lack of explicit prohibition of the use of force in pursuit of
the right of self-determination in international law. However, it
is self-evident that a lack of prohibition of the use of force is
not the same as a recognized and established positive right
that should inform Canadian domestic law. I would
additionally note that the applicability of such a norm to
Canada, even if it were clearly established, would be uncertain,
as, on at least one occasion, Canada has voted against a United
Nations General Assembly Resolution that sought to more
explicitly recognize the right of peoples to pursue selfdetermination (see UN General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/37/43, “Importance of the universal realization of the
right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy
granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for
the effective guarantee and observance of human rights”).91
In Hagos, the court similarly sidestepped the argument that Mr. Hagos’ participation
in the Eritrean liberation movement should not have led to an inadmissibility finding
because of its justification under international law. This argument, the court concluded,
was more relevant to the question of whether Mr. Hagos was deserving of a Ministerial
waiver under (the then) s 34(2) of the IRPA, rather than the question of first instance
inadmissibility.92 A similar finding was made in Yamani.93
It is plainly apparent from these cases that while arguments justifying the use of
force in the name of self-determination have some normative force internationally, they
have not, at least to date, gained any traction in the context of domestic immigrationsecurity proceedings. At best, it would seem that justifications for the use of force are

Ibid at para 78. Note that the reference to UNGA A/Res/37/43 is perhaps somewhat misleading as it was a
frequently reiterated resolution that, amongst other things, strongly and specifically condemned the state of
Israel, which was the more likely reason for the Canadian vote against it than any general pronouncements on
the status of self-determination at international law.
92 Hagos, supra note 89 at para 65.
93 Yamani, supra note 89 at paras 41-46.
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viewed as something akin to defences to admissibility to be considered on a case by case
basis at the Ministerial waiver stage. Earlier I have discussed the illusory nature of the
waiver process, given its political nature, its narrow scope and the extraordinarily long
wait times for decisions. The discomfort that the courts have had in incorporating selfdetermination principles to the security setting is almost assuredly related to its
ambivalent position in international law, but is also likely due to the asymmetry between
the language of self-determination internationally, and the language of subversion and
terrorism domestically.

It is also due, however, to the sui generis use of the term

‘membership’ under domestic immigration-security law, a topic to which I now briefly
return.
Membership
In the preceding pages, we have discussed the phenomena of subversion, terrorism
and self-determination and their connections to both migration security decision-making
and international law. What does not appear to be connected to international law, or any
other body of law for that matter, is the concept of membership, as it appears in s34(1)(f)
of the IRPA. Recall that virtually all inadmissibility claims are advanced on this ground, but
what is it precisely? Unlike terrorism and subversion, membership as a concept cannot be
construed as malfeasance in itself and does not lead to inadmissibility – the question is
always membership in what? To the extent that membership, as it is contemplated in s34, is
necessarily tied to the other grounds of inadmissibility, it is not so much a crime, but a
mode of commission. And as a mode of commission, membership is, as noted above, sui
generis. I do not intend here to reiterate the concerns referred to in the previous chapter
on the concept of membership and its absolute liability characteristics; what is sufficient
for present purposes is to point out that it is not a concept of any importance to
international law. Recall, for example, that liability for the worst kinds of international
crimes is never assessed internationally based on mere membership, but rather on some
closer indicia of connection to the crimes in question.
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This leaves the law of security inadmissibility in an anachronistic position: it
adjudges behaviour based partly on international legal concepts (terrorism and
subversion), yet it departs from international law at perhaps the most critical juncture –
the point at which individual responsibility for violating these concepts must be
determined. Indeed, there is something patently contradictory in finding that an individual
has violated a principle of international law with an approach to culpability that
international law has emphatically rejected. The fact of course remains that countries are
generally free to determine whatever criteria they choose to inform questions of admission,
be they fully consistent with international legal principles or in direct conflict with them.
For example, while it may seem wrong for a country to prohibit immigrants based on their
affiliation with a separatist movement whose actions are fully authorized under
international law, few would claim that this is legally or jurisdictionally problematic, so
long as it remains compliant with domestic law. It is considerably more complex, however,
when we consider the situation of those who assert that they will be persecuted if returned
to their country of origin. In this situation, the receiving state has bound itself to comply
with international protection principles, subject only to a closed list of exclusions that
themselves take meaning from international law.94 When a country excludes a broader
ambit of persons than that which is contemplated internationally, based on a theory of
personal responsibility that is inconsistent with international norms, the fissures inherent
in the approach begin to emerge. Such is the case with Canada’s inadmissibility regime,
particularly when one considers that, at least in the security context, the majority of cases
involve those who have asserted a claim to refugee protection.

For example, Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention permits exclusion only where there are serious
reasons for considering that the individual seeking protection “has committed a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision
in respect of such crimes.” To be clear, many countries, including Canada, have incorporated “complementary
protection” regimes that provide protection against removal, even in the case of inadmissible persons. While
such mechanisms generally protect against removal to torture, other forms of inhumane treatment and death,
they are frequently narrower in scope than the protections provided by the Refugee Convention. As such,
these regimes clearly contemplate removal of individuals who may be subjected to persecutory treatment, if
not other forms of mistreatment contemplated under the complementary protection provisions. In the
Canadian context, see s 97 of the IRPA and, more generally, see Hathaway and Foster, Law of Refugee Status,
supra note 39 at 2.
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The question then is, would the simple recalibration of security inadmissibility
proceedings away from membership and toward internationally accepted modes of liability
bring coherence to the regime? The simple answer to this question is that it probably
would. It would focus the security-admissibility analysis on action rather than association
and would tend to limit inadmissibility in the security realm to those with some actual
connection to the perpetration of proscribed acts. It would bring internal consistency to
the provision and align it with international instruments aimed at global security. The less
simple answer is that such an approach would still not address the preoccupation
(discussed empirically in the previous chapter) with Southern disputes, and the
indeterminacy of self-determination movements.

To help with this, I now turn to a

different approach to international law – the TWAIL approach – to explore whether it could
facilitate an improved approach to decision-making in the migration-security matrix.

3.3 TWAIL Mix: Adding a Third World, International Law Perspective to
the Immigration-Security Setting
What struck Zerai on October 3rd was the boat’s proximity to
land. The drowning of hundreds of people less than a
kilometre from Lampedusa seemed like a manifestation of
Europe’s approach to African migration – a hardening of its
borders coupled with a disturbing indifference to life. He told
an Italian news service that the deaths were “the fruit of a sick
relationship between the north and the south of the world…”95
We have now observed that the migration-security nexus combines a fixation on
individuals who have had some involvement in discrete Southern conflicts with a partial
adherence to international legal principles on security, terrorism and individual
responsibility. While Canada has departed from international law in important ways,
neither Canadian courts, nor international fora have determined that the Canadian
approach to immigration security is in violation of international law. Put differently,
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Mattathias Schwartz, "The Anchor", New Yorker (April 21, 2014) 76 at 78. [Emphasis added]
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international law does not prohibit a country from identifying a more expansive cohort of
individuals for security-related immigration proceedings than would ever be of interest
under international criminal law or international humanitarian law. This flows naturally
from the fact that questions of admission in immigration matters remain largely within the
purview of states, except in so far as they may have implications on compliance with the
Refugee Convention. There is simply no requirement that national security provisions be
consistent with parallel regimes internationally. International law is therefore unlikely, on
its own, to be a corrective to the overbreadth of immigration-security regimes or to the
skewing of such regimes toward individuals from the Global South.
Taking this as a point of departure, I now turn to an exploration of how a more
nuanced and Southern-focused incorporation of international law may help to pivot
immigration decision-making in a more principled direction. While I do not argue that
such an approach could realistically transform the normative landscape in which such
decision-making takes place, I do suggest that absorbing the lessons that TWAIL can teach
could help to both rationalize and improve security processes.
I begin this section with an overview of TWAIL – its origins, its multiple
perspectives and its unifying themes. I will explore how TWAIL scholars have interpreted
processes of decolonization and conflict, processes which have directly led to the fleeing of
individuals from the Global South and to the application of security measures against those
same individuals in countries such as Canada. I will examine how TWAIL scholars have
sought to grapple with the difficult questions posed by assertions of self-determination,
allegations of terrorism and the upheaval of populations. Finally, I will attempt to apply a
TWAIL perspective on the security-inadmissibility regime in an effort to demonstrate how
it could focus attention on criteria that are currently ignored and, as a consequence,
improve outcomes in this area.96

96 At this point, I should situate myself within this analysis. As will become evident below, an important
component of the TWAIL raison d’etre is to give voice to Southern perspectives through the work of
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3.3.1 Third World Approaches to International Law – An Overview
i) Old Words, New Forms: The use of “Third World” terminology in TWAIL commentary
It is perhaps important to begin this exploration with a note on terminology – a note
warranted because of the relatively common view that the term “Third World” is both
unhelpful and obsolete. Formally, of course, the term dates back to the Cold War as a
reference to countries that were not aligned with either the Western “First World” or the
Communist “Second World” but it has also became synonymous with formerly colonized
states and the poverty that has pervaded them. The meaning of the term has extended far
beyond mere geopolitical descriptor, becoming absorbed into the West’s “imagined
geographies” of the colonized Global South, saturated with undifferentiated connotations of
poverty, barbarianism and backwardness.97 Of course “Global South”, as a more recent
term used to describe what is essentially the same geographical space as the “Third World”,
is similarly subject to appropriation and this fact perhaps speaks to the enduring use of the
term by TWAIL scholars, who are acutely aware of its historically contingent origins and
limited descriptive value. Indeed, as we shall see in the coming pages, awareness of the
contingency of historical accounts is central to TWAIL and in holding on to the term “Third
World,” TWAIL and other scholars have injected into it a normativity that it has not always
possessed. As Cedric Grant has noted,
[T]he Third World, as an analytical concept, is likely to retain
its usefulness so long as the world continues to be riven by
serious economic and political disparities. The end of the Cold
War has not been accompanied by a fundamental alteration in
the international economic system. This system is still rooted
in the relationships of the colonial age and biased in favour of
the developed countries of the North. Similarly, the new

academics and international lawyers from the Global South. I am neither an academic nor an international
lawyer from the Global South. This said, another objective of TWAIL is to see that it becomes embedded in
the larger discourse on international law and other areas that “create, foster, legitimize, and maintain harmful
hierarchies” along global lines: see Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL” (2000) 94 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 31
[Mutua, “What is TWAIL”] at 38. It is in this spirit that I take up the challenge to bring a TWAIL analysis to the
realm of immigration and security.
97 The term “imagined geographies” is Edward Said’s, first coined in Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978),
to describe Foucauldian discourses that differentiated the West from the rest of the world.

198

political dispensation has not steered international relations in
the direction of greater democratization. The global changes
taking place give even greater influence to a few major and
wealthy developed powers of the world. Moreover, despite the
end of the Cold War, the majority of the world's people still
face the basic problem of survival, of defending human dignity
against the pressure of want, and of increasing the
opportunities for freedom for themselves as individuals and as
members of a community. In these circumstances, the existence
of the Third World is based not so much on shared memories and
common aspirations as on a sense of what is equitable and just.
For so long as inequity in international relations exists there will
be differing perspectives on, and interpretations of, economic
and social reality between the wealthy and the poor, between the
powerful and the weak.98
As such, TWAIL has consciously held on to the “Third World” terminology, for as
Mickelson notes,
The characterization that is utilized…sees the Third World as
occupying a historically constituted, alternative and
oppositional stance within the international system. The
"Third World" terminology itself may appear out-of-date, but
its very contingency, involving an insistence on history and
continuity, may in fact be one of its strengths.99
Furthermore, Okafor notes that those who question the existence of a cohesive
“Third World” as a helpful analytical construct tend not live there, and while there certainly
are valid points to be made, he suggests that the whole argument is “wrongly framed”:
What is important is the existence of a group of states and
populations that have tended to self-identify as such-coalescing
around a historical and continuing experience of subordination

Cedric Grant, “Equity in International Relations: A Third World Perspective” (1995) 71 Int'l Affairs 567 at
569-70. [emphasis added]
99 Karin Mickelson, “Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse” (1997) 16 Wis
Int Law J 353 [Mickelson, “Rhetoric”] at 360. For further self-reflection on the continuing use of “Third
World” in TWAIL analysis, see Antony Anghie, “International Law in a Time of Change: Should International
Law Lead or Follow” (2010) 26 Am Univ Int Law Rev 1315 [Anghie, “International Law in a Time of Change”]
at 1360.
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at the global level that they feel they share-not the existence
and validity of an unproblematic monolithic third-world
category.
It is on the basis of this self-identification and shared experience that TWAIL
scholars construct their work and it is from this perspective that I too set out to explore the
TWAIL contribution.
ii) TWAIL in Two Parts: A Brief History
TWAIL is both new and not new. That is to say, criticisms and perspectives on
international law have long emanated from Southern or subaltern voices, but it is only
more recently that efforts have been made to consolidate such voices into a more
formalized, if not homogenous, school of thought, network and movement.100 As Okafor
points out, the pedigree of TWAIL is "part of a long tradition of critical internationalism. Its
intellectual and inspirational roots stretch all the way back to the Afro-Asian anti-colonial
struggles of the 1940's- 1960's, and even before that to the Latin American de-colonization
movements."101 In the main, however, TWAIL is a response to the decolonization processes
that swept the globe in the decades immediately following World War II.102 It is, at least in
part, reactive to the international legal order that emerged in the post-war era, viewing it
as a new kind of “imperial project” that has solidified Western hegemony and helped to
perpetuate global inequality over this period.103
Some scholars – most notably Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni – have loosely
categorized the recent history of Southern scholarship on international law into two

The use of the terms “school of thought”, “network” and “movement” is deliberate, for as we shall see
TWAIL is, in many respects, all three.
101 O. C. Okafor, "Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in our Time: A TWAIL Perspective"
(2005) 43 Osgoode Hall L. J. 171 [Okafor, “Newness”] at 177.
102 Mutua, What is TWAIL, supra note 96 at 31.
103 Ibid.
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discrete, if not airtight, phases which they label TWAIL I and TWAIL II.104 TWAIL I, a
retrospective label, refers to the scholarship of writers in the period during and
immediately following decolonisation, while TWAIL II is used to describe more recent
approaches, including those that self-consciously identify themselves as part of a TWAIL
approach. Anghie and Chimni are also quick to point out the limitations of a binary
approach to tracing TWAIL history, but nevertheless find it conceptually useful in tracing
the evolution of analysis in the area, an evolution that is intimately connected to the
disappointing historical arc that has followed decolonization.
TWAIL I
Early writing on international law from a Southern perspective was largely
preoccupied with documenting the Eurocentrism of international law; it asserted that precolonial non-European states were not “strangers to the idea of international law,” and
sought to expose how the Western tradition of international law was implicated in the
violence committed against the colonized world. It specifically interrogated the ways in
which international law both allowed for and justified colonial rule by excluding nonEuropean states from sovereignty and authorized spectacularly brutal acts of conquest in
the colonized world.105
Given that the deprivation of sovereignty for colonized countries was identified as a
defining characteristic of 19th and early 20th century international law, it is no surprise that
early TWAIL thinkers were preoccupied with Third World nationalism, liberation and selfdetermination and sought to solidify through international law the political gains made

Antony Anghie & B S Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility
in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2 Chin J Int Law 77 [Anghie and Chimni, "Third World Approaches"] at 79, also
published as Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, "Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual
Responsibility in Internal Conflict", in: Steven R. Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds.), The Methods of
International Law (Buffalo: W.S. Hein, 2004) pp. 185-210.
105 Ibid at 80-82.
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through decolonization. The following statement of Tieya is thus emblematic of the early
TWAIL position:
The road to sovereignty for Third World nations was not an
easy one. For most of them, independence came only after
bitter struggle. For this reason, sovereignty is considered
sacred and inviolable. Its preservation is the focal point of all
their activities. It is only by tenaciously upholding sovereignty
that the new nations can preserve real self-government;
protect their legitimate rights and interests on the basis of
equality; eliminate colonial oppression and exploitation; and
avoid having to suffer from them again.106
In this approach, one can see both an embrace of a reformed version of international
law and a desire for the newly formed states of the decolonized world to be embraced by it.
As Anghie notes, TWAIL commentary really began with an “attempt on the part of the new
states, those that recently acquired independence, to transform the system of international
law and turn it into one that reflected the aspirations and interests of the peoples of the
Third World.”107 To this end, as Anghie and Chimni note, Third World international law
scholars were aligned with diplomatic efforts to ensure that United Nations resolutions
reflected the interests of the newly decolonized nations, both in terms of support for
ongoing liberation struggles and recognition of the sovereign equality of the newly formed
states. Early TWAIL scholars also concerned themselves with efforts to overhaul economic
structures that so clearly delivered advantage to the wealthy countries of the world and
contributed to the subjugation of the newly independent states.108
TWAIL II

Wang Tieya, “The Third World and International Law” in The Structure And Process of International Law:
Essays In Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) at 969, as cited in Mickelson,
Rhetoric, supra note 99 at note 26.
107 Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change, supra note 99 at 1360.
108 Anghie and Chimni, Third World Approaches, supra note 104 at 82.
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TWAIL II is, at least in some respects, a response to the abject failure of the global
political order to alleviate the daily misery of much of the world’s population. It has been
described as a subsequent generation of TWAIL scholarship rather than a repudiation of
TWAIL I writing, though it would be wrong to suggest that the two are always mutually
compatible. Just as younger generations contest, often with good reason, the ideas of their
parents, so too has recent TWAIL scholarship questioned earlier Southern commentary on
international law, all the while recognizing its organic connection to it.
TWAIL II scholarship also reflects, and reflects back, developments in postmodern
thinking and critical approaches to law that have surfaced over the past two decades, but
more importantly, it calls for new and distinct modes of thought, from a Southern
perspective, on the structures and methodologies of the international legal order. 109 The
current network of scholars exploring Third World modes of thought about international
law can be traced back, at least formally, to a 1997 conference at Harvard University that
produced a vision statement detailing some of the key areas of inquiry and objectives. The
statement reads in part:
We are a network of scholars engaged in international legal
studies, and particularly interested in the challenges and
opportunities facing 'third world' peoples in the new world
order. We understand the historical scope and agenda of the
dominant voice of international law scholarship as having
participated in, and legitimated global processes of
marginalization and domination that impact on the lives and
struggles of third world peoples.
Members of this network may not agree on the content,
direction and strategies of third world approaches to
international law. Our network, however, is grounded in the
united recognition that we need democratization of
international legal scholarship in at least two senses: (i) first,
we need to context international law's privileging of European
and North American voices by providing institutional and

109 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory,
Methodology, or Both” (2008) 10 Int Community Law Rev 371 [Okafor, "Critical Third World Approaches"].
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imaginative opportunities for participation from the third
world; and (ii) second, we need to formulate a substantive
critique of the politics and scholarship of mainstream
international law to the extent that it has helped reproduce
structures that marginalize and dominate third world peoples.
Thus we are crucially interested in formulating and
disseminating critical approaches to the relationships of power
that constitute, and are constituted by, the current world
order. In addition, we appreciate the need to understand and
engage previous and prevailing trends in third world
scholarship in international law.110
While TWAIL scholarship has since been refined and applied as a methodological
lens to a panoply of topics,111 the first observation made in the vision statement – that
international law is not merely agnostic to “global processes of marginalization” but is
directly implicated in them remains a unifying theme of the network. It is a theme that
revisits earlier legal writing on colonialism, recasting it not as a regrettable chapter of
international legal history, but as central to its very formation.112

In a relatively recent

work, Al Attar and Thompson describe this unifying theme in the following way:
TWAIL is an alternative narrative of international law that has
developed in opposition to the realities of domination and
subordination prevalent in the international legal apparatus. A
fundamentally counter-hegemonic movement, TWAIL is united
in its rejection of what its champions regard as an unjust
relationship between the Third World and international law.113
Similarly, Eslava and Pahuja describe the common frame of reference used by
TWAIL scholars as follows:

As quoted in Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories” (2008) 10 Int Community Law Rev 355
Mickelson, "Taking Stock"] at 357-358.
111 Which include: international human rights law, international environmental law, the law of intellectual
property, international trade law, international development and, of note for our purposes, the war on
terrorism, international criminal law and questions of sovereignty and self-determination.
112 Anghie and Chimni, Third World Approaches, supra note 104 at 84.
113 Mohsen al Attar & Rebekah Thompson, “How the Multi-Level Democratisation of International LawMaking Can Effect Popular Aspirations towards Self-Determination” (2011) 3 Trade Law Dev 65 [al Attar and
Thompson, "Democratisation of International Law"] at 67.
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Although there is arguably no single theoretical approach
which unites TWAIL scholars, they share both a sensibility, and
a political orientation. TWAIL is therefore...defined by a
commonality of concerns. Those concerns centre around
attempting to attune the operation of International law to
those sites and subjects that have traditionally been positioned
as the 'others of international law'.114
Despite many differences, other common themes have also emerged. These include,
in Mickelson’s words:
o an emphasis on interconnectedness of subject areas, illustrated by an
unwillingness to draw rigid boundaries between various areas of the law
(such as economics, human rights, or the environment).
o an emphasis on considerations of morality, ethics and justice; in other words,
an unwillingness to separate law from wider concerns or to define law in a
narrow 'legalistic' fashion.
o an emphasis on history, typified by an unwillingness to look at any problem
as ahistorical or to separate law from the historical context within which it
developed.115
To this list, I would add another common register of TWAIL scholars, that being a
desire to change the frame of international law from one that looks almost exclusively at
states as the relevant legal actors to one that also looks to localities and the lived
experience of individuals in trying to think through how international law should be
confronted and changed. It is for this reason that some newer generation TWAIL scholars
have called for TWAIL to engage more explicitly with legal ethnography – to map out how
international law works in the realm of the quotidian and mundane.116 As is I hope
apparent, these themes are all of relevance to the context of migration and security and so I
turn now to delve into each of them in greater detail. Before I do, however, a brief
disclaimer: over the past twenty years, a great deal has been written on, and through,

Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, “Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of
International Law” (2011) 3 Trade Law Dev 103 [Eslava and Pahuja, "Between Resistance"] at 104.
115 Mickelson, Rhetoric, supra note 99 at 397.
116 Eslava and Pahuja, Between Resistance, supra note 114 at 126.
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TWAIL methodologies. In the pages that follow, I do not pretend to provide an exhaustive
review of the entire movement, but rather, to tap into a variety of themes that, to me, bear
particular relevance to the larger project of exploring immigration and inadmissibility.
iii) TWAIL Themes
Emphasis on History
"The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being
removed from history and from the community. Colonization
usurps any free role in either war or peace, every decision
contributing to his destiny and that of the world, and all
cultural and social responsibility."
Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized
To briefly revisit the meaning of the term “Third World,” there are those who
suggest that it “does not have a nature; it has a history.”117 And to a significant extent, the
TWAIL endeavour is to explore, on its own terms, the interplay between this history and
the development of international law. As noted above, earlier Third World critics of
international law set out to establish, through detailed historical accounts, the various and
complex international laws of pre-colonial states.118 More recent TWAIL scholarship has
sought to question – and oppose – the mainstream view that colonialism was a discrete,
almost incidental or aberrational feature of international law.119 This is strikingly apparent
in the work of Antony Anghie who, in Gathii’s words, established that the doctrines of
international law were “constructed around a series of contrasting national identities,
races, and languages with European ones at the apex. Hence, international law was less
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118 See for example, T.O. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972)
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Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).
119 For an elucidating dialogue on this issue, see James Thuo Gathii, “Neoliberalism, Colonialism and
International Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy” (1999) 98 Mich
Law Rev 1996 [Gathii, “Decentering”], followed by Brad Roth, “Government Illegitimacy and Neocolonialism:
Response to Review by James Thuo Gathii” (1999) 98 Mich Law Rev 2056, which is in turn followed by James
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about how order was created among sovereign states than how it managed order among
entities of completely different cultural systems.”120
It is, of course, important to underscore that TWAIL is not simply concerned with
history per se, but with particular histories or, better put, with exploring histories from a
globalized, and in some cases, decidedly Third World perspective. It is, at least in part,
TWAIL’s “methodological insistence” on a globalized historical account that gives it its
perspective on international legal discourse and enables it to uncover the troubling
normativity of many aspects of international law.121 It is also through detailed historical
analysis and connecting this analysis with the contemporary plight of the majority world
that TWAIL scholars obtain a vantage point on the ongoing nature of subjugation and
inequality.

This is readily apparent, for example, in Okafor’s “After Martyrdom:

International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in
Africa,” in which he explores how international law was a participant in the “erasure and
(de)legitimization” of African statehood and compellingly traces these processes of erasure
to the serious and ongoing state-building problems that African states continue to face.122
There is, at least to some, a danger in fastening upon the ongoing influence of
colonial forces on the contemporary world and that danger lies in creating an almost
paralytic sense of historical determinism, succumbing to what Aijaz Ahmad has phrased the
“infinite aftermath” of the post-colonial era.123 For Ahmad, at least in the Indian context, to
distil the consequences of colonialism, separated from precolonial conditions and now after
over a half-century of postcolonial history is too complex a task to be worthwhile.124
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My sense, however, is that TWAIL scholars for the most part avoid the pitfalls of
Ahmad’s “infinite aftermath” by refraining from sweeping statements about the ongoing
reverberations of colonialism 50 years after the last formal vestiges of it disappeared and
by rather drawing careful connections between colonial rule and the structures that
continue to hold significant sway in international law.
To TWAIL scholars, the fact of Western dominance and the projection of its laws
onto the global plane simply cannot be divorced from its intimate corollary, the subjugation
and exploitation of Southern lands and people. TWAIL, in other words, is as much about
coming to terms with the provenance of Western dominance as it about giving voice to
Southern perspectives. They are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. In Mickelson’s words,
An equally important theme, however, is the extent to which
the colonial encounter also constituted the First World. There
is an insistence in all of these writers on seeing how the Third
World, its resources and peoples, were harnessed in the drive
to create the modern Western industrialized state--and thus
played an essential role in the achievement of Western
privilege. This is a move from seeing the Third World as
essentially marginal within the international system to seeing
it as an integral part of that system.125
Another, somewhat unrelated implication of TWAIL's insistence on revealing untold
histories is to call into question universals - not universals per se, as the strong normative
strain that runs throughout TWAIL embraces certain unifying goals - but rather the flawed
universals that emerge from the partial telling of a story. Identifying the contingent nature
of the Western metanarrative is almost ubiquitous in TWAIL writing, but from it also
springs a guarded optimism – an optimism borne of the notion that more inclusive
universals can be found and that that which is need not have been, and need not be in the
future.
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universality” that requires a “commitment to constantly re-engage with the promise(s) of
international law.” In seeking out universality, however, “certainty should give way to
dialectics, and affirmation to multiple assertions.” And in thinking about universals, the
authors underscore the importance of viewing international law as a “set of concrete
practices that express themselves in the material world, as well as about international law
as a normative or ideological project.”126
This brings us to another key feature of TWAIL scholarship, which is that despite its
observation that colonialism is essentially immanent in international law and despite being
deeply critical of the ways in which international law operates to the detriment of maligned
peoples, it remains committed to the idea of international law, albeit of a reinvented kind.
Anghie and Chimni articulate the reasons for this ongoing commitment to the project of
international law as being twofold: first, they suggest that TWAIL scholars continue to
believe in the “transformative potential of international law and in the ideal of law as a
means of constraining power.” TWAIL scholars recognize the role that power continues to
play in international relations, but they steadfastly hold on to the view that this is not, at
least by definition, ordained. And while the power of a good, historically-based argument
will not necessarily “control action,” it can in many instances prevail.127 Second, and more
pragmatically, Anghie and Chimni suggest that even though TWAIL arguments may not
prevail when pitted against the raw power of international relations, the alternative to
engagement with international law – call it critical disengagement – is a luxury the Third
World cannot afford. They note:
[T]here are dangers in conceding the entire arena of
international law to other methodologies and actors in the
aspiration to find a more powerful discourse which would
render injustice with such clarity and persuasion that it would
compel the changes in international relations which TWAIL
seeks. To the extent that CLS suggests this course of action, it
runs the risk of merely supporting, if not furthering the status
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quo...TWAIL simply cannot afford this because international
law has now become an extraordinarily powerful language in
which to frame problems, suggest fault and responsibility,
propose solutions and remedies. International law rules matter
and must be taken seriously. It is not simply a distinctive style
of argumentation but has serious consequences for how
ordinary people live.128
In this statement, we see a clear if somewhat ambivalent point of intersection
between TWAIL and other critical approaches to legal theory, a topic to which I will return
below. For the moment, however, it is simply important to recognize the various ways in
which TWAIL scholars have marshalled history to expose the injustice of international law
and to remake it from a globalized perspective.
Emphasis on Lived Experience
Perhaps the area in which TWAIL II differs most from TWAIL I, and perhaps its most
radical departure from mainstream international law lies in its insistence on looking at the
situation of individuals in thinking through the legitimacy of international law and
international legal principles. TWAIL I scholars understandably focused much of their
attention on condemning mainstream international law’s embrace of colonialism and on
advocating for the recognition and equal treatment of the nascent states of the decolonized
world. But the truth is, for a whole myriad of reasons – some of which are tied directly to
international law, some less so – many of these states have fared poorly over the past 40-50
years and the majority of people in these countries have borne the brunt of this poor
showing. As such, TWAIL II, interrogates the actions of nation states – of both the First and
Third World – to address the very basic deprivations that continue to plague much of the
global population.
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But beyond this, and much more profoundly, TWAIL II scholars also question the
basic legitimacy of states as constituting the sole relevant actors in the formation and
enforcement of international law. The state, as Gathii succinctly notes, is not a “neutral or
even universal ideal.”129

And while there is a general truth to this assertion, it is

particularly resonant to the situation of Third World states, many of which were created
either arbitrarily, or worse, with the specific aim of combining what had previously been
distinct polities.

As Okafor notes, the illegitimacy of many Third World states “has

derived…from their lack of affinity with constituent sub-state groups and their origins as
external impositions rather than organic entities created through an internal process of
consensus-building.”130 As such, many TWAIL scholars look to other entities – social
movements, global civil society organizations and “transnational advocacy networks to
name a few – in exploring the impact of international law on the people of the Global South
and to propose alternatives. The TWAIL emphasis on lived experience is, not surprisingly,
derived from an acute sense of both the historical degradation of people during colonialism
and the widespread betrayal of these same people under many states of the decolonized
world. As Chimni and Anghie note:
For TWAIL scholars, international law makes sense only in the
context of the lived history of the peoples of the Third World.
Two important characteristics of TWAIL thinking emerge from
this. First, the experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism
has made Third World peoples acutely sensitive to power
relations among states and to the ways in which any proposed
international rule or institution will actually affect the
distribution of power between states and peoples. Second, it is
the actualized experience of these peoples and not merely that
of states which represent them in international fora, that is the
interpretive prism through which rules of international law are
to be evaluated.131
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Many have written about the all-too-common post-colonial reality whereby
nationalist elites of the colonized world simply stepped into the place of the former colonial
masters, replacing the domination of colonialism with the despotism of the new Third
World. From Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, to Naipaul’s Mimic Men to the work of Homi
Bhabha and Edward Said, the tendency of Third World states and statesmen (for the vast
majority have been men) to replicate, or “mimic” the structures of the colonial world has
been both long and well-documented.132 TWAIL scholars incorporate these observations
into the realm of law which is, at least in part, what gives rise to their emphasis on lived
experience. But to state it this way is too simple, for recent TWAIL commentary also (and
often simultaneously) recognizes that there are situations that continue to call for the
support of Third World states as states in the ongoing evolution of international law. This
ambivalence is, I believe, what Antony Anghie was referring to when he stated the
following in his Grotius lecture:
For all of us, however, the dualities of TWAIL present an
ongoing challenge. We are for Third World sovereignty and yet
also against it; sometimes for human rights and sometimes
critical of human rights; for international law at times, and
suspicious of it at others. The enduring riddle we confront is
how to formulate a position that is neither imperial, on one
hand, nor narrowly nationalistic on the other. Both
imperialism and the pathologies of the post-colonial state have
caused immense suffering to the peoples of the Third World.
The challenge for TWAIL is to articulate an alternative to these
two very powerful realities.133
Focusing on the experience of Third World peoples as the “interpretive prism”
through which to examine international law means, above all, listening to their “resistance
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(London: Deutsch, 1967); Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London, New York: Routledge, 1994);
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1993). Edward Said on Fanon (at 273):
132

Fanon was the first major theorist of anti-imperialism to realize that
orthodox nationalism followed along the same track hewn out by
imperialism, which while it appeared to be conceding authority to the
nationalist bourgeoisie was really extending its hegemony.
133 Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change, supra note 99 at 1366.

212

to, or acceptance of, international rules and practices” and taking these reactions as “strong
evidence of the justice or injustice of those rules and practices.”134 It also means that a
contextualized process must be used in assessing the actions of individuals engaged in
political conflict in the Third World, one that does not merely attribute responsibility for
the conflict because of an individual’s proximity to it.
Again, however, we must avoid a superficial reading of TWAIL scholarship because
to state that TWAIL supports looking at international law through the lens of individual
experience could be interpreted simply as an endorsement of a rights-based approach to
international law. As Anghie’s above statement suggests, however, it is not. There is by
now a relatively fulsome and varied body of TWAIL scholarship on human rights and
international law and, to come back to a word used frequently in this chapter, its stance on
the liberal rights agenda may best be described as ambivalent. On the one hand, there is
the view that international human rights norms are fundamentally similar to other areas of
international law in that they are constituted by an ethnocentric and deeply colonial view
of the world that invariably, if subtly, places Western countries and peoples at the top of a
hierarchy and Third World peoples at the bottom.135 Citing the example of the former
Yugoslavia and the ease with which claims to self-determination, human rights and liberty
were manipulated by parties to atrocities, Gathii argues that these “abstract but cherished
principles are not necessarily emancipatory” and that “viewing them as antidotes to the
violence of ethnicity and illiberal nationalism only downplays the tragic role they have at
times been mobilized to serve.”136 Recognizing this fact, Gathii continues, makes it easier to
“drop the presumption that international law and norms act in the ‘interests of human
rights, democracy and the people, while local institutions, actors or cultures are seen as
posing a threat to these values.’”137 Note the conditional nature of Gathii’s statement,
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questioning the presumption that international law protects the interests of Third World
peoples. This is not to say that it never acts in their interests, but it is meant to question the
sanctity of the view that international human rights law is inherently protective of the
people of the Global South. And if this is the case, the solution to Third World problems is
not, as is frequently presumed by international lawyers, ‘more law,’ but a different
conception of law: one that recognizes its emancipatory potential for individuals, but also
scrutinizes its relationship with power and its claims to universality. Anghie and Chimni
note that TWAIL II scholars:
…have examined whether and how international human rights
norms may be used to protect Third World peoples against the
state and other international actors. By simultaneously
examining the Third World state critically and recognizing the
possibility of using international law to promote the interests
of Third World peoples, these TWAIL II positions on
international human rights law differ from either mainstream
or critical Northern views on human rights as well as from the
views of Third World states themselves. One of the major
difficulties confronting TWAIL scholars arises precisely
because it is sometimes through supporting the Third World
state and at others, by critiquing it, that the interests of Third
World peoples may be advanced.138
While not directly associated with TWAIL scholarship, many TWAIL scholars have
looked to the work of legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos to help sort through the
complex relationships between global justice, individual rights and an international law
dominated by neoliberalism. First, Santos argues that there are essentially two forms of
globalization: neoliberal globalization and what he calls “counter-hegemonic globalization,”
the latter having arisen in parallel, and in opposition, to the former.139 Counter-hegemonic
globalization he defines as the “vast set of networks, initiatives, organizations, and
movements that fight against the economic, social, and political outcomes of hegemonic
globalization, challenge the conceptions of world development underlying the latter, and

138
139

Anghie & Chimni, Third World Approaches, supra note 104 at 83.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (London: Butterworths, 2002).

214

propose alternative conceptions.”140 Second, Santos argues that from this parallel process
of globalization, a new form of cosmopolitan engagement has also emerged, what he terms
a “subaltern cosmopolitan politics and legality.”141
This new cosmopolitanism, which Santos views as being most clearly illustrated in
the proceedings of the World Social Forum, remains closely connected with the localized
struggles of individuals in the Global South, but is able to project those struggles onto
different planes: international, local, transnational, state. As is evident from the very label
Santos uses to describe this form of cosmopolitanism, it also rejects legal and political
distinctions, viewing the struggles of Third World peoples as being primarily political in
nature but containing important legal components.142
Building on Santos’ conception of a ‘counter-hegemonic globalization’ and on the
work of those who call for a globalized parliamentary system, 143 Attar and Thompson
suggest that injecting the rule of law and popular participation into international lawmaking is central to the TWAIL project and its aims of alleviating global inequality.144 And
in this view, we interestingly come back around to the work of Catherine Dauvergne and
her parallel call for the “unhinging” of the rule of law from its domestic moorings in dealing
with the securitization of international migration.145 While I will return to this connection
between TWAIL and migration below, for now I simply refer to the rule of law issue as a
further indication of the emphasis that TWAIL places on the connection between
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international law and the lived experience of Third World peoples. Now, however, I turn to
another central organizing principle of TWAIL scholarship – its openness to, and indeed its
focus on looking to the scholarship of other domains to help inform its positions on
international law.
TWAIL as Interdisciplinary Normative Project
From the outset, TWAIL II scholarship has been explicit about the need to take into
consideration multiple narratives to demonstrate the ways in which international law has
contributed to, and reflects contemporary problems in the Third World.

This broad

approach, this “unwillingness to draw rigid boundaries” occurs both within and outside
what is typically viewed as legal scholarship.146 And in this, we can glimpse both the
purpose and the method of TWAIL. Its purpose is an unashamedly normative one – to
expose the ideology and injustice of the current international legal order and to (sometimes
radically) ameliorate it by proposing alternative and more globally participatory
conceptions of international law. Its method, or at least one of its methods, is to use the
various analytical tools at its disposal – from across a number of disciplines and schools of
thought – to achieve its purposes.
Within the law, TWAIL is frequently described as sharing characteristics with the
various critical approaches that have emerged over the past twenty five or so years,
specifically feminist legal studies, critical legal studies and its international corollary, New
Approaches to International Law (NAIL). While TWAIL certainly shares features with these
other critical legal approaches, many TWAIL scholars have deliberately distinguished the
TWAIL approach. As I described above, TWAIL generally accepts the view – one central to
critical perspectives – that language and legal reasoning are both indeterminate and deeply
intertwined with power. TWAIL recognizes that international law is both a product and
producer of an ideology that favours the powerful and it therefore questions international
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law’s particular claims to universality. TWAIL openly rejects assertions of the neutrality of
international law, frequently framing its primary task as being the exposition of
international law’s historically contingent and highly subjective nature.147 As such, TWAIL
also rejects many of the rhetorical flourishes that are frequently used to describe the
current international legal order – language which tends to characterize international law
as a kind of pre-ordained and idealized panacea that, through mere adherence to it, can
solve all problems.148
At the same time, TWAIL scholars tend to reject, categorically, the sense of paralysis
and nihilism that is often associated with critical approaches, although it should be
acknowledged that TWAIL has itself been subject to precisely this kind of criticism.149
Recall the words of Anghie and Chimni, recognizing that law, with all of its imperfections,
its subjectivity and its tendency to reflect the views of the powerful also has the unique
capacity, rarely fully realized, to constrain power and is therefore not a domain that the
Global South can afford to cede. This belief in the potential of law, together with its focus
on individual experience and case study clearly distinguish TWAIL from other critical
perspectives, notwithstanding their somewhat common genealogy.
Beyond the strict domain of law, TWAIL also draws from the field of post-colonial
studies. As Mickelson notes,
It is essential to bear in mind that the Third World approach to
international law must be seen as lying at the intersection of
two different discourses. One is the discourse of traditional
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international law and international legal scholarship. Here, it is
part of the story of the development of international law. The
other discourse is that of decolonization: the full, broad
panoramic view of a history of oppression and transformation.
Here, it can be seen as a part of the story of anti-colonial and
post-colonial struggle. In some ways, a Third World approach
to international law is the untold part of both these stories;
that which has remained somewhat marginal, while not
entirely overlooked.150
TWAIL’s affiliation with post-colonial studies is closely related to its relationship
with the work of historians, which I have described above, but it builds on these historical
accounts to expose the ways in which the reverberations of the colonial encounter continue
to be felt – politically, economically and culturally. It should be noted that post-colonial
studies is itself a heterogeneous field of inquiry, but generally speaking it concerns itself
with the politics of knowledge and knowledge creation inherent in colonial and neocolonial encounters. It does this through various methods and in a number of ways,
employing elements of anthropology, sociology, human geography and critical theory.
Within post-colonial studies, TWAIL is frequently described as sharing both a lineage and
an evolution with the subaltern studies collective, which, as Eslava and Pahuja observe, has
followed a similar narrative arc as that described by Chimni and Anghie in their description
of the shift from TWAIL I to TWAIL II. That is, subaltern studies began as an effort to write
the histories of Third World peoples into official accounts, but evolved into a far more
critical analysis of “the colonial and post-colonial production of knowledge,” just as TWAIL
evolved from an exercise of claiming international law for colonized peoples to the more
critical writings of TWAIL II on the immanent nature of colonialism within the basic
structures of our current international legal regime.151 And to Mickelson, these TWAIL II
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insights into the nature of international law are explicitly derived from taking into
consideration multiple (previously ignored) narratives:
In terms of legal doctrine itself, the Third World approach
expands the debate about particular legal issues or areas by
forcing a confrontation with the full panoply of historical,
political, economic and cultural debates which surround them,
and thus offers an enriched understanding of the discipline as a
whole.152
Other TWAIL scholars, however, do not resort (at least explicitly) to the theoretical
offerings of the subaltern studies collective, but look to other thematic domains such as
Women Studies and Feminist Legal Theory, Environmental Studies and Economics.
Employing the TWAIL prism in each of these domains helps to reveal the myriad ways in
which international law and regulation penetrate the lives of Third World Peoples.153
Common to all of these approaches, however, is a desire to situate law in the context of a
global regime that continues to be dominated by power and imposition. And in this we also
see the strongly normative strain that runs through virtually all TWAIL scholarship. It’s
recourse to other domains and disciplines flows from a common purpose, that being a
shared ethical commitment to the intellectual and practical
struggle to expose, reform, or even retrench those features of
the international legal system that help create or maintain the
generally unequal, unfair, or unjust global order. They
accomplish this through a commitment to centre the rest
rather than merely the west, thereby taking the lives and
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experiences of those who have self-identified as Third World
much more seriously than has generally been the case.154
The normative, “avowedly political” goal of TWAIL lies, then, in exposing (and
proposing alternatives to) the normativity of the current international legal regime. 155 The
ways in which TWAIL seeks to reveal international law’s lack of neutrality vary across
platforms, disciplines and perspectives, but as a common objective, it seeks to peel back the
layers of international law to reveal its normative stance toward the Global South, exposing
the myth of neutrality in a manner reminiscent of Anatole France’s famous words: “In its
majestic equality, the [international] law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges,
beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread.”156
That questions of morality should guide legal analysis is of course not unique to
TWAIL. It is, as Mickelson notes, the “defining characteristic” of natural law and the irony
of TWAIL’s embrace of this quintessentially Western view of the law is not lost on TWAIL
scholars.157 But what TWAIL scholars tend to propose is a new kind of normativity – one
that is globally representative and that therefore gives rise to a tentative, yet more
legitimate universality. Such representative universality then justifies an international
legal order, albeit one of a profoundly different character. Thus, to Mutua, TWAIL is a
“reconstructive movement that seeks a new compact of international law,” requiring a
broad, multileveled consideration of all “factors that create, foster, legitimize, and maintain
harmful hierarchies.”158

Okafor, Newness, supra note 101 at 176-177.
Eslava & Pahuja, Between Resistance supra note 114 at 109.
156 Anatole France, The Red Lily, online: Project Gutenberg <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3922/3922h/3922-h.htm>.
157 Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage supra note 99 at 405. Indeed, in his important analysis of the 16 th century
Spanish philosopher and jurist Francisco De Vitoria, Anghie reveals how it was De Vitoria’s approach to
natural law that encouraged and justified the violence of the colonial encounter that was to follow, see Antony
Anghie, Vitoria, supra note 120.
158 Mutua, What is Twail?, supra note 96 at 38.
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As I shall set out in greater detail below, the immigration-security regime, at least in
its current form, can be viewed as a site of false neutrality and “harmful hierarchies,”
particularly in respect of its treatment of people from the Global South. It is for this reason
that I find TWAIL to be a useful prism through which to examine the regime, which I turn to
now.

3.4 TWAILing Immigration and Security
We are now at the point where we can take the principles of TWAIL discussed above
and apply them to the situation of immigration decision-making in the security context.
Bearing in mind the principles we explored in the first chapter, this involves a
reconsideration of immigration from the outside in, as I title this chapter, or to be more
specific, a rethinking of how security is used as a basis for exclusion in immigration and
refugee law. I explore these issues through four overarching considerations:
a) Historicizing and contextualizing Refugee Production
and Border Control
b) Centring the Refugee – Individualized decision-making
in immigration and security
c) Interrogating Security
d) Replacing Political Power with the Rule of Law in
Immigration Decision-Making
I suggest that examining immigration and security through TWAIL inflected
categories could help accomplish a number of objectives. First, it could help to inculcate in
decision-makers a sense of connection between the geopolitical forces that create refugees
and Western states’ connection to those forces. Second, it could encourage a culture of
discourse in assessing the security claims that arise in refugee matters. And finally, in
focusing on the situation of individuals as players in the geopolitical events that create
refugees, a TWAIL approach would help to focus the process not on those with loose
affiliations to any given faction in a historically complex realm of social upheaval, but to
those who have actually played a role in the commission of acts that have harmed people.
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This, I argue, is a key component of a globalized understanding of the rule of law.
Accomplishing all of these objectives, I conclude, will bring a more nuanced approach to the
blunt force that defines current security concerns; it will enhance a broadly-defined
conception of security and will refocus the security analysis on the plight of individuals
caught in the machinery of armed conflict.

3.4.1 Historicizing and Contextualizing Refugee Production and Border Control
The Original Forced Migration – Indigenous Peoples and European Settlement
Any historicized account of immigration in North America must begin, if not end
with the first influx of individuals to the original polities of the continent – that of its
indigenous peoples. Of course, this is often done with superficial platitudes, but I believe it
is an important starting point, one that sets the discursive trajectory away from an
unwarranted nativism, for lack of a better word, and toward a recognition of the role that
immigration has always played in post-contact North America. It also happens to coincide
with the TWAIL notion that the law is embodied by the colonial encounter. For what is
colonialism, one may ask, other than a sort of ‘forced migration’ of a different kind? Law
was used to justify the Europeans’ migration into indigenous lands, forays that became
incursions when the intrepid explorers were met with resistance. This was described by
Anghie in his examination of Vitoria, who viewed rights to travel into the lands of others
much like Kant (as I described in the first chapter), as a natural law of man: “it was
permissible from the beginning of the world (when everything was in common) for any one
to set forth and travel wheresoever he would.”159 Indians, for what it was worth, were also
imbued with this right, but this was a particularly pernicious form of equality, for as Anghie
notes,
While appearing to promote notions of equality and reciprocity
between the Indians and the Spanish, Vitoria’s scheme finally

159 Anghie, Vitoria supra note 120 at 326, citing Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de ivre Belli Relectiones
(Washington DC: The Carnegie Institute, 1917) at 151.
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endorses and legitimizes endless Spanish incursions into
Indian society. Vitoria’s apparently innocuous enunciation of a
right to ’travel’ and ’sojourn’ extends finally to the creation of a
comprehensive, indeed inescapable, system of norms which is
inevitably violated by the Indians. For example, Vitoria asserts
that ‘to keep certain people out of the city or province as being
enemies, or to expel them when already there, are acts of war’.
Thus any Indian attempt to resist Spanish penetration would
amount to an act of war which would justify Spanish
retaliation. Each encounter between the Spanish and the
Indians therefore entitles the Spanish to ’defend’ themselves
against Indian aggression and, in so doing, expand Spanish
territory.160
With this actualized threat of foreign invasion, one could hardly have begrudged
Indigenous peoples had they implemented an expansive security scheme of their own. But
this was not, for the most part, what transpired.161 To be certain, there was resistance to
European incursions, but whether through conquest or commerce, the slow trickle of
European colonists to North America in the 16th and 17th centuries was followed by a
steady stream of arrivals, which in turn led to large influxes of immigrant populations over
the past 150 years. This, together with the decimating effects of diseases introduced by the
European newcomers, created the conditions for a profound reconception of the North
American continent as a settler society.162 The point for our purposes is that sitting behind
and buttressing European expansion of its North American colonies was a bedrock of
justification – philosophical, religious and ultimately legal – that set the stage for large scale
and largely unimpeded displacement of indigenous peoples and colonization of the

Ibid.
Jeremy Webber, “Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community
between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law J 623 at pp 632-635.
162 Sherene Razack, ed., Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the
Lines, 2002) at pp 1-4. See also Catherine Dauvergne, “The End of Settler Societies and the New Politics of
Immigration” (Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences Big Ideas Lecture Series, delivered at Brock
University, May 28, 2014, online: http://www.fondationtrudeau.ca/en/themes/publications/end-settlersocieties-and-new-politics-immigration [Dauvergne, the End of Settler Societies].
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continent. The ensuing societies viewed immigration as a necessary aspect of the nation
building exercise and adopted mythologies about the taming of harsh and savage lands.163
And as time passes and the indigenous society takes on an ever diminished role in
the national psyche, settlers “become the original inhabitants and the group most entitled
to the fruits of citizenship.”164 One such “fruit” includes the authority of contemporary
society to control entry into the formerly ‘open’ spaces of the nation in a manner that the
initial settlers never experienced.

To Dauvergne, North America, together with New

Zealand and Australia, are experiencing the end of settler society, as it is slowly replaced by
a new nativism that leads naturally, if not inexorably, toward a restrictive and
unwelcoming immigration politics.165
As we move on in our discussion on TWAIL and what it might have to say about
immigration and refugee law, it is important to think back to Vitoria and to the original
legal justifications for the traversing of borders into lands that were inhabited and
governed by others. Imagine a contemporary global order, for example, in which the
Western world’s restrictive migration policies would be viewed themselves as acts of
aggression, contrary to principles of natural law. I say nothing further on this issue, but
from this vantage point, let us move forward to the contemporary world of migration and
border control. While I do not intend here to engage in a comprehensive history of modern
migration, it is essential to highlight a couple of historical strands in understanding the
security-migration regime.

Razack, ibid.
Razack, ibid at 2.
165 Dauvergne, “The End of Settler Societies”, supra note 162.
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Borders and Nations – The Decolonized Nation-State and Refugee Production
The first strand is about borders themselves. TWAIL scholars, particularly Okafor,
have had much to say about the borders of the contemporary post-colonial world, noting
that there is nothing ‘natural’ about them; they are historically contingent manifestations of
power that have directly, in many instances, led to conflict. It is an uncontroversial fact
that many of the borders of the colonized world were, at best arbitrary. At worst, they
were the opposite of arbitrary, representing deliberate attempts to “paper-over”
indigenous statehoods to create powerful, but internally illegitimate centralized states.166
In the post-colonial era, these historical facts created immense challenges, for as
Okafor notes:
As heirs to the colonial legacy, these leaders faced the crucial
question of what to do with Africa's inherited colonial borders.
Because the borders were mostly arbitrary, they had forcibly
aggregated diverse pre-colonial polities into single political
units. All too often these borders also resulted in the division of
one cohesive group among two or more of the new states.167
While it is an interesting historical phenomenon that the states, as drawn up, have
remained relatively unchanged, Okafor remarks on how the external stability of the states
has not been mirrored internally:

Okafor, After Martyrdom, supra note 83. In tracing the historical illegitimacy of many (African) states,
Okafor is careful not to engage in nostalgia for a mythical pre-colonial African statehood. On the contrary, he
refers to the violent and expansionist agendas of certain African states that preceded colonial rule and to the
ongoing impact that they have had on contemporary geopolitical problems in Africa. Nevertheless, he
concludes:
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While its violent nature was not excusable, the campaign had been part of a
very slowly evolving process of state-building that was rooted in the
internal dynamics of African politics. It thus had a better chance of allowing
slow-paced formation of less deeply fragmented states much as European
states formed (at p.507).
167 Ibid at 512. See also Makau wa Mutua, “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry” (1995)
16 Mich J Int’l L 1113 [Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa].
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As African and international studies literature has much
celebrated, this historic approach to the boundaries question
dramatically and almost totally eliminated inter-state conflict
in Africa. Despite this remarkable record, however, the postcolonial African state has faced internal crises virtually since
the very moment of its independence. By the end of the 1960s,
when the euphoria of independence had subsided, the little
legitimacy that the new states had secured from the deeply
embedded commonality of the anti-colonial struggle had
already begun to fade. For many African states, the moment of
independence was also a moment of crisis because the postcolonial state was a direct successor and inheritor of the
colonial state.168
The illegitimacy of many post-colonial borders, combined with the iron rule of the
“mimic men” who steadfastly insisted on maintaining them has been a potent and violent
combination. It is of no surprise that from these historical phenomena there have arisen
various efforts to recalibrate Africa’s geopolitical reality – some extremely violent, some
less so; some involving secessionist desires to revamp borders, others remaining entirely
domestic affairs.
International law, according to Okafor, has played a key role in this “coercive nationbuilding” process because it prioritizes external state-recognition processes over internal
processes that would tend to yield more subjectively legitimate state structures. This
approach, Okafor concludes, has been successful in creating states “in the European nationstate image, but in almost complete disregard for the input of the cohesive groups who
inhabit the territory of each of these states.”169 The pride of place that international law
gave to external recognition in the decolonized world led directly to efforts to repress
questions of internal legitimacy, but has not generally been able to extinguish them, which
has frequently led to violence.
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Okafor, After Martyrdom, supra note 83 at 513.
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International law also encouraged the homogenization of colonial populations
based on the Western ideal (at least one that was pervasive throughout the decolonization
period) of a unitary and unfragmented nation-state dominated by a centralized
government structure.170 This has led directly to the widespread and frequently violent
repression of minority groups by states, much of which has been provided cover by
international law and its emphasis on the sanctity of the state, regardless of its internal
legitimacy. And while there have been examples of successful “nation-building,” the results
in many countries have ranged from dismal to cataclysmic.
Layered on top of all of this was the Cold War, which served to prop up nationalist
(and often violent) regimes along ideological lines and repress legitimate exercises of selfdetermination. One of the defining features of the post-Cold War period – most visible in
the states of the former Yugoslavia – has been the collapse of such regimes and the
renewed assertion of independence movements.171
And throughout this long period of upheaval spanning colonial rule and postcolonial, Cold War inflected nationalism, civilians have frequently borne the brunt of
conflict. There is obviously no justification for this, but understanding the nature of postcolonial conflict cannot begin or end with broad and undifferentiated statements about the
nature of violence in the Third World.

Rather, such violence is part of a historical

continuum that in some instances may have preceded colonial rule, but in virtually all of
them was exacerbated by it. The colonial state was defined by violence and coercion.
TWAIL scholars have gone to significant lengths to demonstrate how such structures of
violence and coercion have been replicated in the post-colonial state, with the complicity of
Western-based international law. At times the coercion of the colonized world (and the

Ibid at 523 and Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa, supra note 167 at 1151.
The success of the Eritrean independence movement, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union was
perhaps the clearest example of this fact in the developing world, but the creation of Southern Sudan several
years later is another.
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post-colonial one that replaced it) was met with resistance, a resistance that has also
veered in many cases toward the violent.
Violence and coercion.

External recognition amidst internal illegitimacy.

Repression and resistance. These are dangerous binaries and it is of no surprise that they
have produced many, if not most of the world’s refugees. Indeed, inscribed in the lives of
many refugees, one can frequently trace a historical path from colonial rule, to the creation
of arbitrarily demarcated nation-states, to repression and resistance within those states, to
the need to flee. In this context, one can hardly cast aspersions on forced migrants for
questioning, in the act of fleeing and the desire for safety, the legitimacy of the borders of
our world – both those that imprisoned them in their home countries and those that they
must traverse in search of sanctuary.172
In situations of pervasive violence and abject oppression, one must also hesitate to
cast broad judgment on the actions of those who have taken a stand. Even in mainstream
conceptions of international law, harm to civilians has never been used as the sole arbiter
in determining whether the use of force is justified.173 And yet, as I have described earlier,
this is precisely what the blunt tool of the security-inadmissibility regime does, essentially
rendering inadmissible (at least in principle) anyone who has had any affiliation with an
organization that has ever itself been affiliated with violence. It is an explicitly anti-

As immigration-security matters tend to involve individuals who have fled political conflict, I focus here on
the ways in which international law has historically facilitated such conflict. An equally interesting TWAIL
analysis could be made of the ways in which international law, and particularly the rulemaking of
international financial institutions has contributed to economic circumstances that have also fuelled
international migration – on a TWAILIAN view of international financial institutions and international trade
law, see M. Sornarajah, "The Case against a Regime for International Investment Law" in Leon Trakman (Ed.),
Regionalism in International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); M. Sornarajah,
“Mutations of Neo-Liberalism in International Investment Law” (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Int’l Dev 203.
173 To provide a recent example: in his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize, President Barack Obama
devoted considerable attention to justifications for the use of force, noting that during World War II more
civilians died than soldiers and specifically endorsing principles of “just war” theory, suggesting that war is
“justified only when certain conditions were met: if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the force
used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence.” See Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009) online:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize. [Emphasis
added]
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contextual approach, imposing judgment on those that it captures in a way that is entirely
removed from their understanding of the historical reality of their places of origin. This is
why Salvadoran journalists who merely connected their Western colleagues to FMLN
operatives, why those who donated pittances to Eritrean humanitarian efforts and why
Iranians who opposed the current regime, amongst many others, are all so equally
bewildered to be found security threats to Canada.
What the historically-situated TWAIL approach delivers in the immigration context
is a sense of interconnectedness, of shared moral responsibility and historical nuance in
understanding the geopolitical forces that have given rise to conflict and the global
movement of peoples.174 This is, in my view, a crucial framing gesture in thinking about
forced migration and the responsibility of Western countries towards refugees from
conflict zones – a responsibility that, on a strictly numerical basis, they have demonstrably
failed to take seriously.175 Infusing a TWAILian sense of history into the security process
would help to ameliorate the disjuncture between the application of the security provisions
and the histories of those seeking to migrate to Canada. It would also encourage a critical
engagement with the irrationality and bias of the current regime, calling out the hypocrisy

One may ask at this point whether TWAIL principles inevitably lead to an ‘open borders’ conception of
immigration law, which is to say, to the end of immigration law as it is presently conceived. While relatively
little has been written about TWAIL and migration, the commentary that does exist suggests a less radical
orientation. For example, B.S. Chimni argues for a fundamental revamping of the international refugee
protection regime that would prioritize global dialogue over unilateral action, but does not suggest that states
cede their right to determine questions of admission, see B.S. Chimni, “Reforming the International Refugee
Regime: A Dialogic Model” (2001) 14 J Refug Stud 151. This makes sense. Recall the profound, yet ultimately
practical, approach generally adopted by TWAIL scholars who do not tend to call for the dismantling of
Westphalian sovereignty, but instead advocate a more subtle recalibration and democratization of
international law. As I have stated before in other contexts, this is not a question that I need resolve here,
given my focus on security, for I do not believe that any element of TWAIL scholarship would suggest an open
borders approach in respect of those who have either participated in atrocities in the Global South, or who
pose a legitimate security threat to the host country.
175 Any cursory glance at refugee-related statistics confirms this, and the disparity in refugee reception rates
between countries of the South and Northern industrialized states is only growing. According to the UNHCR,
the proportion of the world’s refugees being resettled or hosted in developed regions has diminished in the
face of massive surges in displacement to the countries of developing regions. The most recent UNHCR
statistical update provides: “At the end of 2013, developing regions hosted 10.1 million or 86 per cent of the
world’s refugees, the highest value for the past 22 years. The Least Developed Countries alone provided
asylum to 2.8 million refugees or 24 per cent of the global total.” See War’s Human Cost: UNHCR Global Trends
2013 (2013) online: UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html at 16-17.
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of its preoccupation with Southern conflicts and the corresponding blind eye it turns to
conflicts in which Western countries have engaged.
As I have outlined above, the security process employs a healthy dose of discretion
on the part of immigration and enforcement officers. In this context, injecting a TWAILian
sense of history into the process would lead to decisions that, I believe, more aptly reflect
our opinions about moral responsibility for conflict and would lead to more intelligent
decisions as to who actually constitutes a threat to national security, even on a broad
definition of the term. It is also, I suggest, not as abstract as it may at first appear. As I shall
set out in greater detail below and in the next chapter, where officers in administrative
regimes exercise discretion, they do so based on guidelines, directions and institutional
cultures, which are in turn guided by particular normative orientations. Importing a
TWAILian pedagogy into this orientation would, I believe, yield tangible results. It would
encourage officers to focus, not on historical conflicts per se, but on the larger context
surrounding such conflicts. Most importantly, it would focus the officer’s attention on the
particular role that the individual whose fate he/she must determine has played in the
unfolding of political conflict.

History and Memory: Recalling Immigration History as Exclusionary Policy
In the previous chapter I provided a brief historical account of Canadian security
and inadmissibility provisions, a history that appears, today, to be more or less appalling.
Former inadmissibility regimes were explicitly racialized and sought to exclude particular
classes of individuals as “undesirables”.

Such exclusion lay at the foundation of

immigration policy, which itself was viewed as a bedrock of sovereignty. And while today’s
inadmissibility provisions may appear more facially neutral, the undeniable discrepancy in
their application as between people from the North and South calls this apparent neutrality
into question. As several TWAIL scholars have noted, another principal aspiration of

230

TWAIL is to uncover the subtle normativity of apparently neutral provisions that tend to
disproportionately prejudice Third World peoples.176
The (mis)use of contemporary security provisions appears to be a prime example of
precisely this kind of false neutrality. While in the past questions of admission were
strictly the domain of national prerogative, this is no longer the case, at least in respect of
international obligations toward refugees. And this is the hook on which TWAIL grasps
hold. Refugee protection has become a core domain of international law and so, to the
extent that national policies on immigration may impact upon these international
obligations, a TWAILian perspective on histories of exclusion is important to consider. And
just as TWAIL narratives have tended to reveal how colonial structures have been
replicated in the post-colonial state, so too it would appear have the tendencies toward
racialized exclusion in immigration law been replicated in the operation of contemporary
security provisions. The point, ultimately, is that any historical perspective on Canadian
immigration-security concerns, would tend to encourage a critical engagement with its
present, particularly in the current climate of almost overwhelming preoccupation with
security, a preoccupation that is almost entirely directed at individuals from the Global
South.

3.4.2 Centring the Refugee – Individualized decision-making in immigration and
security
As noted above, TWAIL scholars have demonstrated the various ways in which both
the colonial state and its post-colonial successor have failed the people of the Global South.
This fact is perhaps most graphically manifested in the lives of refugees who, by definition,
have experienced an almost total disregard for their most basic of rights. The failures of

Okafor, Newness, supra note 101 at 178, citing Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, "The Asian Perspective to
International Law in the Age of Globalization" (2001) 5 S.J.I.C.L. 284 at 285. See also, Chikeziri Sam Igwe,
Dehumanising International Law or Responding to a New Reality?: A Critical Analysis of Post-9/11 Suggested
Changes to the Laws of War (PhD Dissertation, York University, 2009) at 32 [unpublished].
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the past 50 or so years have led TWAIL scholars to argue that any reformulated approach
to international law must subordinate the interests of the powerful to the concerns of Third
World peoples and that their “resistance to, or acceptance of, international rules and
practices which affect their lives offers strong evidence of the justice or injustice of those
rules and practices.”177
At this point, it is important to recall that in security cases, immigration
enforcement officers make determinations that are typically in the domain of international
law: the use of force and its justification, assertions of self-determination, allegations of
subversion, espionage and terror. We must also recall that the empirical evidence suggests
that, notwithstanding the immense breadth of the security provisions, those caught by
them tend overwhelmingly to be from the Global South, in respect of relatively contained
Southern conflicts.
While enforcement officers generally have some basic familiarity with the
international legal principles that undergird their decisions, I contend that they also need
to be imbued with the contexts and historicism proposed by TWAIL scholars and by an
emphasis on understanding how these larger themes map onto the individuals whose lives
are, in some sense, in their hands. Decision-making in the migration-security matrix is an
archetypal example of raw state power, as exerted over individual lives – a power that
confers on officers the right to characterize and objectify those subject to it. And while
such decision-making in the current Canadian regime is, in the formal sense, individualized,
in that an individual decision is made in every case, the data suggests that such decisions
are based, at best, on notions of collective responsibility, operationalized through the
“membership” rubric of s.34(1) of the IRPA. The result, I contend, is a skewed sense as to
who constitutes a security threat, based in large measure on the “imaginative geographies”
of the Global South as a single place of undifferentiated violence and savagery. 178
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A TWAIL approach to the security-migration question would dispel such
imaginative geographies, recognizing that the mere fact of coming from a conflict zone or
even taking a position in a conflict does not, in itself, say anything about security or
individual moral or criminal responsibility. A quick and simple example can, I think, help
to illustrate the point. Think for a moment at how the current security regime would have
operated had it been in effect in the period 1935-1945.179 Of course it would have captured
Nazi war criminals and any members (and many supporters) of the Nazi party. It would
equally, however, have captured anyone who supported armed resistance to the Nazis. The
immoral equality with which the security regime would have operated could be averted,
however, by requiring immigration officers to engage in individualized decision-making
based on context, based on an informed engagement with relevant historical forces and
based on a meaningful inquiry into the actions of those who came before them. In this
thought experiment, it is easy to recognize that the difficulty of segregating Nazis from
resisters would provide no justification for excluding everyone from obtaining asylum. It is
also easy to recognize that immigration matters take place in a normative universe and that
decision-makers must, in some senses, descend into the fray to make decisions that make
sense to our own legal and moral framework. Finally, this example demonstrates that the
mere fact of “taking sides” in a conflict, even an immensely bloody one in which many
civilians are killed, is not generally enough to inform coherent judgment in security
matters.
To close the bracket on this example, I do not suggest that the task of looking into
the (often grainy) past of those who flee situations of conflict in search of asylum is an easy
one. What I propose is that however murky a situation of political conflict may appear,
decisions on security cannot be based on that murkiness or on a removed position of

The immigration regime that was in place at the time has been the subject of extensive criticism, both for
its propensity to allow Nazi war criminals to resettle in Canada and its “None is Too Many” approach to
Jewish refugees. The reference is, of course, to Abella and Troper, None Is Too Many (Toronto: Lester & Orpen
Dennys 1983).
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unprincipled neutrality. And while sorting through the various (and there are often many)
players in a conflict can be immensely complex, what is not so complex, I argue is the task
of evaluating the specific acts of individuals who have fled such conflict.
Emphasizing contextualized histories and a willingness to engage with difficult
normative questions in assessing the justice of a given situation are, as noted above, both
important TWAIL principles. I suggest that these principles should be deployed to help
individualize the migration-security process and that doing so would: i) improve the
consistency and fairness of decision-making in this area; ii) diminish the sense that the
security regime operates arbitrarily; and iii) focus the analysis on those who have actually
committed the kinds of crimes intended to be caught by the security process. A TWAIL
approach to considering security would largely abandon membership (and its attribution
of collective responsibility) as a category of inadmissibility and would instead encourage
an approach similar to that used for determining exclusion under the Refugee Convention.
That is, in considering admissibility, officers should examine whether those seeking
admission (from all countries) have personally contributed in a meaningful way to the
commission of proscribed acts.180
In the short to medium term, it is unlikely that the governments of Western
countries will change legislation in a manner that could be construed as narrowing security
considerations. As such, I imagine that membership, as a category of inadmissibility, will
remain on the books for the foreseeable future. In the absence of formal legislative change,

A TWAIL approach on this issue would see no principled basis for applying membership-based security
criteria to either immigrants or refugees. This is primarily because a TWAIL perspective would also recognize
that the reasons that animate individuals to leave their homelands to immigrate to other places are often just
as connected to inequality in the international order as are those forced to flee as refugees. A TWAIL
perspective would query the distinction between refugee and migration rubrics in the first place,
interrogating the circumscribed nature of the refugee definition and highlighting the often just as compelling
situation of so-called ‘economic migrants.’ The plight of these individuals may not amount to persecution, but
may be just as compelling as those of refugees and just as relevant to the TWAIL account of global inequity.
That said, I maintain the focus here on refugees both because this represents the majority of individuals
caught domestically by the security regime and because of the interlocking international legal obligations that
accrue to refugees, further to the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture.
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however, decision-makers maintain a discretion as to whether to proceed with
admissibility determinations. I suggest (and explore further below) that in the domain of
this administrative discretion, meaningful if not transformative change is possible through
exposing decision-makers to a TWAILian pedagogy aimed at individualizing the process
and attenuating its troubling outcomes.181 Such an approach would not only seek to imbue
decision-makers with a deeper understanding of international law, but would attempt to
do so from the perspectives of those most commonly subject to security proceedings –
individuals from the Global South.

The approach would encourage an openness to

grappling with the complexities and injustices of the global political order and foster an
individualized approach, all with a view to understanding how the actions of the
individuals subject to security processes fit into the larger context of conflict in the Global
South.
3.4.3 Interrogating Security and Terrorism
There is a small but important body of TWAIL scholarship on security and terrorism
in the post 9/11 era and the “new normativity” 182 that it has unleashed, much of which is
relevant to our present context. As a deconstructionist movement, the first task for TWAIL
scholars has generally been to unpack the meaning of the term “terrorism”, as it has been
used (and overused) in recent years. They point to the long history of political violence
amongst state and non-state groups and respectfully question the “newness” of the
geopolitical order that gave rise to the “war on terror”.
Ikechi Mgbeoji, for example, points to the fact that international law has failed to
provide a coherent definition of terrorism and suggests that this failure has had profound

I do not intend here to explicate a detailed description of how a TWAIL pedagogy would operate in this
setting, but rely on the basic contours of an approach to TWAIL pedagogy within law schools, as proposed by
Mohsen Al Attar and Vernon Ivan Tava, TWAIL Pedagogy - Legal Education for Emancipation, SSRN Scholarly
Paper ID 1438325 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2009) [Al Attar and Tava "TWAIL
Pedagogy].
182 Upendra Baxi, “War on Terror and the War of Terror: Nomadic Multitudes, Aggressive Incumbents, and the
New International Law - Prefatory Remarks on Two Wars” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law J 7 Baxi, "War on
Terror"] at 34.
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implications on the rule of law.183 How can the crime of terrorism be applied in a
consistent and lawful manner, Mgbeoji asks, if we cannot derive a common understanding
of the term, let alone any coherent criteria for establishing guilt under it?184
For Mgbeoji, the failure to define the law in respect of terrorism has rendered it
little more than a tool of the powerful and suggests that only through a “rigorous and
dispassionate examination of what constitutes terror can modern international lawyers
and international institutions escape…blinding rhetoric and righteous nationalistic
indignation.”185 The lack of definition has created a “propagandistic narrative,” Mgbeoji
continues, that virtually always favors those in power, rendering law little more than the
will of the sovereign.186 The pervasiveness of this narrative – one which constantly posits
and reinforces notions of insecurity – results in the installation of the exception as the rule,
the diminution of rights and the wholesale labelling of entire categories of individuals as
security threats.
TWAIL scholars, however, are not alone in pointing to the amorphous nature of
“terrorism” and the troubling manner in which it has been deployed. Recall, as but one
example, the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Suresh decision: “[o]ne searches
in vain for an authoritative definition of ‘terrorism’” and acknowledging that the absence of
such definition renders it particularly vulnerable to “politicized manipulation, conjecture,
and polemical interpretation.”187 Where I suggest a TWAIL approach would part ways with

Ikechi Mgbeoji, “The Bearded Bandit, the Outlaw Cop, and the Naked Emperor: Towards a North-South
(De)Construction of the Texts and Contexts of International Law’s (Dis)Engagement with Terrorism” (2005)
43 Osgoode Hall Law J 105 at 113. Mgbeogi notes (at 109) that efforts to define terrorism have resulted in
“twenty-two categories of international crimes of terrorism, representing over three hundred international
instruments enacted between 1815 and 1992. Yet, none of the international instruments offer a generic
definition. Ironically, states strongly disagree on how to define the term and who should be identified as a
terrorist.”
184 Ibid, at 113.
185 Ibid, at 111.
186 Ibid at 111, citing Christopher Blakesley, (book review) State Support of International Terrorism: Legal,
Political, and Economic Dimensions by John Murphy (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 428 at 429-30.
187 Suresh, supra note 29 at paras 94-95. The court’s brief review of the literature shed further light on its
recognition that the term “terrorism” can be viewed as essentially meaningless:
183
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the views of the Court is in the Justices’ conclusion that, notwithstanding the above, a
sufficiently workable definition of “terrorism” could be incorporated into the procedurally
stripped down realm of security decision-making and still comply with the rule of law.
Another TWAIL insight into the discourse on terrorism involves the questioning of
an international legal regime that frequently turns a blind-eye to civilian death when

One searches in vain for an authoritative definition of “terrorism”. The
Immigration Act does not define the term. Further, there is no single
definition that is accepted internationally. The absence of an authoritative
definition means that, at least at the margins, “the term is open to
politicized manipulation, conjecture, and polemical interpretation”: factum
of the intervener Canadian Arab Federation (“CAF”), at para. 8; see also W.
R. Farrell, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an
Effective Strategy (1982), at p. 6 (“The term [terrorism] is somewhat
‘Humpty Dumpty’ — anything we choose it to be”); O. Schachter, “The
Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases” (1989), 11 Houston J.
Int’l L. 309, at p. 309 (“[n]o single inclusive definition of international
terrorism has been accepted by the United Nations or in a generally
accepted multilateral treaty”); G. Levitt, “Is ‘Terrorism’ Worth Defining?”
(1986), 13 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 97, at p. 97 (“The search for a legal definition of
terrorism in some ways resembles the quest for the Holy Grail”); C. C.
Joyner, “Offshore Maritime Terrorism: International Implications and the
Legal Response” (1983), 36 Naval War C. Rev. 16, at p. 20 (terrorism’s
“exact status under international law remains open to conjecture and
polemical interpretation”); and J. B. Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic
Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (1978), at p. x (“The very word
[terrorism] becomes a litmus test for dearly held beliefs, so that a brief
conversation on terrorist matters with almost anyone reveals a special
world view, an interpretation of the nature of man, and a glimpse into a
desired future.”)
Even amongst those who agree on the definition of the term, there is
considerable disagreement as to whom the term should be attached: see,
e.g., I. M. Porras, “On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw”
(1994), Utah L. Rev. 119, at p. 124 (noting the general view that “terrorism”
is poorly defined but stating that “[w]ith ‘terrorism’ . . . everyone means the
same thing. What changes is not the meaning of the word, but rather the
groups and activities that each person would include or exclude from the
list”); D. Kash, “Abductions of Terrorists in International Airspace and on
the High Seas” (1993), 8 Fla. J. Int’l L. 65, at p. 72 (“[A]n act that one state
considers terrorism, another may consider as a valid exercise of
resistance”). Perhaps the most striking example of the politicized nature of
the term is that Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress was, during the
apartheid era, routinely labelled a terrorist organization, not only by the
South African government but by much of the international community.
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caused by state actors, but vilifies non-state movements that may have a valid justice aim,
but who similarly resort to violence. Above I described TWAIL’s acknowledgment that
many Third World states have devolved into highly repressive places. What I did not
describe is that many of these states justify their repression internationally by suggesting
that they are merely defending themselves against terrorism. 188 The point here is not to
justify the targeting of civilians, but to expose the asymmetry of the regime and its
problematic consequences. Baxi notes in this regard:
But at no stage does "state terrorism" emerge as a figuration of
thought in the evolution of the genres of the international law
of war and humanitarian law, the customary and conventional
right to self-defence, and the limits of conduct of belligerent or
military occupation. Unsurprisingly, the term "state terrorism"
is, as yet, not a term of art in either international law diction or
the United Nations' official epistemology; at best some
communities of human rights activists use it.189
This privileging of state over non-state violence is sewn into the very fabric of
international law, for as Anghie notes, Grotius himself was so preoccupied with order and
stability on the state level that he refused to recognize any right of people to rebel against
tyranny, even when that tyranny took on the form of brutalizing slavery.190 And while, as
noted above, various international instruments now specifically authorize peoples’
resistance to tyranny, the residue of state privilege persists. The problem with this
privileging is that, as TWAIL scholars have observed, in many (though certainly not all)
conflicts in the Global South, it is the non-state groups that have the clearer claim to moral
legitimacy than their state-based adversary. In this context, the labelling, stigmatizing and
vilifying of non-state actors as “terrorists” simply tells a skewed version of the story,
Nelson Mandela’s example being clearly the most revealing example.

The most recent example likely comes from Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad has essentially
labelled all of those in opposition to him as terrorists. Interestingly, Canadian immigration law would tend to
agree with Assad, as anyone engaged in the Syrian uprising would, at least on paper, be inadmissible on
security grounds.
189 Baxi, War on Terror, supra note 182 at 24.
190 Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change, supra note 99 at 1322, citing Hersch Lauterpacht, "The
Grotian Tradition in International Law" (1946) Brit YB INT‘L L 1 at 43-44.
188
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All of this is highly germane to the immigration-security context. If allegations of
terror need to be addressed critically because they may be laden with assumptions, halftruths and political agendas, than this is particularly the case in immigration proceedings
defined by low burdens of proof and relaxed standards of evidence. And yet, I suggest that
in the hyper-securitized contemporary context, in fact, the opposite has happened such that
essentially any conflict that has resulted in any civilian casualties is considered terrorist in
nature, thereby justifying the exclusion of anyone with any proximity to it.
Virginia Held has suggested that “all terrorism is awful, just as all war is awful” and
that the difference between the two cannot lie merely in the targeting of civilians because
they are targeted in both, though far more civilians have died in wars than in terrorist
attacks.191 A TWAILian approach to migration and security would accord with this view,
recognizing the dynamics of power that frequently drive the distinction between “just”
wars and terrorist acts. As in our World War II example, a TWAILian approach would
recognize that allegations of terrorism in a context of larger state violence doesn’t actually
say very much about either “security” or about the justice of a particular outcome. When
we pull back the distinction between state violence and terror, what is revealed is a more
complex and far less Manichean context in which it would be simply inappropriate to
impose harsh legal consequences on the sole basis of association. Rather, as Baxi notes,
“context sensitive distinctions ought to guide our reflexive labours,” distinctions that seek
to separate those who have personally contributed to the hardship and suffering of Third
World peoples from those who are, at root, simply fleeing such hardship.192 In their work
on assessing individual criminal responsibility, Anghie and Chimni demonstrate for us one
important way that decision-makers can arrive at context sensitive distinctions. They
propose that, as much as possible (and recognizing the complexities) the views of the
people from the state in which alleged crimes took place, should help guide the
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Virginia Held, How Terrorism is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence (New York: Oxford UP, 2011) at 23.
Baxi, War on Terror, supra note 182 at 18.
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determination of individual responsibility.193

Would, for example, the majority of El

Salvadorans view a journalist with loose connections to the FMLN as a terrorist? Given that
the FMLN is now the democratically elected ruling party in the country, the answer would
likely be no. Would an Eritrean who, in 1977, donated the equivalent of $20 to the
liberation movement for humanitarian aid be viewed in Eritrea (or Ethiopia for that
matter) as a terrorist? Again, the answer appears clear.
Is violence ever justifiable? That is perhaps one of the most vexing questions one
can ask. Its answer ultimately lies not within the domain of law, but rather in the realms of
moral philosophy, perhaps politics and, for some, religion. What is not justifiable, and what
I contend a TWAILian approach would help avoid, is the reductionist labelling of
individuals as terrorists in situations that cry out for a careful consideration of context,
history, justice and individual intent.

3.4.4 Replacing Political Power with the Rule of Law
One of the many paradoxes of TWAIL is this: in its call for a reinvention of
international law, it essentially seeks the global entrenchment of values strongly associated
with the West, most notably democracy and the rule of law. Its insistence on injecting
participatory approaches into international law could be construed, in point of fact, as a
simple call for the transposition of social democratic values onto the international level.
And this is why TWAIL is frequently referred to – in the same breath – as both reformist
and radical. It is reformist because what it calls for internationally is something that many
people take for granted domestically – equality amongst parties, meaningful discourse and
curbs on raw expressions of power.

It is radical because such principles remain in

disturbingly short supply in international legal and political orders.
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Anghie & Chimni, Third World Approaches, supra note 104 at 95.
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One example of TWAIL’s call for an internationalized rule of law lies in its insistence
that any engagement with the global legal/political order must be undertaken objectively
and consistently. Anghie and Chimni refer to the failure on the part of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to fully investigate and prosecute
allegations of war crimes related to the NATO campaign of (allegedly indiscriminate)
airstrikes as evidence of the selectivity of international law; a selectivity that tends to
privilege the people and actions of the West.194 So it is in the security-inadmissibility
regime, where, for example, those who have engaged in Western acts of subversion are,
quite literally, never subjected to admissibility proceedings notwithstanding the fact that
the law makes no distinction between these acts and ones committed in the Global South,
which are frequently the subject of admissibility hearings.
This leads me to anticipate one possible reaction to my position, which is that my
critique of the current immigration-security regime and my suggestion that the breadth of
the security net be reconsidered would both weaken security and “go easy” on Southern
despots and war criminals. My response is that, in fact, the opposite would be the case.
First, encouraging consistency in the application of the law is hardly a controversial view,
but is rather central to the most basic principles of legality.195 Second, suggesting that
those who flee disputes should be treated individually and on the basis of their own actions
is not the same as proposing impunity; to the contrary what I am proposing is merely a
more nuanced approach to the question of who constitutes a security threat, taking into full
consideration the fractured worlds from which people flee. This, I suggest, would only help
to focus and refine questions of security, taking it away from the realm of top-down
assertion of power (where I suggest it currently resides) and into the realm of law.196 In
the process, I suggest, the security process would shed its peculiar preoccupation with

Ibid at 91-92.
Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) at 39. Of note, the
consistent application of the law is also considered an important, if frequently unfollowed, principle of
international law: see for example Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York : Rinehart, 1952)
(New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966) (Clark, New Jersey : Lawbook Exchange, 2003).
196 Again, I refer to “law” here in the Fullerian sense, see note 45, above, and accompanying text, in addition to
Section 1.3.2, above.
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those who have fled internal disputes in the global south and focus instead on those who
genuinely pose a threat to Canadian and international security.
It is not, in my view, a coincidence that states tend to view both immigration and
international relations through political, rather than legal lenses. They are, in some senses
mirror images of each other – the one projecting out, the other reflecting in – both helping
to define national sovereignty. What Western states have failed to recognize however, is
the interconnectedness of the two. They have failed to recognize that the histories of
colonization, the generations of subjugation and the decades of using international law as
thin cover for political power have had their consequences, one of which is the arrival on
their shores of those who have fled the ensuing fallout. I suggest that the rule of law has a
role to play in both international and immigration law. Ironically, introducing it into the
former would diminish many of the pressures on the latter.

Conclusion
“Tra il dire e il fare c’è in mezzo il mare,” she remarked. Between words and deeds
there is a sea.197
Immigration law and international law are intimately connected.

Immigration

decision-making is necessarily influenced by international legal principles and both
domains are closely linked to notions of national sovereignty and autonomy.

In the

preceding pages I have described a Third World approach that seeks to transform the
global order by questioning the historical legitimacy of international law and replacing it
with a new normative order, one that places the interests of individuals into the analysis
and is based on discursive and participatory interactions between all parties. From this
vantage point, I sought to illustrate how transposing TWAIL onto the migration-security
realm would focus the process on the actions rather than the associations of individuals
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and bring to it a coherence and fairness that it currently lacks. With this in mind, I turn to
similar conversations from the realm of administrative law – about dialogue, participation
and the rule of law – and examine how a progressive interpretation of administrative
discretion could help turn words into deeds and contribute to a more coherent and
justified approach to security matters.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCRETIONARY DECISION-MAKING
AND DIALOGUE IN IMMIGRATION AND SECURITY:
FORGING LEGITIMACY
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Introduction
In the previous chapter, I discussed the intersections between immigration
and international law and argued that applying a TWAIL lens to security matters
could help bring them into closer conformity with basic principles of legality. In this
chapter, I focus on a domestic domain – that of administrative discretion – within
which, I suggest, TWAIL principles could be deployed. What I hope to illustrate in
the process is that a conception of discretion in security matters as a dialogical and
participatory space that situates those affected by administrative decisions at the
centre of the process is perfectly suited to, and perhaps even requires, a
consideration of TWAIL principles. I argue that pairing TWAIL with this discursive
approach to administrative decision-making could accomplish the (modest) project
of bringing security laws, even in their current state, into closer conformity with
basic principles of legality.
This approach is consistent with TWAIL’s radical, yet ultimately reformist
agenda of working within the law to cultivate an approach to decision-making that
is both cognizant of, and sensitive to the experiences of those from the global south.
Recognizing that discretion is not, in itself, an inherently benevolent decisionmaking mechanism, I nevertheless argue that it is inevitable and that its existence
provides an opportunity for the consideration of Southern perspectives in a manner
that could materially affect outcomes for those unnecessarily caught in the securityinadmissibility apparatus.

Infusing TWAIL perspectives into administrative

discretion in the security sphere does not ultimately challenge the exclusionary
nature of state security practices, but it does require that such practices be carried
out in nuanced and coherent ways that are reflective of Southern realities.
My project here, if it is not already apparent, is an unapologetically
normative one. I am of the view that discretionary authority that affects the very
right of individuals to seek asylum from persecution, such as that related to security
245

measures, needs to be interpreted narrowly, individually and in context. I am
comforted in taking this position by the view offered by some, and with which I
agree, that questions about public administration are almost inherently tinged by
politics. This is because, as Sossin notes, administration itself “is not and has never
been a science - it is and has always been normative.”1
I also acknowledge in the following pages that discretion is both inevitable
and potentially, but not necessarily, helpful in this normative agenda.

It is

unrealistic in the fortress-like mentality of contemporary Western states to suggest
that security measures – in the form of the ‘laws on the books’ – be relaxed or that
the executive handcuff itself from a relatively wide degree of latitude in matters of
security. The only place where more nuanced, fair and coherent outcomes can be
realized, then, is in the spaces left open by an otherwise overly broad security
regime; in other words, in the realm of discretion. The only way for discretion’s
potential to be realized, I contend, is through a reconfiguration of who makes such
decisions and a reconception of how they are made, elevating the perspectives of
those who are subject to them and recognizing that such individuals need to be
listened to in order to properly assess both their desire and eligibility for admission.
To help illustrate these points, I refer toward the end of this chapter to several
conversations I have had with inadmissible persons and with the lawyers who
represent them. Before getting to their stories, however, it is important to first back
up a few paces and sketch out a brief history of discretion, a topic to which I now
turn.

Lorne Sossin, “From Neutrality to Compassion: The Place of Civil Service Values and Legal Norms in
the Exercise of Administrative Discretion” (2005) 55 Univ Tor Law J [Sossin, Neutrality to
Compassion] 427 at 428.
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Discretion and the law as dramatic foils: A brief history
The interplay between discretionary decision-making and the rule of law goes to
the very core of administrative law – it raises questions about the role of the
executive and the independence of tribunals, and more fundamentally, about the
place of law within the administrative state. As David Strauss has noted, “[t]he
dilemma of rules and discretion is ancient and intractable, and it is ubiquitous in the
law.” Discretion means many different things in many different contexts. In the
words of Richard Lempert, the discretion that law grants “may be examined as a
quality of rules, as a quality of behavior, or as a sense that people have of their
freedom to act.”2 In this chapter, I predominantly refer to discretion in terms of the
role it plays in legal landscapes, while recognizing that many of the problems
associated with discretion are not created by law, and cannot be corrected by law
alone. This type of formal legal discretion, as Sossin and Pratt observe, “arises when
an official is empowered to exercise public authority and afforded scope to decide
how that authority should be exercised in particular circumstances.”3

Such

discretion, which usually finds its genesis in permissive statutory language, thus
involves the granting of a power to choose between options, but “within a context
set by law.”4 Discretion in this sense may thus be viewed as freedom and constraint,
both rooted in the law.5
4.2.1 Discretion, the will of the Sovereign and the rule of law
Conversations about the role that discretion plays in administrative decisionmaking have been around as long as administrative decision-making itself. These
conversations have evolved in fascinating ways over the years, tracking a larger and

Richard Lempert, “Discretion in a Behavioural Perspective: The Case of a Public Housing Eviction
Board”, in K. Hawkins, ed., The Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) [Hawkins, The Uses
of Discretion] at 185.
3 Anna Pratt & Lorne Sossin, “A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion,” (2009) 24 Can JL & Soc
301.
4 Lempert, supra note 2, at 186.
5 Ibid.
2
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more general commentary about the rise of the modern administrative state. Many
scholars from the first part of the last century, most notably A.V. Dicey, viewed
unfettered discretion as being anathema to the rule of law and an exercise of
executive (or sovereign) power that needed to be constrained by the judiciary. As
Cartier notes, citing Willis, this view may at least in part be attributed to the
institutional memory of the judiciary on the role that it had played in defending the
commons against the tyranny of the king.6 Others situate the views of Dicey and
others within the laissez faire liberal economic model that prevailed at the time:
governments should do little and what they do should be subject to review by the
courts and the courts alone.
Regardless of its historical antecedents, this view of administrative discretion
construed it as a threat to liberty and a vehicle for the expression of arbitrary
executive power. Adherents to this school of thought were highly skeptical of the
capacity of administrative agencies to compose themselves and to behave in a
manner that comported with the rule of law, unless closely leashed by the courts.
Indeed, to Dicey and others, this had to be the case since the very concept of law was
inextricably linked to the judiciary.7

4.2.2 Discretion and the imperatives of the administrative state
Later, with the rise of the welfare state, executive action and the discretion
through which it was channeled came to be viewed with less suspicion. On the
contrary, discretion in the nascent administrative state was seen as a key
mechanism for ameliorating inequality and addressing broad policy goals in the
public interest. Thus a generation of administrative law scholars shifted their focus

Genevieve Cartier, “Administrative Discretion as Dialogue: A Response to John Willis (or: from
Theology to Secularization)” (2005) 55 Univ Tor Law J 629 [Cartier Discretion as Dialogue].
7 A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1885), 10th ed., 1959, E. C. S. Wade,
editor (repr. 1965) at 40. Dicey could not have been more explicit on this point – he defined law
simply as “any rule which will be enforced by the courts…”
6
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away from shielding individuals from the excesses of the state, and instead
embraced the value of broad discretionary latitude in the promulgation of public
policy.
In Canada, John Willis is frequently credited with leading the charge away from
Dicey’s inherently suspicious approach to administrative discretion. For Willis, the
first stage in the analysis was to acknowledge the reality, indeed the centrality, of
the administrative framework in the modern state.

Given this reality, Willis

reasoned, the most important task is to fit the administrative realm into our
constitutional structure.

This, Willis continued, was best achieved through a

functional approach to determining both “who is best fitted to exercise a discretion”
and “to what extent and by what type of persons shall the exercise of the discretion
be supervised."8 Willis emphatically believed that in the administrative realm, the
executive was more suitably fitted to exercise this discretion. Indeed, to Willis,
discretion was a central feature of administrative action, one that had to exist
essentially outside the realm of law, or perhaps more to the point, outside the
gnarled grasp of the judiciary.
And just as Dicey’s approach can be situated within the larger economic and
political ideologies that prevailed at the time, so too can the approach which
followed it. In the decades following World War I there emerged a strong belief in
both the obligation and capacity of government to address all social problems. This
approach was intimately tied to a growing faith in science and the capacity of
experts to bring science and scientific reasoning to virtually every aspect of life, and
governance was no exception to this. Writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1937,
Robert Cooper observed,

Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6 at 632, citing John Willis, “Three Approaches to
Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional” (1935) 1 U Toronto LJ 53, at
59.
8
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The administration of general legislation by technical
experts, skilled and trained in specialized fields, is "the
contemporary answer to the challenge to bridge the gap
between
popular
government
and
scientific
government."9
And to a very significant extent, this approach made sense at the time.
Governance was becoming a vastly more complicated endeavour and it was
increasingly clear that neither the legislature, the executive, nor in particular the
courts, had the scientific or technical capacity to define policy and make decisions in
key areas of government regulation. The complexity in these areas was instead
navigated through the creation of bodies such as security and exchange
commissions, labour relations boards and other regulatory bodies populated by
experts in their respective fields.
While administrative regulation certainly existed before this era, its prominence
as an integral component of the political landscape can certainly be traced back to
this period. Indeed, to some, administrative governance was the defining feature of
the era. In commenting on the shift towards the administrative, Roscoe Pound,
while Dean of Harvard Law School, observed, "as the eighteenth and the forepart of
the nineteenth century relied upon the legislature and the last half of the nineteenth
century relied upon the courts, the twentieth century is no less clearly relying upon
administration.”10
Most commentators tended to recognize, begrudgingly perhaps, that
administrative discretion had to be subjected to some minimal form of judicial
scrutiny, but the encroachment of the court into the administrative arena was
viewed with criticism bordering on hostility. Willis wrote of it being “confining and

Robert M Cooper, “Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion” (1937) 47 Yale L J 577 at 583,
citing Dickinson, J. "Judicial Control of Official Discretion" (1928) 22 AM. Pol. Sci. Rev., 275 at 277.
10 R. Pound, “The Administrative Application of Legal Standards” (1919) 44 A.B.A. Report 445, at 446.
9
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inadequate” to look at the administrative process from the viewpoint of the sporadic
court cases on judicial control, particularly given its fixation on “that slippery eel,
the rule of law.”11 Or as Cooper put it,
No adequate reason has ever been advanced to explain
why judges, apart from their individual capacities, are
the "only suitable custodians of administrative honor
and decorum" or "by what strange process…judges
become more trustworthy than" administrative
officials." It is hardly reasonable to assume that a
judiciary, completely untrained in the problems of
public administration, is more capable or more likely to
reach proper results than experienced administrators
selected primarily for their specialized knowledge,
technical competence, and thorough familiarity with the
intricacies of modern governmental policies."12
And what of the rights of individuals under the scientific administration of the
modern state? The preoccupation of Dicey was all but abandoned on the premise
that the public good was the paramount concern:
In a certain sense the recent tendency to invest
administrative agencies with a discretionary authority

John Willis, “The McRuer Report: Lawyers’ Values and Civil Servants’ Values” (1968) 18 Univ Tor
Law J 351 at 355-356 [Willis, McRuer Report].
12 Cooper, supra note 9 at 595. Cooper later describes judicial and other intervention as almost
inherently distorting of the administrative project:
11

[T]he primary purpose of investing the instruments of
administration with a discretionary authority was to place the
enforcement of legislative policies in the hands of officials who
presumably possess a technical competence and specialized
knowledge in their particular fields of governmental activity. In this
respect the exercise of discretion is synonymous with the
operation of a scientific government. Consequently, the efficiency
of administration in performing its functions is reduced to the
extent that its operations are controlled by external force which
does not possess this indispensable degree of specialized ability.
Whether the discretionary function is subject to a supervisory
control by the judiciary or by any other non-expert body, the
ultimate result is a perversion of the entire process of
administration.
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is a belated recognition of the paramountcy of the
public over private interests. To this extent the
principles of public law repudiate the older theory that
administrative justice must be meted out in accordance
with the traditions of the common law, for in view of the
present responsibilities of the modem State the rights
and interests of the private citizen can no longer be
placed above or on an equal basis with the privileges
and interests of government. The sound exercise of
discretionary authority is the answer to the demand
that administration be accorded a freedom to determine
what the national interest requires in any situation
within its control.13
The scientific rationalism and open-ended faith in public administration that
dominated this view is replete with criticism of liberal legality which, the argument
went, not only skewed the fair and efficient running of government, but also
underestimated the built-in safeguards of “fairminded civil servants, a vigilant press,
and a 'watch that government' atmosphere in the general public.”14
4.2.3 Where law ends: discretion or tyranny?
If the middle part of the century was something of a science experiment in
technocratic discretionary decision-making, it can fairly be said that its underlying
hypothesis was first, or at least most notably, questioned with the publishing of K.C.
Davis’ Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry in 1969.15 Davis argued that the
administrative system, such as it was at the time, was riddled with examples of
discretion gone wrong. Davis focused primarily on the discretionary powers of
police and prosecutors, noting that they were amongst the most important policy
makers in society and yet their decisions were inherently vulnerable to
arbitrariness and were entirely beyond the scope of judicial or other review. The

Cooper, supra note 9 at 588.
Willis, McRuer Report, supra note 11 at 353.
15 K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 1969) [K.C.
Davis, Discretionary Justice].
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book was not, however, confined to the broad discretion found in the criminal
justice system. Indeed, Davis pointed to myriad examples of unfettered discretion
within the administrative state that were essentially beyond the power of law to
control.
But Davis was no Dicey. He recognized both the inevitability of discretion and
the central role that it had come to play in the modern state.

Indeed, Davis

commences Discretionary Justice by referring to the Lockean axiom that “where law
ends tyranny begins,” but suggests that, in reality, where law ends discretion begins
and that this discretion may mean “either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or
injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness.”16 I shall return below to this idea
of the normative character of discretion, but for now the point is simply Davis’
recognition of its ubiquity in the modern state. What Davis lamented was the
proliferation of what he termed unnecessary discretionary power and the lack of
structure and checks applied to those remaining areas of discretion deemed
necessary.

Properly conceived, however, Davis appreciated the potential of

discretion to tailor justice to the inherently unpredictable circumstances of the
individual. Indeed in many circumstances, Davis acknowledged, the mechanical
application of a rule with no recourse to discretion results in injustice. For as
Edward Chase noted in an early review of Discretionary Justice, “[t]he necessity of
discretion is a manifestation of our condition as limited, thoroughly historical
beings. No rules or principles laid down yesterday or today can hope to foresee,
much less control and regularize, the profusion of event and personality which
tomorrow will thrust upon us. We cannot divine, much less subdue, the future. Some
discretion…is necessary, always.”17

Ibid at 3. Davis appears to wrongfully attribute the axiom to William Pitt, though it seems that it
first appeared in Locke’s "Of Tyranny" in Book II, § 202 of Chap. XVIII of the Two Treatises of
Government.
17 Edward Chase, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (book review) (1969) 44 Tulane Law
Rev 649.
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To Davis what was needed, and what administrative bodies were to strive for,
was individualized justice; that is, justice that to the “appropriate extent” was
tailored to the needs of the individual, which could only be accomplished through
the proper balance of rules and discretion.18 Writing of Davis in 1979, Harry
Arthurs posed the dilemma in these terms:
What, then, is the proper relationship between law and
discretion? Davis defines the problem as finding “the
optimum point on the rule-to-discretion scale,” a task
which is said to be inevitable because “[e]very rule
involves some discretion and every discretion involves
some limitation.”19
The problem, to Davis, was not with discretion itself, but with the abuse of
discretion, which was avoidable through confining it to necessary contexts, through
structuring the manner in which it is exercised and by ‘checking’ it through a variety
of oversight mechanisms. Approached in this way, Davis suggested that discretion
could be transformed from a mechanism of arbitrary state power to a facilitator of
the kind of bespoke justice that he envisioned.
Central to Davis’ conception of how discretion should be structured was the idea
of openness, both to the individuals who are the subjects of administrative
proceedings and to the larger public. As we shall see in the coming pages, the
aspiration that discretion be conceived of as a space for dialogue is predicated on,
and to some small extent, owes its existence to this call for openness in the realm of
administrative action. The call for openness and fairness toward those affected by
administrative decisions can also be discerned from the evolution of jurisprudence
on discretion, a topic to which I turn below.

K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra note 15, at 19.
H W Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall
Law J 2 at 25.
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Before doing so, however, two further points should be made. The first relates
to the difficulty in devising any unifying theory of discretionary decision-making.
The difficulty lies, at least in part, in the breadth and diversity of the endeavour
itself. It is trite, of course, that administrative law governs everything from broad
and relatively esoteric policy propagating bodies to highly adversarial and curialtype adjudicating tribunals. Supreme Court of Canada Justice Louis Lebel described
the large tent of administrative law in the following, amusing way: “[N]ot all
administrative bodies are the same. Indeed, this is an understatement. At first
glance, labour boards, police commissions, and milk control boards may seem to
have about as much in common as assembly lines, cops, and cows!”20
To some extent at least, differing opinions on the topic of discretion seem to turn
on which end of the administrative law spectrum is most prominent in the mind of
the commentator. If, in one’s mind’s eye, administrative law consists primarily of an
array of policy-setting experts seeking to bring order to the complexity of the
modern state, a relatively permissive approach to the question of discretion makes
sense. Those, on the other hand, who begin from the position that administrative
law is primarily a kind of ‘court-lite’ that adjudicates the fundamental rights of
individuals, are more likely to emphasize the need for tight judicial constraint over
discretion. Harlow and Rawlings label this the “model of law-model of government”
distinction.21 In defining this distinction, Cartier notes:
A model of law defines administrative law as a set of
rules and principles designed to control the
administrative state. It focuses on the ability of courts to
control administrative exercises of power and to
protect individual liberty. By contrast, a model of
government views administrative law as facilitating
government action and promoting the public interest.22

Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 SCR 307, 2000 SCC 44 at para 158.
See Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths,
1997) at 69ff.
22 Cartier, supra note 6 at 638, emphasis in original.
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This dichotomy can be observed throughout the commentary on discretion. It
influenced Dicey’s critique of discretion and in turn coloured Cooper and Willis’
criticism of Dicey; it inspired Davis’ cri de coeur against unfettered discretion and
finally it influenced subsequent criticism of Davis.23
Second, it is a mistake to look at the evolution of commentary on administrative
discretion, as superficially described above, as being defined by a series of discrete
periods. Dicey had his successors, and his views can still be discerned in some of the
more interventionist judgments that emanate from the courts. The contributions of
Willis and others similarly continue to reverberate throughout the administrative
law world, as do those who have swung the pendulum back towards a more rightsbased orientation.
4.2.4 Discretion and Canadian law in three parts: Roncarelli, Nicholson and
Baker
While it is well beyond the scope or ambition of this chapter to trace Canadian
jurisprudential history on discretion in administrative law, it is important to provide
a brief sense of this history to both elaborate on the relationship between discretion
and law and to outline the role of the courts in creating the conditions for a
dialogical approach to administrative decision-making.

Roncarelli v. Duplessis24
A decade before the publication of Davis’ Discretionary Justice, the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Roncarelli v. Duplessis marked a shift, if not a sea

The most notable perhaps being that of D.J. Galligan, see Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of
Official Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) [Galligan, Discretionary Powers] at 110.
24 [1959] S.C.R. 121 [Roncarelli].
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change, between the previous era of “untrammeled” administrative discretion and
an emerging focus on individual rights and judicial oversight. While there remains
debate as to the degree to which discretion has become “trammeled” in the postRoncarelli era, it is certainly clear that the Court’s decision marked an important
development.25
The case involved a decision by then-Quebec premier Maurice Duplessis to
revoke the liquor licence of Frank Roncarelli for reasons related to his faith as a
Jehovah’s Witness and, more specifically, because Roncarelli frequently provided
bail for fellow members of his faith who were being arrested for handing out
Jehovah’s Witness literature, a practice which irked the local city prosecutor. 26 The
liquor licence revocation eventually caused Roncarelli to close down his restaurant
and he sued for damages. He prevailed at trial, but that decision was overturned on
appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench.
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada reinstated the trial decision,
concluding that Duplessis had wrongfully caused the revocation of Roncarelli's
liquor licence and increased the damages owing to him. While three separate set of
reasons were provided by the majority, it is really only the decision of one judge –
Justice Rand – whose reasons called into question the conception of discretionary
power as constituting an area of non-justiciable executive prerogative.
Justice Rand notably pointed out that, even where broad statutory discretion is
conferred on government officials, their decisions must nevertheless conform to the
statutory purpose that gives rise to their authority. No legislative act, Justice Rand
continued, can “be taken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable

See for example Lorne Sossin, “The Unfinished Project of Roncarelli v. Duplessis: Justiciability,
Discretion, and the Limits of the Rule of Law” (2010) 55 McGill L J 662.
26 Of interest, the arrests were carried out under a local ordinance which, after the licence
cancellation, but before the Supreme Court’s decision in Roncarelli, was declared unconstitutional –
see Saumar v The City of Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299.
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for any purpose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or
purpose of the statute.”27 Therefore even where seemingly unfettered discretion is
conferred upon state officials, there is always an implied limit on its exercise, a limit
that is demarcated by the purpose of the statutory framework involved and by the
interests of individuals subject to that framework.28 Discretion, to put it differently,
“necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty.”29
The limits on discretionary power, Justice Rand concluded, were disregarded in
the revocation of Roncarelli’s liquor licence for reasons “totally irrelevant” to the
sale of liquor, but rather because of unrelated activities – those related to his
religion – that he had an absolute right to engage in.
Justice Rand’s effort to define the outer limits of discretionary power, together
with his emphasis on good faith decision-making in matters affecting individual
rights did not instantly transform administrative law, but they did represent a first
crack in the wall that had previously sealed off discretionary decision-making from
judicial oversight.

The jurisprudence that followed Roncarelli remained largely

deferential of discretionary decisions but the shift in judicial orientation was
notable – it was no longer to be assumed that discretionary power was a lawless
space, entirely immune from the judiciary. At the very least, the courts began to ask
tentative questions about whether obligations related to fair procedures, if not
substantive outcomes, had been met in the discretionary domain.

Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police30

Roncarelli, supra note 24 at 140.
Ibid at 141.
29 Ibid.
30 [1979] S.C.R. 311 [Nicholson].
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This distinction between process and substance has preoccupied legal scholars,
if not always the courts, for decades, particularly in the wake of the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Baker, discussed at greater length below. Years prior to
Baker, however, the Supreme Court first determined in Nicholson v. HaldimandNorfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police that the fulcrum on which
procedural obligations rest is not a rigid classification of the decision-making setting
(i.e. judicial, quasi-judicial or discretionary) but is determined, rather, by the rights
at stake.
Nicholson was a police officer who, after 15 months of employment for the
county of Haldimand, was terminated without an opportunity to be heard and
without any reason given. The employer claimed that as Nicholson was still within
an 18 month probationary period created by the Ontario Police Act, he was
essentially an office holder “at pleasure” and his termination disclosed no grounds
for review. Nicholson argued that he had a common law right to be treated fairly
and be notified of the reasons for his termination. A majority of the Supreme Court
ultimately agreed, finding that the proliferation of administrative action into
virtually every area of life meant that the simple classification of a decision as being
discretionary was no longer sufficient in determining whether the common law duty
to act fairly arose. Rather, the consequences of the administrative action for the
individual subject to such action were to be considered in determining the content
of the duty of fairness in a given setting:
What rightly lies behind this emergence is the
realization that the classification of statutory functions
as judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative is often very
difficult, to say the least; and to endow some with
procedural protection while denying others any at all
would work injustice when the results of statutory
decisions raise the same serious consequences for those
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adversely affected, regardless of the classification of the
function in question…31
As Cartier rightly notes, the effect of the court’s decision in Nicholson was to
continue the process, started in Roncarelli, of softening the judicial interpretation of
discretion from that of a pure top-down expression of state power to a process that
includes and must take into consideration the interests of those affected by such
decisions.32 And as many scholars have further pointed out, this process of centring
individual interests in discretionary decision-making reached its apex in Baker, a
decision to which I now turn.

Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 33
The decision of Justice Claire L’Heureux Dubé in Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) was seminal for a variety of reasons and it marked an
important evolutionary moment in both the characterization and the content of
public law in Canada. The decision is multifaceted, but here I focus on the way in
which it profoundly called into question distinctions that had previously been
assumed – distinctions between law and discretion and between procedure and
substance.34

Breaking down these distinctions carries with it the potential to

reformulate administrative law by recognizing that discretionary decisions are
more than mere exercises of executive power and by affirming that the interests of
those subject to administrative decisions matter, while simultaneously recognizing
the imperatives of the administrative state. Cartier describes this as the potential to
reconceive discretion as a process of dialogue rather than an exercise in top-down

Ibid at 325, citing, Mullan, Fairness: The New Natural Justice (1975), 25 Univ of Tor LJ 281.
Genevieve Cartier, supra note 6 at 642.
33 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker].
34 Ibid at para. 54 and see generally, David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the
Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v Canada” (2001) 51 Univ Tor Law J 193 [Dyzenhaus & FoxDecent, “Rethinking"].
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exertions of state power. And it is precisely a reconception along these lines that I
contend below should also emerge in the immigration-security setting.
The facts in Baker have been recounted dozens of times, and so I restate them
here only briefly. Mavis Baker was a Jamaican citizen who had resided in Canada for
several years and who had four Canadian-born children. She herself had no legal
status in Canada and was eventually ordered deported.

In order to avoid

deportation, she submitted an application for permanent residence on humanitarian
and compassionate (H&C) grounds. The application was refused and Ms. Baker
challenged the refusal, arguing, amongst other things, that the refusal was unlawful
because the immigration officer had failed to adequately consider the best interests
of her children.
In the decision of the majority in Baker, Justice L’Heureux Dubé characterized
discretion in the following terms:
[T]he concept of discretion refers to decisions where
the law does not dictate a specific outcome, or where
the decision-maker is given a choice of options within a
statutorily imposed set of boundaries.35
Justice L’Heureux Dube noted that, to that point, courts tended to hold a
“dualistic” view of administrative decision-making; that is, there was a distinction, a
dualism, between jurisdictional issues (over which the courts presided) and nonjurisdictional issues such as policy-making and discretionary decision-making (over
which government tribunals held expertise). Baker appeared to fundamentally
question this dualism by concluding that virtually all decisions contain within them
a measure of discretion and to this extent, the courts had to determine the

35

Baker, supra note 33 at para 52.
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appropriate level of scrutiny they should apply in reviewing substantive aspects of
discretionary decisions.36
The questioning of the law-discretion distinction was a profound change, most
notably because it cleared the path to a substantive review of discretionary
decisions based on the reasonableness standard. Thus notwithstanding the “choice
of options” granted to decision-makers, and the deference that will be afforded the
choices made, discretionary decisions could be reviewed for their substantive
reasonableness, based on several factors:
However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner
that is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin
of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in
accordance with the principles of the rule of law…in line
with general principles of administrative law governing
the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms…37
To the court in Baker, judicial review is not limited to merely defining the legal
limits of discretion, but much more fundamentally, it may delve directly into the
decision to determine its reasonableness. And reasonableness in this context means
that discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the
statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the
fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter. This is
perhaps the most important insight of the Baker decision – the insight that
Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent refer to as the “principle of legality.” That is, the idea
that “legal principles, of which the duty of fairness is an important example, control
the spaces in which both the judgment of administrative tribunals and the exercise
of discretion take place.”38

A determination that they should make through what was then termed the “pragmatic and
functional” approach: Baker, supra note 33 at para 55.
37 Ibid, at para. 53, citations omitted.
38 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent, Rethinking, supra note 34 at 218.
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In then assessing, substantively of course, whether or not the officer’s decision
to refuse Baker’s application was reasonable, Justice L’Heureux Dubé looked at
whether or not it adhered to the values underlying the grant of discretion. The
grant of discretion was, in this case, inseparable from the humanitarian and
compassionate nature of the application, and required as such, that officers
approach the matter in a humanitarian and compassionate manner. The values
underlying the grant of discretion were also found to lie in general statements found
within the Immigration Act, in international law and in soft law Ministerial
Guidelines meant to assist officers in their discretionary deliberations. In taking
these factors into consideration, Justice L’Heureux Dubé concluded that the officer’s
decision was inconsistent with the values underlying the grant of discretion
primarily because the officer failed to give sufficient consideration and weight to the
best interests of Baker’s children.39
The Baker decision has had a profound impact, not necessarily on H&C
application outcomes, but on the manner in which immigration officers are expected
to exercise their discretion (particularly in cases involving the interests of children)
and on the openness of lower courts to consider whether officers have meaningfully
engaged with the evidence put before them. The willingness of the court in Baker to
peer into the substantive reasonableness of the immigration officer’s decision
carved out a dialogical space between applicant and decision-maker that does not
dictate outcomes, but does frame the process in a way that gives voice to the
perspective of H&C applicants. As we shall see in the coming pages, however, the
Baker decision represents a clear high water mark in the court’s willingness to
engage substantively in administrative decisions and has come to sit in sharp
contrast to the court’s approach to cases involving migration and security. Before

39 The court also found that the comments of one of the officers involved in the case gave rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias, which itself warranted granting the appeal.
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exploring this issue, however, I delve a little more deeply into a central issue at play
in the Baker decision – that is, the precise nature of the relationship between law
and discretion.

Debunking the Law-Discretion Binary
As can be seen from the above, in the evolution of the administrative state,
discretion and law have frequently been cast as dramatic foils, the presence of one
signifying the absence of the other. As I further alluded to above, this dynamic finds
its origin in the move toward modern governance in which constraining state power
by law was viewed, for better or worse, as the antidote to the discretionary whims
of the sovereign. While this idea of the discretion-law dichotomy has taken on a
modern form under liberal democracies, it has been around since antiquity, for as
Aristotle noted,
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign;
and personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single
person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only
in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the
difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies,
to make an exact pronouncement.40
The most cited contemporary articulation of this view is that of Dworkin, who
described discretion as being like the hole in a doughnut, as something that does not
exist, in other words, “except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of
restriction.”41 Traditional debates about discretion, such as those outlined above,
start from Dworkin’s assumption – that there is a negative correlation between law
and discretion – but disagree on the question of whether, on this understanding,
discretion is a good thing.

40
41

Aristotle, E. Barker (trans), The Politics, book III, (New York: Oxford UP, 1998) at 112.
R. Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1977), at 31.
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In recent years, several scholars, mostly from the social sciences, have
reformulated the law/discretion binary, suggesting that the concepts exist not in
opposition to each other, but as parallel expressions of government power. Seen in
this light, the existence of discretion is not merely a “residual category of law,” but is
rather an essential component of liberal governance that may either ameliorate or
exacerbate law’s exclusionary tendencies, depending on the circumstances of the
particular case.42
Discretion, to such scholars, is both ubiquitous and inevitable and is best
understood not as a threat to the rule of law, but as a central process by which legal
abstraction is translated into concrete reality by legal actors.43 This interpretive
exercise is inevitable because of the indeterminacy of language, the infinite variety
of circumstances in which law must operate and the (sometimes intentional)
ambiguity of legislative intent.44 In this context, the primary contribution of the
social sciences has been to point out that the exercise of discretion is influenced by a
range of factors outside the law itself. This is not to suggest that law is irrelevant; it
will generally impose a Dworkinian-like framework upon discretionary decisions,
but within that superstructure, social and organizational factors often play a far
more immediate and meaningful role in influencing discretionary decisions.45
Rather than the hole in the doughnut, consider for a moment another analogy.
Imagine the lives of two ants living inside a matchbox and the extent to which their

42 See generally, Anna Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada, (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2005) [Pratt, Securing Borders] at 57.
43 Keith Hawkins, “The Uses of Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science” in Hawkins, The
Uses of Discretion, supra note 2 at 11.
44 Galligan, Discretionary Powers, supra note 23 at 1.
45 This would include various soft law instruments – bureaucratic guidelines, policies and the like –
but would certainly not be limited to them. It would also include any number of larger sociological
norms: on the influence of soft law, see Lorne Sossin & Charles Smith, “Hard Choices and Soft Law:
Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating Government” (2003) 40
Alberta Law Review 867. On other factors see for example MP Baumgartner, “The Myth of
Discretion” in Hawkins, The Uses of Discretion, supra note 2 [Baumgartner, The Myth of Discretion]
at 129 (on discretion and discrimination) and Richard Lempert, “Discretion in a Behavioural
Perspective: The Case of a Public Housing Eviction Board” supra note 2 (on discretion and
behavioural factors).
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lives are constrained, determined and influenced by the four walls of that box. Now
move those ants into a football stadium and consider the role that the stadium plays
in their lives. To be sure it encloses them and frames, in some very general way, the
outer parameters of their experience, but for such ants, a panoply of other factors
will become far more relevant to their existence. This is one observation of recent
scholarship; law provides some outer scope of meaning, but for many decisionmakers and for the individuals subject to discretionary decisions, other factors are
far more immediate.
The suggestion that a variety of non-legal factors is central to discretionary
decision-making is not, however, to suggest that such decisions are arbitrary. In
fact, social scientists frequently argue the opposite; that discretionary decisionmaking is highly predictable, but not by recourse to legal doctrine. Discretion is not,
from this perspective, an amorphous zone of unpredictable administrative action
but is rather a domain of social organizing as amenable to scrutiny as any other.46
Indeed, the “social context” of administrative matters – influenced by various factors
including the patterned forms of behaviour and social backgrounds of decisionmakers and the perceived “respectability” and social status of the parties – often
provides a very clear picture of why discretionary decisions are made.47
Baumgartner goes on to explain the implications of this view of discretion:
All of this requires not only a new conception of
discretion, but also a new appreciation of its
consequences.
The traditional view that saw
discretionary decision-making as a very personal,
situational, and idiosyncratic affair implied an image of
random judgment in which the fate of all citizens alike
hinged on largely unknowable factors. Uncertainty of
outcomes fell equitably across the citizenry some
people – perhaps many people – might end up being

Geneviève Bouchard & Barbara Wake Carroll, “Policy-making and administrative discretion: The
case of immigration in Canada” (2002) 45 Canadian Public Administration 239.
47 Baumgartner, The Myth of Discretion, supra note 45 at 130-1.
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treated more favorably than stipulated by the written
law, but for reasons of chance, emotion, or caprice that
no one could take for granted and that might as well
have worked against them or on behalf of someone else.
The sociological reality of discretion reveals something
quite different. How individuals fare in the legal system
turns out not to be mysterious, and, what is more, not
random. People enter the legal process with very
different prospects, depending upon their own social
characteristics as well as those of their opponents,
supporters, and the officials who deal with them.
Officials may answer to the dictates of their conscience,
but their conscience consistently comes to different
conclusions depending on the social circumstances of
the case. Left to their own devices, agents of the law
routinely favor some sorts of people over others.
Discretion, in practice, amounts to what is commonly
known as discrimination.48
In the context of immigration enforcement, Pratt comes to much the same
conclusion, albeit from a distinct theoretical perspective, calling out the fallacy of
the autonomous, free-thinking decision-maker and illustrating how discretionary
power “facilitates the translation of shifting societal anxieties and priorities into
exclusionary immigration law and policy.” 49 In arriving at this conclusion, Pratt
traces the unseemly history of decision-making concerning archetypal ‘undesirable
immigrants’ from previous preoccupations over race, religion and morality to
contemporary fixations on criminality and security.50

Also, with the shift in

decision-making authority to border security agencies, it seems clear that the

Ibid at 157.
Anna Pratt, “Dunking the Doughnut: Discretionary Power, Law and the Administration of the
Canadian Immigration Act” (1999) 8:2 Social and Legal Studies 199 at 200.
50 Pratt, Securing Borders, supra note 42 73-91. Pratt further suggests that in recent years, the
concept of national security has considerably expanded, encapsulating concerns over certain forms
of criminality and organized criminality to form a ‘crime-security’ nexus that significantly blurs the
lines between criminal justice and immigration. See “Wanted by the CBSA” in Deborah Brock, et al
(eds) Criminalization, Representation, Regulation: Thinking Differently About Crime (Toronto: UofT
Press, 2014) and "Immigration Penality and the Crime-Security Nexus: The Case of Tran Trong Nghi
Nguyen" in Karim Ismaili, et al (eds), Canadian Criminal Justice Policy: A Contemporary Reader
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012).
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decisions they make are not merely a translation of social concerns about security,
terrorism and risk, but a reflection of a metastasized and, in many cases, distorted
version of them.
But to suggest that administrative discretion frequently acts as a conduit for the
expression of social prejudices is not, at least for many social scientists, to call for
more law.

On the contrary, the understanding of law and discretion as

complementary components in an overarching regulatory scheme suggests that the
layering on of more law would not alter its fundamental nature.

Criticism of

particular forms of discretion should also not be understood as criticism of its
essential quality because, to many, it does not have an essential quality, at least not
in the normative sense. To borrow Willis’ colourful metaphor, it is not just the rule
of law, but also administrative discretion that is a ‘slippery eel’, a shapeshifter,
capable of both jealously protecting executive control and dispensing individual
justice, frequently at the same time. Within Canadian immigration law one can
readily see both forms of discretion in action – the Minister always possesses
discretion to exempt individuals from the hard application of the IRPA on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds where such application would result in
unusual hardship.51 Elsewhere, the IRPA provides the Minister with extraordinarily
broad discretion to restrict the rights of asylum seekers by designating their arrival
as “irregular”.52 Within the same legislation we see the two faces of discretion in
action – discretion as a quality of mercy and as a repository of executive authority.
Both forms of discretion, however, reinforce the notion that the power to decide
resides with the sovereign, which in turn leads to the observation that law and

IRPA, s 25(1). As I note in the pages that follow, however, this discretion in the specific context of
the IRPA’s security provisions was recently circumscribed by the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals
Act, SC 2013, c 16 [FRFCA], s 9.
52 IRPA, s 20.1.
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discretion are not truly oppositional, but “mutually constitutive” pieces to the puzzle
of state power.53
The ubiquity of discretion in the modern state, together with a recognition of its
normative neutrality have lead many scholars to avoid sweeping claims about how
and when it should be deployed, but to seek instead to understand it in the
particular contexts in which it is wielded. As Pratt further explains:
To view discretion as a form of power promises to
provide a way out of the dichotomous impasse imposed
by the law/discretion binary. This view encourages
different questions about discretion. Rather than asking
why it is used, how it can be eliminated, curtailed or
expanded, made more fair or just, the guiding question
becomes how does this power work in specific empirical
contexts? What are its practical purposes and effects?
What are the historically specific discourses that inflect
and justify its use? What social, political, legal, and
economic preoccupations and processes influence its
operations? What organizational and institutional
networks, channels, and techniques are at play?54
In other words, the challenge posed by recent scholarship on discretion is not to
eliminate it, as Dicey would have done, and nor is it to eliminate law’s encroachment
on administration, as Willis would have had it, but to examine, closely and with
nuance, the expressions of discretion in particular circumstances. Going beyond
this, Handler calls not only for administrative action to be examined in context, but
for it to be thought about creatively and with an awareness that there is a moral
dimension to discretion – namely, as I have previously described, that those who are

Pratt, Securing Borders, supra note 42 at 57, citing Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law,
(London & New York: Routledge, 1992).
54 Pratt, Securing Borders, supra note 42 at 72.
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subject to decisions have a moral right to participate in them, if not dictate their
results.55
In the pages that follow, I take up Pratt and Handler’s challenge to think about
discretion in context, creatively and from a dialogical perspective and consider the
possibilities and implications of dialogical approaches in the top-down world of
immigration-security decision-making. In doing so, I readily acknowledge many of
the claims that I have superficially outlined above concerning the law-discretion
dichotomy.

Such claims have profoundly amplified the conversation about

administrative action but they do not, to me, suggest that law has no role to play. In
the following sections, I examine the extent to which law can help to carve out the
conditions in which a new and more positive conception of discretion may take root.

Discretion, democracy and communication: Discretion as dialogue

As noted above, the traditional debates over discretion have tended to be
preoccupied with its relationship to law and, more specifically, with the extent to
which legal standards should constrain its exercise. As Pratt and Sossin point out,
this process of narrowing the scope of discretion has given rise to a wave of
scholarship on discretion as a mechanism for dialogue, democratization, and the
enhancement of human dignity.56 These contributions have come both from legal
scholars and from social scientists, who have in recent years paid increased
attention to the place of discretion within public policy. In the words of Cartier, new
approaches to discretion tend to emphasize a “bottom up” analysis, starting from

Joel F Handler, “Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic
Community” (1987) 35 UCLA Law Rev 999 [Handler, Dependent People] at 1076 and Joel Handler,
“Discretion: Power, Quiescence, and Trust” [Handler, Power, Quiescence, and Trust] in Hawkins, The
Uses of Discretion, supra note 2 at 334.
56 Pratt and Sossin, A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion, supra, note 3 at 303.
55
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the individual affected by decision-making and moving out from there.

This

approach, Cartier observes, was essentially set in motion by the concern expressed
by Justice Rand in Roncarelli for the perspective of the individual.57
According to Cartier, the Baker understanding of the rule of law in discretionary
decision-making further paved the way for a substantive understanding of
administrative law, based on what she terms “discretion as dialogue.”58 This term is
derived in no small measure from the work of Sossin and Handler, who also call for
a conception of administrative discretion based on good faith processes of
communication between decision-makers and those affected by the decisions. In
developing their theories on discretion, these authors in turn look to principles of
democratic governance, cooperative procedure and communicative action to
undertake the ambitious project of “transforming citizenry from the object to the
subject of government…”59
While calls for injecting administrative discretion with communicative processes
are not entirely new, they have not generally prevailed, in part Sossin argues,
because of the commonly made distinction between politics and discretion. In the
political realm, dialogue is associated with democracy and is consequently expected.
In the bureaucratic realm, which is, at least in theory, simply an ‘in the trenches’
actualization of political will, there is no such association, and dialogue is frequently
viewed with suspicion. Sossin notes
That administrators do or should act out of a sincere
belief in what is good and just, and that such a belief
should be developed out of dialogue with groups

Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6 at 639.
Genevieve Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6; see also Genevieve Cartier, “Reconceiving
Discretion: From Discretion as Power to Discretion as Dialogue”, PhD Dissertation, University of
Toronto, 2004 [Cartier Dissertation].
59 L. Sossin "The Politics of Discretion: Toward a Critical Theory of Public Administration" (1993) 36
Can. Pub. Admin. 364 [Sossin, Politics of Discretion] at 365; J.F. Handler, The Conditions of DiscretionAutonomy, Community, Bureaucracy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986).
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affected by those actions, rarely has played a role in
these analyses.60
For Sossin, the key to providing a normative justification for bureaucratic
decision-making comes from questioning the distinction between administration
and politics. On this view, the relationship between law and discretion is not merely
a “particular form of authority” but is rather a “potential forum for politics.”61
As noted, in Cartier’s view, discretion as dialogue calls for a “bottom-up”
approach to discretionary decision-making, rather than traditional approaches
which view discretion from the top-down, as “one way projections of state
authority.”

In her 2004 PhD dissertation, Cartier set out her view of dialogic

discretion as follows:
The central argument of my thesis is that administrative
discretion must be approached from a bottom-up
perspective and conceived as a "dialogue" between the
individual affected by the decision and the public
authority making that decision.
This notion of
"discretion as dialogue" is different from what I term
"discretion as power", that is, discretion exercised from
a top-down perspective or as a "one-way projection of
authority" where discretionary powers were seen as
"direct descendants of what were once considered to be
unreviewable or unjusticiable executive prerogatives…”
The "dialogue" that is implied in my conception of
discretion is not just procedural fairness. Procedural
fairness creates spaces, venues for communication,
while dialogue relates to the content of that
communication. Dialogue consists of a meaningful
exchange between the decision maker endowed with
discretionary powers and the individual affected by the
decision.
Meaningful exchange requires that
participants to the dialogue have the ability to put

Sossin, Politics of Discretion, ibid at 377.
Lorne Sossin, “Redistributing Democracy: An Inquiry into Authority, Discretion and the Possibility
of Engagement in the Welfare State” (1994) 26 Ott Law Rev 1 [Sossin, Redistributing Democracy].
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themselves in the shoes of the other participants, to
understand their perspective and to contribute to the
making of a decision that is both responsive to the
substance of the exchange and in line with legislative
intent and public interest. Therefore, to view discretion
as a dialogue requires that discretion be both exercised
at the close of a meaningful and authentic
communication between the parties involved, and
justified in the light of the content of that
communication. Stated differently, the discretionary
decision is justified if it is a genuine reflection of the
dialogue that took place. Dialogue is not merely
explanatory: it affects the outcome in that it conditions
the justification of the decision. It does not always or
even often guarantee any particular outcome, but
guarantees a justified outcome.62
As mentioned, Cartier’s call for a view of discretion based on dialogue borrows
from, and has much in common with Sossin’s conception of communicative
discretionary decision-making; the one real distinction, she asserts, is that she
would apply her approach to all discretionary decision-making, rather than to the
narrower subset of decisions contemplated by Sossin involving vulnerable
individuals.63
Rather than focusing on the strictly legal project of confining and controlling
bureaucratic discretion (a project that has only achieved a modicum of success in
improving the situation of the disempowered), Sossin argues that it is necessary to
“seek new ways of legitimating bureaucracy as an independent political
institution.”64 The way to do this, Sossin asserts, is through a process of engagement
imbued with dialogue between those who make decisions and those who are
affected by them. Sossin grafts Habermas’ theory of communicative action onto the

Cartier Dissertation, supra note 58 at 9.
Cartier Dissertation, supra note 58 at 312. While Sossin clearly focuses on developing a theory of
discretion that takes into account the vulnerable, it would appear less clear that he would limit his
call for legitimating discretionary decision-making to situations involving vulnerable persons.
64 Sossin, The Politics of Discretion, supra note 59 at 365.
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administrative sphere in order to address a deficit of legitimacy that the
administrative realm has always confronted in relation to both the judiciary and
representative officials.65 Referring to Habermas, Sossin suggests that legitimacy
arises “in earnest” only from practical discourse and not merely from public
acquiescence.66
Sossin further argues that a discursive conception of administrative law based
on mutual engagement is meant not only to create spaces for dialogue, but also to
create a situation of interdependence between decision-makers and those affected
by discretionary decisions.67 It is, Sossin continues, only through such a process of
engagement that a truly democratic form of administrative discretion can be
salvaged. He states:
What I term the "theory of engagement" focuses legal
and political discourse on the content of discretion
rather than its jurisdictional boundaries, in the hope of
fostering a discursive space for reflecting on the nature,
scope and purposes of administrative judgments. To the
degree that this would enmesh a more diverse set of
interests in the administrative process, and a principle
of interdependence and mutuality in administrative
relations, I believe it would counter the alienation
which has become synonymous with how we think of
"bureaucracy" in the welfare state.68
The need for such discourse is based at least in part on the notion that the
legitimacy of democratic administration rests with its ability to empower people “to
be persuasive, and have equal access to the resources needed to convey
argument.”69

I do not suggest here that the democratic obligation to confer

discursive tools exists at large, but rather, that it arises in the sense contemplated by

Ibid, at 382-383.
Ibid, at 382
67 Sossin, Redistributing Democracy supra note 61 at 4.
68 Ibid.
69 Sossin, The Politics of Discretion, supra note 59, at 379.
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scholars such as Benhabib and Abizadeh, when and on whom the state aims to
exercise its coercive power.70 This is particularly clear in the cases of Convention
refugees and individuals seeking refugee protection who, at least potentially,
possess rights against removal. In these circumstances, I assert that the legitimacy
of democratic administration does require discursive and participatory approaches.
To Handler, facilitating this ‘power to be persuasive’ is the central feature in
overcoming the failure of adversarial approaches in addressing the needs of the
powerless. He notes:
Discretion contemplates a conversation within a
normative framework, but dependent people – the poor,
minorities, the uneducated, and unsophisticated – are
often at a serious disadvantage.
They lack the
information, the skills, and the power to persuade. The
official has the unfair advantage.71
To Handler, then, it is not merely dialogue that is required, but dialogue within a
certain context; that is, a cooperative context free of the strictures of the liberal
adversarial model. Handler, like Sossin, speaks to the importance of fostering an
interdependent approach to discretionary decision-making, an approach that
cannot arise in an adversarial system fixated with procedural over substantive
fairness concerns. He notes:
These limitations should not be surprising. Lawyers
especially put too much faith in the relevance and
durability of process, but process is always molded by
substantive events…The task is to discover the
conditions which will facilitate the creation and
nurturing of empowerment in discretionary dependent

See Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (West Nyack NY: Cambridge
UP, 2000) at 47-48 and Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to
Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders” (2008) 36 Political Theory 37, both discussed in Chapter
One, notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
71 J. Handler, Power, Quiescence, and Trust, supra note 55 at 333.
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relationships, not to search for some magical procedural
formula.72
Handler and Sossin also argue for the need to move beyond the idea of the
administrative decision-maker as an almost infallible source of technical expertise.
Indeed, to Sossin (again channeling Habermas) the predominance of the
technocratic decision-maker whose decisions are based solely on a detached view of
instrumental reason is in large measure responsible for the disengagement of
individuals from the public sphere. Instead, Sossin calls for a different approach, an
approach based on dialogue and “communicative rationality” to create the
conditions for “intersubjectivity.” And it is through such an approach, the argument
continues, that individuals subject to administrative discretion become, in a sense,
the subjects of democratic discourse, rather than mere “objects to be
administered.”73
The objectification of those subject to administrative decisions is also of concern
to Cartier, who sees top-down expressions of discretion as having created a
significant legitimacy gap in administrative law. This gap can only be bridged, she
suggests, by recognizing that grants of discretion must be consistent not only with the
specific expression of legislative intent that creates them, but also with the core
democratic values that undergird the broader legal system.

Viewed from this

perspective, discretionary decisions can only make a claim on legitimacy if they are
made at the end of a process of meaningful engagement with the persons affected by
those decisions.

This idea of discretionary decision-making as a location for the

expression of democratic values is important because of the breadth and
importance of administrative law in modern democracies and because access points
for democratic participation in decision-making are extremely limited. Injecting
democratic values into discretionary decision-making would therefore bring
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democratic legitimacy to such decisions. In this sense, it would also turn the
traditional Diceyan view of discretion entirely on its head, transforming it from a
threat to democratic principles into a process that actively improves the democratic
nature of administrative decision making.74
Despite what appear to be the profound changes proposed by Handler, Sossin
and Cartier in the way administrative discretion is conceived, none of these
commentators suggest that discretion should be eliminated or that it should be
entirely detached from law. First, both Handler and Sossin point to the abovediscussed ubiquity of discretion and recognize that its existence is not, in itself, a
normative issue. The goal is not to eliminate discretion, but, as Cartier notes, is
rather to reconceive of it as a potential tool to help achieve the goals of a very
particular legal order – one that “enhances the autonomy, dignity, and responsibility
of the participants.”75
This project of reconceiving discretion as a location for democratic engagement
preserves an important role for law, recognizing that it can help to create the
conditions for dialogue to flourish, even if it cannot bring it about on its own. Put
differently, I do not take it as the position of those who advocate a dialogical
approach to administrative discretion that we return to the pre-Roncarelli era of
unchecked administrative power. Nor do they argue against the use of law to clearly
define, and narrow, the scope of discretion in particular contexts. They do not, in
other words, celebrate the existence of discretion per se, but argue that where it
exists, and it will always exist, it ought to be wielded in a particular way, respectful
of basic values of democratic accountability and justification. This then brings us
back around to the role of law and the courts, which have increasingly in the years

Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6 at 652.
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since Baker understood their role in reviewing administrative decisions as one that
searches for justification. Indeed, in the years since the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir, the very definition of a reasonable decision
has come to mean one that is justified, transparent and intelligible.76 A reasonable
decision, Cartier suggests, is not simply one that is bounded by the law, but is also
one that is justified because it arises from a genuine process of participation.77 In
this way, hinging discretion to dialogue can serve to fill the spaces left open by law
with deliberative democratic principles. Law and legal rights on this view do not
end conversations related to public decisions, they begin them.
If law can help to encourage a dialogical approach to discretion but is not on its
own sufficient, the question is what more is needed to bring this approach about.
The answer, in short, is the reform, and in some cases the transformation, of public
service agencies. Again building on Habermas, Handler calls for legal institutions in
the welfare state to alter their self-image from ones based on legal abstraction and
the perception of individuals as objects to be legally administered, to bodies that
facilitate communicative action to accomplish particular goals.78 This can only
happen, Handler continues, through both will and trust, not simply on the part of
administrative agencies, but also on the part of those subject to their decisions. The
“foundational condition of dialogism,” Handler notes, “lies in the predisposition of
the parties-they must want to and be able to enter into a conversation.”79
Grounding Handler’s analysis are three separate case-studies – informed consent in
medical ethics, special education, and community care for the elderly poor – in
which he views dialogical approaches as having taken root. This said, Handler
readily accepts that this dialogical approach has not typically defined administrative
agencies, particularly in contexts involving power imbalances between the parties.

Dunsmuir v New Brunswick (Board of Management) 2008 SCC 9 at para 47.
Genevieve Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6 at 652-3.
78 Handler, Dependent People, supra note 55 at 1045.
79 Ibid at 1093.
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He also recognizes the role that ideology plays in social relations and that a
“monologue by the powerful to the powerless” has typified administrative action far
more than any principle of dialogue.80
Nonetheless, Handler implicitly questions the historical determinism of critical
legal studies and the nihilistic conclusions it tends to draw. Drawing from a widerange of sources and from various disciplines, he instead puts forward a conception
of administrative relations based on communitarian feminist values with the ideals
of trust and good will at its very centre. With dialogism as a “regulative ideal,”81
Handler then considers how it could become embedded in public institutions. In
this, he sees a role for law, as noted above, but focuses on the role of professional
norms and “practice ideologies.”82 These ideologies arise, in some measure, because
of the latitude provided to administrative agencies to determine how, and in many
circumstances, upon whom, to do their work. The choices made by these agencies,
or in Hasenfeld’s words, the “technologies” they choose to employ, are of
fundamental importance in determining how the organization will operate and
interact with its clients. The choices are, furthermore, frequently moral ones – in
Handler’s words:
Clients are vested with moral and cultural values that
define their status vis-a-vis the agency. Personal
characteristics are not only "objective"; they are also
statements about social and moral status. The
organization's pattern of intervention is crucially
shaped by the staff's moral evaluation of the client.
…The moral system incorporated in the technology
encompasses, either explicitly or implicitly, a
conception of human nature that provides the moral
justification for the agency…

Ibid at 1074-5, citing Terry Eagleton’s critique of hermeneutics in Literary Theory: An Introduction
(Minneapolis, Univ of Minnesota Press, 1983) at 73.
81 A term he borrows from Richard Bernstein in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science,
Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983) at 163.
82 Another borrowed term, this from Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Human Service Organizations (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983) at 118-119.
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…At the same time, the technology of human service
organizations is indeterminate. This indeterminacy
places human service organization practitioners in a
dilemma – they have to respond to people and meet
their needs. Even though the available technologies are
uncertain, they have to develop a coherent set of beliefs
upon which to base their actions. They respond to these
dilemmas, says Hasenfeld, by adopting "practice
ideologies.”83
Handler then goes on to examine how the pre-conditions for dialogue – good will
and trust – can be fostered, suggesting key and interrelated areas in need of reform:
professional norms, client empowerment and fostering a positive approach toward
discretion.84 The first area is easily described, if less easily accomplished: dialogism
must become a central tenet of the professional norms and ideologies that guide
agencies’ front line work.85 Handler recognizes that in his case-studies, dialogism
was consistent with professional norms, and that this will certainly not always be
the case. To illustrate that collaborative administrative norms can prevail, he then
moves on to a somewhat surprising source: historical scholarship on American
social welfare agencies from the New Deal era.86

The professional norms that

emerged from these agencies embraced interdependence, dialogue and recourse to
legal rights, not for their own sake, but as a means to facilitate conversation.87
Handler goes on to note that “the enforcement of rights helped people to define and
effectuate their goals and to foster a general sense of self-respect and autonomy. Clients
were to be made to feel comfortable and treated with respect. They were presumed to be

Handler, Dependant People supra note 55 at 1053-4, citing Yeheskel Hasenfeld, ibid at 118-119.
Handler, Dependant People supra note 55 at 1094-1113.
85 Ibid at 1094.
86 More specifically, to the work of William Simon, see “Legality, Bureaucracy, and the Class in the
Welfare System” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 1198; “The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights” (1985)
44 Maryland L Rev 1 and “Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System” (1986) 38 Stan L Rev
1431.
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eligible.”88 As we shall see below, this presumption of eligibility is highly relevant to the
determination of status in immigration and refugee law.
Sossin also discusses the importance of professional norms – in his terms “civil
service values” – and their ability to elaborate on, rather than simply implement
important legal norms.89

Central to Sossin’s approach is the fundamentally

important premise that civil servants owe duties beyond those owed to the
government of the day, but also ultimately to the public.90 In this sense, Sossin
continues,
while administrative decision makers take on their
authority through statutory provisions, civil service
values may extend beyond the content and purpose of
particular decision making powers - these can be
expressed as simply as that all civil servants have a
mandate to 'act in the public interest' and to 'uphold the
rule of law.'91
The primary mechanism by which administration is able to comply with this
larger conception of its duties is through the civil service value of neutrality. Sossin
then goes on to demonstrate how this value of neutrality can itself lead to the
elaboration of legal norms such as independence, fairness, and trust. 92 Of interest
for our purposes, Sossin examines this interplay between law and administration in
the context of humanitarian decision-making under immigration legislation.
Elsewhere, Sossin has explicitly criticized the formalist legal frameworks imposed in
this same decision-making context as thwarting an approach that would foster
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Sossin, Neutrality to Compassion, supra note 1.
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“intimate” or genuinely communicative relationships.93 Once again, the language of
law, rights and judicial review are not entirely rejected, but Sossin points once more
to the obligations of the civil service to the public, and particularly to the vulnerable,
as providing a potentially more fruitful approach to realizing meaningful forms of
fairness, impartiality and reasonableness in administrative decision-making. Here,
Sossin refers to fiduciary relationships and specifically to the jurisprudence on
fiduciary duties owed by the Crown to aboriginal peoples.

While quick to

acknowledge that administrative law in respect of the vulnerable cannot solely be
viewed through the lens of fiduciary relationships, what I believe Sossin suggests is
that public obligations toward individuals should not be an either-or proposition;
there is a spectrum of obligations that may arise and civil servants’ relationships
with the vulnerable ought to be mapped toward the fiduciary end of that
spectrum.94
As with Handler, the goal of this approach to administrative decision-making is
to foster relationships between the civil service and those subject to their decisions,
not of dependence, but of mutual trust and interdependence. For powerful private
actors, this relationship is easily achieved – oil extraction, for example, is subject to a
series of regulatory approvals and the oil industry does not appear to have difficulty
in obtaining a meaningful and interdependent process of dialogue in relation to
these administrative decisions.

Civil service obligations toward the powerless,

however, may require an entirely different operational approach. The point is not
that vulnerable parties should get “special benefits” but that in dealing with
individuals who do not possess the resources to be persuasive, different approaches
may be needed to ensure fairness.

Put simply “acting fairly, impartially and

Lorne Sossin, “An Intimate Approach to Fairness, Impartiality and Reasonableness in
Administrative Law” (2001) 27 Queens Law J 809 [Sossin, Intimate Approach to Fairness].
94 Ibid at 853. Sossin refers here to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker and its
specific invocation of an immigration officer’s duty of compassion, a duty which includes an
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reasonably toward vulnerable parties may require additional considerations than
those same standards require in other contexts.”95
Ultimately, the aim of interdependent administrative law relationships is, in
Sossin’s words, “to shift our focus from the form to the substance of participatory
rights,” and in this sense, it is not dissimilar from the “thick” conception of the rule
of law that I earlier described.96 Sossin continues,
In other words, an intimate approach asks: What would
administrative decision-making look like if citizens and
bureaucrats had a genuine opportunity to know each
other outside the limitations of legal strictures? What if
all important exercises of administrative discretion
were purposive, disclosing not just the scope of the
discretion, but the social, economic, moral, political,
remedial and policy goals that the statutory power was
intended to further?
What if the obligation to provide reasons meant the
actual reasons for a decision, not just reasons which
meet the applicable legal standard? What if decisionmakers had a chance to know the people whose lives
they shape, rather than the pieces and fragments of
those lives which appear in application forms and case
files?97
These questions articulately express the aspirations of an engaged and dialogical
approach to administrative decision-making, aspirations that Sossin suggests may
be achieved not simply out of good will, but from what he refers to as a progression
of regulatory devices, the first (and perhaps most important) stage of which would
involve an elaboration of the mutual expectations of decision-makers and affected
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parties, but would also include internal review mechanisms aimed not at
supplanting legal rights, but at “suffusing” them with meaning. Ultimately, Sossin
notes, “while it is important for affected parties to possess the right to be heard…it is
more important to develop the capacity for those parties and decision-makers to
listen to each other.”98
This distinction between the easily conferred, but far too hollow “right to be
heard,” and what I like to call the “right to be listened to” gets to the nub of much of
the criticism of administrative decision-making and its relation to law.99

The

question that remains for our purposes, and the topic to which I now turn, is
whether an approach to administrative decision-making as dialogue is possible in
the immigration-security context. This context, perhaps more than any other, is
defined by top-down expressions of state power and an extremely vulnerable group
of individuals over whom decisions are made.

Thinking through a dialogical

approach to discretion in this area is interesting because, to my mind, it puts the
principles and theory that underpin the approach to the ultimate stress test.

Discretion, Security and Inadmissibility
"What we have is the growth of governmental power, so
that law becomes the vehicle by which the government
delegates back to itself the power to make policy for
which it will be accountable only at the next election.
Rather than legislative supremacy, we have executive
supremacy."100

Ibid, at 854-5.
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1985], this right was recognized in the context of the right of refugee claimants to a full and fair
hearing of their claims to refugee status. When I point to a ‘right to be listened to,’ I simply refer to a
thick, or substantive understanding of the right to be heard, one which encourages good faith
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For administrative law scholars interested in national security issues, the past
decade has been a fascinating period. On the one hand, this period has been witness
to a clear shift in the courts’ view of discretion and the deference it should be
afforded in fashioning just decisions on fundamental issues.101 The increasingly
sparing use of the correctness standard is a clear example of this shift.102 At the
same time, however, the post 9-11 era has seen an explosion in raw expressions of
executive power, applied against individuals in a manner that would have made
Kenneth Culp Davis shudder.

In many ways, national security cases in the

immigration context represent the antithesis of a dialogic approach to discretionary
decision-making.
As I outlined above in Chapter One, Catherine Dauvergne sees a close
relationship between the discretionary spaces within law and securitization. To
Dauvergne, the bedrock of discretionary mechanisms that undergird immigration
law is a reflection of one of her central claims - that the basic questions of admission
and exclusion that form migration law are themselves constitutive of the liberal
state.103 Discretion, in this view, is a contemporary iteration of the supremacy of
sovereign power on questions of admission, a holdover (at least in common law
states) from the period when questions of entry were firmly a matter of royal
prerogative.104 And it is precisely because this is the case that discretion can be

See for example Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, in which the Supreme Court of Canada
found that the standard of review of administrative decisions relating to an individual's Charter
rights is "reasonableness".
102 See Alberta (Information& Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 for
a recent review of the few remaining circumstances in which the correctness standard is still said to
apply.
103 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law
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manipulated in times of perceived exception, ramping up its exclusionary
tendencies. Dauvergne continues:
All of these factors result in a legal structure which is
highly malleable and closely tied to shifting political
winds. It has the appearance of law, but is changed so
rapidly (either through amendment or policy shift) that
its adherence to rule of law principles has been easily
suspect. Some of the best evidence of this malleability is
provided by the shifts in migration law provisions in
prosperous Western states following the events of
September 2001. Many of these shifts were
accomplished without any change in the law, it was
rather discretionary practices, already permissible, that
were used to achieve significant alterations in the effect
of the law.105
It is for this reason that the national security debate, pitting as it does core
liberty interests against equally core state interests in determining admission,
represents something of a stress test for democratic and dialogic approaches to
administrative discretion. In the pages that follow, I examine the existence of
discretion in national security matters and describe the various ways in which it
(not surprisingly) lacks most, if not all dialogical properties. Discretion in this
context looks far more like Dyzenhaus’ grey holes, than a domain of reciprocal
communicative relationships. While acknowledging the strong incentive on the part
of the executive to consolidate control over this domain, I nevertheless assert that
certain changes are possible that would enhance both the democratic nature and the
quality of decision-making in this area.
4.5.1 Locating Discretion in National Security Cases
As mentioned earlier, section 44 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
provides a double-dip of discretion in determining whether to proceed with the
inadmissibility process. For ease of reference, the provision states:

105

Ibid.
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44. (1) An officer who is of the opinion that a
permanent resident or a foreign national who is in
Canada is inadmissible may prepare a report setting out
the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to
the Minister.

(2) If the Minister is of the opinion that the report is
well-founded, the Minister may refer the report to the
Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing,
except in the case of a permanent resident who is
inadmissible solely on the grounds that they have failed
to comply with the residency obligation under section
28 and except, in the circumstances prescribed by the
regulations, in the case of a foreign national. In those
cases, the Minister may make a removal order.
The first discretionary decision is made by an officer, the second by the Minister
(in reality a Minister’s Delegate).106

It is also important to recall here the

amorphous, but undeniably low threshold required to trigger the s 44 process.
Section 33 of the IRPA mandates this threshold, providing that the facts that
constitute inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts “for which there are
reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may
occur.”107
In the national security context, then, an officer (and subsequently a
Minister’s delegate) must only have reasonable grounds to believe that an individual
is described in s 34 of the IRPA in order to initiate the inadmissibility process.108

It also should be noted that this discretionary triggering process for admissibility determinations
applies to more than just national security concerns, which are set out at s.34 of the IRPA, but also for
example to admissibility arising from potential human rights violations (s.35), criminality (s.36) and
organized criminality (s.37).
107 IRPA, s 33.
108 Again, for ease of reference, s 34 states:
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government,
institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
106
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As we explored above, the breadth of the s 34 inadmissibility provision is
striking. It extends well beyond those who pose a threat to Canadian security,
capturing within its net anyone who has engaged in espionage against a democratic
government and any person who has engaged in the subversion by force of any
government. Most strikingly, the provision also captures anyone who has been a
member of an organization that has undertaken these kinds of activities, regardless
of one’s personal involvement in them.
In most cases, after a report under s 44 is written, it is referred to the quasijudicial Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board for a hearing.
The Immigration Division then renders a decision based on the same inadmissibility
criteria.

But it is significant to note that, unlike in the referral process, the

Immigration Division possesses no discretionary powers. If it concludes that an
individual is described by s34 of the IRPA, it must issue the applicable deportation
order. It is thus an ironic, but perhaps unsurprising feature of the inadmissibility
context that the location of discretion (the s44 process) is without independence
and the location of independence (the IRB) is without discretion.
Additionally, built into the process is yet another site of discretion contained at s
42.1 of the IRPA, which provides that the matters referred to in, amongst other
provisions, s 34(1) will not render a person inadmissible if, in a separate
application, that person satisfies the Minister that their presence in Canada “is not
contrary to the national interest.”109

(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
(c) engaging in terrorism;
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in
Canada; or
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages,
has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
109 Ibid, s.42.1.
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As I discussed in Chapter Two, the jurisprudence on inadmissibility
determinations has endorsed an extremely broad approach to determining who
may be subject to a discretionary report under s 44. Recall that, pursuant to s 33 of
the IRPA, the courts have repeatedly found that there is no temporal limitation to
inadmissibility determinations under s 34.110

In other words, inadmissibility

findings may arise in relation to membership in an organization that once engaged
in subversion by force of a government, but has long since disavowed the use of
violence. Inadmissibility could also arise where an officer finds there are reasonable
grounds to believe that an organization will, at some point in the future, engage in
the use of force. In the former scenario, an individual is inadmissible under s 34,
even if she joined the organization long after it renounced the use of force.111 In the
latter scenario, it would not seem to matter if the individual severed her ties with an
organization before it took up subversive activities.112
Recall also that officers are not particularly constrained from exercising their
discretion to allege inadmissibility in relation to acts committed by individuals
while they were still children. While noting that there is some sliding scale of moral
responsibility for acts committed by minors, the courts have nevertheless upheld
inadmissibility findings against them.113
There are several other examples of the role that the courts have played in
authorizing an extremely broad understanding of the discretion exercised under
sections 34/44 of the IRPA, but I will refer here to only one more: the meaning of
the term “membership.”

The jurisprudence on the meaning of membership

endorses (not inappropriately) the fact that it can take on myriad forms, particularly

Al Yamani v Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 1457 at paras 11-12.
Gebreab v Canada (MPSEP), 2010 FCA 274.
112 Al Yamani v Canada (MPSEP), 2006 FC 1457.
113 Poshteh v Canada (MPSEP), 2005 FCA 85.
110
111
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in the amorphous structure of terrorist organizations. To reiterate the oft-cited
passage from the Federal Court in Singh, Justice Rothstein (as he then was)
characterized the membership issue as follows:
The provisions deal with subversion and terrorism. The
context in immigration legislation is public safety and
national security, the most serious concerns of
government. It is trite to say that terrorist organizations
do not issue membership cards. There is no formal test
for membership and members are not therefore easily
identifiable…I think it is obvious that Parliament
intended the term "member" to be given an unrestricted
and broad interpretation.114
In addition to authorizing a virtually limitless scope of discretion with respect to
concepts such as membership, as I shall explore below, the courts have provided
very little guidance in the security context as to how that broad discretion should be
exercised.
The final locus of discretion that requires mention is one that no longer exists.
As I set out above, discretion can equally be construed (and used) as a tool for
excusing individuals from the overly harsh consequences of inflexible laws and,
contrastingly, as a repository of state power that facilitates unilateral action. In
immigration law, the most obvious way in which individuals seek to access the
former, ‘emancipatory’ nature of discretion is through an application for relief on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds, pursuant to s 25 of the IRPA. Until
recently, this was an option available to those found inadmissible under s34 of the
IRPA and it was viewed as a particularly important one because of the perceived
overbreadth of s 34 and the futility of the Ministerial waiver provision. With the
passage of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act115 in 2013, the government

114
115

Singh v Canada (MCI), (1998), 151 F.T.R. 101, 1998 CanLII 8281 (FC) at para. 52, emphasis added.
FRFCA, supra note 51 at s 9.
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eliminated this option entirely, excluding from the ambit of s 25 any individual
found inadmissible under sections 34, 35 and 37 of the IRPA.
All that remains in the discretionary realm, then, is the broad power to initiate
proceedings under s.44 and the circumscribed and rarely invoked authority to
relieve individuals from inadmissibility under s42.1.

4.5.2
Cases

Diminishing Baker: Suresh, Agraira and Discretion in Security

Following the promising approach taken by the Supreme Court in Baker, the first
indication that things are simply different in the security field arose in the decision
of the court in Suresh.116 At first blush, the Supreme Court’s decision in that case
appears to contain strong language about the substantive protection of core human
rights values. On closer inspection, however, the differences between the court’s
approach in Baker and Suresh become readily apparent. Such differences, I suggest,
reflect the view that some forms of executive power should remain relatively
immune to substantive judicial control.117
Recall that in Suresh, the Immigration and Refugee Board had found Mr.
Suresh, a Sri Lankan Tamil, to face a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka
should he be returned to that country.

He was consequently found to be a

Convention refugee and later applied for permanent residence. Over the course of
this application, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) received a report from
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) indicating that Suresh had been a
member and fundraiser for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an
organization alleged to have been involved in terrorist activities in Sri Lanka. As a
result of this report, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration formed the opinion

116
117

Suresh v Canada (MCI), 2002 SCC 1, discussed above at Section 2.3.4.
Cartier dissertation, supra note 58 at p.267.
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that Suresh constituted a danger to the security of Canada and ordered him to be
deported, notwithstanding his Convention refugee status. Suresh unsuccessfully
challenged the decision that he posed a security threat in the Federal Court and the
Federal Court of Appeal, on the basis that the procedures set out in the legislation
exposed him to the risk that he would be deported to torture, contrary to both the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Convention Against Torture.
In granting Suresh’s appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the impugned provisions, but concluded that the procedural safeguards chosen to
ensure that he was not deported to torture were inadequate. At the same time,
however, the court did not foreclose the possibility that s 7 of the Charter could in
rare circumstances permit deportation to torture. The court also considered the
expansive scope of s 19 of the former Immigration Act, the predecessor to s 34, and
concluded that its breadth was justified, in part, because of the availability of a
discretionary Ministerial exemption mechanism, the predecessor to the current s
42.1 of the IRPA. In an important passage, the court noted:
We believe that it was not the intention of Parliament to
include in the s. 19 class of suspect persons those who
innocently contribute to or become members of
terrorist organizations. This is supported by the
provision found at the end of s. 19, which exempts from
the s. 19 classes “persons who have satisfied the
Minister that their admission would not be detrimental
to the national interest”. Section 19 must therefore be
read as permitting a refugee to establish that his or her
continued residence in Canada will not be detrimental
to Canada, notwithstanding proof that the person is
associated with or is a member of a terrorist
organization. This permits a refugee to establish that
the alleged association with the terrorist group was
innocent. In such case, the Minister, exercising her
discretion constitutionally, would find that the refugee
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does not fall within the targeted s. 19 class of persons
eligible for deportation on national security grounds.118
While not admitting as much, the court in Suresh also clearly backed away from
the approach adopted by Justice L’Heureux Dube in Baker on the substantive review
of discretionary decision-making, at least in the context of national security. Indeed,
the court affirmed the almost unfettered discretion of the executive to weigh the
relevant factors in determining what constitutes a threat to national security,
limiting the role of the courts to ensuring that the relevant factors were indeed
taken into account.119 Dyzenhaus’ observation in this regard is apposite:
Suresh largely pays lip service to Baker on review of
substance, since it diminishes scrutiny of substance to a
check list of factors which the minister has to take into
account, and it restores in all but name the distinction
between review of administrative interpretation of the
law and review of discretion.120
In Baker it was the willingness of the court to engage in substantive review of
the weighing of factors that created the conditions for a communicative approach to
decision-making, at least in respect of humanitarian and compassionate
applications. While the court in Suresh recognized the need for a relatively robust
set of procedural protections in the context of national security, its refusal to engage
substantively in the weighing of relevant factors affirmed the sense that dialogue in
the national security context is not required. And as we shall see, this sense has only
been reinforced in the years since the Suresh decision.
In Chapter 2, I discussed at some length the extremely deferential approach of
the courts in reviewing security decisions, including those related to Ministerial

Suresh, supra note 116 at para 110.
David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law”
(2001) 27 Queens Law J 504 at 506. See also Cartier Dissertation, supra note 58 at 268.
120 Ibid, at 507.
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discretion, most notably, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Agraira v
Canada.121 While I do not intend to revisit these decisions in detail, it is important
to glimpse back at the Agraira decision in the present context to illustrate the ways
in which the courts have, in my view, declined to foster dialogue in national security
cases. Recall that in Agraira, the appellant sought a discretionary waiver of a finding
of inadmissibility that arose because of his affiliation with the anti-Ghaddafi Libyan
National Salvation Front (LNSF). The Minister’s response to the waiver request was
summarily dismissive.

In refusing to exercise his discretion, the Minister

determined that “It is not in the national interest to admit individuals who have had
sustained

contact

with

known

terrorist

and/or

terrorist-connected

organizations.”122 The rationale of the Minister effectively renders the exemption
clause redundant: the applicant required Ministerial relief because he was
inadmissible and the Minister’s responded by refusing the application based on the
very inadmissibility from which relief was sought. Recall further that the Supreme
Court ultimately upheld the Minister’s decision even though it readily admitted that
it could not determine, at least with finality, the actual reasoning of the Minister in
rejecting the waiver request.123 Instead, the court attributed to the Minister an
interpretation of the national interest exemption that admittedly included a
humanitarian and compassionate dimension, but one virtually devoid of tangible or
enforceable meaning.124 In concluding as it did, the court gave short shrift, in my
view, to the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility and radically
departed from its Baker-era emphasis on substantive reasonableness. Importantly,

Agraira v Canada (MPSEP), 2013 SCC 36.
Ibid at para 13.
123 Ibid at para 58 and see above discussion in Section 2.3.7.
124 The Supreme Court’s finding that humanitarian and compassionate considerations were relevant
to the Ministerial relief provision, and had adequately been considered in the case at bar, became
more or less moot with the passage of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, supra note 51,
which formally eliminated humanitarian and compassionate considerations from the national
interest determination and barred inadmissible persons from the general H&C provision found at s
25 of the IRPA. The FRFCA came into force on June 19, 2013. The Supreme Court’s decision was
released on June 20, 2013.
121
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it also hollowed out the very same provision that, as noted above, it had relied upon
in Suresh to uphold the breadth of immigration law’s security provisions.

4.5.3

Discretion and the Power Not to Act

It is clear that immigration officers (and Minister’s delegates) have been granted
broad discretionary authority to determine who may be inadmissible under s.34(1)
of the IRPA, and that the courts have been loathe to interfere with such
determinations. It is, however, interesting (if not surprising) that the discretionary
authority of officers to not initiate inadmissibility proceedings has been narrowly
interpreted by both the courts and the soft law instruments meant to assist officers.
In Cha, a case involving allegations of criminal, rather than security inadmissibility,
the court recognized that the use of the word may in s.44 of the IRPA created a band
of discretion within which officers could consider inadmissibility cases, but at the
same time, the court found that the discretion to refrain from initiating proceedings
was exceedingly narrow. Most notably, the court found that it was not open to the
Minister’s delegate (in respect of the s 44(2) determination) to consider either the
nature of the allegations against the individual or other details regarding his
personal circumstances.125
The relevant immigration manual contains language that similarly emphasizes
the narrowness of officers’ discretion to forego admissibility proceedings. It states:
The fact that officers have the discretionary power to
decide whether or not to write an inadmissibility report
does not mean that they can disregard the fact that
someone is, or may be, inadmissible …

Canada (MPSEP) v Cha, 2006 FCA 126. Cha was a case that arose in relation to the criminal
inadmissibility provisions of the IRPA (s 36), rather than the national security context. While there
are some differences in the way that the two types of inadmissibility cases are handled, the point
made in Cha essentially holds true for cases under s 34: the discretion to refrain from initiating
proceedings against someone who is caught by the broad statutory language is narrow.
125
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Rather, this discretion gives officers flexibility in
managing cases where no removal order will be sought,
or where the circumstances are such that the objectives
of the Act may or will be achieved without the need to
write a formal inadmissibility report under the
provisions of A44(1).126
In his study of immigration enforcement at the United States-Mexico border,
Josiah Heyman notes that the power not to act reveals as much about discretion as
more formal decisions to initiate enforcement action.127 In their work on front-line,
or “street-level” bureaucrats, Hawkins and Lipsky have also commented on the
central importance of early decisions not to take action.128 The subtlety of nonaction can make it difficult to assess in any quantifiable way, but the essential point
to recall is that a decision not to act is a decision nonetheless, one that is often
deeply revealing about power, privilege and the operating assumptions that guide
the decision-making body.
Commencing with Pratt’s emphasis on risk as a central organizing premise of
contemporary border enforcement, Heyman focuses on the inverse but equally
important role of trust in guiding front-line decisions about admission. Trust is
particularly important in examining border decisions because of the large number
of decisions that must be made every day and because most of those who formally
approach borders are granted admission.

In this context, the grouping of

individuals into groups deemed trustworthy is common. Heyman notes:

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Manual ENF 5 “Writing 44(1) Reports” (20 August, 2013)
online: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/.
127 Josiah Heyman, “Trust, Privilege, and Discretion in the Governance of the US Borderlands with
Mexico” (2009) 24 Can J Law Soc 367 [Heyman, Trust, Privilege and Discretion].
128 See respectively, Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory
Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Michael Lipsky’s seminal Street-Level
Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell Sage, 1980).
Observations about police work and the decisions made by officers to refrain from invoking the law
have been made for some time, see for example Joseph Goldstein, “Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice” (1960) 69 Yale Law
Journal 543.
126
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The existence of non-acts is best seen, in the places I
will discuss, in the "sorting" of individuals as members
of assumed social groups.' Sorting is central to border
policing because officers in this region (which is not just
the literal boundary but, rather, a deep layer of
inhabited territory) confront not a well-defined set of
individuals but, rather, a complex web of people flowing
throughout a variegated space of ordinary activities.
Officers, faced with so many people and activities that
they could be acting on, sort individuals into categories:
riskier actors who are worth additional action
(questioning, request for identification, search, initial
detention)-versus actors who are trustworthy and are
thus not acted on any further.129
Heyman’s reasoning can be directly transposed to the context of decisionmaking under s 34 of the IRPA. Contrary to the apparent view of the courts and, to
some extent, contrary to the soft-law manuals that guide officers’ actions,
discretionary decisions not to invoke s 34 proceedings are made constantly, if often
unconsciously. This is directly revealed by the striking breadth of the provision
which, as I have noted above, unambiguously captures large numbers of individuals,
as contrasted by the relatively few cases under this provision that are actually
initiated.

Recall, for example, that the wording of the relevant inadmissibility

provisions renders any member of the United States military or intelligence
agencies inadmissible to Canada. Recall further that a plain reading of the provision
also leads, quite inexorably, to the conclusion that any member of the Democratic
and Republican parties in the U.S., or for that matter, the Labour Party in Britain
would also be inadmissible.130

Heyman, Trust, Privilege and Discretion, supra note 127 at 369.
As noted in Chapter Two, this was recognized by the Federal Court in Oremade v Canada (MCI),
2005 FC 1077, most explicitly in the court’s suggestion in that case (at para 17) that George
Washington, Eamon De Valera, Menachem Begin and Nelson Mandela all could be deemed
inadmissible to Canada.
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But of course, inadmissibility proceedings do not typically occur against such
individuals.

Instead, as I sought to illustrate in Chapter Two, border security

officials seem to have engaged in the kind of grouping that Heyman describes –
focusing their attention under s 34 on those who have any kind of affiliation with
subversive movements from the Global South, while turning a relatively blind eye to
those who may similarly meet the definition of subversion from Western countries.
Viewed from a TWAILian perspective, these discretionary decisions not to act
are born of, and serve to reinforce, the power and prestige of individuals from the
West at the expense of those from the Global South, whose struggles and actions are
subjected to an undeniably closer degree of scrutiny. And as Heyman observed from
the United States-Mexico border, this privileging of those deemed trustworthy
provides an important illustration of the “invisible power” of those who benefit from
non-action, whose daily comings and goings across borders are rarely subjected to
the kinds of “delays and indignities” that others frequently experience.131
4.5.4 The Consequences and Shortcomings of Monologue: Documenting the
experiences of inadmissible persons
The immigration-security context reveals the limitations – both moral and
conceptual – of discretionary decisions that are dominated by one-way expressions
of executive power. These decisions are defined by an institutional predisposition
toward unilateralism; little or no advanced notice is provided to individuals subject
to them, notwithstanding the factual complexities on which they are based and the
profound implications that they may have.132

Heyman, Trust, Privilege and Discretion, supra note 127 at 370.
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act distinguishes between foreign nationals, citizens and
permanent residents. Foreign nationals include visitors, those without any formal status and,
notably, refugee claimants. In Hernandez v Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 429, the court recognized an
obligation to at least inform permanent residents of s 44 proceedings, but it remains to be seen
whether this obligation also extends to foreign nationals. In Awed v Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 469, for
example, the court found that an officer erred in failing to notify the applicant of the s 44 process, but
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As I described at the outset of this dissertation, in seeking to provide a multifaceted perspective on the Canadian security-inadmissibility apparatus, I
interviewed several individuals who have become enmeshed in s34 proceedings. I
did not seek to conduct an exhaustive number of interviews, nor to engage in a
sustained legal ethnography. My objectives, rather, were first to layer personal
narratives over the quantitative data that I outlined in Chapter Two in an effort to
bring some of the conclusions drawn in that chapter into sharp relief.133 The
second, and equally important objective, was to create a space, modest though it is,
for the voices of inadmissible persons to be heard. Put in a different way, my aim in
speaking with such individuals was to employ in the research process a dialogue that
I suggest is lacking in the legal processes used to make security-related decisions.
Over the coming pages, I weave into the analysis some of the perspectives of these
individuals in the hope that, in so doing, we might capture a glimpse of a more
participatory approach to decision-making, one that I contend would yield more
legitimate results.134

nevertheless denied judicial review on the basis that the error would likely have had any appreciable
impact on the proceedings.
133 Nataliya Ivankova, John W Creswell & Sheldon L Stick, “Using Mixed-Methods Sequential
Explanatory Design: From Theory to Practice” (2006) 18:1 Field Methods 3 at 10.
134 In total, I conducted interviews with nine individuals over the span of roughly one year, though I
spoke with numerous other individuals who were uncomfortable commenting publicly on their
cases, even with the assurances of anonymity that were outlined to them. Once again, I make no
claims that the experiences of this small group of individuals are necessarily representative of all of
those subjected to the security-inadmissibility regime. Rather, I provide their perspectives for the
reasons outlined above and to demonstrate how at least some individuals have experienced the topdown security regime. I met the individuals with whom I spoke in a number of different ways. As I
mention below, a couple of the individuals were former clients. Some were clients of lawyer
colleagues, while I was put in touch with others through refugee advocacy networks. I should
acknowledge that over the course of this dissertation I did not speak with many individuals for
whom discretion was exercised not to commence inadmissibility proceedings. The reason for this is
simple: these acts of discretion are generally invisible; people do not necessarily know when they
have benefitted from positive acts of discretion in the s 44 process. There is one exception to this –
the experience of K.G. – whose story I describe below.
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First, however, recall that for those seeking protection in Canada, the initiation
of admissibility proceedings means an automatic suspension and possible
termination of the refugee claim process.135 Recall further from Chapter Two that
the clear majority of individuals subjected to inadmissibility proceedings are
refugees or refugee claimants. The law does not require advanced notice of a
section 44 report for claimants and there is no formal process for responding to it.
Claimants simply receive notice that their claim has been suspended pending an
admissibility hearing. If, following the admissibility hearing, the allegations against
the individual are upheld, the refugee claim is terminated.136 For many refugee
claimants that I have spoken with, the process was dizzying; one moment they were
awaiting the adjudication of their refugee claims, hopeful of their new and safe
future in Canada, the next their claims were terminated and they were labelled as
security threats. After experiencing tremendous hardship on their journey, a legal
channel once seemingly open, is unceremoniously closed.137
Take, for example, the situation of A.K., a former client, whom I interviewed for
the purposes of this study in November, 2013. 138 A national of Eritrea, he arrived in
Canada with his wife and six children from Saudi Arabia where he and his wife had
lived in exile for the previous thirty years, and where all of his children were born.
The danger he and his family face in Eritrea – one of the worst human rights
offenders in the world – is palpable and they were tired of living at risk of removal
in Saudi Arabia, which essentially bars all foreigners from obtaining permanent
residence.

A.K. and his family were initially granted refugee status by the

Immigration and Refugee Board. That decision was subsequently overturned by the
Federal Court and, days prior to the rehearing of their claims, the Minister of Public

See IRPA s 103(1).
IRPA s 104.
137 The situation could not be more reminiscent of Kafka. As the doorkeeper in The Trial says to the
countryman: “'No one but you could gain admittance through this door [into the Law], since this door
was intended for you. I am now going to shut it.’” Franz Kafka, The Trial, (New York: Vintage Books
ed., 1969) at 269.
138 Interview with A.K. November 5, 2013.
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Safety provided notice that the hearing was suspended as A.K. had been referred to
the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board for an admissibility
hearing under s 34 in relation to small donations he had made, in 1977, to the
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).
A.K. did not deny having made the donations – they in fact formed the basis of
his claim to be at risk in Eritrea – but he asserted from the outset that the donations
had been for humanitarian purposes as the ELF had been providing de facto social
services to Eritreans for several years in the 1970s as a result of a brutal state
crackdown on Eritreans by the authoritarian Ethiopian regime that controlled
Eritrea at that time. Because A.K. did not deny that he had made the donations in
question and because there was evidence of rights violations committed by the ELF,
the outcome of his admissibility hearing was a foregone conclusion – he was found
to be inadmissible and his refugee claim was therefore terminated.139

Where

discretion had existed – in the writing of the s 44 report, prior to the referral of the
matter to the Immigration Division – it was exercised before A.K. even knew about
it. As A.K. told me,
As long as my family is safe they can do whatever they
like with me. I just wish that I could have told my story
at the right time, then they would see I am a peaceful
man. I have never held a gun, I would probably hurt
myself if I did hold one.140
The tension between a broad grant of discretion to find individuals inadmissible
and a poorly communicated discretion to waive or overlook inadmissibility has led
to numerous decisions that are at best awkward, and at worst perverse. And as I
sought to reveal quantitatively in Chapter Two, this top-down approach to section

Recall that the decision of the Immigration Division is not discretionary – its responsibility is
entirely confined to the often mechanical process of determining whether the facts alleged amount to
inadmissibility. The points of discretion come before, in the s 44 process, and after in the Ministerial
relief process under s 42.1.
140 Ibid.
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34 decision-making is no theoretical matter. It has affected hundreds of individuals
– from numerous African National Congress members who have been summarily
denied visas under section 34141 to numerous others engaged in similarly
sympathetic movements, the flaws inherent in a one-way process of discretionary
decision-making have been exposed.
Another example of the shortcomings of monologue was provided to me by A.M.,
an Iranian individual found to be inadmissible in relation to his passing affiliation
with the Iranian opposition group the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), who told me:
For them [CBSA] to say that I am a threat just means
that they did not speak to me, get to know me. You
know I would love for someone to do some surveillance
on me, then they would see what I do. I married a
Catholic woman, my kids go to Catholic schools. I don’t
even spend time with Persians. I know that culture, I
wanted to learn about other cultures.”142
It is telling that individuals subject to the inadmissibility regime are left wishing
for surveillance as a means of conveying their case. While I contend below that we
can aim higher than employing surveillance to assess inadmissibility, it is not
difficult to understand A.M.’s perspective. Embedded within it is an assertion not
only that he has nothing to hide, but that any detailed inquiry into who he actually is
would reveal that he should not be subject to security measures. More subtly, I
suggest that what is discernible in A.M.’s statement is a desire to communicate, even
if unwittingly, with those who hold the power to make decisions that will
profoundly alter his life.

See for example Matthew Little, “Anti-apartheid heroes denied visa to Canada”, The Epoch Times
(28 Feb. 2012), online: Epoch Times http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/canada/anti-apartheidheroes-denied-visas-to-canada-197204.html.
142 Interview with A.M. March10, 2013.
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More broadly, what was apparent in the views of all of the individuals with
whom I spoke was a respectful disagreement with the process used by CBSA and an
unwavering belief that things would have been different had they genuinely been
listened to in the discretionary decision-making process. No one with whom I spoke
questioned either the authority or the responsibility of the Canadian government to
inquire into their backgrounds. Similarly, no one questioned the authority of the
government to impose consequences on those who either engaged in human rights
abuses or truly constituted a threat to the security of Canada. What was questioned
by all, however, was the legitimacy of decisions to find them inadmissible when
there seems to have been open acknowledgment that they have neither engaged in
human rights violations, nor constitute a security threat. It is this perverse situation
that is so fundamentally troubling to these individuals. Another individual, J.G.,
made precisely this point to me in describing his dismay at being found inadmissible
for his involvement as a young student with El Salvador’s FMLN, a leftist opposition
movement at the time, but now that country’s ruling party. When I spoke with J.G.
he had been living in Canada for over 17 years, but had spent the previous year in
sanctuary in a church as he struggled to avoid deportation.

Recognizing the

inconsistency with which section 34 allegations appear to be brought and the
seeming absurdity of declaring him inadmissible for his involvement in El Salvador’s
ruling party, J.G. told me: “If the law is going to be applied fairly it should be applied
equally to everybody…I have not committed any wrongdoing and they even
recognize that and they are basically punishing me harsher than a criminal…”143 J.G.
also lamented the unwillingness of CBSA to genuinely listen to his story and, more
generally, the collective inability of immigrants to assert their rights because of the
powerlessness of their situation:
The thing is that the law as it is being interpreted and
applied by CBSA officers is totally unfair and many
immigrants basically we don’t have the means to fight
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Interview with J.G., May 6, 2014.
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against it. It is frustrating because we try to explain the
situation and what happens is that many other
immigrants are in the same situation because they don’t
have an understanding of the system they feel fear to
come forward and fight against it…This is a fight that
has to be done legally, but also using political means.
That’s how I feel about this, it is violating the rights of
my family and I am very strong on saying that, and that
is probably why they want me out of Canada. I speak
too much, but either I fight or I am deported and
separated from my family. I don’t have any other
options.144
In this statement we can see J.G.’s hope for a substantively positive outcome in
his case, but once again, we can also discern a strong desire simply to be heard. But
as J.G. has experienced, such is not the current reality and the experiences of those
with whom I have spoken tend to confirm my suggestion that decision-making in
the immigration-security context represents the antithesis of a dialogic approach to
administrative discretion.

Far from placing the individual affected by security

decisions at the centre of the process, such individuals are frequently informed of
the decision only once it has been made. There are also indications, the most
notable example of which arose in the Galloway case, that the administration of the
inadmissibility provisions is not immune to overt executive influence.145
In Chapter Two, I outlined some of the problematic trends that have arisen in
relation to decision-making under section 34. These problems, together with the
extreme delays in attending to s 34 cases, have had wrenching consequences on
those subject to them. First, many individuals with whom I spoke lived in constant

Ibid.
Galloway sought judicial review of the notice that he received alerting him to the fact that he may
have been found inadmissible if he were to have approached the Canadian border. The record in
respect of the judicial review proceedings revealed direct involvement of the office of the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration in the determination as to how to respond to Galloway’s proposed visit.
See Toronto Coalition to Stop the War v Canada (MPSEP), 2010 FC 957.
144
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fear that they would be permanently separated from their families. As another
individual, J.M. told me:
The trauma this will cause on my family is the most
complicated, my wife will have a choice, stay here with
the kids or come with me…The kids are not going, they
cannot go back to my country, this is the hard thing…146
A.K. spoke similarly of the wrenching hardship that the inadmissibility process –
now entering its eighth year – has had on him and his family:
Headache, stress, very stressful. First of all, reporting
every month for years for, you know, what did I do?
Secondly, I don’t have rights, renewing the work permit
all my life. Also in general, the papers itself, now and
then, is [just causing] stress by itself, it’s not easy that’s
why I go so many times to my family doctor…but the
main thing now is my mother, that is the worst, I don’t
like my mother to cry…She is waiting until now, but still
whenever I [talk to her] she cries.147
In a passage worth reproducing in its entirely, a refugee lawyer with whom I
spoke described the experience of her clients similarly:
The way in which Canada’s inadmissibility provisions
are applied makes me so angry. The vast majority of the
clients that I have represented are not terrorists; they
are heroes. They risked their lives trying to bring
justice, democracy and the rule of law to countries
governed by tyrannical rulers responsible for massive
human rights violations. Not a single one of the clients
I have represented ever used arms. Every one of the
clients I have represented abhors violence, and never
has, and never would, sanction the use of violence
against civilians. That said, all of my clients believe that
the use of arms is justified to overthrow tyrannical
regimes, when all attempts at a peaceful resolution have
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Interview with J.M. March 28, 2014.
Interview with A.K. November 5, 2013.
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failed. These are views that are shared by most
Canadians: Canada is not, after all, a pacifist
country. So why are my clients being labelled as
terrorist, while Canadian soldiers who have fought in
Afghanistan are called heroes? What kind of hypocrisy
is this?
The effect of being labelled as a terrorist, or a security
risk to Canada, especially in the post 9/11 world is
profound. Many of my clients arrived in Canada
seeking safety because they were persecuted simply for
trying to improve the human rights situation in their
homelands. For these people, many of whom have
already experienced torture, to be subjected to an
unwarranted admissibility process is almost unbearably
difficult. It is stigmatizing. It labels people with terms
that are completely contrary to how they view
themselves, and how they ought to be viewed. It is
degrading and humiliating.
Beyond the shame and the degradation inherent in
being labelled as a terrorist, security inadmissibility
findings have other devastating consequences. Many of
my clients had to flee from their countries suddenly,
and were forced to leave their spouse and minor
children behind. An inadmissibility determination
prevents my clients from ever sponsoring their families
to come to Canada. The result is that minor children are
indefinitely separated from one of their parents, parents
from their children, and spouses from each other.
Most of my clients are stunned by the treatment that
they have received at the hands of the Canadian
government. They believed Canada to be a beacon of
fairness and tolerance, a country where human rights
are upheld, and a country devoid of racism. That is why
they sought refuge here. The shattering of this image is
profoundly
disturbing
for
them.
As
their
representative, I struggle myself when trying to explain
a system which is as indefensible to me as it is to my
clients.148
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Interview with lawyer H.D., April, 2015.
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In the pages that follow, I contend that the legitimacy that inadmissibility
decisions currently lack, and the often unnecessary hardship that they impose, can
be largely remedied by embracing dialogue.

Discretion, Dialogue and the Security Regime
Before making the case for injecting dialogue into the decision-making process
in national security cases, I should perhaps reiterate and clarify precisely my
starting position. Recall that at the outset of this dissertation, I suggested that
regardless of the merits of Carens’ open-borders approach, it is commonly accepted
that states have, at the very least, the authority to restrict entry in situations
involving public safety and security.149 At the same time, however, international law
creates obligations towards those within a country’s jurisdiction who have asserted
a right to remain because of a risk of persecution, subject once more to certain
security based exclusions.150 There is, then, conceptual symmetry between states’
baseline authority to exclude and the limitations on its corresponding obligation to
admit. There is also broad theoretical and practical consensus as to the legitimacy
of these binary propositions. But the consensus only holds so far as the exclusions
on security grounds accord with those permitted at international law. It disappears,
in other words, when a country adopts an approach to security that effectively
excludes a broader ambit of individuals than is contemplated at international law.

As was explicitly acknowledged by Carens himself, see Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for
Open Borders” (1987) 49:2 Rev Polit 251 at 258-9 and see the discussion above at Chapter 1, notes
42-44 and accompanying text. I note that in much of Carens’ later work, he too has simply decided to
move beyond the impasse created by the open borders debate, and has instead focused on the
legitimacy of state removal practices in particular contexts, see for example, Immigrants and the
Right to Stay, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).
150 Most notably, those found in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Can. TS 1969 No. 6,
Article 1F, entered into force April 22, 1954, entered into force for Canada September 2, 1969 and
the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, entered into force October 4, 1967,
entered into force in Canada June 4, 1969 [“Refugee Convention”] at Articles 32 and 33.
149
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Within this broad framework, countries have to create procedures for
determining who may legitimately be excluded for security reasons and who should
be permitted to remain, at least in so far as their claim to refugee status is wellfounded. The Refugee Convention requires that these procedures accord with “due
process of law.”151

In Canada, furthermore, the jurisprudence has clearly

established that refugee claimants are entitled to the protections of s.7 of the
Charter in the determination of their rights under the Convention.152 These facts,
taken together with the consequences of removal and the state coercion implicit in
deportation, create the conditions for a thick conception of procedural rights, one
that I argue is best actualized through dialogue.
There are two questions that may fairly be posed at this point. The first relates
to Canada’s Pre-Removal Risk (PRRA) program, which guarantees that persons –
even security threats – will not be removed to torture or to a risk to their life or a
risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.153 Why, the question goes, does
this program not provide sufficient protection for at-risk individuals? My response
is that there is neither conceptual nor pragmatic synonymy between the rights of
refugee claimants under the Refugee Convention154 and those granted to persons
under s97 of the IRPA.

First, protection against persecution and the PRRA

protections are not the same and to suggest otherwise is to read redundancy into
sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. Persecution is a broader concept than the forms of
mistreatment protected by the PRRA. Consider the common situation of a political
activist in a repressive country who faces not extreme sanction, but repeated and

Refugee Convention, Article 32(2).
See Singh, 1985, supra note 99, in which the Supreme Court concluded that refugee claimants are
entitled to fundamental justice in the determination of their claims to refugee status and that the
principles of fundamental justice include, at a minimum, the notion of procedural fairness.
153 See s 97 of the IRPA. Of note, for those found to be inadmissible for, inter alia, security reasons, a
finding of risk under s 97 results in a temporary stay of removal that may be revoked whenever the
situation of risk has diminished, see the combined effect of sections 112(3), 114(1)(b) and 114(2) of
the IRPA. In short, then, protection afforded under these provisions is temporary; there is no path to
permanent residency for such individuals.
154 As incorporated into Canadian law by s 96 of the IRPA.
151
152
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withering arrests and detentions as a result of her political activity. She is not
tortured during these detentions, nor is she detained for lengthy periods of time, but
she is conveyed an ominous and threatening message about her ability to
participate in political life, one that clearly infringes core liberty interests. This
mistreatment is a textbook example of persecution and yet, it does not generally
meet the threshold for protection under s97 of the IRPA. Or consider the situation
of an individual who is subjected to systemic discrimination in his country of origin
because of his ethnicity. The discrimination is pervasive; the individual was forced
out of school before he learned to read, he cannot find work, which makes it almost
impossible to provide food and shelter for his family. Once again, such individuals
are clearly entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention definition of
persecution, but would receive no corresponding protection from deportation
under s97 of the IRPA.
These facts are further exacerbated by the fact that Canadian courts have
incorporated a stricter legal test for the granting of protection under the PRRA
regime than applies to claims to refugee protection.155 Finally, those subject to
protection under s97 of the IRPA do not benefit, as do refugees under international
refugee law, from the expectation that they be naturalized.156

The reality, as

illustrated by several of the individuals with whom I spoke, is that if they are lucky
and receive a positive risk assessment under s97, they then enter into a period of
indefinite limbo with no assurances that they will be permitted to work, to receive
healthcare or other social services and with the spectre of removal constantly
hanging over their heads. In these circumstances, the suggestion that Canada’s pre-

The test utilized under s96 of the IRPA involves a determination as to whether there is a
“reasonable chance” that the refugee claimant will face persecution if returned to their country of
origin, while applicants under s97 of the IRPA must establish the risks they face on the higher
balance of probabilities standard. See, respectively, Adjei v Canada (Minister of Employment &
Immigration), [1989] 2 FC 680 and Li v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 1.
156 See Article 34 of the Refugee Convention, supra note 150.
155
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removal screening measures are a reasonable facsimile for Canada’s international
obligations toward refugees is simply inaccurate.
The second question relates to the fact that the inadmissibility cases that I have
examined over the course of my research have all arisen following an oral hearing
by an independent, quasi-judicial tribunal.

What clearer expression of

administrative dialogue, one may ask, can there be than this? My answer to this
question touches upon the location of discretion within the decision-making scheme
under the IRPA. I do not deny that the hearing that takes place into inadmissibility
at the IRB has, in the formal sense, all the appearance of a dialogical process. As I
have discussed, the problem is that there is no discretion at this stage in the process,
which is instead defined by the mechanical application of a set of facts to an
exceptionally broad set of inadmissibility criteria. Where discretion does exist – at
the s44 report-writing stage of the process – there is little concern for procedural
fairness and correspondingly no requirement to engage in dialogue.

The

administrative dissonance that flows from this scheme frames the discretionary
process as a one way process of executive decision-making and completely
undermines the value of any dialogue that takes place in the tribunal process that
follows. It is, in the end, precisely the kind of situation contemplated by Dyzenhaus
as a legal grey hole. The scheme maintains the optics of legality, but upon peeling
back the layers, we see that optics can be deceiving and compliance with a
substantive interpretation of fairness principles is illusory.
I should also at this point clarify and qualify my starting position on what
dialogue can accomplish in an administrative regime: I do not believe that dialogue
is in itself a panacea and I do not believe that it can cure bad laws. A benevolent
dictator is a dictator nonetheless, even if he takes into consideration the views of
those over whom he lords power.

Similarly, a law that provides no tangible

meaning to those who will be subject to it is flawed, even if those charged with
administering the law do so in deliberative and dialogical ways. Consider a law that
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stated: “The Minister can remove any non-citizen for any reason, upon taking into
consideration the non-citizen’s perspective.” It is doubtful that such a law would
comply with even the most basic principles of legality, even though it does require
some form of dialogue.157
In the inadmissibility context, it is similarly doubtful that the breadth of s 34
complies with Fullerian principles. As I set out in Chapter Two, the provision is
unpredictable, unwieldy and subject to whimsy, manipulation and retroactive effect.
As I further set out in Chapter Three, section 34 has been utilized in alarmingly
asymmetrical ways, almost entirely against those from the Global South. This being
the case, one may question why I have devoted such attention to the exercise of
discretion under s 34, if the provision itself is of questionable legitimacy. The
answer to this question lies mainly in the nature of security concerns in the
contemporary world. To be clear, it is my view that there are concerns with the law
such as it is, or at the very least, with the interpretation of s 34 that has emanated
from the courts. But that does not end the analysis. In the present context, security
laws are universally cast in broad strokes.

There are no exceptions.

To my

knowledge, no country in the world is without a broadly cast provision in its
immigration statutes related to national security and/or public order.158 I do not
suggest that the particulars of a given law are unimportant, or that the ability to
make inadmissibility findings should be unconstrained by law. The point, however,
is that states will likely always reserve to themselves the right to make decisions
related to security and insist on some considerable degree of latitude, some
discretion, in making those decisions. As such, the question of discretion is likely to
remain ubiquitous. And if this is the case, the question as to how discretion is
wielded comes back into focus.

For example, those expounded by Lon Fuller in The Morality of Law, revised ed. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1969) at 39, as described above in Chapter One.
158 As but a few examples, see s 10(d) and 73(b) of the Norwegian Immigration Act (2008); Chapter 5,
s 1 of the Swedish Aliens Act (2005); and s 202 of the Australian Migration Act (1958).
157
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4.6.1 Why Dialogue?
The case for dialogue in the context of security decision-making can be made
with relative brevity given the ground that we have already covered. Recall that the
principal rationale for dialogical approaches is that in democratic states, the
legitimacy of coercive state action is tied to, and contingent upon, the extent to
which it reflects democratic values. Central to these values and to a substantive
understanding of the rule of law are principles of communication and participation,
particularly in relation to those who are directly and meaningfully affected by the
particular state acts in question. These are central concerns to many of the scholars
with whom I have engaged over the course of this project – from Carens, Benhabib
and Dauvergne in Chapter One, to Sossin, Handler and Cartier in the present
chapter.
The goal of discretionary decision-making in democratic states is, therefore, to
exercise public authority in a manner that is democratically legitimate or as Cartier
puts it, to develop modes of decision-making that are authoritative, rather than
authoritarian.159 In the security context, those who are implicated in state decisions
are deeply affected by them. These are not minor decisions; they are ones of almost
indescribable importance to those subject to them. In the section above, I referred
to some of the consequences that individuals have experienced in seeking to
navigate the security regime: they are wrenching, invasive and frequently
permanent.

They include the possibility of permanent separation of families,

removal to persecution and deprivations of rights within Canada related to work,
access to social services and healthcare.

They have, in other words, a direct and

coercive impact on rights – life, liberty, security of the person – that are at the very

Genevieve Cartier, Discretion as Dialogue, supra note 6 at 646, citing Joseph Vining, The
Authoritative and the Authoritarian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
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foundation of liberal democracies. Just as the relative importance of a decision to
the individual affects the content of the duty of fairness, so too should it heighten
expectations over dialogue.160 Democratic values do not necessarily dictate that I
have a right to engage in dialogue with the parking enforcement officer who tickets
my car, but they do require that I be given participatory agency over administrative
decisions – i.e. removal to political persecution – that may be anathema to those
very values.
Furthermore, the only factor that could conceivably be viewed as justifying a
more unilateral approach – that these cases involve potentially existential threats to
the state – is simply not borne out by the empirical evidence referred to in Part Two,
above.

Recall that virtually no cases brought under s 34 actually relate to

individuals who are even alleged to constitute a threat to Canadian national
security.
Finally, security decisions, particularly those related to lower level participants
in discrete, localized contexts, generally depend on information and disclosure from
the individual concerned. Given the breadth of the security provisions, context and
motive are important factors in determining whether to proceed with
inadmissibility allegations. Take the example that we referred to above of British
M.P. George Galloway.

As I described above, Mr. Galloway was alleged to be

inadmissible in relation to his donations to the governing authority in the Gaza Strip,
which is dominated by the Hamas group. Hamas was and remains a listed terrorist
entity. While it is not difficult to make a connection between that government
authority and terrorist acts, Galloway asserted, and it was not disputed, that his
donation was used to buy incubators and pediatric dialysis units for a Gaza
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See Baker, supra note 33 at para 25; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504 at para
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hospital.161 This is, one would imagine, highly relevant to the determination as to
whether Mr. Galloway constituted a threat to Canadian security and yet it was
information that only could have emanated from him. As a relatively privileged
individual, Mr. Galloway was able to convey this information to Canadian
authorities, not because the process required any process of dialogue, but because
he had ready access to legal counsel and the media.
Another example of the importance of dialogue arises in the case of A.K. One of
the consequences of the inadmissibility decision made against him is that he has to
report regularly to a Canada Border Services office to confirm his address. A.K.
reported to me that his frequent trips to the CBSA office were generally pleasant,
that the people there had gotten to know him and treated him well. After some
time, one CBSA officer admitted to A.K. that his situation was not fair. As A.K. told
me:
He [the officer] said that I did not deserve this and I
should not be considered as inadmissible. He saw I was
just a family man, trying to work for my kids. He saw I
am peaceful. He knew I had another application [for
Ministerial relief] and wished to me good luck.
Unfortunately this CBSA officer is not the one who will make the decisions that
will fundamentally alter A.K.’s life. Those officers continue to go about their work
with the remoteness, alienation and objectification that Sossin laments as having
“impoverished administrative law.”162 A.K.’s relationship, his “intimacy,” with the
reporting officers, on the other hand, is precisely what Sossin contemplates when he
calls for an inclusion of the “personal dimension” in administrative relationships.163

Toronto Coalition to Stop the War v Canada (MPSEP), supra note 145 at para 18.
Sossin, Intimate Approach to Fairness, supra note 93 at 811.
163 Ibid.
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The resulting relationship, even in this highly stigmatized security context, proved
to be one “capable of engendering mutual respect and trust.”164
Those who suggest that dialogical processes can help to legitimate
administrative decisions do not tend to limit or qualify the contexts in which
dialogue could be introduced. As was illustrated by A.K.’s experience, I contend that
there is little principled reason why those subject to immigration-security measures
should not be afforded a meaningful opportunity to communicate with those whose
discretionary decisions are so important to them. I similarly do not see it as
particularly onerous to require of immigration decision-makers that their decisions
clearly reflect the content of that dialogue. With this in mind, I turn now to what I
consider to be some of the preconditions for dialogical principles to take root in the
migration-security context.

4.6.2 Demystifying Security
Assuming that security provisions are likely to remain broadly cast, subject to
discretionary exemption processes, demystifying and destigmatizing security
inquiries is an important first step to fostering dialogue. In other words, decisionmakers must recognize that a necessary corollary to an expansive security regime is
the reality that those caught by the regime are not necessarily a threat. Rather,
those notionally described by the security provisions are simply those for whom
dialogue must commence in earnest. This need for further dialogue, however,
should not be viewed as displacing a presumption of eligibility. Handler describes
the importance of this presumption in his discussion of New Deal social agencies,165
but it also finds application in the immigration context, where jurisprudence has
firmly established that the stories of refugee claimants are presumed to be true,
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Ibid.
Handler, Dependent People, supra note 55 at 1096.
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absent clear and articulable reasons for questioning their truthfulness.166

The

presumption of admissibility is crucial as it represents a distillation of the trust that
many commentators suggest is at the very foundation of dialogical approaches.167
It is also central to destigmatizing those subject to security measures as it requires
that decision-makers refrain from making judgments about the moral character of
individuals, at least until they have listened to their story from their perspective.
This calls to mind the situation of another person with whom I spoke. K.G., also
from Eritrea, was accepted by Canada as a Convention refugee in the early 2000’s
following which his application for permanent residence floundered.

He was

notified that there were concerns in relation to his admissibility to Canada and for
years he was really provided no further information. His application was neither
accepted nor rejected and he lived in a constant state of anxiety that he would be
returned to Eritrea, a country that he had not been to since he was a minor, as he
had spent many years in the United States before coming to Canada. Finally, he was
notified by Citizenship and Immigration Canada that he might be considered
inadmissible in relation to nominal donations that he had made while in the United
States to another Eritrean political party, and he was given the opportunity to both
make submissions and appear for an interview. Following the interview – and a full
decade after arriving in Canada – it was determined that K.G. was not inadmissible.
His application for permanent residence was later accepted and he eventually
became a Canadian citizen. As K.G. sees it, getting the chance to meet with the
individuals who were deciding his case was crucial. He told me:
This all took too long. Too long. All they had to do was
to meet me to know that I am not a political person and
that I was always just trying to do the right thing for my
country. They asked lots of questions, lots about
individuals who I never heard of. I told them honestly,

Maldonado v Canada (MEI), [1980] 2 F.C 302 (C.A.) at 305.
Handler, Dependent People, supra note 55 at 1076, citing Annete Baier, “Trust and Antitrust” (1986)
96 Ethics 231; and generally Handler, Power, Quiescence and Trust, supra note 55.
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“I don’t know these people, I have never heard of them”
and they could tell that I was telling the truth. Once
they talked to me they see that I believe in all these
things, peace and democracy and freedom of religion
and all these other things. They see that I am just like
them.168
K.G.’s story illustrates, all too belatedly, the benefit of dialogue and the changed
course that discretionary matters can take when individuals are given the power to
persuade. K.G.’s case need not have been accepted. He did contribute to and join a
political party that could be construed as having taken part in activities described
under s 34 of the IRPA. But when given the opportunity to converse with those who
possessed the discretion to decide his case, any notion of him being a person of
actual concern appears to have disappeared. The offer to interview K.G. was clearly
predicated on the possibility that, notwithstanding his political affiliations, he was
not necessarily a ‘terrorist’ and not necessarily a person on whom the admissibility
regime had to be imposed. To engage in dialogue there needed to be an openness to
looking beyond the security-threat label that was being considered. And it was this
openness and the dialogue that ensued that lead to the determination that K.G. was
of no concern to Canadian society. In this, then, we can see that dialogue not only
depends upon demystifying security concerns, but it also contributes to this
demystification.

In short, recognizing that security provisions do not necessarily

involve existential questions about the actual security of Canada, tamps down the
rhetoric associated with security matters and puts them on a plane similar to other
more mundane admissibility matters.
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4.6.3 Abandoning membership as a proxy for security concerns
In liberal democracies, the law tends to attach consequences to an individual in
relation to action (or inaction) deliberately taken by that person. Put differently, it
is a generally held principle that individuals should not be subjected to serious state
imposed legal censure for acts or events over which they have no individual agency.
This connection between agency, action and consequence is ruptured in security
matters related to membership under section 34 of the IRPA. Recall some of the
absurdities that may arise because of the broad interpretation attached to the
concept of membership. Individuals can be found inadmissible for membership in
an organization that engaged in proscribed activity only after the individual left the
organization. They can similarly be found inadmissible for joining an organization
that denounced such activity decades earlier. And in the case of two individuals
with whom I spoke – J.M. and M.C. – they can be suspected of membership in an
organization simply for writing accounts (albeit sympathetic ones) of their
activities.
M.C. is a Colombian human rights advocate who was found to be a Convention
refugee in 2003 after he was forced to flee Colombia due to threats from that
country’s paramilitary groups. Prior to leaving Colombia, M.C. had been a vocal
critic of the human rights abuses of the country’s paramilitary groups and their
connections with the national government. He reported and published on the topic
and came to support a leftist political party, in return for which, the paramilitary
threatened him, his wife and four year old son.169 Twelve years after his arrival and
recognition as a Convention refugee, Canada has still not made a decision on his
application for permanent residence, nor explained the delay. It is clear to M.C. and

As was documented in calls for M.C.’s immediate protection by both Amnesty International in an
“Urgent Action” communique and by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in a formal
request to the Colombian government.
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his lawyer, however, that the delay is related to a suspicion that his actions while in
Colombia constituted membership in the FARC guerrilla group.170
J.M.’s experience was very similar – he was found inadmissible in relation to his
work as a journalist in El Salvador primarily it seems because he acted as an
intermediary between foreign journalists and FMLN rebels during that country’s
prolonged civil war.171 J.M. describes his actions in the following terms:
I was never a member of the guerrilla, but I went to the
front to make stories. At that moment, what you had to
do was just say the truth. The media of El Salvador
favoured the right, and we said, just say the truth. Yes
this was good for the guerrillas, but this was also good
for journalism.172
The problem with membership as a ground for establishing inadmissibility is its
total lack of connection to any personal acts – those set out at paragraphs 34(1)(a)
to (c) –

that actually animate security concerns.

Basing inadmissibility on

amorphous notions of membership obviates the need to hear from the individual, as
the analysis is almost entirely directed at the actions of the organization in question
rather than those of the individual. Once the broad criteria for membership are
satisfied, there is very little room for the inadmissible individual’s perspective: the
complexities and nuances of their own personal history and the fractured history of
the countries that they have left become irrelevant. One can immediately see how
this concept of membership is at odds with a TWAILian perspective, but for present
purposes, I also contend that it forecloses the possibility of meaningful dialogue.
Instead, it has created a kind of guilt by association free-for-all that has been

Interview with M.C. October 16, 2014.
Interview with J.M. March 28, 2014. Of interest, the United States has implemented a general
waiver of inadmissibility for FMLN members who did not directly engage in terrorist activity, see
Exercise of Authority Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 78, Fed. Reg. 24225 (April 13, 2013).
Canada has implemented no such waiver.
172 Ibid.
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specifically rejected in other immigration contexts173 and is at odds with principles
of both domestic and international criminal law.174 Membership does not concern
itself with a person’s own culpable conduct, but rather with the conduct of others
for whom the person cannot, and often does not wish to speak. This is why
membership as a proxy for personal or knowing connection to security related
actions forecloses dialogue. If individual agency is unimportant to the matter, there
really is no basis on which to engage in a meaningful discursive exchange.
It is indeed notable that even the United States, which not surprisingly also
adopts a broad approach to security-related immigration matters, has recognized
that loose criteria oriented towards group affiliation rather than personal action is
problematic. The U.S. does not impose immigration liability for mere membership.
What is required, rather, is evidence that an individual provided “material support”
to an organization engaged in terrorist or other proscribed activity.175 Responding
to criticism that the “material support bar” similarly held people responsible for the
wrongdoing of others, the Department of Homeland Security has recently
implemented a series of waivers for those whose contributions were insignificant,
were related to routine social or commercial transactions, humanitarian assistance
or arose out of “substantial pressure that does not rise to the level of duress.”176
These exemption provisions provide to individuals the raw material with which to
present their perspective and, at least in theory, with a meaningful opportunity to

173 Most explicitly in the context of refugee status determination and the application of the Refugee
Convention’s exclusion clauses for acts amounting to complicity in war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as elucidated in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ezokola v Canada, 2013
SCC 40 at para 3.
174 As further noted in the Ezokola case, ibid, at para 82: “guilt by association violates the principle of
individual criminal responsibility. Individuals can only be liable for their own culpable
conduct…”[citations omitted] Domestically, criminal code provisions concerning terrorism, while
also exceptionally broad, are oriented towards prohibiting acts that facilitate terrorist activity rather
than mere membership in an organization that may be implicated in such activity: see Criminal Code
of Canada, RSC, 1985, C-46, s 83.
175 See section 212(a)(3)(B) of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B).
176 The waiver provisions were implemented by discretionary authority under s212(d)(3)(B)(i) of
the INA: 79 Fed. Reg. 6913 (Feb. 5, 2014) online: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-0205/pdf/2014-02353.pdf and http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-05/pdf/2014-02357.pdf.
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persuade decision-makers that they do not pose a security threat.

Just as

importantly, these provisions also inform decision-makers that the blunt instrument
of inadmissibility based on association is at times in need of nuance and that the
‘right’ decision in such matters is one that, whichever way it goes, is rooted in
context.

In short, these provisions create the possibility for meaningful and

substantive dialogue, a possibility that simply does not exist under the Canadian
approach to membership.

4.6.4 Changing the Decision-Makers and their Practice Ideologies
As I alluded to above, the “practice ideologies” that suffuse the work of
discretionary decision-makers are essential in determining whether they will apply
dialogical approaches to the processes over which they preside. I argue here that
the transfer of decision-making responsibility for those flagged for security
concerns from Citizenship and Immigration Canada to the Canada Border Services
Agency makes the creation of dialogical practice ideologies virtually impossible.
This is the concern expressed by Dauvergne when she describes the “differing
governing ethos” associated with the shift in decision-making responsibility from an
agency responsible for admission, to one whose primary task is enforcement and
removal.177
Whether it is a differing “governing ethos” or a new set of “practice ideologies,”
the implication of the shift to border control is clear: the end game of security
matters is removal and in this game, dialogical processes are superfluous at best and
counterproductive at worst. It is indeed, very difficult to conceive of a set of
conditions by which an enforcement agency such as CBSA could ever engage in truly
good faith dialogue with those over whom it holds such totalizing power. Handler

Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008) at p 169 and see discussion, above, at Chapter 1.
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notes that there are many potential barriers to developing trusting relationships
between decision-makers and individuals – “lack of resources, working conditions,
staff characteristics,” but the crucial one, he continues, is “the construction of the
client's moral character, which…is pre-determined by the organization's dominant
moral system – specifically, are clients to be treated as subjects or objects?”178 The
overarching CBSA construction of the moral character of inadmissible persons is
that they are law-breakers and criminals who threaten public safety and state
security interests. They are dangerous objects to be contained and processed, and
the processing, it hardly need be mentioned, is removal.179
This is not to say that decision-makers will never side with individual applicants,
or that they are necessarily unsympathetic towards those whose cases they decide.
But it is unrealistic to expect an organization with an enforcement mandate and a
top-down, command and control approach to truly absorb the elements of trust,
dialogue and attention to historical nuance that I suggest are integral to any agenda
of reform in security-related decision-making. For these reasons, I believe it is
imperative to transfer decision-making in all admissibility cases back to agencies
that view admission as an integral part of their mandate – those being Citizenship
and Immigration Canada and, as I will describe below, the Immigration and Refugee
Board.

178 Handler, Dependent People, supra note 55 at 1056, again citing Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Human
Service Organizations, supra note 82. Once again, of relevance here is the literature on New
Institutionalism which explores and seeks to understand the ways in which social interaction,
institutional logics, norms and rules guide the behaviour of individuals within organizations. See the
discussion at Chapter One, note 94 and, in particular Victor Nee and Paul Ingram, “Embeddedness
and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure” in Mary Brinton and Victor Nee, The New
Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage, 1990) at 19-20. The refusal of CBSA to engage
in personal interviews makes it difficult to precisely assess how these factors play out within the
Agency. For the purposes of this project, I merely mention this strand of research in recognition of
its relevance in explaining organizational decision-making cultures.
179 Nowhere is this construction of the moral character of inadmissible persons by the CBSA made
more evident than in its creation and energetic promotion of its “Most Wanted List”, which closely
mimics criminal ‘wanted lists’. The list can be viewed online at: http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/wccg/menu-eng.html.
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In addition to changing the location of decision-making in this area, a new
“governing ethos” needs to be cultivated amongst those charged with making
admissibility assessments and determinations, an ethos built on the following:
x

A presumption that those seeking admission have come in good faith;

x

A desire to engage with these persons, born of the recognition that
“good” decisions – those that are transparent, intelligible and justified
– are ones based on information that can usually only be obtained
following two-way processes of dialogue;

x

A recognition that while the stories of those seeking admission may be
complex and their pasts intermingled with conflict, these facts alone
do not constitute a threat to national security;

x

A further recognition that security is not enhanced, but in fact
compromised by focusing on an overly broad cohort of individuals;

x

A renewed focus on the actions of individuals, rather than on vague
and unhelpful indicia of group affiliation;

x

A TWAILian sense of the histories that have led to Southern conflicts,
the patterns of forced migration that these histories have created and
the asymmetrical ways that security provisions have typically been
applied to those fleeing from conflict zones in the Global South.

Returning decision-making responsibility for security matters to immigration
officials will not on its own institute the above practice ideologies. They must be
proactively introduced, inculcated and reinforced through a number of strategies
and instruments. As Sossin notes, these include but are not limited to: soft law
instruments, judicial vigilance, leadership, supervision and the fostering of civil
service values.180 What are these values? I suggest that they include Sossin’s
conception of the value of neutrality which, as mentioned above, is defined by a

180

See most particularly Sossin, Neutrality to Compassion supra note 1 at 430.
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willingness to balance competing obligations that may include those owed to the
government of the day, but extend to include duties toward applicants, to the 'public
interest' and to 'uphold the rule of law.' 181 This balancing of multiple interests is
particularly important in an area implicating security and terrorism, given the
politically supercharged nature of the issues and the omnipresent temptation on the
part of political actors to curtail liberties in the name of protecting security.
Sossin also examines civil service values through the lens of legal norms such as
independence, fairness and trust: these norms are important in creating the
conditions for substantive dialogue.182 More specific to our present context, I
suggest that well-established international legal norms to which Canada has
acceded, most particularly the principle of non-refoulement, must also play a role in
all decision-making involving individuals who have asserted a fear of persecution if
removed to their country of origin.

The 1951 Refugee Convention is a

comprehensive scheme with provisions related to the protection of refugees,183 but
also to the exclusion of those who have engaged in serious and international
crimes184 and to the ineligibility of those few individuals who pose a threat to the
security of the host state.185
obligations toward refugees.

These provisions define Canada’s international
They formalize the commitment of the Canadian

public to the protection of the human rights of non-citizens and they make clear to
refugee claimants the limits of this commitment: it does not extend to those who
have themselves engaged in human rights abuses and it does not apply to those who
present a security threat to Canada.

Put somewhat differently, the Refugee

Convention defines the terms of engagement – the terms of dialogue – between its
signatories and those seeking protection under it. I suggest that these parameters
must be central in the minds of decision-makers exercising discretion under s34,

Ibid at 428-430.
Ibid at 439.
183 See Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra 150.
184 Ibid at Article 1F.
185 Ibid at Articles 32, 33.
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particularly because the ambit of that provision is, as we have seen, potentially
broader than the limited set of exclusions found in the Refugee Convention.
Internalizing knowledge of the Refugee Convention and understanding how its
obligations are woven into security matters is relatively straightforward. More
difficult, but no less important, is the need to expand the scope of practice ideologies
to include a sensitivity to the global dynamics that have created protracted
situations of conflict in the global south and the waves of forced migration that have
ensued. As I have mentioned above, if large swaths of the global population are at
least notionally captured by broad security provisions, it is crucial that discretionary
decisions about admission be informed by context, an appreciation for history and a
corresponding focus on the actions of individuals, rather than their mere proximity
to conflict. This is central to the TWAILian perspective that I previously explored,
but it is also central to a coherent approach to security. In this vein, I propose that
decision-makers receive training on the history and context of political conflicts that
have created most of the world’s refugee-producing situations.
In an engaging and provocative paper, Mohsen al Attar and Vernon Tava provide
a conceptual and practical approach to incorporating TWAIL principles into legal
pedagogy, particularly in the teaching of international law.186 The central goal of the
approach is, of course, to expose students to southern perspectives on international
law. But of particular interest for our purposes is that the authors propose not
merely to introduce students to TWAIL scholarship, but to do so through a ‘dialogic
teaching-learning experience’ aimed at fostering genuine student engagement.187
This approach is a direct response, claim the authors, to the alienation caused by
traditional legal pedagogy, an alienation that arises because law students are

Al Attar, Mohsen & Vernon Ivan Tava, "TWAIL Pedagogy - Legal Education for Emancipation"
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1438325 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2009) [Al Attar
and Tava, "TWAIL Pedagogy"]. See also, Diane Otto, “Handmaidens, Hierarchies and the Crossing of
the Public/Private Divide in the Teaching of International Law” (2000) 1 Melbourne J. Int’l L. 35.
187 Al Attar and Tava, TWAIL Pedagogy, ibid, at note 68, citing Otto, ibid, at 40-44.
186
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virtually compelled to sever justice claims from the application of legal principle.188
This in turn “yields a generation of jurists, judges, and legislators unmoved by the
plight of the poor and unequipped to tackle the oppression our international legal
corpus produces.”189 By way of contrast, the authors suggest that deploying TWAIL
principles – as both international law theory and legal pedagogy – encourages
students to become more conscious of themselves and their place in the world and
to think independently about the law, the Western world and its role in the
problems of the Global South.190
It is, of course, unrealistic to expect governments to provide critical legal
pedagogy to those they entrust to uphold the current legal order. This is not what I
propose. What I do propose is that officers be encouraged to reflect in their training
on the histories and inequities that drive global migration and to weave this
perspective into an approach to discretion that emphasizes transparency,
participation and non-discrimination. One of the ways in which officers may begin
this reflection is by consideration of the following scenarios191:
Scenario I
Applicant A donated the equivalent of $60 in 1976 to an organization that asserted
independence from a regime that Canada has designated as one that engaged in
widespread human rights violations.

The successful independence movement was

immediately recognized as legitimate by both the United Nations General Assembly and
by Canada individually.
Scenario II

Al Attar and Tava, TWAIL Pedagogy, supra note 186 at 22.
Ibid.
190 Ibid at 39.
191 I include these scenarios as an illustration of the kind of thought experiment that I believe officers
should be encouraged to undertake. I leave for another day a more fleshed out training curriculum.
188
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Applicant B is the spouse of a politician who was a member of a non-violent,
ethnically-based political party that urged negotiations between a militant organization
and the federal government.
Scenario III
Applicant C engaged in the subversion by force of a government in the last ten years.
He was directly involved in armed confrontations. The subversion led to the falling of
the government and the failing of the state, which is now dominated by militants who
have subsequently made direct threats against Canada.

Of course the provocative feature of these scenarios is that the more or less
innocuous examples of Applicants A and B are based on actual findings of
inadmissibility, while the far more concerning Applicant C is a hypothetical
American soldier who participated in the Iraq war. The intent of such an exercise
would not be to encourage officers to find American soldiers inadmissible, but
would rather be to encourage officers to reflect carefully about their perceptions as
to who constitutes a security threat and to focus their minds on the commission of
acts that trigger security concerns, rather than on discriminatory views of those
who seek admission from conflict zones in the global south.
The prospect of translating Al Attar and Tava’s approach to teaching TWAIL in
law schools into an approach to training immigration decision-makers about the
international dimensions of their work is intriguing for reasons related to both
process and product. From a process perspective, Al Attar and Tava’s approach
suggests that the method by which individuals learn about legal relationships
informs how they will later engage in such relationships. On this understanding, a
dialogical approach to training about the international issues that arise in security
decisions can only help to foster a dialogical approach to the decision-making itself.
With respect to content, I believe that an engaged exploration of the root causes of
political conflicts, taking into consideration TWAILian perspectives on international
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legal issues such as colonial rule, foreign domination and the legitimacy of selfdetermination efforts would help bring nuance to the process, focusing it on
individuals who have meaningfully contributed to proscribed activities.192
4.6.5 The Role of the Judiciary
The suggestion that legal norms have a role to play in considering civil service
values brings to the fore the role of the judiciary in reforming and refining the
security process. While I accept on a fairly theoretical level the suggestion that
judicial control in administrative law does not necessarily improve outcomes and
can, in fact impede dialogical processes, I have come to view immigration matters in
general and security matters in particular as an exception to this rule.

The

vulnerability of security decision-makers to overt, top-down political suasion,
combined with the extremely high stakes of these decisions require, in my view,
some form of oversight from a body more structurally detached from politics and
narrowly oriented toward rule of law considerations.193

British scholar Satvinder Juss proposes a somewhat similar approach to discretionary
immigration decision-making that he refers to as “cultural jurisprudence.” It is, in large measure, an
approach to dialogical discretion in the immigration context that attempts to take seriously the
perspectives of those seeking admission and to reform immigration law along non-discriminatory
lines. The result, I suggest, provides insight into a similarly promising possibility for decision-making
in the migration-security context. In addition to calling for a process based on participation, respect
for dignity and trust, Juss’ conception of cultural jurisprudence emphasizes the importance of
contextual socio-political and cultural knowledge in crafting appropriate discretionary immigration
decisions. See Satvinder Juss, Discretion and Deviation in the Administration of Immigration Control
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 5-6, 14-15.
193 In this, I share the view of Daniel Kanstroom, who notes:
192

Immigration law differs in important respects from many other
areas of administrative law, however. Too Olympian, transcendent,
or even policy-based a perspective in this arena can put many
individuals at grave risk. A sort of theoretical triage, in which
abstract intellectual purity may have to be sacrificed in the service
of more immediate law reform is therefore justified.
See D Kanstroom, “Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in US
Immigration Law” (1997) 71 Tulane Law Rev 703 at 730.
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In a recent public lecture, McGill University professor and United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants François Crépeau provocatively noted
that in its increasing use in matters of security, detention and removal,
administrative law has become “the most dangerous law in the land,” as invasive on
matters of human liberty as the criminal law, yet devoid of the protections that
criminal courts have developed over the centuries.194 Crépeau went on to note that:
In many countries that do not have the death
penalty…the administrative judge today is the only
domestic judge who can send people to face
extrajudicial execution, torture or arbitrary detention. It
is a heavy burden to shoulder. Immigration regulations,
proceedings, and policies now "mimic" the criminal
justice system in many ways…However, these shifts
have not been accompanied by increased legal
safeguards of the kind found in criminal law. The
continued insufficiency of human rights guarantees
within administrative proceedings relating to migration,
coupled with the increasing use of punitive sanctions
and regimes akin to criminal law, often place irregular
migrants in a very precarious position.195
In flagging a judicial role for preserving rule of law principles in migrationsecurity matters, I am not suggesting that decision-makers be stripped of all latitude
in determining how best to go about their work. What I do suggest, however, is that
if legislation is to cast security matters in sweepingly broad terms, than the
processes for determining questions of admission and expulsion must contain
mechanisms for ensuring that the individuals subject to security decisions are
listened to in good faith and that they are afforded the opportunity to persuade
independent decision-makers that they pose no security threat. In short, migrationsecurity matters need their “Baker moment” and in a context in which political

François Crépeau, “From Enforced Closure to Regulated Mobility: The Need for a Paradigm Shift in
Migration Policies”, Public Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association for Refugee and
Forced Migration Studies, Toronto, Canada, May 13, 2015.
195 Ibid.
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actors seek to secure advantage by entrenching perceived links between migration
and insecurity, it would appear that such a moment can only emanate from the
courts.
Another, and perhaps more compelling reason that the courts maintain an
important role in the security-migration nexus is that this area is not one solely
relating to executive discretion, but it also implicates important legal entitlements.
These entitlements derive from a complex interplay of international and domestic
law – the right against refoulement and the non-derogable right not to be returned
to torture amongst them – that are firmly within the decision-making expertise of
the courts.
This raises a different angle on the notion of dialogue than that which we have
discussed, that being the dialogue that may take place, not between decision-maker
and individual, but rather between the decision-maker and the judiciary. Above, I
referred to the potential that the Baker decision held out for a shift to a more
dialogic approach to decision-making in humanitarian and compassionate
applications. It was predicted that Baker would have an impact, not necessarily on
the outcomes of H&C applications, but much more fundamentally, on the way in
which such applications are considered by immigration officers, a prediction that
has to a significant extent at least, been born out.196 Sossin refers to the changes in
soft law instruments that were implemented as a result of the Baker decision and
the impact of the decision can also be observed, still frequently, in decisions of lower
courts sitting on judicial review of H&C decisions.197

See Lorne Sossin, “The Politics of Soft Law: How judicial decisions influence bureaucratic
discretion in Canada” in Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday, eds., Judicial Review and Bureaucratic
Impact : International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Cambridge UP, 2004) at 150.
197 The examples are myriad, but see for example Paul v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1081 and Damte v
Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 1212.
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Similar change needs to occur in the migration-security context. To reiterate a
point I made earlier, this is not a normative call for a more “lenient” approach to
discretionary decision-making in this area. It is, rather, a call for substantive review
of inadmissibility decisions in the hopes that it will foster a more nuanced, engaged
and individualized process. It is a call to bring individuals affected by such decisions
into the mix and to recognize that this is central to the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process.

4.6.6 Reform the Discretionary Ministerial Relief Provision
As I illustrated in Part Two of this study, the theoretical availability of a
discretionary exemption for inadmissibility found at s42.1 of the IRPA is all but
illusory given the delays associated with it and the truly minimal level of
engagement that it requires of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness.198 However, I do not view the availability of a backend discretionary
relief mechanism to be inherently problematic; first of all, in a risk averse world, it is
likely inevitable that governments will choose to err on the side of caution on
questions related to security and admission. In this context, the availability of a
discretionary waiver of inadmissibility can provide an important safeguard against
overly broad inadmissibility decisions. 199

I refer specifically here to the fact that applications for Ministerial relief frequently remain
undecided after 8-10 years, and to the more or less “boilerplate” reasons for denying relief that were
upheld as sufficient by the Supreme Court of Canada in Agraira, supra note 121.
199 Though to be clear, I do not suggest that after-the-fact waivers of admissibility are a sufficient
curative to an otherwise overly broad security regime. Just as courts have rejected the notion that
prosecutorial discretion can ameliorate constitutionally impaired criminal provisions, so too (in my
estimation) should they reject arguments that a Ministerial discretion can cure an otherwise infirm
inadmissibility regime: see for example R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at paras 86-88. As I have
noted above, however, in matters of security, states will virtually always seek to maintain the
flexibility that a discretionary regime provides and it is on this basis, rather than on the basis of an
endorsement of the current discretionary regime, that I make these comments.
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Secondly, if designed properly – that is, if designed to provide timely, impartial
and justified decisions – a discretionary relief mechanism can form an important
part of an overall scheme that takes national security concerns seriously without
compromising the state’s international human rights obligations. Recall that it was
the very availability of such a mechanism that the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Suresh decision relied upon to uphold the legality of the security provisions then in
place.200
Unfortunately, the promise of the Ministerial exemption provision has wilted out
of neglect, to the point that it should now be viewed as an entirely ineffective
administrative mechanism.

One can see why elected politicians, particularly the

Minister responsible for public safety, would want to avoid making the politically
charged decision to grant rights to those already found to have engaged in acts such
as terrorism and subversion of foreign governments. And yet, given the seemingly
innocuous forms of involvement of many of these individuals, a significant
percentage of the applications for Ministerial relief will be strong on the merits. The
result, it seems, is avoidance. Successive Ministers have confirmed through their
(in)action that they simply want no part of this process, and so I would propose that
they be granted their wish. I would instead place responsibility for waiver decisions
in the hands of the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board, a body that already possesses considerable expertise balancing, in the
criminal context, concerns over public safety and security with the rights of
individuals.201

Recall from earlier in our discussion that the review of

inadmissibility findings at the Immigration Division of the IRB is asymmetrical – the
Minister may appeal Immigration Division decisions to the IAD, but the individual
found to be inadmissible may only seek leave and judicial review before the Federal
Court. I would propose to allow both parties to appeal inadmissibility findings

Suresh, supra note 116 at para 110.
The IAD hears appeals of criminal inadmissibility matters pursuant to its authority under sections
62-71 of the IRPA and may grant relief to appellants on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.
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under s34 to the IAD, and to grant the IAD the residual discretionary authority to
waive inadmissibility in appropriate cases. It is imperative that in considering these
security cases, the IAD be required to act expeditiously and to conduct hearings, as it
does in the other appeals that come before it. This, of course, is the key element of
any discretionary regime built around dialogical principles, for it is at this moment
of literal dialogue that the decision-maker must listen to the individual whose future
is in their hands and it is frequently at this moment, I contend, that the individual
ceases to simply be a terrorist or a spy or a security threat and instead becomes a
person whose past actions may be adjudged on their own merits.
Transforming the process along these lines would breathe life into the relief
provision – it would attain a degree of insulation from political rhetoric and give
inadmissible individuals a sense that they are active participants in a process that is
fundamentally important to them.

Public safety considerations would still be

prominent in the process and the Minister would retain avenues of recourse to
respond to decisions with which s/he disagrees. What would end, however, is the
indefinite period of waiting that most inadmissible persons endure, only to be
followed by a boilerplate decision that merely reiterates the original basis of the
inadmissibility determination.

Conclusion
The use of discretion is ubiquitous and controversial. In its many incarnations it
has been both praised and criticized; it has been viewed as essential to a progressive
state and as a troubling deviation from the rule of law and individual rights. The
paradox of administrative discretion is that it is at once an expression of state power
and a limitation on it. It is exercised in contexts in which the state possesses the
power to establish the parameters of acceptable choice. At the same time, the
existence of discretion implies a ceding of state control to the administrative realm
which balances multiple duties beyond those owed to the government of the day. In
the preceding pages, I have argued that for states to exercise this power in
333

justifiable ways, it must approach discretion as a location of democratic action. This
requires, at a minimum, that those who are affected by expressions of discretionary
state power be placed at the centre of the processes by which it is exercised. This, I
suggest, is as true in the context of migration-security determinations as it is in any
other domain.
The reality of discretion in security matters is, however, very far removed from
any principle of dialogism and instead resembles a classic iteration of top-down
executive power. The result is a security regime that is suspicious of context and
skewed to ensnare those who have fled conflict in the global south. This is a
problem from a TWAIL perspective, but it is also a problem from the perspective of
a coherent and legitimate security regime. The solution, I propose, is to recalibrate
the approach of decision-makers so that they meaningfully engage with the
individuals affected by their decisions and consider carefully both the content of
their actions and the context in which they occurred. Given the rights at stake in
these matters and the fundamentally legal nature of them, I believe that the courts
should preserve an important role in the security context, but one that is mindful of
the complex weighing of interests in the discretionary process. While rights must be
preserved, the courts also play an important role in creating the conditions for
dialogue. There are times, as in the example of Baker, when the courts must take it
upon themselves not to end a conversation, but to begin it.
In the end, then, what I have proposed in the above pages is rather modest: I do
not suggest that individuals within Canada should not be subject to some form of
security screening process. I do not suggest that such individuals have a right to any
particular form of substantive outcome. But what I do suggest is that where these
individuals assert that their core rights will be affected by removal, they should be
entitled to a rich procedural process that focuses on the security threat that they
may pose in an individualized, dialogical and good faith process, and which takes as
sacred Canada’s commitment to comply precisely with its international obligations.
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As the final stages of this dissertation were being completed, public interest in
the Syrian refugee crisis exploded following the viral image of a young boy who
drowned, together with his brother and mother, in their efforts to seek asylum in
Europe. This tragic event created a renewed push to prioritize the resettlement of
refugees, yet even in these solemn circumstances, the security discourse surged to
the front of the agenda. In refusing to commit to admitting more refugees, Prime
Minister Stephen Harper asserted that his political rivals were not capable of
making the tough national-security decisions required of a prime minister. He
continued: “Our opponents are simply not up to it. Thomas Mulcair and Justin
Trudeau will not even call jihadist terrorism what it is. But if you cannot call jihadist
terrorism by its name then you cannot be trusted to confront it and you cannot keep
Canadians safe from it.”1 In an instant, Mr. Harper sought to reframe the national
conversation from one about refugees and the common call of humanity to one that
unsubtly cast refugees as security threats.
At roughly the same time, the American Migration Policy Institute published an
interesting commentary, revealing that in the 14 years since September 11, 2001,
the United States has resettled 784,000 refugees. Of those refugees, precisely two
have been arrested for planning terrorist activities and, the report goes on to note,
neither of these individuals were planning an attack on the United States.2
These two stories, and the geopolitical context from which they emerge, help to
frame the debate that I have explored over the preceding pages. They illustrate the
tensions of the securitized state, brought into sharp relief in the context of a refugee
crisis of historical proportions. As Syrian refugees converge on European borders,

Tonda MacCharles, “Conservative Leader Stephen Harper discounts meeting with other party
leaders to discuss refugee crisis, holds to 10,000 more admissions from Syria, Iraq in next three
years”, The Toronto Star (7 September 2015), online: The Toronto Star <http://www.thestar.com>.
2 Kathleen Newland, “The U.S. Record Shows Refugees Are Not a Threat”, Migration Policy Institute
(October, 2015), online: Migration Policy Institute http://migrationpolicy.org.
1
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they implicitly question the legitimacy of closing borders to those who face danger
at home. In this, they are backed by international law, but not necessarily by the
states tasked with receiving them, many of which are reconsidering (in highly nontheoretical ways) the twin imperatives of the liberal democratic state: ensuring the
security of citizens while respecting the universality of human rights.
Revisiting the Analysis
This brings me to some concluding remarks about security, inadmissibility and
migration. Over the course of this exploration, I have endeavoured to identify an
approach to security in immigration matters that would be generally acceptable to a
wide spectrum of observers, ranging from those who propose a generally open
borders approach, to those who defend the sovereign orthodoxy of contemporary
migration law.
As I have noted at various points along the way, exclusionary migration policies
are relatively uncontroversial where they are legitimately tied to matters
implicating the security of the host community. It is equally uncontroversial that
states owe certain obligations to non-citizens within their territory, at the very least
where removal of such individuals would result in their persecution. In the space
between these principles, decisions on security must be made and in the securitized
context of this era, states are tempted to leave this space largely unencumbered by
any substantive notions of legality. It is, I have argued, an example of a legal grey
hole – one that contains superficial trappings of legality but in reality remains a zone
of virtually unfettered executive power. I have argued that states ought to resist the
temptation to create such grey holes.
My arguments in this regard have proceeded in a number of steps, all with an
emphasis on the Canadian context.

In the first step, I examined some of the

prevailing debates on issues germane to my topic: migration, security, the rule of
law and exclusion in times of perceived exception. After a brief ‘first principles’
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review of scholarship on liberalism, migration and security, I moved on to outline
the arguments of scholars such as Benhabib and Dauvergne who make the case, in a
variety of ways, for a thick conception of the rule of law, one that applies to citizens
and non-citizens alike and even in times of perceived exception. The position is not
dissimilar to that of Joseph Carens who, in his recent work, has proposed a version
of liberalism that that “takes rights seriously without making them absolute,” and at
the same time is sensitive to context and history.3 At the very least, Carens notes,
liberal states should take seriously the moral claims of outsiders within a political
community who would like to remain.4 Exclusion, Carens concludes, “has to be
justified.”5 While I do not, in this dissertation, attempt to settle the argument as to
whether this process of justification is owed to all persons outside a political
community who may seek entry into it, I do assert one very basic fact that is of
central importance to my later argument: justification is required in relation to
those already within a community who assert a risk to themselves if removed. As I
later explore in the first chapter, this position is consistent with other scholars who
write, more generally, about principles of legality and the rule of law. As Dyzenhaus
notes, “the constraints of legality are the constraints of adequate justification.”
With this frame in mind, I moved on in the second step to an examination of the
Canadian decision-making regime in immigration security cases. In doing so, I made
reference to the various periods of exclusion in Canadian immigration law and to
the current preoccupation with security as a basis for inadmissibility. I also outlined
the broad legislative language applicable to these cases and the correspondingly
broad and deferential approach adopted by Canadian courts in reviewing securityrelated decisions. The result, I suggested, is that Canadian law renders inadmissible
not just those thought to pose a security threat to Canada, but a significantly

Joseph H Carens, “A Reply to Meilaender: Reconsidering Open Borders” (1999) 33:4 Int Migr Rev
1082 at 1083.
4 Joseph Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010).
5 Ibid.
3
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broader ambit of individuals. To further explore this observation, I then turned to a
quantitative assessment of Canadian decision-making in security cases, revealing
that such cases: a) virtually never relate to actual security threats against Canada or
its allies; b) virtually never involve allegations related to the actual commission of
crimes, but rather to membership – broadly defined – in organizations alleged to
have committed crimes; and c) are generally made against individuals from the
Global South who wish to make, or have made, a claim to refugee status in Canada.
The reality, I conclude, is that Canada’s security-migration regime appears to be
primarily focused on a surprising cohort of individuals: those with some connection
to localized, Third World (and frequently anti-colonial) movements.

This

preoccupation is not only empirically unconnected to actual security concerns, but it
also has important and, I assert, unjustified consequences for those subject to
security measures.
In the third step, I incorporated a TWAIL perspective to help explain – and
ultimately resolve – the deficits in justification identified in the preceding chapter. A
paradox of immigration law lies in the fact that it is a domain of both insular statebased policy and intimate connection to international law. At the outset of the
chapter I sought to illustrate the myriad ways in which domestic migration law is
both informed and constrained by international law and, inversely, how migration
law also transmits legal principles onto the international plane.
With this in mind, I set out to explore how a third world perspective on
international law can help us to think differently about some of the central themes
of this study. I argued that TWAIL’s emphasis on reading history and context into
the law, its focus on the rights of individuals rather than states, its critical stance on
the war on terror and its insistence on a substantive place for the rule of law are all
important ingredients in improving decision-making in the migration-security
realm. I also sought to illustrate how transposing TWAIL onto the migrationsecurity realm would require the adoption of discursive and participatory
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interactions between all parties and focus the security analysis on the actions rather
than the associations of individuals, bringing to it a sense of justification that it
currently lacks.
Building on this TWAIL analysis, I turned in the final chapter to an examination
of similar conversations from the realm of administrative law – about dialogue,
participation and the rule of law – and examined how a progressive interpretation
of administrative discretion could assist in bringing a greater sense of justification
to security-based immigration decisions. After briefly tracking the ebb and flow
history of discretionary decision-making in administrative law, I focused in on
recent approaches that assert that for discretionary authority to produce results
that are viewed as both legitimate and justified, they must engage in meaningful
dialogue with those over whom it is exercised. Dialogue and justification are
reinforcing concepts: a legal culture that aspires to justification is one that
emphasizes dialogue as the principle mechanism by which to attain it. Fostering
such a legal culture is particularly important when dealing with individuals who
lack the ability to assert their own voice; who lack the power, in other words, to
assert their version of the story that has placed them under the authority of the
administrative decision-maker. It is all the more so in legal domains where the
decision at issue is one that affects important rights.
Foreign nationals, particularly those alleged to have taken part in activities that
raise national security concerns are perhaps the prototype of such individuals. They
lack political voice and frequently face obstacles in asserting legal rights. And for
many such individuals, the discretion exercised in determining how their case will
proceed is perhaps the most important administrative decision that they will ever
confront. At this point in the analysis, I again addressed a central question: what
obligates states to engage in dialogue with non-citizens? The answer, at least for
present purposes, lies in two facts. The first is that, as I illustrated in my empirical
research, the vast majority of those subject to the security mechanisms in Canada
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have asserted a well-founded fear of persecution if removed to their countries of
origin. The second is that the cases that I examined over the course of this study
involved persons already present in Canada who were asserting a right to stay. As
such, processes to determine their legal entitlements are necessarily also processes
that define state authority to exercise coercion over such individuals. State coercion
is an important trigger for the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, and it also, I assert, triggers obligations to engage in dialogue.
Given that the actors in this legal context also tend to assert rights under
international law, most notably the Refugee Convention, this is also where TWAIL
commentary converges with dialogical approaches to administrative law. As noted
above, TWAIL principles support the use of discursive approaches when considering
the rights of Third World peoples, but it also provides direction, guidance and
context on the question of how that dialogue should take place.

It provides

substantive meaning, in other words, to administrative dialogue in a manner that
comports with the reality of those affected by security-based decisions. At the end
of this final step, I therefore sought to articulate an approach to decision-making
that incorporates both TWAIL perspectives and dialogical principles as two
ingredients that, I suggest, would remedy many of the ailments that presently
plague decisions in this area.
A TWAILian, Dialogical Model of Decision-Making
In the end, I suggest that taking principles derived from TWAIL scholarship and
combining them with dialogical approaches to administrative law creates a
promising formula for enhancing the legitimacy and justification of security related
decisions. It would accomplish this by issuing a number of prescriptions for reform
of the current process that I outlined in the previous chapter. To briefly reiterate,
the most important changes that this approach would dictate include the following:
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x

Demystifying Security – A prescription born of the realization that
security provisions will inevitably be cast in broad legislative language,
reserving to decision-makers the authority to distinguish cases of true
concern from those that are not. While immigration policy cannot be an
avenue of impunity for international crimes, nor too can it become a
vehicle for recasting all activity related to foreign instability as a security
threat. Measures must be taken to instil in decision-makers an
understanding of the complexity and context of global geo-political
instability and a general recognition that many cases flagged under the
broad security legislation do not raise existential questions about the
actual security of the state. Where a person is found to be notionally
described by the security legislation, this merely triggers the requirement
to engage in good faith dialogue, taking into consideration relevant
TWAIL factors, such as colonial history and post-colonial repression. And
as I illustrated by reference to one individual, engaging in dialogue at this
level fosters the demystification of security as a necessarily more
threatening form of inadmissibility than any of the others.

x

Abandoning membership as a proxy for security concerns – This
prescription aims to bring inadmissibility determinations in security
cases, at least in respect of refugee claimants, into conformity with the
Refugee Convention and with commonly accepted principles of individual
criminal responsibility.

In Chapter Two, I revealed that mere

membership in groups alleged to have committed proscribed acts is the
most frequent ground of security-related inadmissibility.

This has

occurred over a period of time in which appellate courts around the
world have firmly rejected membership as a form of liability in
international refugee law. Recalling that the vast majority of individuals
subject domestically to the security provisions are asylum seekers or
Convention refugees, it is a simple and incontrovertible fact that the
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membership criterion places Canada outside its international legal
obligations. I suggest that security-related decisions be based instead on
the concept of complicity, a ground of secondary liability that has been
both well-developed internationally and widely recognized as a
legitimate basis on which to assess individual responsibility for illicit
group activity.
x

Changing the Decision-Makers and their Practice Ideologies – In the binary
world of immigration law, evaluating inadmissibility is as much about
admission as it is exclusion. This being the case, I further proposed that it
is inappropriate for front-end decision-making in this domain to be
undertaken by a government agency whose principal raison d’etre is
enforcement and removal.

As such, I argued that decision-making

authority for security-related inadmissibility determinations be entirely
returned to Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
x

The Role of the Judiciary – I also contended that courts must maintain a
role in ensuring the legitimacy of security-related decisions, given both
the complex domestic and international law issues that arise and the
core, protected legal rights at stake. Processes of dialogue, such as those
that now routinely take place in the context of refugee determination
proceedings and humanitarian and compassionate applications are
frequently generated and maintained by a backdrop of legal entitlement.

x

Reform the Discretionary Ministerial Relief Provision – Finally, I proposed
that the mechanism for providing relief for inadmissibility be reformed
by shifting it away from the Public Safety Minister and placing it instead
within the framework of an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board. This would not only bring parity to
the appellate processes under the IRPA’s inadmissibility regime, granting
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to individuals that which the Minister already possesses, but it would also
situate dialogue and discretion in the same decision-making location.
This is in contrast to the current regime which confers discretion in a
process (the s44 report) that does not require dialogue and then confers
dialogue in a location with no discretion (the Immigration Division
hearing).
Agenda For Future Research
While this dissertation touches upon a variety of themes, its central objective is a
relatively modest one: to enhance the legitimacy and justification of security-related
decisions within one particular decision-making regime.

Several interesting

questions remain unaddressed, which gives rise to a research agenda that includes
the following issues: 1) the use of security provisions in overseas immigration
applications, particularly applications for refugee status submitted from abroad; 2)
a detailed analysis, beyond that which could be provided here, of the particular
kinds of groups that attract scrutiny from a security perspective; 3) further
international

comparative

research

on

how

other

countries

determine

inadmissibility for security purposes; and 4) a consideration of the contributions
that a TWAIL approach might make to other immigration contexts, most notably, the
present global refugee crisis. I now briefly expand on these topics:
1) Inadmissibility and Overseas Immigration Applications
The empirical work that I have undertaken in this dissertation concerns two
sights of decision-making on inadmissibility: decisions of the Immigration Division
of the Immigration and Refugee Board and decisions on Ministerial relief made by
the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. There remains another
area of decision-making that this dissertation does not touch upon: overseas
immigration applications determined by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
While I endeavoured to collect data on these decisions – I spent over a year in back
and forth communication with CIC on various Access to Information Requests – I
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was repeatedly frustrated in my efforts and was ultimately told that this data could
not be captured without absorbing exorbitant fees. Nevertheless, as an area of
inquiry, I continue to believe in the importance of collecting information on these
decisions. In the procedurally stripped down world of immigration law, overseas
immigration applications represent a certain kind of nadir: the Charter is of limited
application, procedural safeguards are minimal and judicial deference of such
decisions is at its highest. In particular, I would be keenly interested to find out how
many overseas applications for refugee protection are refused by Canadian officials
on the basis of s34 of the IRPA. The rights at stake in such applications are at least
equal to many of those individuals in Canada whose cases were included in this
study and yet decision-making in this area is virtually devoid of scrutiny.
2) International Comparative Research
While I have briefly referred over the preceding pages to migration-security
practices internationally, a more sustained comparative analysis of comparable
security regimes in other refugee-receiving countries would be of clear assistance in
evaluating the Canadian approach. In particular, it would be interesting to delve
into the recent waivers implemented in the United States, which represent an
apparent recognition of the overbreadth of their security-related inadmissibility
criteria. It would also be helpful to explore whether countries distinguish between
immigrants and refugees in the application of their security criteria and, if this is the
case, whether security measures applied vis-à-vis refugees are consistent with the
Refugee Convention.
3) Analysis of Inadmissible Groups
As I noted in my empirical analysis of s34 decisions, it was beyond the scope of
this dissertation to delve deeply into the nature of the organizations that become
embroiled in security proceedings. While I have looked into this elsewhere in the
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particular context of one country,6 a more in-depth analysis of the various
movements, organizations and groups would be of considerable value in shedding
further light on the motivations that drive security decisions. This vein of potential
research could help us understand whether there are any particular kinds of groups
that attract sanction; whether it matters if such groups are considered Canadian
allies or whether the question of current engagement in armed conflict is truly
considered to be an irrelevant consideration.
4) TWAIL in other Immigration Contexts
I have found TWAIL to provide a useful lens through which to examine my
dissertation topic. As I have argued, it can help to bring nuance and sensitivity to
legal domains not known for these traits. It can help to convey an understanding of
broad, macro-political phenomena as they are embodied in the lives of the
individuals who have been affected by them in ways that are highly relevant to legal
proceedings. And as many TWAIL scholars have argued, it is an approach that is
readily transposable to many areas of legal enquiry. In the realm of immigration
and refugee law, I suspect that a TWAIL approach could provide interesting insights
into a variety of areas, including: i) the application of the exclusion clauses under the
Refugee Convention; ii) the assessment of the bona fides of spousal sponsorships
under immigration legislation; iii) the assessment of credibility in relation to
refugee determination proceedings; iv) the selection of skilled workers for
immigration and the subsequent accreditation processes that follow immigration.

Angus Grant, Catherine Bruce & Catherine Reynolds, “Out of the Fire and into the Pot: The Eritrean
Liberation Movement, the Right to Self-Determination and the Over-Breadth of North American
Immigration Security Provisions” (2010) 25 Georgetown Imm Law J 859 at 870.
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5) Exploring the Role of Institutions in Migration-Security Decisions
As I have mentioned at various points, the influence of institutions in shaping
the discretionary decisions of their employees is an area of inquiry that is both
immensely important and, unfortunately, difficult to undertake in an era of guarded
access.

Nevertheless, further research on the internal dynamics of various

institutional players – CBSA, CIC and the IRB – and the role they play in influencing
security-related decisions would represent a helpful further contribution.7
More specifically, it would be interesting to examine how both formal
“norms-building" exercises such as training and less formal social relationships
serve to differentially inform the decision-making processes of CBSA enforcement
officers, CIC immigration officers and IRB adjudicators. Because circumstances arise
in which individuals from all three agencies make essentially the same
determinations, it would be particularly informative to explore whether, and to
what extent, their different institutional structures lead to different approaches to
the question of security.8

Once again, I refer here to the literature on New Institutionalism, which could prove particularly
insightful in thinking about how to improve decision-making in security matters, given its emphasis
on issues related to institutional change and inertia. See once again Mary Brinton and Victor Nee. The
New Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage, 1990) at pp 32-33 and see Helen Marie
Williams, “Examining the Nature of Policy Change: A New Institutionalist Explanation of Citizenship
And Naturalisation Policy in the UK and Germany 2000-2010”, PhD Dissertation, University of
Birmingham, 2011.
8 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “The Political Economies of Immigration Law” (2012) 2 UC Irvine
Law Review 1 at 46, who devotes considerable attention to the fragmentation of immigration law and
policy in the United States and to the disparate institutional players within the system that, when
working at odds, may compromise the “coherence and practical viability of immigration policy.” Any
engaged assessment of Canadian institutions that engage in security-related decisions would have to
confront the same possibility.
7
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Conclusion

“There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which
specified that a concern for one's safety in the face of
dangers that were real and immediate was the process
of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be
grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he
did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly
more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions
and sane if he didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly
them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to;
but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to.9
In a very recent decision of the Federal Court of Canada, the court was
confronted, once again, with its own version of a Catch-22 when it considered
whether an individual had reasonably been found inadmissible for his opposition to
the Soviet-backed regime that ruled over Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992. This was
also a regime that Canada has designated as one that committed gross human rights
violations or war crimes. In finding that it had no choice but to uphold the decision
finding the applicant to be inadmissible for security reasons, the court expressed its
discomfort, but nevertheless stated:
Although I am highly sympathetic to the Principal
Applicant’s position and recognize the potential
absurdity in denying refugee status to an individual on
the basis of his efforts to combat organizations that
Canada opposed as well, I am nonetheless bound to
apply the jurisprudence of our Court of Appeal.
…
There is therefore a Catch-22 quality to the outcome for
Mr. Maqsudi vis-à-vis subversion.10

9

Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961) at 32.
Maqsudi v Canada (PSEP), 2015 FC 1184.
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In this dissertation, I have sought to demonstrate that the above catch-22
situation is by no means confined to that case, but is in fact pervasive in the realm of
migration-security laws. I have also argued that this need not be the case. I have
done so by drawing upon commentary on migration and the rule of law, TWAIL
scholarship and a dialogical conception of administrative law. The confluence of
these distinct areas of legal inquiry can, I have argued, help us to conceive of an
approach to security in immigration matters that takes seriously the concerns of the
receiving state, while ensuring that inadmissibility findings are both justified and
limited to those who truly constitute a security threat.
I close with a final example of the problematic, and in some instances selfdefeating, security regime. In recent days, it emerged that the CBSA detained and
refused entry to Mourad Benchellali, a well-known Muslim anti-radicalization
activist. Benchellali had been an inmate at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba but this was not the end of his story; in the years following his release in 2004
he had become engaged in educational programs aimed at preventing the
radicalization of young Muslims, highlighting the dangers of ISIS and calling into
question the glamour of armed Jihad. Benchellali was seeking entry into Canada to
participate in a documentary on deradicalization and to speak to school groups.
Instead, he was deemed inadmissible under s34 and promptly returned to his native
France.11 In its efforts to secure Canada’s borders, the CBSA refused entry to
someone whose chief ambition is to diminish the imposing spectre of global
terrorism and insecurity. A Catch-22 of the highest, and most unjustified order.

11

Nicholas Keung, “Anti-radicalization activist to return to France after arrest at Pearson” The
Toronto Star (05 November, 2015) online: Toronto Star http://www.thestar.com.
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IRPA s.34(1) Decisions
Year

Country

Individual concerned

IRB File No./Locator

2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009

India
Turkey
Eritrea
Pakistan
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Iran
Germany
India
United States
Colombia
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Not stated
Iran
India
Pakistan
Pakistan
Russia
India
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Pakistan
Philippines
Lebanon
Pakistan
Angola
El Salvador
Russia
Nigeria
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Lebanon
India
Jordan
Spain
El Salvador
Pakistan
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Iran
Iran
Pakistan
Pakistan
Nigeria
Sudan
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Spain
Palestine
Sri Lanka
Iran
Niger
Mongolia
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Nigeria
Namibia
Namibia
Eritrea
Ethiopia

Redacted

2p.1
A2-02062/Tor.2p.84
A2-00882/Tor.1p.1
A2-02220/Tor.2p.113
A2-02084/Tor.2p.99
A2-02739/Tor.2p.125
A3-00040/Vanc.2p.30
A3-02442/Tor.2p.229
A2-02052/Tor.2p.64
A2-00439/Vanc.1 p.4
A4-00008/Tor.2p.240
A4-00251/Vanc.1 p.10
A4-00623/Vanc.2p.102
A3-00661/Tor.2p.147
A4-00253/Tor.2p.259
p.11
A4-00028/Tor.2p.247
A2-01163/Tor.2p.32
A4-00291/Vanc.2p.46
A4-00221/Tor.2p.255
A4-00552/Vanc.2p.66
A4-00754/Vanc. 2p.140
A4-00685/Vanc.2p.114
A4-0074S/Vanc.2p.133
A4-00550/Vanc.1 p.148
A4-00248/Tor.2p.1360
A3-02249/Tor.2p.179
A5-00065/Vanc. 2p.151
A5-00256/Vanc.2p.174
A3-02428/Tor.2p.202
94-00306/Tor.2p.6
A5-00305/Vanc.2p.240
A7-02227/Tor.2p.1
A4-00577/Vanc.2p.79
A4-00778/Vanc.1 p.52
A6-00680/Vanc.2p.424
A5-00762/Vanc.2p.380
A5-00730/Mtl2p.19
A5-02189/Tor.2p.370
A2-01501/Tor.2p.41
A5-00895/Tor.2p.1349
A7-00191/Vanc.2.p.447
A5-01856/Tor.2p.340
A7- 00473/ Vanc.1 p.75
A5-00146/Tor.2p.282
A6-01465/Tor.2p.518
A6-01120/Tor.2p.468
A5-01011/Tor.2p.300
A6-02505/Tor.2p.557
A7-00389/ Vanc.1 p.68
A5-00761/Mtl2p.25
A6-01490/Tor.2p.526
A6-02450/Tor.2p.541
A6-01328/Tor.2p.508
AB-00369/Tor.1p.103
A6-00947/Tor.1p.12
1p.1
A5-02375/Tor.2p.380
A6-00310/Tor.2p.395
00711/Mtl2p.44
A8-01194/Tor.2p.833
A5-01959/Tor.2p.353
A7-00971/Tor.2p.634
A5-00684/Vanc.2p.267
00230/Mtl2p.40
A8-00335/Tor.2p.805
A9-00743/Vanc.2.p.559
A8-02587/Tor.2p.925
A9-00297/Vanc.2p.522
A8-02764/Tor.2p.953
A8-01053/Vanc.2p.467
A8-01933/Tor.1p.32
p.122

Inventory List

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
)
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

Redacted
Redacted

Redacted

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

Redacted

IRPA
Section
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c)
( )( )(

c)

Proscribed
Organization
(BK)
HADEP
ELF
ISO/TJP
ISO/TJP
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
MEK
STASI
BTF

34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
Earth Liberation Front
34(1)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
FARC
LTTE
34(1)(f)(a)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
LTTE
34(1)(f)(c)
LTTE
34(1)(f)(c)
LTTE
34(1)(f)(c)
LTTE
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
Not stated
34(1)(f)(c)
Fedayan-e Khalq
34(1)(f)(c)
ISYF
34(1)(f)(c)
JKLF
34(1)(f)(c)
JKLF
34(1)(a)(f)
KGB
34(1)(f)(c)
KLF
34(1)(f)(c)
LTTE
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c)
NPA
34(1)(f)(c)
PFLP
34(1)(f)(c)
SSP
35(1)(a)**
UNITA
34(1)(f)(c)
FMLN
KGB
34(1)(a)(f)
34(1)(f)(c)
MAD
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
PLO
34(1)(f)(c)
AISSF/ISYF
34(1)(f)(c)
Arab Lib. Front
34(1)(c)(f)
ETA
34(1)(f)(c)
FMLN
34(1)(f)(c)
JKLF
34(1)(f)(c)
JKLF
34(1)(f)(c)
LTTE
34(1)(f)(c)
Mahdaviyat
34(1)(f)(c)
MEK
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
p
Cong.
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
SPLA
34(1)(f)(c)
ELF
34(1)(f)(c)
EPRP
34(1)(c)(f)
ETA
34(1)(f)(c)
Fatah/PLO
34(1)(f)(c)
LTTE
34(1)(f)(c)
MEK
34(1)(f)(b)
MNJ
34(1)(a)(f)
Mongolia/China
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
MQM
34(1)(f)(c)
AISSF
Bang. Freedom Party
34(1)(f)(c)
Biafran/Ogoni Orgs
34(1)(f)(c)
Caprivi Lib. Army
34(1)(f)(b)
34(1)(f)(b)
CLM
34(1)(f)(c)
ELF
34(1)(b)(f)
EPRDF

Organization Type

Outcome

Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Religious
Religious
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Government agency
Separatist/Liberation
Environmental
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Not stated
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Government agency
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Religious
Political Movement
Political Movement
Government agency
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Liberation/Political
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Religious
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Government agency
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement

Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible*
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible*
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible*
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible

Refuge
e Claim
Yes
Yes
Yes
n
Yes
n
Yes
Yes
n
No
n
No
susp.
susp.
Denied
n
n
Yes
Denied
Denied
Denied
1996
CR
Denied
No
susp.
susp.
Denied
n
Yes
No
Yes
1995
Denied
No
Yes
CR
n
Yes
susp.
Yes
Denied
Yes
No
Yes
1997
2003
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
susp.
n
Yes
susp.
susp.
Yes
Yes
susp.
1997
Yes
Yes
Yes
n
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2004
Yes

Board Member
Ladouceur
Dennis Paxton
M.A. Stoddart
Vlad. Tumir
I. DeCarlo
Aina Martens
M. Tessler
Vlad. Tumir
Marilou Funston
Irene Dicaire
M.A. Stoddart
Leeann King
Irene Dicaire
Dennis Paxton

J. Walkinshaw
Beauchamp
Marilou Funston
Vlad. Tumir
M. Tessler
C. DeCarlo
O. Nupponen
M. Tessler
Leeann King
M. Tessler
O. Nupponen
Leeann King
Aina Martens
O. Nupponen
Leeann King
Douglas
C.A. Simmie
O. Nupponen
W. Willoughby
D. Shaw Dyck
Irene Dicaire
D. Shaw Dyck
O. Nupponen
Louis Dube
J. Walkinshaw
S. Gratton
S. Gratton
M. Tessler
C.A. Simmie
D. Shaw Dyck
M.A. Stoddart
J. Walkinshaw
C. DeCarlo
Marilou Funston
S. Gratton
Leeann King
Ladouceur
Douglas
C.A. Simmie
Douglas
K. Thomson
R. Stratigopoulos
Louis Dube
DeCarlo/Simmie
Marilou Funston
Marco Gaetani
Harold Shepherd
C.A. Simmie
Bill Willoughby
O. Nupponen
Isabel Germain
R. Stratigopoulos
Geoff Rempel
A. Seifert
Geoff Rempel
Harry Adamidis
Leeann King
Ama Beecham
Geoff Rempel

IRB
Region
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
r
r
Toronto
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
r
r
r
r
r
Toronto
Toronto
r
r
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
r
r
r
r
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
r
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
NF
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
Montreal
Toronto
r
Toronto
r
Toronto
r
Toronto
r

Judicial
Review
Unknown
Unknown
2004 FC 283
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
2005 FCA 85

No
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
2005 FC 1053

Unknown
not of this
No
No
No
No
No
Unknown
2007 FC 1049

Comments

Counsel

Sikh org.
Dismissed HADEP-PKK connection

Timothy Leach

Note: contemp. case on TJP with opp. Conc.

Robert Blanshay

Aaron Weinstock
Imamia Students Org./Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan

M. Berger/Orman

Accepted recanting of LTTE membership

Lorne Waldman

Rejected PCs airport admission to LTTE member.
Min fail to estab. LTTE as terror. and PC as mem.

Unknown

Premature Charter; No age limitation, broad mem.

Avi Sirlin

Fail to estab. Balwinderwal Tiger Force as terror.

R. Addinall

But found inad. under 36(1)(c)
Rejected recanted LTTE membership

Robert Blanshay

ID reject bias alleg. against US DOS

K. Sriskanda

Membership not made out
Accepted recanting of LTTE membership

M. Crane

See notes re retracting admission and Min burden

Ian Hamilton

JR Denied.
ID accepts RPD lack of cred. finding re member

M. Herman

GREAT re meaning of 34 and discretion - notes.
Relied on CC listing of ISYF, rather than evidence
Jammu Kashmir Lib Front/Accepted b/c temporal
JR of Ref Claim - 2000 Canlii 15299
See notes multi-faceted org.
1st JR granted: 2003 FC 1022; also inad under 35&36

C. Elgin

Rejected recanted LTTE membership

Ron Poulton

Temporal distinction/Minister's IAD and JR denied

2008 FC 610

Overturned by IAD, which was upheld by FC.

Unknown

New People's Army - Military wing of Com Party

Helen Kim

PR since 1985 - Foundational 34 temporal case

B, Jackman

2006 FC 1457

No
Unknown
No

Sipah-e-Sahaba. Dismissed s.35 allegations

2007 FC 43

34(2) decision: 2009 FC 942

No

Movement for Advance.Democracy/ Hijacking

IAD appeal

Overturned by IAD: 2007 CanLII 68319 (IRB)

NOTE: Seems to be limited to 35 allegations

M. Korman

2007 FC 478

Applies complicity anal.

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

But jr of PRRA 2011 FC 221

Jack Davis

Joined as minor - poshteh cited…

Eziefule

No

Accept recanted story/No memb. through temple

No
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
DR
Unknown
No
Unknown
No
No
No
Unknown
No
No
No

Joined as student, simple donations student activ.

2009 FC 141

No
No

R. Pannu

G. Levesque

Friend of Sancho
Allegations not brought on subversion…

None listed

contra A6-01120, connect b/w Indian&Pak JKLF

D. Barker

ID rejects connection b/w JKLF Indan and Pak.

Lani Gozlan

Rejected recanted LTTE membership/

Ian Wong

Not inad per s.36 - group cmtd. one act of terror

None listed

Youth when joined MEK
Ref. to Siddiqui re consistency; A35 alleg. Denied

Jack Davis

Also inadmiss per A35.

Johnson Babaloa

Min. Counsel recommended a finding of admiss.

Aaron Weinstock

Reject. Min sub that PC was lying re: mem.

E.Brown/J.Phipps

Also inadmiss per 35; temporal - terror after left

Ed Corrigan

A.Grant

Membership not made out - little CBSA int. notes

Ian Hamilton

RefClaim was accepted
Mvmt of Nigerians for Justice - Accept recant mem.

Sandra Zaher

Double agent for Mongolia/China spied on fugees?

Clifford Luyt

Of 34(2) dec.

See notes re: acontextual nature of ID decisions

Chantal Desloges

Red. '07 FC 6

Overturned by IAD: 2010 CanLII 68719 (IRB)

No
Unknown

RefClaim was accepted

IAD appeal

No
Unknown

pp
Reasons@588

Joel Sandaluk

ID rejected Min evidence re BFP - int. re: temporal

S. Ashamalla

Was in US when said to work for orgs

2010 FC 308-den

See notes, no dispute over minimal role of PC

2009 FC 1260

Caprivi Liberation Movement

No
Unknown

Edoh
Jack Davis

Oremade re: Mandela

24/10/2015

Year

Country

2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011

Ethiopia
Ethiopia
China
Colombia
El Salvador
El Salvador
El Salvador
.
Iran
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
n
Nigeria
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Pakistan
DRC
India
India

Inventory List

Macedon./Albania

Libya
Iran
Iran
India
Eritrea
Eritrea
Colombia
El Salvador
El Salvador
India
Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Nigeria
Nigeria
Iran
Iran
Pakistan
Afghanistan
Iraq
Cameroon
Sudan
Sri Lanka
Colombia
Sudan
Ethiopia
El Salvador
Iran
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Nigeria
Nigeria

Individual concerned
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

Redacted
Redacted

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

Redacted

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

IRB File No./Locator
p.109
A8-01009/ Vanc.1 p.94
A7-01067/Tor.2p.642
A9-01668/Tor.2p.1129
A7-01850/Tor.2p.721
A7-01324/Tor.2p.651
A7-00358/Tor.2p.1335
A9-01155/Tor.2p.1002
A8-00771/Tor.2p.811
A8-01383/Tor.2p.841
A7-02748/Tor.2p.762
A7-02749/Tor.2p.782
A6-01259/Tor.2p.483
A8-01943/Tor.2p.852
A8-01297/Vanc.2p.482
A7-02397/Tor.2p.737
A6-02796/Tor.2p.569
A8-00912/Tor.1p.19
A7-00748/Tor.2p.622
A9-00692/Vanc.2p.534
B0-00544/Tor.2p.1250
01324/Mtl2p.120
A9-01189/Tor.2p.1016
B0-00392/Tor.2p.1204
A9-01127/Tor.2p.977
A9-01137/Tor.2p.995
A8-01252/Vanc.2p.474
A9-01456/Tor.1p.73
p.131
A6-00892/Tor.2p.402
A9-01356/Vanc.2p.612
A9-01353/Vanc.2.p.598
B0-01468/Vanc.1 p.1
A9-01424/Tor.2p.1056
A9-02910/Tor.2p.1193
B0-00511/Tor.2p.1224
A8-02353/Tor.2p.859
A8-02994/Tor.2p.959
A7-01631/Tor.2p.703
A9-01358/Tor.2p.269
A5-01713/Tor.2p.319
A9-01649/Tor.2p.1121
A9-01860/Tor.2p.1162
B0-00268/Vanc.2.p.644
00890/Mtl2p.62
01585/Mtl2p.73
A8-01302/Vanc.2p.497
A3-00236/Vanc.2p.38
B0-00240/Vanc.2p.628
A6-02902/Tor.2p.588
00136/Mtl2p.82
C/Vanc.2p.638
A9-01759/Tor.2p.1136
B1-00592/Tor.1p.94
B1-00206/Vanc.2p.1
01330/Vanc.2p.1010
B0-00989/Vanc.2p.952
B0-00897/Vanc.2p.739
B0-00896/Vanc.2p.728
B0-00878/Vanc.2p.716
B0-00911/Vanc.2p.764
B0-00925/Vanc.2p.779
B0-00955/Vanc.2p.822
B0-01106/Vanc.2p.979
B0-00940/Vanc.2p.800
B0-00953/Vanc.2p.807
B0-00988/Vanc.2p.870
B0-01101/Vanc.2.p.967
B0-01188/Vanc.2p.998
B0-00844/Vanc.2p.676
B0-00847/Vanc.2p.690
B0-00866/Vanc.2p.708
B0-00972/Vanc.2.p.836
B0-11458/Tor.2p.1287
B0-02641/Tor.2p.1299

IRPA
Section
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c)

34(1)(f)(b)
34(1)(f)(b)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(a)(d)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c)

34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c)

34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
( )( )( )( )(
c)

34(1)(f)(b)
( )( )( )( )(
c) ( )( )( )( )(
c) ( )( )( )( )(
c) ( )( )( )( )(
c)

34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)

Proscribed
Organization
EPRP
EPRP
ETLO
FARC
FMLN
FMLN
FMLN
KGB
MEK
MQM
MQM
MQM
MQM
MQM
n/a
NDV
Force
OLF
L.
AFDL
AISSF
AISSF/ISYF
Army
Al-Haramain
Basij Forces
Basij Forces
BTF
ELF
EPLF
FARC/M19
FMLN
FMLN
ISYF

Mvmt
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
MASSOB
MASSOB
MEK
MEK
MQM
Muslim World League

Pat.Union.Kurd.
SCYL
Sudan Lib Move.
Move.
AUC
Beja Congress
EPRP
FMLN
Komala
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
MASSOB
MASSOB

Organization Type

Outcome

Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Government agency
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
n/a
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Religious
Government agency
Government agency
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Religious
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
First Separatist then Political
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation

Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible

Refuge
e Claim
Yes
Yes
susp.
susp.
2000
Yes
2004
2000
CR
CR
1998
1999
Yes
Yes
n
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
n
Yes
CR
susp.
CR
Yes
Yes
1993
susp.
n
susp.
CR
n
n
Yes
No
Inel.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
susp.
Yes
susp.
susp.
CR
CR
Yes
Yes
susp.
Yes
n
Yes
Yes
susp.
1991
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
susp.
Yes
susp.

Board Member
Geoff Rempel
Geoff Rempel
Jennifer Harnum
L. Del Luca
M. Hayes
Ama Beecham
L. Lasowski
M. Hayes
Marilou Funston
C.A. Simmie
M. Hayes
O. Kowalyk
Harold Shepherd
R. Stratigopoulos
M. McPhalen
A. Laut
A. Laut
Harold Shepherd
Harry Adamidis
O. Nupponen
S. Kim
Me Marisa Musto
Ama Beecham
Harry Adamidis
A. Seifert
C.A. Simmie
O. Nupponen
L. Del Luca
Leeann King
Ama Beecham
M. McPhalen
O. Nupponen
Leeann King
S. Kim
S. Kim
L. Del Luca
I. Kohler
John Grant
Harold Shepherd
John Grant
I. Kohler
Harry Adamidis
Ama Beecham
Geoff Rempel
Louis Dube
Louis Dube
O. Nupponen
Geoff Rempel
Geoff Rempel
A. Seifert
Cote
Leeann King
Harold Shepherd
A. Laut
L. Ko
M. Tessler
Leeann King
L. Ko
Leeann King
Leeann King
M. McPhalen
M. McPhalen
Leeann King
L. Ko
M. McPhalen
Geoff Rempel
M. McPhalen
Geoff Rempel
D. Shaw Dyck
M. Tessler
M. Tessler
M. McPhalen
M. Tessler
J.M. McCabe
A. Laut

IRB
Region
r
r
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
r
Toronto
r
r
r
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
Montreal
Montreal
r
r
r
Toronto
Montreal
r
Toronto
Toronto
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Toronto
Toronto

Judicial
Review
No
Unknown
No
No
No

Comments

Counsel

See also re temporal
See notes re: temporal
East Turkistan Liberation Organization - Uygur org
int'l Sikh Youth Federation

Brian Cintosun
John Grice

Joined RedX as youth, then FMLN as medic

M. Melvin

2010 FC 246-den

Helped father as youth, then stayed member

P. Bhardwaj

No
No
No
No
No
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
No
No
2010 FC 198
No
Unknown
No
No
No
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
No
Unknown
Unknown
No
No

Rejected duress argument

Jonathan Jurmain

PC was crypto. for KGB, but not against democ.

None listed

Counsel admitted inadmissibility

Ed Corrigan

Low level worker for MQM - Rejected S.35

J. Gill

PC denied any MQM involve. In terror-rej.

None listed

PP - 34(2) refused as in A7-02748

A. Naqvi

s.35 alleg. rejected

Max Sultan

Rejected s.35 allegations

Peter Wuebolt

espionage but not against democracy
Niger Delta Vigilantes - See notes re memb.

Stella Anaele

ID rejects PC's credibility wrt early claim of mem

J. Jubenville

JR dismissed

Alyssa Manning

Pakistan Muslim League and Muslim Student Fed

Peter Wuebolt

All. des Forces Democ. pour la Lib. du Congo-Zaire
Also member of Damdami Taksal and SADAM

S. Chera

All India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF) and/or the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
ANA, not an actual army: ID rejected recanted memb.
Allgd Qaeda link; s.35 alleg. rej, see notes delay&AofP

Randal Montgomery
Jacqueline Swaisland

See notes: also part of Min. of Iran Intel and Sec.

S. Morris

ID accepts PC claim not to have admit. mem. @ POE

Michael Korman

Bhindranwale Tiger Force/post-stroke interview
Patrick Roche
Terrori/war crimes def.
Prelim motion re: disc. and R to C. - reject kidnap

Leigh Salsberg

Int'l Sikh Youth Federation

acc

ID rejects recanted PIF, distinction b/w JEM &JESML

Aaron Weinstock

No
No
No
No

ID rejects recanted admiss. made b/c of schizophren.

K. Sriskanda

ID rejects recanted LTTE mem claim from France

Max Berger

2011 FC 339-den

Also rej. A35/Accepted recanting LTTE membership

Ian Hamilton

ID accepted recanting of LTTE mem.. from UK claim

L. Vasan / L. Waldman

ID Denied duress re membership, upheld

Waikwa Wanyoike

Unknown

Husband & wife contradict-wife inad for inad. Fam

Robert Blanshay

Of prev dec.

Redet. of prev. inadmis hearing based on psych

John Grant

No
No

See Canlii for MASSOB cases where no Inad. brought

Bola Adetunji

ID rejects recanted PIF / See Canlii for RPD MASSOB

S. Orjiwuru

Unknown

PC on US MEK list, but was MEK prisoner: duress

No
No
Unknown
No

Temporal issue

2011 FC 409

Rejected account of South Cam.Youth League factions

11yr delay bw ref and inadmiss
MWL (or IWL) alleged Al Qaeda funder
PC arrived 2003, ref claim, IH suspended for 34(2)

No
No

SLA not same as SPLA from A6-01328

2011FC1013

Defence of duress not made out - JR denied.

No
Unknown
No

No (1)(c) re: targeting of pipeline but accept 70s coup

Aaron Weinstock

ID accepts recanted
memb'ship
j
(p claim;
) see notes

P. Vandervennen

2012 FC 131

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
No
Unknown
No

A. Weinstock

World Tamil Movement (WTM) front for LTTE

process (p.13-26 )
JR dismissed
Ref. to sign IOM waiver; IRPA s.16; Con Inf.- see notes
UK claim based on LTTE memb. Rejected = not inad.
Bad cred., s.35 charge rejected as well for help to army
As in B0-00847, no inadmiss. for work in LTTE comp.
No inadmiss. for work in LTTE comp. to avoid LTTE
Posted LTTE material on FB, lent motor., wife contra.
See notes. Use of CI; on int'l list from IOM
Reject. CI ev. and prev. admiss of LTTE memb.
Admitted member "by accident", rejected coercion arg.
pSunSea admitted LTTE member,
, also inadmiss per 35
know pass. didn't have papers: p.942
Heavily redacted; PC was actor in LTTE film
Admitted membership in LTTE

Unknown

SL newspaper associated with LTTE

Unknown

See notes: work for LTTE company OK in context

Unknown
Unknown
No
No

As in B0-00847, no inadmiss. for work in LTTE comp.
Dec.p863-Worked and paid by LTTE
Insuff evidence of MASSOB - same rec as other cases

R. Amadi

ID rejected recanted MASSOB membership story

K. Kwan Anderson
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Year

Country

Individual concerned

IRB File No./Locator

2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

Nigeria
Iran
nd
Pakistan
Afghanistan
Iran
Liberia
.
Sudan
Sri Lanka
Lebanon
India
Lebanon
Colombia
Ethiopia
Palestine
Lebanon
Sudan
Iran
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Colombia
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Iran
Pakistan
Turkey
Palestine
Tunisia
India
Lebanon
Pakistan
Afghanistan
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
India
India
India
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
DRC
DRC
Iraq
Peru

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

B0-00517/Tor.2p.1242
B0-00438/Vanc.2p.651
B1-00301/Vanc.1 p.140
A7-00723/Vanc.2p.455
A8-02510/Tor.2p.884
B1-00360/Tor.2p.1315
B0-00545/Tor.2p.1261
01108/Mtl1p.13
B1-00362/Tor.2p.1326
A9-01567/Tor.2p.1070
00846/UPDATE/p.22
00758/UPDATE/P.59
00041/UPDATE/p.559
00767/UPDATE/p.656
03051/UPDATE/p.414
00804/UPDATE/p.684
00947/UPDATE/p.709
01424/UPDATE/p.240
00322/UPDATE/p.636
01914/UPDATE/p.353
00341/UPDATE/p.47
00889/UPDATE/p.209
B0-00824/Vanc.2.p.661
00770/UPDATE/p.667
66
01950/UPDATE/p.186
00176/UPDATE/p.675
002336/UPDATE/p.222
00269/UPDATE/p.101
96
00303/UPDATE/p.2
01145/UPDATE/p.81
02216/UPDATE/p.510
00137/UPDATE/p.72
00530/UPDATE/p.696
00137/UPDATE/p.451
02470/UPDATE/p.311
01126/UPDATE/p.624
00449/UPDATE/p.168
00612/UPDATE/p.497
02368/UPDATE/p.537
01115/UPDATE/p.523
01189/UPDATE/p.598
01079/UPDATE/p.591
000763/UPDATE/p.137
01019/UPDATE/p.124
00161/UPDATE/p.609
02956/UPDATE/p.583

Redacted

Redacted

Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted
Redacted

IRPA
Section
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(a)(b)(c)

34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
34(1)(f)(c)
)(c) 35 (1)(a)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(b)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
c)
(34)(1)(f)(b)
c)(42)(b)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
a)(b)
34(1)(f)(b)(c)
b)
a)
c)
c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
35)(1)(a)
b)
35(1)(a)
1)(a)
(34)(1)(f)(a)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
35)(1)(a)
(37)(1)(b)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
b)(36)(1)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(c)
(34)(1)(f)(b)
35)(1)(b)
c)
b)

Proscribed
Organization
MASSOB
MEK
Army
MQM
Mujahedeen
NCRI
NPFL
PFLP
SLM
TNA-LTTE
Brigade/AMAL
(

Organization Type

Outcome

Amal
AUC
7/EPPF/CUD
Hamas
Hezbollah
Mvmt
KDPI
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
M-19
MASSOB
MASSOB
MASSOB
MEK
MQM (MQM-A)
PKK
PLFP
RCD Party
Redacted
SSNP
SSP
Taliban
TNA-LTTE

Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
First Separatist then Political
Separatist/Liberation
Religious
Separatist/Liberation
Religious
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Government agency
Not stated
Separatist/Liberation
Religious
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation

AISSF
AISSF
BKI
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE/TRO
MLC
MLC
PUK/CTG
Shining Path

Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement
Political Movement
Separatist/Liberation
Political Movement

Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Admissible
Inadmissible
Inadmissible
Admissible
Inadmissible

faction)

Refuge
e Claim
Yes
n
n
CR
Yes
Yes
susp.
Yes
Yes
susp.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
susp.
Yes
n
susp.
1999
Yes
n
n
susp.
Yes
susp.
susp.
Yes
Inel.
1999
susp.
n
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
susp.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
susp.
n
susp.
Yes
susp.
1999
Yes
n

Board Member
R. Stratigopoulos
Geoff Rempel
M. Tessler
M. McPhalen
M. Hayes
J.M. McCabe
C.A. Simmie
Dianne Tordorf
Harry Adamidis
O. Kowalyk
Louis Dube
O. Nupponen
Ken Thomson
M. Tessler
O. Kowalyk
Geoff Rempel
Geoff Rempel
I. Kohler
Geoff Rempel
I. Kohler
Marisa Musto
R. Stratigopoulos
L. Ko
L. King
A. Beecham
Harold Shepherd
L. King
L. Del Duca
O. Nupponen
L. Del Duca
Yves Dumoulin
Yves Dumoulin
Marilou Funston
Dianne Tordorf
T. Cook
O. Kowalyk
S. Kim
L. King
Cote
A. Seifert
M. Mokbel
A. Seifert
Geoff Rempel
M. Tessler
Cote
Louis Dube
L. Ko
Statigopoulos

IRB
Region
Toronto
r
r
r
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Montreal
Montreal
Niagra
r
Toronto
Edmonton
Edmonton
Toronto
r
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
r
r
Toronto
Toronto
r
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Montreal
Montreal
Toronto
Montreal
r
Toronto
Toronto
r
Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
r
r
Montreal
Montreal
r
Toronto

Judicial
Review
No
Unknown

Comments

Counsel

ID rejected 34(1)(a) and (b) allegations

M. Akinyemi

Disting. From B0-00268 - similar facts, not coerced

Unknown
Unknown
Pending

No
2012 FC 317-den

Disbelieved distinction b/w MQMs
S. notes re: subv&JR: IMM-6362-11. Also inad per A35

Leigh Salsberg

1DW O&RXQFLORI5HVLVWDQFHRI,UDQ0(.

Timothy Leach

ID rejected recanted story and defence of duress

P. Vandervennen

No
No

Admission of membership not enough/insuff evidence

Howard Eisenberg

Leave-denied

MC withdrew 35 alleg.; TNA-LTTE rel. - See notes

Raoul Boulakia

Mentions PIF!

Giovanna Allegra

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

Robin Bajer

Richard Lage
N/A
A. Brouwer
S. Yu
j
JEM

Unknown

p

g

S. Binder
Barbara Jackman

Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran
g
g
national, other than a protected person, is inadmissible

P. Larlee L. Waldman

training
to gCBSA
, (coersion) successfully proven.
,
j Refers
g
y
argued re: c

Ethan Alan Friedman

N. Mithoowani
L. Waldman

Forced to transport items for LTTE. Not membership.
R. Kincaid
R. C. Amadi
g g
subversion by force of, Nigerian
government.
y

Sina Ogunieye
G. Badh

previously.

K. Kostadinov

341fa founded alllegation 35 unfounded

Mark Gruszczynski

y
y
inadmissible under section 351a, government did not

Kamel Balti

Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party

Anthony Karkar

Unsuccessfully tried to argue coersion.

E. Sehatzadeh

Found TNA pandpLTTE same
gg ggroup.
Sun Sea.
g

S. Boyd

C. Acikgoz
Razur Rahman
E. C. Roth
G. Murtaza

g

Sadrehashemi

Singh Gill faction of the AISSF was or is engaged in

Giovanna Allegra

Babbar Khalsa International

S. Bharati D.S. Jammu

Minister failed to prove he was a de facto member.

P. Edelmann

Rehabilition Organization was tied to the LTTE. Came

G. Chand

K. Kostadinov
B, Jackman

Marie-Josee L'Ecuyer
Movement for the Liberation of Congo

Jacques Beauchemin

Counter Terrorism Group

G. Badh
Campbell

'JFMETCMBDLFEPVUXIFSFOBNFTPGJOEJWJEVBMT
XFSF JONBOZJOTUBODFTXSPOHGVMMZ EJTDMPTFECZ*3#
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